THE LIFE

OF

THE MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE, K.T.



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The Marquis of Dalhousie
K.T.

BY

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be intended to illustrate our inaptitude for living in the climate of Arakan, in which certainly nothing but a frog, and a frog too of a strong constitution, can safely exist.

Far different was the feeling of the Punjabis towards the Lawrences, Edwardes, or John Nicholson whom they worshipped as a god. In Pegu the British had to commence their long-fought battle against disorder without even the asset of personal respect. Their efforts were further prejudiced by the fact that the people had suffered not merely from our hostilities, but also from a wanton spoliation and desecration of their pagodas, which Lord Dalhousie did his best to stop. What we had spared had been wrested from them by Burmese soldiers sent to protect their country from annexation. The King's levies ran away whenever they were reached by our forces, but their course was marked by the wanton desolation of the country, the burning of villages, and the pillage and destruction of their crops and property. Lord Dalhousie's arrival in the Punjab had been followed by a long-delayed downpour of rain, and richer harvests were never ingathered than in the year which witnessed the battles of Chilianwalla and Gujarat. But the disturbance which followed the British advance into Pegu in 1852 arrested sowings, and in the next year agricultural operations were paralysed in Tharrawaddy and in Prome. Rice became so scarce that men were murdered for a handful of it, and the only succour that found its way to the famine-stricken survivors was that afforded by the charity of British residents in Prome and Padoung, who raised a relief fund and imported grain from Rangoon. The scarcity of food-stuffs left its mark upon the exports of rice from the whole province, which even in the year 1853-54 amounted to only 17,344 tons, though in the

next year they rose to 80,388, and in 1855-56 to 126,674 tons.

The methods pursued by Lord Dalhousie in providing for the new adminstration were in principle the same as those which he had found to succeed in the Punjab. Having selected his chief agent, he lost no time in dividing the province into districts with the requisite personnel of officials. Early in 1853 he paid a short visit to Arakan, and spent the end of that year and the beginning of 1854 in a tour through Pegu, returning to Rangoon for a final visit in 1855. During his stay in the country he settled on the spot a mass of details, rewarded the deserving, gave confidence to the people that they would not be restored to the tender mercies of the King of Ava, and furnished his colleagues and the authorities at home with information which secured their assent to his larger measures for communications, canals, posts, and municipal improvements. From the outset he had foreseen that there was but little prospect of any formal settlement with the Court of Ava, and his continued endeavours to that end satisfied his masters, and also public opinion, that the conclusion of a treaty for the cession of Pegu was neither attainable nor necessary. Failing in this, he prepared the way for a commercial treaty which Lord Elgin eventually ratified on the 13th of December, 1862, though even after that interval the agreement then concluded contained no clause in confirmation of the right that conquest had given. The account which will be presently given of the tours of the Governor-General, and of the missions which he sent and received from Ava, will show fully the main features of his administration, and it is only necessary to preface it by a brief outline of his scheme of government.

For Governor-General's Agent and Commissioner of Pegu he chose Major Arthur Phayre, an officer who so fully justified his selection that he was in 1862 nominated as the first Chief Commissioner of British Burma, with charge of Arakan, Pegu, Martaban, and Tenasserim. Lord Dalhousie's departure in this case from the rule of routine was a marked one, for Colonel Bogle, a much senior officer, then Commissioner of Tenasserim, had looked upon himself as entitled to this advancement. But the Governor-General was convinced of Phayre's superior qualifications, and he soothed Bogle by giving him an increase of pay and the addition to his charge of the Martaban district. The new Commissioner of Pegu has been described as "of the same type as the Lawrences, an Irish-Scot." It is, however, difficult to trace any connection with Scotland. He was born at Shrewsbury on the 17th of July, 1812, and was educated at its great school with his brother, the late General Sir Robert Phayre, G.C.B. His father had indeed been born in Ireland, but on the completion of his service in India he took up his residence in Shrewsbury, where he lived for more than twenty years, until his death in 1830. His mother, Maria Ridgeway, who continued to reside there after her husband's death, was a daughter of the well-known publisher and a lady of remarkable talents, who instilled into the minds of her children a strong devotion to duty and religion. The letters which passed between Lord Dalhousie and his Commissioner in Pegu show the firm hand which the former maintained over his subordinate, though without in any way impairing the implicit confidence which Phayre placed in the wisdom and justice of his chief. On three occasions, connected with the formation of police posts, the introduction

of the electric telegraph, and an attack upon British territory by Nga Shwe Bo near Meaday, the Governor-General wrote to the Commissioner with some severity, but the replies of the latter show that the reprimand was accepted in a spirit free from all irritation.

"I am conscious, my Lord," wrote Phayre on the 4th of July, 1855, "that I am not without blame in the matter of the posts. I only hope that, when my explanation arrives, I may not appear so blameworthy as at present. The immediate cause of delay in the police posts was the non-arrival of the arms for the men. I certainly should have seen closer to that, but as all previous indents had been complied with direct, I only discovered their want on my arrival at Prome. But I do not attempt, my Lord, to exonerate myself. I acknowledge I am much to blame. All I can say is I hope it will appear less so than it does at present."

In not attempting wholly to excuse himself, Phayre showed his wisdom, for it was a cardinal point of the policy of the Governor-General to organise a strong police force, and the Commissioner's tendencies to be economical had been rebuked more than once, as the following extracts show:—

An organised police, and above all an organised and powerful river-police, reinforced at points by gunboats, and all capable of dealing effectually with these dacoits, or guerillas, or insurgents, or whatever they are, is to my mind an indispensable necessity.

And again—

Do not fear the expense. Peace externally I hope for, but submission and order internally I must have, and at whatever cost.

And yet again—

I reply to you frankly that I think your leaning is to keep establishments too low. I am aware of your motive, and appreciate it, but I think a free expenditure to repress outrages, which make much noise and do much harm, is good economy.

Called to account on another subject, Phayre thought that he had a better case and was not afraid to defend himself. The Governor-General was anxious to have a special department for the telegraph, and his plans were upset when the services of soldiers or civilians were employed in work which he intended to entrust to a distinct department. When, then, Phayre was engaging outsiders to carry on the work, his action was rebuked. He replied on the 20th of August, 1854 :—

I am much concerned to find that I have taken steps of which your Lordship does not approve. There is, however, one portion of my plan which I have probably not explained with sufficient distinctness, and which I now beg to do. I did not mean that Major Du Vernet, and those appointed under him, should be anything more than temporary executive officers, marking out the line of electric telegraph, and putting the poles in the ground. As soon as this work was accomplished, it was intended that their functions should cease. Now, as it is your Lordship's wish that the telegraph should commence working as soon as possible, I do assure you, my Lord, that I am convinced that what I propose is the plan best calculated to attain that object.

The most serious occasion of difference between the Governor-General and his subordinate arose out of the violation of the British territory at a moment when Phayre was about to be sent as a special envoy to Ava. On the 2nd of April, 1855, the Commissioner wrote :—

I now come to speak of a matter that has disturbed me considerably. On my march from Meaday with Major Allan across the hills, we halted at a large Karen village at the foot of the high range. This village is about ten to twelve miles within our border. It had not been visited before; the people were friendly and were constantly about our tents. I gave the Headman the usual document constituting him Chief of his tribe. There were doubts whether these people would not be molested from across the border on account of my visit. Very soon after

I left, these Karens and the Burmese living in the village received notice from one Shwe Bo, a hired ruffian, that they must leave the British territory, and as they were unwilling to do so, an armed party came to drive them off.

Assistance was promptly sent from a British post, and the attempt was foiled. But Phayre was "exasperated," and he proposed to withhold the mission to the King until full atonement for the outrage had been made, insisting that no reparation should be regarded as satisfactory which did not include the dismissal of Shwe Bo, the removal of Moung Bo, the Burmese officer on his side of the border, and the restoration of all our people who had been carried away. Lord Dalhousie, with his larger experience of affairs on the Punjab frontier, saw that such a line of action must lead to a war with Ava. He recorded his judgment in these words:—

> I dissented from the Commissioner's view of this case, and demurred altogether to his proposed policy. In the first place, it was evident that the commission of this offence was attributable to the neglect of the orders of Government, given in October last, for the establishment of police posts along the whole frontier. Had those posts been placed, the inroads made by Shwe Bo would never have been attempted. In the next place, our declared policy from the first has been to treat all such border forays on the Burmese frontier as we treat them on the north-west frontier; and by no means regard them as affording ground for quarrel with the Court of Ava on each recurrence of the offence. Thirdly, we have every reason to believe from the King's past conduct that such outrages meet with no countenance from him; and we have every reason to anticipate that on due representation being made he will punish the actors in the present raid.

The envoy was accordingly ordered to proceed, and to make a representation to the King of the necessity for repressing such affrays on the border, at the risk of

our interposition should his Majesty fail to comply. Phayre was also authorised to inform the Court at Ava that the British guards on the frontier would, if necessary, pursue marauders even across the border, and take such steps as they pleased to bring them to justice. These communications were well received, and frontier expeditions were unknown on the Pegu side of the British dominions in India.

A careful study of Phayre's correspondence with Lord Dalhousie reveals no more serious differences between the two men than those just narrated. On the other hand, it discloses the wonderful range of the Governor-General's activity, knowledge, and suggestion. Phayre was on the spot, and for the most part he either made proposals as to a course to be adopted, or referred his difficulties to the decision of the Governor-General. To him, therefore, belongs all the credit due to a local official who supplies the information, originates plans, and carries out orders. But it is obvious that the success achieved in introducing peace and administration into Pegu was largely owing to Lord Dalhousie himself, and his subordinate constantly acknowledges his debt to his chief. The correspondence treats of the formation of a local corps, the employment of movable columns of troops, and the organisation of frontier-guards and river-police. The location of cantonments and forts, the plans for laying out a city at Rangoon, and preserving to Government and the public their rights while granting building sites to applicants, the armament of certain classes or villages with the means of self-defence, the alignment of roads, provision of lighthouses, and the extension of telegraphs are fully discussed, together with larger matters of taxation, the introduction of surveys, and the organisation of civil

justice. The choice of suitable presents for the King and the Queen who "has a scientific turn of mind," and the prince to whom singing birds are acceptable, is a subject not beneath the personal interest of the Governor-General. Occasionally Phayre is surprised by the discovery that something which he had failed to report is known to Lord Dalhousie. On the 8th of July, 1853, the Commissioner regrets the "irregularity of not having reported to your Lordship that a reward had been offered for the capture of the robber chief Mya-tun"; but points out that no price had been put upon the offender's head, as the Government of India had been led to believe. Again, Phayre proposes the name of an engineer for the work of constructing the important road over the mountain from Arakan to the Irrawaddy. But the Governor-General prefers to entrust this work to another officer, and the Commissioner at once agrees that Forlong is the best selection, explaining that he had not been aware that his services were available. In the long and frequent correspondence which passed between Lord Dalhousie and Phayre, ideas were exchanged and projects evolved for the welfare of the new province, and every letter from the latter shows that he had acquired a thorough understanding and grasp of the subject under consideration. One is prepared, then, to find the Governor-General writing of his subordinate that he is—

> the fittest man in India for his work. His intimate knowledge of the language is an incalculable advantage. He has a perfect acquaintance with the Burmese national character, the firmness required to deal successfully with them, and at the same time remarkable gentleness of demeanour, and perfect good-temper.

The merit of selecting such a man rested entirely with the Marquis of Dalhousie, and Phayre reciprocated

the feelings which induced his chief in the midst of his arrangements for leaving India, and in the trials of ill-health, to write a farewell letter to him in these terms :—

> And now I must take leave of you. I do it with great regret. It is impossible to conceive any demi-official correspondence more agreeable and satisfactory than yours has been to me. You have performed your public duties with ability, with assiduity, and success; and I am grateful to you personally for exertions which have raised my own reputation, while they were of conspicuous value to the State. Farewell.

The testimony was worthy of the writer and of the recipient. But we must pass on from the head of the local administration to take a general view of the measures adopted for the settlement of the country placed in his charge. Under the Commissioner six deputies were appointed for the six districts of Rangoon, Bassein, Henzada, Tharrawaddy, Prome, and Toungoo, with a staff of assistants. The portions of country in which the most serious conflicts with disorder occurred were Donabew and Tharrawaddy. In the former a hereditary Thoogyee, or official of the district, named Mya-tun, drove off thousands of people and their cattle, and established himself in the heart of forests and swamps twenty miles from the right bank of the Irrawaddy. He defeated and killed Captain Lock, of the Royal Navy, and was only expelled from his position by a column operating under General Cheape. In Tharrawaddy, a tract of country which, starting from near the junction of the Bassein, extended on the left bank of the Irrawaddy almost as far as Prome, a distance of eighty miles, a Burmese official named Moung Gye treated with ruthless cruelty those of his countrymen who had accepted the service of the British. Villages were attacked by his gang, and the wives and children of

their inhabitants carried off into the mountains. Captain D'Oyley with parties of troops and local levies hunted him from one place to another, until at last he was deserted by his followers, and escaped into the territory of the King of Ava early in 1855. To deal with these and other leaders of plundering bands, a body of river-police, numbering some 2300 men, chiefly Malays, was organised under a British officer named Theodore. The boatmen were armed, and they soon cleared the creeks of the banditti that infested them. Three battalions of police were formed for the districts, and a special frontier-guard was stationed along the north-eastern frontier. A local regiment of Peguans, called the Pegu Light Infantry, was also raised, on the model of the Sikh local regiments ; but although the Burmese and Talaings enlisted in it proved brave and loyal, their dislike of discipline and of service away from their homes rendered the scheme ultimately of little value to the new province. They were, however, employed at the outset, together with a Prome police battalion, in garrisoning a series of defensive posts erected along the northern and north-eastern frontier. In the event of any serious disturbance, the military forces were behind them ready to move at a call from the civil officers.

The development of communications both by river and by land received the earliest attention of the Governor-General. Lights, buoys, and pilots were provided for Rangoon, and some provision was also made for the new port of Dalhousie on the Bassein. Before his retirement the Governor-General recommended to the Court of Directors the construction of a lighthouse on the Alguada reef south of Cape Negrais. Half of the steam flotilla on the Ganges was transferred from that river to the Irrawaddy to convey passengers,

troops, and supplies between Meaday and Rangoon, while a sea-going steamer was placed at the disposal of the Commissioner to ensure his ready communication with Calcutta. The invincible objection of some native regiments to a passage by sea induced the Governor-General to connect Pegu by land with Bengal. For this purpose he at once ordered the construction of a road from Dacca to Akyab, passing through a most pestilential tract and a number of rivers and estuaries. For the transit of the river iron ferry-boats were provided, and from Akyab to Ramree an inland creek was made use of. Thence by the energy of Lieutenant Forlong a road was carried for 157 miles over the Arakan mountains by the Toungoop Pass to Prome, and continued to Meaday along the eastern bank of the Irrawaddy. The highest elevation crossed was 3000 feet, and the gradient nowhere exceeded three feet in a hundred. The density of the forests, through which 150 elephants had with immense difficulty forced a way in the expedition of 1852, and the extreme unhealthiness of the climate, which limited the working season to five months in the year, were only one part of the obstacles encountered. Water was scarce, and there were no labourers to be obtained except the Burmese, impatient of steady toil and afraid to commit themselves to our service. Shelter and water had to be supplied along the route; but although the road was not actually commenced until December, 1853, the Arakan battalion was able to march along it from Prome to the sea with all its baggage and followers in the spring of 1855. Considerable progress was made with the road from Rangoon to Prome before Lord Dalhousie closed his term of office, and those from Martaban and Rangoon to Toungoo were surveyed. The telegraph line from

Meaday to Rangoon was also completed. By these systems of communication, and by his other administrative measures, the Governor-General reduced the chaos he had found in Pegu to order, and eventually to prosperity.

Lord Dalhousie was not content with choosing his provincial governors, and then issuing his orders to them from his official desk. It was an essential part of his plan to see with his own eyes, and hear with his own ears what his subordinates were doing. Accordingly he paid three visits to Burma. The first was a preparation for those that followed, and was confined to a short stay at our earliest possession in Burma on the coast of the Bay of Bengal. Leaving Calcutta on the 17th of February, 1853, the Governor-General reached Akyab in four days. The "truly magnificent harbour, of space enough to contain the navies of Europe, sheltered by hills on the east and south, and protected to the west by rocks and reefs," greatly impressed him. But the civil offices on shore and the jail attracted his unfavourable notice. Inquiries were instituted as to the enlistment of men for the Arakan battalion, the prospect of obtaining labour for the road into Pegu, and other matters which might help towards forming a judgment on the administrative problems that had to be faced. In the progress of missionary enterprise Lord Dalhousie took a deep interest, and he collected from the earnest workers in that field much information regarding the habits and customs of the population.

"In the lower parts of the Arakan about Sandoway," he notes that "the missionaries have had great success among the Karen tribe. Captain Dicey, who commands this ship, told me that not long since he took back to Bassein two missionaries who had for some years been stationed at Sandoway and in the districts

near it. The Karens, he said, flocked into Bassein in hundreds to welcome their teachers, and proved the sincerity of the goodwill they professed by setting to work and building for them an excellent house and schoolhouse before they returned to their homes. In these tracts there is no doubt that the success of Christian teaching has been great and lasting.

Chittagong was next visited, and as no previous Governor-General had been seen in what was one of our earliest acquisitions, much curiosity was excited by the event. The wide range of Lord Dalhousie's inquiries led him into a new direction here. He not only visited schools, dispensaries, jails, and custom-houses, but also studied the new revenue settlements and the statistics of civil justice, making shrewd comments upon the notorious love of litigation which the people of Bengal displayed. Thus he wrote:—

> The Judge, Mr. Bowring, quoted one case for me in which an action was brought for a bamboo stick value one anna, or three halfpence sterling. The stamped paper on which the plaint was written would alone cost sixteen times the value of the article sued for. Yet it was pursued up to the highest court of appeal accessible by regulation law. Ingenuity has long been taxed to discover some remedy for this great evil, but in vain. A modification of the principle of small cause courts has been lately suggested, and I hope some palliation for this mischievous mania for law may be found through the medium of some such summary procedure.

The short trip, brought to a close by the return of the Governor-General to his capital on the 28th of February, had served a double purpose. It had given him a change of scene after his late parting from his wife, and had enabled him to collect the facts he required as to communications with Prome from the shore of Bengal, as to the character of the labourers and the supplies he could obtain from Arakan, and as to

various traits of national character in the inhabitants of Pegu, of whom many sought shelter and employment in the British districts along the Bay.

Upon all these details of the administration of Pegu which Phayre referred to him during the next few months, Lord Dalhousie brought to bear the full force of his judgment and experience, and thus prepared himself for the measures to be adopted during his second visit, for which he embarked in the *Zenobia* on the 9th of December, 1853. On this occasion he took with him J. P. Grant, his Foreign Secretary, Major Banks, the Secretary of the Military Department, James Ramsay, his Military Secretary, an aide-de-camp, Mecham, whose tragic death saddened the closing days of his life, and Dr. Grant. Examining sites for a lighthouse as he went along, he landed on the 15th of December at Rangoon. For the first two days he was very constantly occupied with business, and settled several local questions that had long been pending. He was not slow to notice the vast improvements already effected by Major Phayre, but he was scandalised "at the gross and reckless desecration of the pagodas by the soldiers and sailors during the last war," and issued orders to prevent "the recurrence of so great a disgrace to our name." In sanctioning a scheme of defence which included the Shwe Dagon pagoda, he ordered a clear space to be left round it "for the worshippers who are to be admitted on the four changes of the moon, being the great worship days." On the 17th he proceeded up the river on a boat towed by the river steamer *Nerbudda*, visiting as he went along the scenes of the late fights, and noting the frank and pleasant demeanour of the people. "I have heard more laughter," he remarked, "among

the Burmans in one week than in all the six years I have spent in India." The absence of cultivation and the desertion of most of the villages bore testimony to the ravages committed by the notorious leader of banditti, Moung Gye, and the clear moon in the bare heavens, as she cast her silvery light upon the broad and smooth expanse of the river, seemed to him to gaze with sadness on a scene of desolation. Nevertheless the "man of no imagination" who, as he journeyed through the Sind Sagar Doab had looked forward to fields white with harvest and irrigated by canals, here, too, dipped far into the future :—

It was impossible not to ask oneself when looking on that splendid stream—can it fail to become, before many years are past, one of the great highways of the world, though so lately unlocked for the real entrance of commerce, and still but imperfectly set free? Of what trade may it not become the channel? To what nations may it not open the way, along whose coasts we are now vainly seeking an entrance that is denied us? What new power, arts, knowledge, and religious truth may not crowd upwards within a few years along this magnificent avenue which we are preparing, I hope, to be the means of adding to the prosperity and happiness of our own country, and of those with which she has been brought into contact?

At Prome the Governor-General discussed with Sir John Cheape matters of frontier defence, the selection of cantonments, and measures for ensuring the health of the garrisons left to occupy the province. He then pushed on to Meaday to go through a formal ceremony which would force upon the Court of Ava and the people of Pegu a conviction that British rule was now supreme and firmly established in the province. On the 28th of December—

I proceeded to the boundary on the left bank of the river. Three steamers left Meaday at daylight. The *Lord William*

> *Bentinck* led the wa carrying a guard of honour of European and native troops. Tl *Nerbudda* with her flat followed, and the *Mahanuddy* was ir the rear. Though the river had not been examined beforehnd, we made our way up without striking on any unpropitus shoal, and anchored in a little bay, where deep waters alloed the steamers to lie alongside of the bank if it were required We walked up to the brick pillar which Major Allan had built n the left bank of the river. There, in front of the troops, ancn the presence of the General, the Commissioner, and many othe officers, having questioned Major Allan as to his certainty of th accuracy of the line, I begged these officers to bear witness tlt I had received a full assurance that the utmost care had been bserved in measuring the distance according to the declaration made by the Supreme Government: I therefore confirmed his demarcation, and declared the line which was marked by the illars to be the boundary of the British province of Pegu. The olours were then hoisted on the top of the pillar, the troops prented arms, the band played "God Save the Queen," and a oyal salute was fired from each of the three steamers.

The echo of the cheers which concluded these proceedings rsounded through the province, and just as the news of Lord Dalhousie's darbar at Peshawar had in 1849 ben carried to Kabul, so now in 1853 his action at Meaday became the talk of the Court at Ava.

1854. On his way down the river the Governor-General gave orders for the despatch of a military force to reassure the villagers and to expel the banditti. Phayre accompanied himin all his movements, and a thorough understanding beween him and his chief was arrived at. On reaching Henzada Lord Dalhousie took the opportunity of revarding the 10th Regiment, which had volunteered for service in Burma, and had distinguished itself in the recent campaign, by conferring the rank of Jamadar upon some of the Native officers. He reached Rangoon on the 5th of January, 1854, to

receive intelligence of further outrages committed by the dacoits in Tharrawaddy, where Captain Barry had been shot dead and Lieutenant Thompson wounded, with several of their men, by robbers whom they never saw. His comment recalls what he had said when the outrages upon the north-western frontier were criticised in London, "This is very sad work, but there is no help for it." Certainly he had done all in his power to suppress these inevitable sequels to conquest, and his efforts proved eventually successful. Nor were these the only legacies of his forethought and sagacity. Before leaving Rangoon he wrote a minute directing the Commissioner "to take immediate measures for reserving the lake and the forest ground round it as public property, in addition to the cantonment, and for preventing the indiscriminate destruction of the timber which had already been commenced upon it." The General paid him the compliment of ordering the 51st Regiment, which had served in his father's division in Spain, to furnish a guard of honour for the Governor General when he embarked on board the *Zenobia*, and proceeded to Bassein and Cape Negrais.

Lord Dalhousie did not undervalue the political importance which display possesses in the eyes of an eastern nation. But he could not disguise from himself the ludicrous element in a scene which met him when going on shore at a point near Cape Negrais.

"Captain Fytche's boat," he writes, "is one of the old golden war-boats, and although he has filled it up with a roofed cabin amidships, it is still pulled by forty rowers, and still retains some traces of its golden glories. These boats are in truth gigantic canoes. Though 80 feet in length, and at least 9 feet wide, this one is formed from a single tree felled in the forest, and made to expand itself by the action of fire lighted round it.

We passed Captain Fytche in it this morning, seated on the roof of his cabin, the golden chatta of the Menghyee held over his head by a Burman squatted behind him; and the Menghyee's gong sounded after their manner in the boat, with slow, single strokes which sent a deep, mellow note booming over the water long after the chant of his boatmen had ceased to be audible. I could not help laughing a little at the dignity; and had half a mind to tell him that nothing so gorgeous or so grand had been seen since Cleopatra floated on her barge down the Cydnus. But so far as the natives are concerned, I have no doubt that it has a good effect in supporting his authority, and he is wise to keep it up."

The songs of the Burmese boatmen on the river sent the Governor-General's thoughts back to the days of childhood, just as the scenery in the Dehra Dun and the giants of the forest on his way to Chini had previously done.

Wild fellows, they were thoroughly in earnest in all they did, and pleased me by a picturesque and characteristic scene, more peculiar and national of its kind than anything I have seen since my father, as Governor-General in the West, used to travel the waters of the St. Lawrence paddled in a birch canoe to the songs of the Canadian voyageurs, taking me on half-holidays as a little boy by his side, little dreaming of the day when, as Governor-General in the East, I should paddle the waters of the Irrawaddy to the wild chorus of Burman boatmen, rude and sturdy types of a nation which even at that time looked down upon the British strangers as barbarians.

This happy scene of pleasant memories was soon exchanged for the dust and heat of Calcutta, to which he returned before the end of January, 1854, and where he relapsed into ill-health and low spirits.

1855. In November of the following year Lord Dalhousie paid a short and last visit to Rangoon on his way from the Neilgherries to Calcutta. The town, the barracks,

the lake, and the new road were all inspected, and as he wrote :—

I came expecting much, and I was not disappointed. Remarkable progress has been made in laying out the town, in clearing the jungle round it, in forming the cantonment, in making roads, and raising public and private buildings everywhere.

There was a full moon during his visit, and the whole population turned out in their best dresses to worship in the Shwe Dagon pagoda. Contentment and good-humour shone in their faces, and although the regilding of the lower portion of the pagoda was not completed, the Governor-General observed, "Take it all in all, it is the fabric in India of all that I have visited most worth seeing, the Taj alone excepted." Of the sincerity of his feelings the Marquis of Dalhouse gave substantial proof, as shown by a letter from Phayre, dated the 20th of December, 1855, in which the Commissioner thanks his Lordship for a liberal donation towards the expense of regilding the Shwe Dagon pagoda, together with a cheque for Rs. 750 for the Protestant inhabitants. Evidently the Christian Governor-General did not wish to be misunderstood as having any leaning towards Buddhism, for Phayre assures him that he "took care to explain to them your Lordship's motives." A passing look at the new port of Dalhousie, and a grounding of his vessel off the south of the Negrais, were the only other incidents of this farewell visit to the new province. Calcutta was reached on the 29th of November, 1855.

We may now turn from the internal administration of Pegu, and the Governor-General's visits to it, and examine the position of foreign affairs. The home authorities naturally wished that the annexation of Pegu

1853.

should be recognised by the King in a formal treaty, and to the very last Lord Dalhousie spared no effort to accomplish this object. Phayre was sanguine, and for a short time after the revolution at Amarapura, when King Pagan Min was deposed by his half-brother Mindon Min, there seemed a fair prospect of attaining that end. Early in the hot weather of 1853 the new King sent envoys to Prome, and on the 4th of April a draft agreement, in which the British boundary was described as fixed at six miles north of Meaday, was placed by Phayre and General Godwin before them. At their next conference the Burmese chief of the mission made a piteous appeal for the rendition of Pegu. When this proved unavailing, the envoy declared that the proclamation of the 20th of December, 1852, was opposed to the boundary so fixed. Godwin, to the intense surprise of Phayre, supported the Burmese view. The envoy thereon expressed his willingness to deliver to the King a letter from the Governor-General, and also to sign the agreement according to his view of the terms of the proclamation. On hearing this Lord Dalhousie lost patience: "This conduct on the part of General Godwin is most strange, inconsistent, and injudicious," he observed, and he proceeded to record a minute showing that we had a perfect right to select Meaday as our frontier without the slightest violation of the terms of the proclamation. At the same time directions were given to meet the envoy halfway. Godwin, who had moved troops to Meaday, was ordered to make no further advance without the express sanction of the Government of India. The envoy was to be told that if he would conclude the treaty of peace and acknowledge the cession of Pegu, our boundary would be drawn back to

Prome. In the meantime Father Paulo Abbone, an Armenian priest resident in Ava, had arrived at the capital, and he expressed a firm conviction that the King would never recognise the British right to Prome and Toungoo. This forecast proved to be accurate. His Majesty replied to the Governor-General's letter, and the envoys asked for a suspension of negotiations pending the receipt of his Lordship's reply to it. On the refusal of this pretext for delay, the chief of the mission declared that he had no authority to sign any treaty making reference to a British frontier at Prome, and

"thus after all," wrote Lord Dalhousie, "my first expectations proved to be correct, and the Court of Ava has refused to sign a treaty containing the cession on which the home authorities insisted as a *sine qua non*. It is unfortunate that we were compelled to require a treaty, or to allude to it. Our having been required to do so has involved us in the appearance of failure; whereas the position we should have occupied, if my original advice had been followed, would have been independent and commanding, while at the same time it would have been every whit as secure as though we had concluded a treaty."

For the next year the external relations of Pegu continued to be satisfactory. Meaday became the British frontier, and the Burmese troops were withdrawn from its neighbourhood. In July, 1853, Phayre had heard of a Scottish merchant named Thomas Spears, who was engaged in trade at Amarapura, and who soon proved not only a valuable news-agent, but a trustworthy adviser on political matters. By his advice, a judicious arrangement was made for buying wheat and other supplies for our troops in Pegu from the royal granaries at a right royal price. The rate agreed upon was at first £25 for every hundred baskets

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of wheat, and £2[illegible]0 for the same number of baskets of grain. In the case of the wheat, a basket weighed 64 lbs. The rate was reduced later on, and after a while the system was discontinued. But so long as it lasted, it gave the King a substantial interest in the British occupation of Pegu. Spears, as became a Scotsman and a merchant, was not unreservedly pleased with the stimulus which this patronage gave to the King's commercial spirit. On the 13th of February, 1854, he wrote:

> I do not like the monopolising spirit that prevails here, and will always do everything I can to persuade the King against it. Rubies, timber, cutch, hartal, cotton, and every article of produce it is the King's intention to monopolise. Things here are very much in the same state as when I wrote last. Neither the King or prince has any wish to quarrel with our Government at present. Of course you cannot expect them to love you very much, but you may be sure they will do nothing openly against you.

Spears frequently wrote to Phayre on the subject of presents which his Majesty desired to send to him, and which Phayre would not receive without payment.

From this suggestion it was easy to pass to the idea of sending a complimentary mission to Calcutta with presents for the Governor-General. Lord Dalhousie saw an opening here for negotiation, and approved the idea. Then the inevitable hitch occurred, and Spears showed himself an excellent diplomatist. The Woongyee selected to bear the King's letter and his presents to Calcutta appeared in Pegu with a letter from his royal master "couched in the old tone of Burmese arrogance," as if the King were dealing with an inferior. Phayre, whose action was approved by the Governor-General, refused to receive the letter or send forward the Woongyee. While a reference was

made to Ava, and Spears was trying to get another letter written, the Woongyee made friends with the Commissioner, as the following extract from a letter to the Governor-General, dated the 27th of October, 1854, will show :—

> The envoys lately proceeded up to pray at the Pegu Pagoda, and on returning the Dalla Woon sent me a message with a half share of the merit he had acquired by the act. So we continue very good friends, though I have not yet received him publicly.

On receiving this intimation Lord Dalhousie observed, "This exquisite subdivision of the value of a work of supererogation outdoes even Cardinal Wiseman's ingenuity." At last, the letter being amended into more acceptable language, the Woongyee was publicly received by Phayre, and on the 27th of November, 1854, the *Zenobia* arrived at Calcutta bringing the mission and flying an immense white flag at her mast-head, in the centre of which was the national emblem of Ava, a peacock surrounded by a crimson circle. Ashore nothing was wanting in pomp and circumstance which might serve to impress the royal envoys with the strength and splendour of the Company's government. The streets were lined with troops, through whose ranks one of the Governor-General's carriages passed along carrying the King's letter with eight golden umbrellas over it. Behind the carriage followed the six envoys in carriages with their umbrellas. The bodyguard furnished the escort, and the guns on Fort William thundered their welcome.

The envoys were entertained in the Fort in state apartments, and Bowie, who remained with Phayre to see that they were comfortably settled, reported that

> as soon as the Secretaries to the Government of India left them, the envoys threw off their crimson robes and golden hats, and

with universal consent squatting down on their heels, each man produced a flint and steel, lit his cigar, and subsided into the enjoyment of privacy. The old man who carried the King's letter, however, was not forthcoming; and on proceeding to look for him, he was found to have got into bed with the royal letter clasped in his arms.

The envoys desired to be treated to European fare, and their wish was gratified. The chief of them, the Dalla Woon, was Governor of Dalla when Commodore Lambert demanded satisfaction for the outrages which led to war. But the brains of the party was the Woon-douk, or secretary. The third envoy was an Armenian named Mackintosh, who held the office of Kala-woon, or Governor of Foreigners. It is unnecessary to recount the honours paid to the party, or the formal exchange of presents. Nothing was said about a treaty, but the Woon-douk, who took the lead in the conversation, used many smooth words about friendship and goodwill. The envoys dined at Government House, and "were perfectly calm and self-possessed, conversing freely and without embarrassment." When grace was said they reverently bent their heads. After dinner Lord Dalhousie announced his intention of sending Major Phayre on a return visit to the King with a letter and presents, and this announcement was received with much satisfaction.

When every attention and honour had been paid to the envoys, and the date of their departure was fixed, they requested a private interview with Lord Dalhousie. This was accorded, and after some ordinary civilities the Governor-General asked whether they had any further communication to make to him, supposing, after what had been told him, that the question was one of mere form. The Woon-douk replied that they

had written down a few words, and begged permission that they might be read. Having received leave, he produced a large piece of black paper on which his communication was traced, and from which he read, sentence by sentence, Major Phayre translating as he went along. To the surprise of every one, the "few words" were these :—

The war which unhappily interrupted the amicable relations between the two States originated in a very trifling circumstance, and is to be deeply regretted. Now peace has been restored, and His Majesty is anxious for its continuance. But it is the custom of all Governments that, on the return of peace, things should be restored to their former position. We therefore represent that the villages and lands occupied by the British Government may be restored to His Majesty the King of Ava.

The Governor-General, turning to Phayre, thus replied :—

Then, Major Phayre, you will be good enough to inform the envoys that I will reply to their representation distinctly and frankly. The war was not commenced by the British Government. It was commenced by the King of Ava. The occupation of territory that followed the cessation of war was forced upon us by a regard for our own security and our own interests. You may tell the envoys that so long as the sun shines which they see [at that moment the sun shone in upon the room of audience] those territories will never be restored to the kingdom of Ava. The King has sent me a friendly letter, and I will cause a reply, couched in the like friendly terms, and equally expressive of a desire for the maintenance of amicable relations, to be sent to his Majesty, and the envoys shall be made acquainted with the terms of it.

After this incident the envoys left Calcutta, and on their return home they were received by the King, who was pleased with their report of their proceedings, and greatly impressed with the photographs which they had

brought. A dispute occurred between the members of the mission as to telling their master the words used by the Governor-General at the final interview. Eventually his Majesty learned the truth.

A final attempt to secure a treaty had yet to be made, but it failed, as previous efforts had failed. In order that the position of affairs at Amarapura and the causes of Phayre's unfruitful visit to that capital may be fully understood, mention must now be made of a mysterious person who called himself General D'Orgoni. This episode in Burmese history is important in its obvious bearings upon the state of India after the Crimean war and on the eve of the Sepoy mutiny, to which attention will be called hereafter. It is often forgotten that the war with Russia furnished an opportunity for intrigue and for sowing broadcast the seeds of disloyalty. To the Asiatic mind the slow progress of hostilities indicated a weakness in the military resources and capacity of the Empire, which supplied to foreign agents a suitable theme for dilating upon the difficulties and dangers that beset the British in India. No wonder then that the King of Ava thought it prudent to reserve his claim for the rendition of Pegu, and to decline to enter into any treaty of surrender with the Governor-General.

On the 21st of July, 1853, Phayre wrote to Lord Dalhousie :—

> I know not if your Lordship ever heard of a Frenchman named D'Orgoni, who came to Rangoon. About a month ago he left this to go into the interior in rather a suspicious manner. News has now reached me that he is supposed to have gone to Tharrawaddy, that he has had communications with Mya-tun, and has passed on to Ava.

In due course he reached Amarapura, and in April,

1854, Spears reported that the King had heard that an invasion of India by the Persians was threatened, and that events in Europe would compel the Government in India to give up Pegu. About the same time the King of Sardinia managed to get a project for a treaty with "the Emperor of Burma" put before the Court of Ava. A copy of the treaty, which, however, was not accepted by the Burmese King, and of certain correspondence which passed between the Sardinian minister and Don Paulo, a Roman Catholic priest at Amarapura, fell into the hands of the canny Spears, and D'Orgoni was suspected of having a finger in it. To his inspiration also was attributed the despatch of agents from the Avan Court, who were directed to count the number of British troops in Pegu and to examine their military and naval resources. No doubt the information thus supplied led to the scene[1] already described, when the King's envoy in Calcutta sprang a mine upon the Governor-General with his impudent request for the restitution of the districts taken from Burma. In the middle of the year 1854 D'Orgoni disappeared from the stage as mysteriously as he had entered upon it, and Spears could ascertain nothing about him. But from other sources of information it appears that he went to Paris, where he imposed upon the Emperor of the French as he had previously done upon the King of Ava. For, as a mark of friendship, His Imperial Majesty sent him off to London with letters to the Foreign Office introducing him as a man of intimate acquaintance with Burmese affairs and great influence at the Court. The Queen's Ministers, in turn, were for passing him on to the Governor-General that he might be suitably rewarded for his services, and Sir Charles

[1] See p. 29 *ante*.

Wood mentioned to the Governor-General that D'Orgoni complained of uncivil treatment at the hands of the Indian authorities. Lord Dalhousie did not mince matters. He wrote to Sir Charles Wood on the 8th of February, 1855:—

Of course I would not give a personal interview to a vagabond, which he was then. Equally, of course, I would now see him in deference to the august master he has so successfully humbugged in Paris. I have no expectation, however, of his coming. Why not put him into your new Foreign Legion? You will have room enough there for plenty, and of all sorts.

1855. D'Orgoni did not fail to return to India, although he derived little profit from his adventure. As the Marquis of Dalhousie was on his way to Ootacamund and his ship was lying in the harbour of Point de Galle, the mail steamer *Bengal* arrived, bringing the adventurer back to his hunting-grounds. He at once wrote and asked for an interview, but since the *Zenobia* was on the point of starting, the Governor-General pleaded an excuse and promised to write about him to Mr. Dorin, who was then President in Council. Dorin was authorised to offer the "General" an appointment in the stud department if he liked to accept it, but to refuse him any employment in Pegu. Whether the visit was paid to the President and the offer made, there is nothing to show. But it is certain that the Frenchman returned to Amarapura and busied himself with his old intrigues. On the 14th of June, 1855, Spears reported that D'Orgoni was having constant interviews with the King, the prince, and the ministers, giving them handsome presents of French manufacture, and proclaiming that he was commissioned by the French Minister of Marine to secure a contract for the supply to his Government of timber to the extent of

twelve millions of francs. Spears writes to Phayre of him :—

The account he has given to the King and the prince of the progress of the allies is not very flattering, particularly of the British army, which he represents to be worn down to a mere handful of men by hard work, want of food, and clothing (the French having to supply them with the latter). He says that if it were not for the assistance of the French the Russians might come out one day and with brooms sweep the British all into the sea.

On hearing of the approach of the British mission, which arrived in September as will be presently seen, General D'Orgoni gave out that he intended to take a trip into the interior, but he remained in close touch with the Burmese officials, even during the visit of Phayre to the capital, and contributed not a little to its failure. After the departure of the mission an Italian merchant informed Spears that the real name of the mysterious visitor was Girodon, that he was a sugar-planter, and that his object was to be entrusted with a mission to Paris. Between these conflicting rumours the reader must form his own opinion of the identity and the aims of this foreign intriguer. That he created a feeling opposed to British interests seems probable from the account which must now be given of the last attempt made to secure a treaty from the King.

In July, 1855, Lord Dalhousie had completed his arrangements for the despatch of a mission to Amarapura. Phayre was appointed sole envoy. With him went Dr. Forsyth, who was to report on the climate and products of Ava, Major Allan to examine its military resources, Captain Rennie to study the navigation of the upper waters of the Irrawaddy, the geologist Oldham, the artist Grant, and Tripe, a junior officer in

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the Madras army skilled in photography. Yule of the Engineers was made secretary, Edwardes was interpreter, and a doctor accompanied the European escort. Minute instructions were given even on the subject of dress and presents. The objects of the mission were defined to be the transmission of presents in token of goodwill, and as a secondary purpose the negotiation of a treaty. As to this Lord Dalhousie wrote :—

> I have now removed from the draft the stipulations obnoxious to the King and no longer of moment to us. The draft is very short, consisting of only two articles. The first is a clause merely of amity and friendship. The second secures the right to trade without hindrance in both countries. If the King should object to the second article, we will be content with the first. I have addressed a letter to the King; but as no mention has been made of the treaty, there will be no apparent failure of the mission if it should return without one : while the primary and real object of its appointment will have been obtained if it shall be accepted as evidence of our friendly intentions, and shall conciliate the Burmese Court. I am not sanguine of success in obtaining a treaty. But the effect of the mission itself, I have no doubt, will be entirely successful and beneficial.

The envoy and his party with their valuable presents worth £12,500 duly arrived at Amarapura in September, 1855. The scenes which followed as told in Phayre's diary are so typical of Burmese arrogance that it is a matter for regret that limits of space should forbid a full description of them. One detail after another of ceremonial or formality was omitted by the envoy in order to secure the object of his mission. The letter of the Governor-General was to be borne under a canopy, but the Court officials objected. Phayre, who did not consider it essential, after some stickling deemed it proper to reply that "I was far from having any wish to embarrass His Majesty, and that I therefore gave up

my claim derived from his promise to carry a canopy and umbrellas over the King's letter to the palace and stairs." Then followed a discussion as to whether the members of the mission should take off their shoes in the enclosure outside the palace. This difficulty was solved by the decision to go direct to the palace and avoid the enclosure. On the eventful day of the reception, the 13th of September, the envoy sent on the band and seventy-five men of Her Majesty's 84th Regiment to await his arrival on the other side of the lake; and having reached the spot where the mission landed, he caused a flag to be raised over the letter. The Woon-douk at once objected, but Phayre threatened to return to his boats if the flag was removed. The road lay to the palace through a line of 6000 men armed with muskets and a great number of horsemen and elephants. Outside the palace a final attempt was made to induce the envoy and his attendants to take off their shoes, to which Phayre firmly replied "No, it is not our custom." Entrance was denied to the palace by the royal gate, and we "circled round to the east side. At the foot of the steps we took off our shoes and walked up, led by our conductors." Having reached the hall of audience, "we sat down about twelve feet within the building immediately opposite the throne, about fifty feet distant."

After a delay of twenty minutes, the door behind the throne opened, and then, as told in Phayre's diary,

> the King appeared to labour up the stairs of the throne, apparently using his gold sheathed sword of state to help him, and carrying a white chowree[1] in his left hand. He came fully on the throne and sat down. The Queen immediately appeared,

[1] A *chowree*, or more properly *chaunri*, is a fan generally made of the tail of a Tibetan ox set in a handle, and used for keeping off flies or mosquitoes.

and took her seat also on the throne to the right of his Majesty. The King was dressed in a kind of tunic, which appeared to me to be of white silk, probably stiffened with thick lining and sparkling all over with diamonds. The lower part of the dress I could not distinguish. The head-dress was a cap approaching to an oval shape, with a spire-like ornament six or eight inches high. It is called a "Tha-ra-poo." This also was covered with jewels. The Queen had a tunic generally resembling that of the King, and a cap in shape almost like a rhinoceros-horn with the points turned down. As her Majesty took her seat, she smoked a cigar, and commenced fanning the King. A young female attendant appeared from behind and handed up a golden spittoon, which the queen placed in front of her.

Various regalia were next brought in — a golden betel-box, a cigar case, and a gold cup of water; and six white umbrellas with silver fringes were raised, three on each side of the throne. The priests chanted a song, and after the recital of various offerings to pagodas, the Governor-General's letter and a list of the presents were read aloud.

The short conversation which followed was interesting only from the manner in which it was translated, as one example may show. Asked whether the English ruler was well, Major Phayre replied, "The English ruler is well"; and the version conveyed to his Majesty ran thus, "By your Majesty's great glory and beneficence, the English ruler is well, and therefore I with obeisance inform your Majesty accordingly." At the close of the interview a visit was paid by the envoy to the Lord Elephant with the thin plate of gold over his forehead. The mission party then returned to their quarters. The next few days were spent in the difficult task of arranging the etiquette for visits to the chief ministers of state. On the occasion of the visit to the heir apparent, the envoy was kept waiting a long time

before the prince spoke to him, and silence was only broken when a courtier had proceeded up the room on his stomach to attract the attention of the prince to his "humble suppliants." Such business as was transacted was the result of frequent interviews with the Woondouk, who inquired on one occasion whether the English expected the Court of Ava to keep quiet supposing that Sebastopol did not fall, and the province of Pegu rebelled. On another occasion Phayre was sounded as to the despatch of an embassy from Ava to Paris. On various pretexts a private interview with the King was postponed until the British envoy was made to understand that no treaty would be concluded. The most favourable answer which he received was that a treaty was unnecessary when friendship was assured. At other times he was informed that the matter might be considered when a new Governor-General arrived. But on one point satisfactory progress was made. The mission gained a mass of information and cultivated friendly relations with the leading persons at Court, and the representations made as to the necessity of removing Moung Bo from the frontier and of adopting an amicable attitude towards the British administration in Pegu, were favourably received.

With these results Phayre had to content himself, and after taking leave of the King on the 20th of October, he started on the 22nd on his return journey. If the mission failed to secure a treaty, it was through no want of courtesy or diplomatic ability on the part of the British. The Governor-General had from the first anticipated failure, although he had loyally done his best to carry out the wishes of his masters. The fall of Sebastopol and the suppression of the Sepoy rebellion were needed to convince the Court of Ava as to the

ability of the British Government to maintain its own rights. But the measures taken by Lord Dalhousie at least paved the way for his successors. On the 10th of November, 1862, Colonel Phayre, duly authorised by Lord Elgin, concluded a treaty of commerce with the Woongyee appointed by the King of Ava. It recorded the existence of peace and friendship and looked forward to their continuance, but it gave no fresh title to the acquisition of Pegu. In accordance with its terms peace was preserved between the two countries so long as King Mindon reigned, but after his death and the accession of Thibaw the difficulties which had faced the Government of India in 1855 recurred, and were solved by the sword alone. Thus history confirmed the forecast made by the Marquis of Dalhousie on the 3rd of November, 1852—

> If the lapse of time and the course of events shall establish a real necessity for advance, then let us advance—let us fulfil the destiny which there, as elsewhere, shall have compelled us forward in spite of our wishes; and let us reconcile ourselves to a course which will then have no alternative.

CHAPTER II

SORROW AND SICKNESS

Hopes and anticipations formed at the conclusion of the war with Burma —Lord Dalhousie's failing health—Lady Dalhousie's visit to Ceylon, 1852—Her indomitable courage conceals the state of her health—Her departure for England, 1853—Her death on board ship—Lord Dalhousie's letters to his friends, and silence of his diary—Lady Dalhousie's character—Effect of her death upon his retention of office —Expresses his intention to retire after 1854—But outbreak of Crimean war alters his purpose—Arrival of Lady Susan in Calcutta, 8th December, 1854—Lord Dalhousie's serious illness—He is obliged to proceed to the Neilgherries, 1855—Changes in the Government at home—He presses for orders on the Oudh question—The Moplah outbreak—Fanatical attack upon Colin Mackenzie—The Santal rising and its lesson—Causes of the outbreak—Measures of repression, and reforms introduced — Effect of these troubles upon Lord Dalhousie's health—Visit to Mysore and Madras—News of the fall of Sebastopol—Proclamation of thanksgiving—Return to Calcutta—The Council's dispute with Lord Elphinstone—The year closes with better prospects.

1853-56.

At the close of the Burmese war Lord Dalhousie was justified in looking forward to the pleasant task of gathering in the fruits of patient labour, and to the enjoyment of the satisfaction and public credit which are the due reward of successful statesmanship. He had a clear perception of the tasks that still lay before him, and a conviction that he could accomplish them. His strength lay in organisation and a genius for con-

solidation. He realised the supreme necessity for binding together the scattered fragments of Indian empire. Bombay, the western presidency, was cut off from Bengal by Nagpur, a wide stretch of territory under Native rule, and tedious distances of unbridged and unmetalled roads separated the seat of government at Calcutta from the various provinces over which the Company exercised direct dominion. The European army was small, but the resources of western science had provided, in the shape of steam and telegraphs, instruments of rule which would go far to make up the deficiency in its numbers. The development of communications was obviously the first need of India. The structure of the Government was also out of date, and by the new Charter Act the establishment of legislative councils, the removal of Bengal from the personal charge of the Governor-General, and other internal reforms, had become feasible projects. Lord Dalhousie could not but feel, what others perceived, that no man was so well fitted as himself to weld the Company's territories into one organic whole, and to make the British undisputed masters of the broad continent from Peshawar to Pegu and from Sikkim to Tenasserim. Both within the Indian empire and beyond its borders there were, moreover, questions of foreign policy connected with Hyderabad, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan that called for a judicious settlement. In all these directions there was work for a pilot who could steer a clear, firm, and consistent course, and so carry his vessel safely through a sea of difficulties. Personal ascendency in India and an unrivalled influence with the home authorities were great endowments at the disposal of the Governor-General for the accomplishment of the work before him. So clearly, indeed, was his

unique position in these respects recognised by those around him, that on his leaving India it was felt to be no exaggeration when in the Calcutta press his career was summed up by the words, "for eight years he has been our king in the old sense of the word."

But with all these qualifications for his task, one thing was needed to enable the slender thread of a single life to sustain the weight of such heavy responsibilities and labours. A king is not exempt from human weaknesses, and sooner or later the uncrowned king of India was sure to discover that

> Infirmity doth still neglect all office
> Whereto our health is bound; we are not ourselves
> When nature, being oppressed, commands the mind
> To suffer with the body.

If the next three years were marked by great achievements, they were also years of sadness and bitter trial, in which the fineness of his spirit triumphed over bodily suffering and a broken heart. The Crimean war induced him during a national crisis to prolong his term of office, and the penalty of his unflinching heroism was that when he laid down his burden the once strong and resolute man returned to his loved native land "a ruined piece of nature," to die a lingering death. At that cost to himself Lord Dalhousie rendered signal services to his country, which will be the subject of future chapters. Here we shall follow out through the years from 1853 to 1856 the narrative of his home-life, if indeed it be not a solecism to associate ideas of home with the public cares of a Governor-General, a condition of closely watched slavery mocked by the name of power. We shall see how sorrow fell upon him, and sickness followed in its wake, and by what desperate expedients he forced himself to consummate a sacrifice

imposed by passionate devotion to duty, long after all personal ambition had ceased to be among the motives of his life.

1852. It will not have been forgotten that Lady Dalhousie was accompanied on her voyage to Ceylon by James Ramsay, from whose unaffected diary the following extracts are given. On the 17th of April, 1852, Ramsay writes: "Reached Galle at 6.30 A.M. Lady Dalhousie landed after breakfast, and went to the Queen's Hotel, a wretched, miserable, uncomfortable place." Through Colombo and Kandy they proceeded to Newera Elia—"my lady and myself in one palkee carriage, Grant and Minnie[1] [the pet dog] in one, Moss and the Ayah in a bandy, Galwan and the compounder in another bandy, and the baggage in a light cart." Some relief was found in the exchange of the palkee for a bandy, but at times Lady Dalhousie had to walk in the rain over execrable roads, halting at "uncomfortable piggish places," as the diary graphically describes the rest-houses, and rejecting "the worst specimens of Sinhalese bestiality" for "some bread and cheese which we had fortunately brought." At last towards the end of April they reached Barnes Hall, "uncomfortable in every way and dirty to a degree; how are six months to be got through in this hole, how will one survive it! No decent bread, no fresh eggs, no butter, meat—bah! cooking filthy, beds dirty to a degree, and hard as iron—rain, rain, rain." While without reserve of disgust Ramsay thus confided their experiences to the pages of his diary, Lady Dalhousie in her letters to her husband put the best face on the discomforts she had to endure. In May a private house was hired, and matters mended

[1] This devoted companion of his wife accompanied Lord Dalhousie on his visit to Malta in 1857 and died there.

a little. The rain was still pitiless in its persistency, but it was possible to snatch from it a few rides in the evening. On the last day of the month Ramsay writes, "Lady Dalhousie very poorly to-day, and not able to leave her room." Similar entries recur, until in June it was found necessary to exchange horse exercise for a chair, in which the invalid took her airing. In August there was an improvement, and on the 25th of September Newera Elia was left for Galle, where, on the 23rd of October, the party embarked for Calcutta on board the *Hindustan.*

Even then the real truth which Lady Dalhousie's love had concealed was not at once realised. On the 28th the *Hindustan* brought his "dear wife" back. She assured her anxious husband that she had been remarkably well at Galle, but that the intense heat on board the steamer had caused her much distress. With this explanation Lord Dalhousie was partially satisfied, and he wrote to his friends that "in all essentials her health has been greatly restored, and I think she will now be well able to stand the cold weather of Bengal." But it was settled, in accordance with her own wish, that in January she should go home by the Cape in one of Green's ships. This would prolong the voyage by some three weeks, but would avoid the heat and discomfort of the overland journey through Egypt. The *Monarch* was expected to sail from Calcutta towards the end of January, and her captain was an agreeable man, who might be trusted to make the voyage as comfortable as possible. "I may fairly hope," wrote Lord Dalhousie on the 14th of January, 1853, "that she will land in England in better health than when she left it." To this hopeful view Lady Dalhousie did all in her power to lend countenance. For, weak as she

1853.

was, and amid all the worry entailed by preparations for her departure, the Governor-General's wife resolved to fulfil to the last those duties which she conceived to be demanded of her position. In this spirit she braced herself to attend a ball given in her honour by Prince Ghulam Mahomed, one of the surviving sons of Tippu Sultan of Mysore, visited the Bethune School, in which she and her husband had always taken so much interest, together with the European Orphanage in Calcutta, and dispensed her hospitality as though no shadow were upon her of the end that was so near.

At last the day of her adieu to India arrived, and at daybreak on the 23rd of January, 1853, she embarked at Garden Reach, escorted to the vessel by James Ramsay, and with Captain Bowie for her companion and attendant during the voyage. The Marquis of Dalhousie, whose grief shrank from a farewell in public, watched her departure from his window, and described himself "as thoroughly miserable as my worst enemy could have wished to see me." The sense of utter loneliness pressed heavily upon him. He envied others their friends, companions, and acquaintances, feeling himself more than ever isolated by his position. "Do what I will, I cannot escape from the Governor-General. I am forced every day, every hour of my life, to feel that I am alone." Fortunately James Ramsay was to remain with him, and he had been able to bring back from the vessel a fairly cheerful account of the circumstances in which Lady Dalhousie had commenced her voyage. With this intelligence, and with the hope that he would receive better news from St. Helena, the Governor-General plunged himself into public affairs, and trusted in the mercy of God.

It was not until the end of May that he received

any communication from his wife. Then a letter, dated St. Helena, the 29th of March, told him that at first her health had improved, but that off Mozambique the *Monarch* had encountered a severe storm, with the consequence that the invalid had fallen into a state of extreme debility and prostration. Still she looked forward to returning to India in November, and although from other sources Lord Dalhousie heard that his wife had frequently lain insensible for long periods, her courage and the infection of her sanguine hopes concealed from him the real gravity of her case. It is true that he awaited the next mail with anxiety and apprehension, yet with no premonition of the tidings that were so soon to reach him. Before, however, the letters borne by that mail arrived in Calcutta, the blow that shattered for ever the joys of his life had fallen with sudden and overwhelming shock. By the line of telegraph to the mouth of the river, which Lord Dalhousie had himself planned, James Ramsay learnt on the 13th of June that Lady Dalhousie had died just as she was approaching the shores of England, her heart still warmed with the expectation that at least she would see her children before her death. Ramsay, who was riding when the message reached him, at once galloped back to Government House to break the news to his chief, then enjoying the evening air after a hard day's labour. When presently Lord Dalhousie returned and entered the porch, his servants as usual came forward to relieve him of his hat and walking-stick. The Military Secretary impatiently bade them hurry, and the Governor-General gently rebuked him with the remark, "Why, Jemmy, aren't you rather hasty? They are doing their best." As soon as Lord Dalhousie had entered his own room and taken his seat, Ramsay went

up to him, and kneeling down and clasping his knees, said, "My Lord; oh, my Lady! my Lady!" At once came the calm response, "Is she dead?" to which Ramsay could only reply with an inclination of his head and a repetition of the same words. Lord Dalhousie seemed stunned and as if turned into stone. For a brief space of time he sat speechless, then he left the room "to deal with grief alone." Making his way to his bedroom, he locked the door, and only opened it some hours later on the imperative demand of his doctor, Grant.

From the 6th of June, when he recorded in his diary the anxious thoughts that were troubling him, to the 9th of December, when he resumed his pen to chronicle passing public events, he abandoned what had been the habit of a lifetime. In the unutterable woe of those six months no relief could be found except in work, and in such escape from himself as tours could afford. On the 15th of June he wrote to his Private Secretary, "Beg the Secretaries not to keep back business from me; but I cannot see them. Let them keep me constantly employed, for God's sake. It is my only chance." Spending Christmas at Prome, the agonising cry escaped him, "Oh, my God, what a life-long change has Thy chastening hand brought down upon my worldly happiness!" and on the last day of 1853 his prayer was that he might remember how truly life is a pilgrimage upon earth, and that he might in heaven rejoin his gentle love, where sorrow and sighing would be no more.

On the 24th of June he wrote to Lord Panmure as follows:—

I thank you often and truly for your affectionate letter of 6th May. I will say—I can as yet say nothing on its subject,

excepting only this. The Almighty has closed a long course of trial by a blow which has shattered my life and home. I recognise the hand that struck, and I hope do not murmur in rebellion against it; but as yet I must wring my hands. I cannot fold them. The natural impulse of my wishes, of course, would have been to come away and try to put together the fragment of my home, but I never entertained a design of doing so. I gave my word last year that I would not quit this command at present, and I shall stay till next year, as I said I would. I have never for long abandoned my work here, and indeed I trust to the constant occupation as a refuge. It is toilsome labour when there is no heart in it. If I live, however, it shall be done, and my pledge shall be kept. Once fulfilled, no consideration on earth shall induce me to remain here. I think in twelve months more I should be free. Excepting James Ramsay, I am in utter solitude.

Then the thoughtfulness of his kindly nature made him add a line about his aide-de-camp who had accompanied his wife to England:—

If anything should throw Charles Bowie in your way while he is in England, you would confer on me an obligation which I should deeply feel if you would show him some courtesy and kindness. Everything that he could do, poor fellow, was done; and as I know he will feel his position painful, I would fain obtain some notice from my kindred for him that would soothe his pain. God bless you, my dear Fox.

A few months later Lord Panmure lost his own wife, and the Governor-General addressed to him a beautiful letter of condolence and sympathy, moved by his "piercing fellow-feeling," and ending with the prayer, "May He, who alone can, comfort you, and guide you to the submission which we all know to be due from us, and to the calm which I have sought vainly as yet to reach."

Lady Dalhousie was worthy of enrolment in that

noble army of British women who have played a prominent part on the stage of Indian history. She was not called upon, as Mrs. George Lawrence was, to inspire confidence in the hearts of others by exposing herself to the risks of murder and captivity at the outpost of an empire. Neither was it her part to remind Native officers of their duty as, standing alone in a sea of rebellion, Mrs. Cortlandt had done in the scenes which followed the tragic murder of British officers at Multan. Her fortitude had not to undergo such a trial as that faced by Mrs. Henry Lawrence when she applauded her husband's act of heroism in offering to return to captivity in Kabul as a substitute for his brother. It was not her cruel fate to endure with Christian fortitude and resignation the nameles atrocities of the Sepoy mutiny. Her death was lacking in those dramatic incidents which have secured to many of our countrywomen a niche in the temple of fame where heroines are enthroned with heroes as the builders of our empire. Yet none the less was her life a sacrifice to noble ideals in a noble cause. For throughout it repression of her own wishes and inclinations was the guiding principle. Reserved, shy, and even nervous, she preferred the quiet of home-life to the homage coveted by leaders of society. But no thought of self was allowed to interfere with the discharge of the responsibilities which her high station imposed, and with which her husband's interests were bound up. If she did not possess the remarkable talents and brilliant qualities of her mother-in-law, in her tender love and gentle tact that husband found such solace from the toils of office as in a large degree made it possible for him to fight the strenuous battle that was ever before him. Courage and endurance nerved her to share with

him the physical fatigues which his extended tours involved, to submit without complaining to separation from the children she was never to see again, to triumph, a silent martyr, over the pain and suffering which were her attendants for many weary months, and even when strength was ebbing out so fast, to make light of forebodings that must have been upon her, if so doing she might send comfort and encouragement to him to whom her life had been consecrated. Her love was met with equal tenderness, the nobility of her character was recognised in fullest measure, and with the touch of her vanished hand there vanished from her husband's life all that had made sunshine in the present, all that promised happiness for the future. For a time the whole fabric of his existence was broken, and it seemed impossible to repair the wreckage. But even when eager hopes and the satisfaction of success were lost, work, constant work, in the wide field of his official activity brought its compensation, and strong duty sustained him to the close of his career.

We must now pass from the pity of the events described to their effects both in relation to the continuance of Lord Dalhousie in office, and also to his state of health. The course of his correspondence upon the former subject will presently be explained, but a summary of it is here given. His immediate decision was to fulfil his promise to the home authorities of remaining till April, 1854—a decision he so far modified at a later date as to fix January, 1855, as the limit of his term—and then to go home to be with his daughters. When, however, the Crimean war threatened to produce excitement and complications in India, the Governor-General changed his plans, summoned his eldest daughter to his side, and remained at his post until the war was

concluded, while at the same time the orders from home regarding Oudh had been carried out.

On the 23rd of June, 1853, Lord Dalhousie wrote to the Court:—

> The Almighty has stricken me sorely, and I try to submit myself to the severity of His will. If my health does not disable me, I will redeem the pledge I gave last year. When that has been done and things are settled, I must go without hindrance.

On the 11th of July he further wrote to Hogg on the subject of his undertaking to remain in office until the new Charter Act should come into force. He explained his position with two motherless daughters, and added that "unless a real call of public duty or a real difficulty of the Crown" demanded the sacrifice, he must retire in 1854.

> By that time I shall have been ten years in exhausting office, with but one interval, and that interval filled up with sickness and pain. I am growing weary and worn, and I must have an end at least in view. Wherefore, although I will keep my word and will remain next year (if I live to do so), no power on earth shall make me remain after 1854, whether your Bill be passed or not.

A few weeks later, on the 20th of August, 1853, the East India Company Act, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 95, received the Royal Assent, and its operation was fixed to commence from the 30th of April, 1854. As we shall see in another chapter, Lord Dalhousie made every preparation for the changes introduced by it, and in other respects worked hard to wind up his public affairs. "The sense of solitude," he wrote in March, 1854, "itself becomes more oppressive every day. My eternal labour saves me from breaking down." In the prospect of retirement, and of living quietly with his

children, lay his chiefest consolation, but even this consolation was taken from him by the news that on the 28th of March war had been declared with Russia. On the 13th of June he wrote to Sir Charles Wood :—

Last year I told you that my intention was to ask leave to retire from this government in January or February, 1855, but I stated that I would always give you six months' notice of my intentions. The time has now come for me to act upon this promise. Had matters continued in their former course I should now have begged that I might be relieved in February next. But as the hope, to which I have clung in spite of my reason, has been disappointed, as the country is plunged deeply in formidable war which may any day affect these possessions of the Crown with the charge of which I have been entrusted, may possibly, indeed, affect them in more quarters than one, and as the six years' experience which I have gained in India must needs make me more useful there at such a time than a far abler man succeeding me could be; I feel that I cannot ask to be allowed to leave my post, consistently with the regard which I owe to the interests of the public service, and indeed with due regard to my own character. At such a time every man is bound to remain at his post, and I do not wish to quit mine. I will therefore, if it be the Queen's pleasure, remain for a year after the period I had originally fixed.

Reverting then to his family reasons for going home, Lord Dalhousie added :—

I do not propose to remain for my own convenience, advantage, or pleasure, and my sole motive for remaining in India during 1855 is that, in the time of trouble I may render to the country such service as it is in my power to offer.

1854.

It was well for the United Kingdom and India that this offer was cordially accepted by the Queen, the Board, and the Court, for Lord Dalhousie resisted proposals for denuding India of European troops which a weaker man would have accepted; and most of his

administrative reforms were introduced in the course of the next two years. But he never could have endured the strain without the society of one of his daughters, and arrangements were accordingly made for the eldest to join him in Calcutta. After a visit paid to Her Majesty at Osborne at the gracious and thoughtful command of the Queen, Lady Susan, with her friend and governess Mademoiselle Roulet, accompanied by James Ramsay, left London on the 22nd of October to proceed by the overland route *via* Marseilles and Malta to India. Lord Dalhousie himself having resolved on the course which duty suggested, felt the need of conserving his health and strength in order that he might complete the task which he had undertaken. In December he took a short trip to Puri, where he visited the temple of Jaganath, and returning to Calcutta on the 8th of that month, shortly afterwards enjoyed the inexpressible satisfaction of welcoming his daughter. On the 22nd he gave a State ball in honour of her arrival, and his letters to friends brimmed over with the expression of his happiness in having at his side one who in so many ways recalled his "dear wife."

1855. But the laws of reaction asserted their force upon a constitution weakened by sorrow and disease. In the middle of January, 1855, his leg, which had received an injury in the course of his tours, became swollen and intensely painful, and day by day he grew less equal to exertion. Dr. Grant was desirous of a second opinion, and called Dr. Jackson into consultation, with the result that they ordered the Governor-General to return to England. In the same spirit in which the Emperor of Russia said, "My dear doctor, you have done your duty, now I will go and do mine," the Marquis of Dalhousie declined to follow their advice. One question

only he asked of them, whether there was immediate and direct danger to his life if he remained in India. This they were not prepared to assert, but they warned him that there was grave indirect danger if he should be attacked by any illness, since he had no reserve of strength to resist it. His remaining in Calcutta during the hot season was pronounced impossible, and, as an alternative to his return home, it was insisted that he should proceed to the temperate climate of the Neilgherry Hills. With his habitual consideration for others, Lord Dalhousie was anxious to relieve his advisers of all blame for anything that might result from his refusal to listen to their first injunction, and on arrival at Ootacamund, in March, he wrote a letter to Dr. Grant which ended thus—

> I hope that all may go well. But, in any case, Dr. Jackson and you are entirely exonerated from all responsibility for whatever consequences may ensue from my disregarding your advice to return at once to England.

Having himself offered to extend his term of service, Lord Dalhousie regarded it as a point of honour to adhere to his undertaking. His recent breakdown of health was wholly unexpected, and notwithstanding this misfortune, he felt tolerably confident that with proper care and a due regard to the choice of climate he would be able to last out till January, 1856. It was therefore incumbent upon him to pay attention to medical advice in these particulars. Accordingly, when the day arrived, to which he had looked forward with keen personal interest, for opening with ceremony the line from Calcutta to Raniganj, a distance of 120 miles, he obeyed his doctors with a heavy heart, giving up the journey to Burdwan and contenting himself with atten-

dance at the terminus, where a prayer was offered by the Bishop, and a blessing asked before the train set off on its journey from Calcutta. By a painful coincidence at this time, the Governor-General lost the services of his Military Secretary, James Ramsay, whose regiment, the 22nd, was ordered home for foreign service, in which the Major naturally desired to take part. Ramsay was not only his kinsman, he was "a kind and attached friend," to whose good offices Lord Dalhousie as well as his wife owed a debt of gratitude, and whose companionship would be sorely missed by the lonely man.

Great hopes were entertained that the voyage along the coast and the invigorating air of the Neilgherries would restore the health of the Governor-General, at least to the state in which it was when he accepted the last extension of his office. The *Zenobia* was ordered to take him round Ceylon to Calicut, where the party arrived on the 28th of February, 1855. There Mr. Conolly, the ill-fated Collector of Malabar, received him, and did everything in his power to lighten the fatigues of the journey to the hills, and to relieve the strain on his broken constitution. The tedious hot passage in narrow canoes by canal or river, the jolting carriage by *tonjons* or *mancheles* (hammocks suspended from a pole borne on the shoulders of coolies) through the still and sultry nights, and then the sudden change to cold mists and storms on the Sissipara Ghat at an altitude of 7000 feet, undid what little good the sea-voyage had done for the sufferer. At last, wearied and chilled, the travellers reached the Avalanche Bungalow, and on the 7th of March came to their journey's end at a house called Walthamstowe in Ootacamund. "I was very much knocked up by the journey and very lame when we arrived at Ootacamund," wrote the Governor-General to a friend.

"I could not ride; the carriage horses had died; I could not stand being aired in a tonjon like a sick duchess at Bath, so that I rarely left the house." A change to Kotagiri, situated 800 feet lower than Ootacamund and less exposed to the rains and winds, proved beneficial, and in May he moved into Major Minchin's house at Coonoor, where at last the bad effects wore off, and his health and strength greatly improved.

With the fall of the Ministry at home on the Roebuck motion, the London press busied itself with conjectures and suggestions, and Lord Dalhousie's name was mentioned in connection with the consequent changes. But the Governor-General felt that he was unequal to further efforts in the field of politics. On the 12th of March he wrote to Lefevre:—

> I have worked now hard and long. I am almost done, and by the end of the year I shall be completely done; and it is the first and last wish of my heart that the collar of office may never again gall my neck when once I shall have put it off here in the East. I have come to these hills ill and suffering, and hope from them only so much benefit as will carry me through the year. After that I must have an European climate and rest.

On the 3rd of March Mr. Robert Vernon Smith replaced Sir Charles Wood at the Board of Control, making the fifth incumbent of that high office during the period that Lord Dalhousie had been at the head of the Indian Government. Sir Charles Wood was transferred to the Admiralty when Gladstone and the Peelites left the ministry of Lord Palmerston, and although at times the President of the Board and the Governor-General had corresponded in very plain language, each thoroughly respected and understood the other. On the 20th of April, 1855, Lord Dalhousie wrote to Lord Panmure—

It has vexed me very much to lose Sir C. Wood from the India Board. A change at all just at this time in my last months would have been unpalatable; but Sir C. Wood has treated me with confidence and frankness—he was a very honest worker, sincerely interested in his duties; and thus his transfer *is* a personal loss to me, as well as a detriment to the public service in India.

The replies which Lord Dalhousie received to his letters by the English mail leaving London on the 9th of May included a most gracious and flattering autograph from Her Majesty, full of approbation and kindness, urging him to come home at once without waiting for the end of the year if his health demanded it. But the monsoon had now set in, and he dared not face it after the sad experience of his wife's sufferings. Moreover, the change to Kotagiri had begun to bear fruit, and lastly the Oudh question was looming in the near distance. He therefore wrote to the Court offering to give effect to their policy regarding that State before he left India, and to prolong his tenure of office until March, 1856, if they would come to a speedy decision. On the 24th of June he further appealed to Hogg to put his "shoulder to the wheel." He was aware that his offer to remain would "bring upon me a good deal of abuse from some quarters, and give me a vast deal of additional trouble. Still, I have no objection to close my administration with a good deed. There is not a week to be lost if anything is to be done." While awaiting a reply to his letter, and flattering himself that affairs in India were tranquil notwithstanding the disquietude of the public mind caused by the slow progress of military operations in the Crimea, a series of untoward events occurred which once more reminded Lord Dalhousie of the remark he had made to Hogg on

the 5th of March, 1853, that "nothing can be regarded as certain in this country," and he again warned his friend of the importance of not weakening the European garrison. "With all these smouldering mischiefs around us," he wrote, "the proposal of drawing troops from India, and the apparent countenance given to it by your colleagues, drive me furious."

The first of these incidents was the murder of Mr. Conolly in September, 1855, by a party of Moplahs who had escaped from the Calicut gaol; an event naturally causing deep distress to the Governor-General, who had so lately enjoyed his hospitality. On the 29th of August Lord Dalhousie had written, "I wish to be among the first to congratulate you on your nomination to be provisional Member of Council in Madras"; and now, ere the unfortunate man could take up his appointment, he was butchered in cold blood before the eyes of his helpless wife as he sat reading to her in the verandah of his bungalow after a hard day's work. A few weeks later the poor lady told the Governor-General that by day and night, in her waking hours and in her dreams, the mangled form of her husband was ever present to her mind, and could never be veiled from her sight. This was only one of a long series of fanatical outbreaks which have as yet defied all the endeavours of authority and civilisation. Ever since the Chera king of Malabar, Cheruman Perumal, after a visit to Mecca about A.D. 827, embraced the creed of Islam, the converts to that faith among the Nairs of the Malabar coast have surpassed all other fanatics in bigotry and murderous excesses. In 1774 Tippu Sultan had failed to quell a rising of this sect, his troops, a thousand in number, being defeated, and the Hindu temple at Manjeri burnt to the ground. Their next serious *émeute* was in August,

1849, soon after Lord Dalhousie's arrival in India, when, after desecrating the rebuilt temple, thirty Moplahs repulsed two companies of Sepoys, and being joined by others of their clan, pursued their career of violence until they were destroyed on the 4th of September by a detachment of H.M.'s 94th Regiment. In 1851 and 1852 came further raids, and many lives were lost. Conolly had reported upon these events and expressed his feeling of despair and inability to devise any method of preventing a recurrence of such scenes or of capturing any of those who had taken part in them. "The Moplah," he wrote, "is a fanatic madman, whose sole object is to throw away his life after doing all the damage possible to his adversary. They will receive no quarter; they fight like madmen." A high priest, whom Conolly suspected of having instigated the recent murders, and who certainly had promised the perpetrators the blessing of paradise if they died fighting bravely, was, at his suggestion, banished from the country in 1853. The Collector was, therefore, a marked man, and the attack upon him was regarded as an act of personal revenge. In October, 1854, Lord Dalhousie had given his assent to an Act, XXIII. of 1854, for the suppression of outrages by Moplahs, under which forfeiture of property, the confinement of persons suspected of an intention to commit such offences, and the cremation of the bodies of those killed in attacks or sentenced to suffer capital punishment, might be inflicted. This Act was now put in force, and heavy fines were exacted; but though the policy then introduced has been pursued by successive Governments of India, the fanatical savagery of the Moplahs has not abated. Even so lately as March, 1896, a rising of the sect took place at Manjeri, when twenty men of H.M.'s South

Stafford Regiment were attacked by nearly a hundred of these miscreants, of whom eighty-four were killed or wounded. Several of them were mere youths under fifteen years of age, and the ferocity displayed by the wounded recalled similar incidents reported in 1849.

Shortly after the attack on Conolly, Colin Mackenzie, the Brigadier-General commanding the Hyderabad contingent at Bolaram, was cut down by some excited members of a Mahomedan procession in that city. As a Scotsman, as a man of strong religious principle, and as a chivalrous, gallant soldier, he was highly esteemed by Lord Dalhousie, who at once wrote to Mrs. Mackenzie a letter of warm sympathy. Mackenzie's bravery had been proved on many an occasion in the Afghan troubles of 1841-42. The hero of the forty hours' siege of the fort of Nishan Khan at Kabul, he was sentenced to be executed shortly after the murder of Macnaghten, but was rescued from this fate by two Afghan chiefs whom his courage and saintly character had won over to his side. While a prisoner he was so thoroughly trusted by his jailers that they employed him on missions sent to Pollock, in which he encountered extraordinary hardships and dangers, and from which he returned to captivity. Later on he was sent off to Bamian to be sold with others into slavery, and finally became security with George Lawrence and two other fellow-captives for the ransom promised for the release of the prisoners. In the month of September, during the festival of the Moharram at Hyderabad, he had issued orders forbidding processions to pass along the roads or through the barracks on a Sunday. Notwithstanding this, the men of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment persisted in carrying their *tazzias*[1] along the high-road close to his residence.

[1] *i.e.* models of the tombs of Hasan and Hussain.

Messengers were despatched to bid the men retire, but no attention was paid to the order, and the General, unwilling to draw his Hindu guard into an altercation with Mahomedans, went out to enforce his prohibition. He returned to his house carrying with him some of the standards borne by the processionists. Shortly afterwards a mob of soldiers, forcing their way into his house, attacked Mackenzie, splitting his skull open, cutting off a finger on the right hand, gashing his left arm, and inflicting such injuries as would have killed most men on the spot. The tough "old Covenanter," however, recovered sufficiently to be able to go home, where he was forced to remain during the outbreak. Henry Lawrence attributed the attack to a deliberate purpose; but whether it was premeditated or merely the result of sudden passion at the General's interference, the incident served to show that the spirit of fanaticism was a danger to be reckoned with in Central India, and was not confined to the Malabar coast. About the same time also there was a violent explosion of religious animosity near Faizabad in Oudh, in which a fanatic Maulavi, named Amir Ali, led a Mahomedan party against a Hindu sect, with much bloodshed as the result.

To these causes of unrest agitating the public mind and bringing anxiety to the Governor-General, was added the Santal rebellion, an event which illustrated at once the volcanic substrata of Indian society and the immense value of railway communication. Lord Dalhousie, isolated from the Government of India, took no part in the measures adopted for the suppression of the disturbance, though on hearing of it he at once offered to leave the hills and return to Calcutta. The President of the Council, however, was unwilling to

impose that fatigue upon the Governor-General, who therefore wisely abstained from interference with his colleagues. Only when the rising was quelled did he take his full share in devising remedial measures and in assessing the blame of those who were responsible. The Santal insurrection is introduced here as an event which broke in upon the enfeebled life of the Governor-General and added grave public anxiety to private sorrow and sickness. But its importance demands a fuller examination of its causes, its progress, and the remedies employed to prevent its recurrence. It is regarded by some writers as a beacon which heralded the approach of the mutiny, and as an event which reflected discredit upon Lord Dalhousie's administration, because the outbreak was unforeseen, and when it occurred the Government were not prepared to deal with it. With the mutiny it need hardly be said that the occurrence had not the remotest connection. Nor is there much better ground for the charge that Lord Dalhousie misread the signs of the times and by his treatment of the case lulled himself and his successor into a false sense of security. On the contrary, he wrote to Vernon Smith on the 22nd of September, 1855, in these words:—

> I beg to impress upon you that this Santal outbreak has taught us a new and cogent lesson; and I trust very much that Her Majesty's ministers and those who talk of drawing troops from India so glibly and so confidently as Sir Delacy Evans has been doing, will lay that lesson to heart.

It is, however, perhaps true that when in a minute dated the 12th of February, 1856, Lord Dalhousie, while condemning the local officers, acquitted the Government of Bengal of all blame, he was more generous than just.

"I concede," he wrote, "to the Government of Bengal, and I claim for the Government of India, exemption from all blame for the occurrence of this unhappy event. It rose like an exhalation from the earth. No human sagacity could have foreseen it; for its occurrence was unseen and unlooked for even by those who were in the midst of it when it rose. No endeavours were wanting to repress its progress. No false clemency has interfered to avert the punishment which was due; and no precautions have been neglected which seem calculated to prevent the recurrence of so grievous and so lamentable a scourge."

The facts elicited by a thorough local inquiry have never been disputed. The land assessment had, in the opinion of the Government of India, nothing to do with the rising of the half-civilised aboriginal tribes of Kolarian stock who inhabited the hilly country of Rajmahal. The Government assessment did not exceed sixpence an acre for the finest and richest land, and the amount due was fixed by committees of the Santals themselves. It was readily paid and without complaint. But the local officers, and in particular Mr. Brown, the Commissioner, and Mr. Pontel, the Deputy Collector, had turned a deaf ear to constant complaints regarding the extortions and exactions of the money-lenders and land-owners, and the oppressive conduct of the subordinate Native officials, whether police or revenue agents. The facile reply that the Santals should appeal to the civil courts, or prove their charges of oppression before the criminal courts, was the answer of the father who should offer his son a stone when he asked for bread. The simple, unsophisticated Santal was no match for the shrewd moneylender, landlord, or unscrupulous Native official. Although the British administrators were unable to live throughout the year in the unhealthy tracts of the country, they comfortably flattered themselves that the tribesmen were happily

settling down to a life of agricultural industry. Indigo planters and railway contractors praised the laborious and patient qualities of the Santals. A race so gentle and harmless, with courts of justice ever open to them, must be as contented as they seemed. No one, whether official or unofficial, whether land-owner or police officer, had the smallest suspicion of an insurrection, nor could it have been dreamt by the peasants and villagers of the Bengal plains in their neighbourhood that they would one day be massacred without distinction of age or sex by the inoffensive hillmen. There was no doubt, however, about the severity or the extent of the human tempest when it burst at the commencement of the monsoon. Suddenly, as if possessed by a mad spirit, the Santals armed themselves with pickaxes and poisoned arrows, and poured down upon the plains to discharge their long pent-up vengeance upon civilisation and its miseries. Whole villages were consigned to flames, the houses of Europeans were sacked and destroyed, and every life of man, woman, or child, Indian or European, that fell into the hands of Sidhu, Kanu, and other leaders, was ruthlessly taken. The railway alone saved Raniganj from pillage and destruction, but the troops sent to defend it were unable to pursue the baffled invaders, because the country was impracticable for military movement. As soon as the cavalry left the Grand Trunk Road their horses sank to their saddle-girths; artillery could not cross the swampy rice-fields; infantry, despite the courage and endurance they displayed, failed to cope with the half-naked savages who fled before their approach. All that the armed forces of civilisation could do was to draw a cordon round the Santals and confine them to their forests and hills until nature herself came to the

aid of General Lloyd and allowed his troops to pass over dry land, and by scouring the country from side to side to inflict retribution upon the offending tribe. An immense quantity of booty was recovered, numbers of Santals were put to death, and many of those whom the army spared fell victims to an outbreak of cholera.

Granted that the Government of India was not responsible for the absence of roads, which it had no funds to provide, and that its faith in the remedial agency of civil courts was not unnatural, no reasonable critic could blame the administration of Lord Dalhousie for so extraordinary and unprecedented an occurrence, or for its inability to act with vigour during the rainy season. But the measures which the Governor-General took to prevent a repetition of such scenes proved so thoroughly effective, that one may fairly say that they might have been taken by the Government of Bengal before the outbreak. The Santals had complained to the local officers, and the local officers had done nothing. They had not even reported the complaints to superior authority. Lord Dalhousie provided one remedy against such neglect in the future by instituting a system of annual reports of administration. His success in planning and carrying out imperial lines of communication armed his successors with a further weapon against similar disorders; but necessarily these measures required time and money, and no possible blame can attach to the Government of India for the omission to deal with the Santal country when far more important roads and bridges leading to Cawnpore and Delhi were still unfinished. But there were local changes which ought to have been introduced before 1855, and for their neglect the Bengal Government must be held answerable. After the experience of the insurrection,

the Santal districts were removed from the operation of the regulations and created a non-regulation province, with the result that justice was administered and processes executed in civil as well as revenue disputes by simple and summary forms which the tribesmen could understand. British officers were ordered to reside in the country throughout the year, and they were provided with proper assistance. The Bengali police were removed, and authority was given to organise a force recruited from the Santals, their headmen, or Manjhis, being gradually made instruments of local government in the double capacity of guardians of the peace and farmers of the revenue. The effect of these reforms, late though they came, was so marked that it was not necessary to retain for any length of time the three regiments stationed in the disturbed districts and the two other regiments held in reserve. Lord Dalhousie's policy was continued by his successors, and in the last forty-five years the population of the Santal highlands has increased from 84,000 to 1,807,000 souls.

The Santal outbreak, when added to the widespread anxiety regarding the progress of the Crimean war, preyed seriously upon the mind of the Governor-General. His health, which had improved from the change to Coonoor, at once suffered a relapse, and one evening at the end of August he was found unconscious, and remained so for some time. Nevertheless, a few weeks later he was able to receive a visit from Lord Harris, the Governor of Madras, whom he appreciated as "an able, conscientious, and diligent ruler, in whose hands the affairs of Madras will be well cared for and improved." The last two years of Lord Dalhousie's stay in India were a continuous struggle with disease,

and a series of ups and downs. The close of the rainy season found him once more in better health and spirits, and when he left the hills for Madras, travelling through Mysore, he was able to enjoy the tour. He exchanged courtesies with the Maharaja at his capital, and visited, with deep interest, Seringapatam and other places in which his patron the Duke of Wellington had won his fame as a Sepoy general. At Bangalore he was the guest of General Cubbon, an old friend, who showed him original reports and despatches written by Sir Arthur Wellesley when he was Governor of Mysore. Although the handwriting differed much from that of the Duke in his later years, the Marquis of Dalhousie easily recognised it by a number of well-known peculiarities and abbreviations.

At Bangalore the long-expected news of the fall of Sebastopol lifted a load of anxiety from his shoulders. There was hardly a Native Court on the borders of India, from Ava to Kabul, and few Native States in the interior, in which the comparative failure of the allies, and of Great Britain in particular, was not being actively discussed. Lord Dalhousie therefore determined at once to give the utmost publicity to the news, and on the 5th of November, 1855, he wrote a minute recording his conviction that a proclamation should be issued and widely distributed, bringing into one view the various successes achieved, and ordering a general thanksgiving for the capture of Sebastopol, its dockyard, arsenals, and forts. The proclamation, penned by himself, after recounting the capture of Bomarsund, the destruction of Sweaborg, the blockade of the coasts of Russia, the three great battles won, and the successful siege of Sebastopol, "without parallel in the annals of war," proceeded thus :—

For the great and glorious victory which has thus been vouchsafed to their arms the Allied Sovereigns have already offered up their sacrifice of gratitude to Almighty God. The Governor-General, desirous that their example should be followed throughout the British dominions in the East, proposes that on the second day of December public thanks should be offered to Almighty God for the signal and repeated successes which have been gained during the present war by Her Majesty's forces and those of her allies, and especially for the capture of the town of Sebastopol.

The proclamation was criticised by the *Englishman*, a Calcutta newspaper, as heterodox, Judaical, and unbecoming a Protestant pen, inasmuch as it spoke of "a sacrifice of gratitude." Lord Dalhousie in his letters and journals easily justified his language, not only as thoroughly adapted to the Indian understanding, but as being familiar to a Christian congregation from the expression "sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving" in the liturgy of the Church of England.

It is not necessary to dwell at any length upon the movements of the Governor-General after he left the Mysore State on the 7th of November. Arcot and Madras were the chief places he visited, and the hospitality which he received at the latter city and the public functions which he attended proved a serious tax on his health. He left Madras on the 15th of November, looked in at Rangoon, and reached Calcutta on the 29th. Here no less than twenty-eight boxes of reserved cases awaited his decision, and as on a former occasion, so now, he found that considerable friction had arisen in his absence. The Council had not fallen out among themselves, but they were in angry controversy with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Moreover, the authority of the President in Council had been challenged, not this time by the Commander-in-Chief, but by the Governor of Bombay. Lord Dalhousie

acted with promptitude. Writing to Lord Elphinstone on the 31st of December, he vindicated his colleagues from any thought of giving him personal offence, adding that he himself was unable to see any reason for umbrage.

> The President in Council within his jurisdiction was the supreme authority in India. Your Government was as much subordinate in official position to the President in Council as you are superior to Mr. Dorin in personal rank. I must stand by my colleagues, firstly, because I am bound to say that I think they had a perfect right to object to the extent to which they believed that petitions were still received, and to ask what had actually been done in execution of the Court's orders; and secondly, because the minutes of yourself and colleagues are so exceedingly fiery that really, unless we make defence, our lesser light over here will not only pale before yours, but will be utterly snuffed out.

But the Governor-General's time was not wholly occupied in these unpleasant episodes. He was busily engaged with Outram in discussing the affairs of Oudh, and preparing for the orders of the Court, which were still delayed. He also gave his attention to arrangements for the arrival of his successor, for whom he despatched the *Firoze* to Suez, after some repairs in which he took a personal interest. "This letter will meet you at Aden," he wrote on the 22nd of December to Lord Canning.

> You must excuse me if I confess to feeling a small shock on writing these words, and if in addressing you within the "Indian limits," I feel as a Scot must do when he first sees his own wraith.

We may now pass from the home-life of Lord Dalhousie in India to the study of his work in various departments of the administration, leaving him in

tolerable spirits, anxious only to receive the Court's orders regarding Oudh, and to give effect to them before quitting office. As the year 1855 came to its close, he expressed himself satisfied that his life had been spared to fulfil his promise of remaining in India until March, 1856, and that the clouds which had gathered in July and August had given place to a clear sky and sunshine after storms.

CHAPTER III

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

India's part in the Crimean war, 1854—Herbert Edwardes appointed Commissioner of Peshawar—Russia's inability to attack India—India's inability to make a diversion in Central Asia—Lord Dalhousie's opposition to the schemes of Rawlinson and the Bombay Government—He objects to denuding India of European troops—Advocates the neutrality of Persia—Outline of his policy with regard to Afghanistan—Grounds of complaint against the Amir—Herbert Edwardes directed to procure information—Lord Dalhousie objects to incurring detailed obligations to the Amir—Edwardes given *carte blanche*, but only in matter of expenditure—Lawrence's views upon the danger of overtures from us, and on the character of the Afghans—Tactful negotiations with Nazir Khairulla—A new emissary, Mufti Gholam Hyder—Lord Dalhousie's views about a subsidy—Lawrence's opinion on Afghan feelings towards Russia—Nazir Khairulla's views on same subject—Rahimat Khan appears on the scene—Edwardes' draft of a treaty—Premature announcement in Parliament—The Amir proposes to appoint Sultan Mahomed Khan as his envoy—Amir's letter and Governor-General's reply—Lord Dalhousie's draft of a treaty—Fouzdar Khan proceeds to Kabul—Edwardes informed of Amir's preference for John Lawrence, 1855—Treaty completed at Peshawar on 30th of March—Lawrence recommended for K.C.B.; Edwardes goes without reward—Treaty with Kelat, 1854—Objection of home authorities to annual subsidy—Results of treaty with the Khan of Kelat—Review of Lord Dalhousie's foreign policy.

1854. ON the outbreak of war with Russia in 1854, Lord Dalhousie was compelled to deal with those complex and many-sided questions of external policy which have

continued to engross the attention and disappoint the hopes of his successors. At that time the interest of the problem was focussed upon the single point whether the Russian and the Indian Empires were within striking distance of each other. Was it possible that Russia should despatch an expedition against India? Could the Government of India take a useful part in the national struggle by creating a diversion in Central Asia? Lord Dalhousie answered these questions in the negative. He dismissed as groundless all apprehension of a Muscovite attack, and resolutely refused to embark upon any wild scheme of Anglo-Indian advance to meet the enemy. When he had secured the acquiescence of Her Majesty's Government in the decision which he had formed, he resisted to the utmost the pressure put upon him to allow the European garrison to be reduced, and forcibly demonstrated the danger of thus denuding India. But his precautions were not those of a merely negative character. The treaties which he concluded with Afghanistan and Baluchistan were the reply of the Government of India to the challenge thrown down by Russia. Their effect has lasted beyond the occasion which called them forth. The agreement made with the Amir was more than a public act of reconciliation. It kept the ruler of Afghanistan steadfast and loyal in the crisis of 1857, and it laid a foundation upon which the Viceroys of India have built. The agent whom Lord Dalhousie employed in carrying through the negotiations was well chosen. On the death of Mackeson, Herbert Edwardes had been selected as Commissioner of Peshawar, and his selection, although questioned at the time, was abundantly justified by the result. The "Scotch terrier" proved himself as successful and as ready of resource in the field of diplomacy as he had been in the

face of Mulraj's troops. He rose to the responsibilities of the high office which his patron clearly set before him in the following letter, dated Government House, 17th October, 1853:—

> I have much and real pleasure in acquainting you that the Government has selected you to fill the very important and difficult office so sadly vacated by the slaughter of my poor friend Mackeson. In the whole range of Indian charges I know of none which at the present time is more arduous than the Commissionership of Peshawar. Holding it, you hold the outpost of Indian Empire. Your past career and your personal qualifications and abilities give me assurance that in selecting you I have chosen well for its command; and I feel confident that your tenure of it will advance you by another and a long stride towards the third letter G, which I once already anticipated for you, and towards the high and solid reputation of which that letter will be the sign. You have a fine career before you. God speed you in it for your own sake, and the sake of this Empire.

The negotiations with the Amir of Kabul, which were thus entrusted to Edwardes, and brought to a conclusion by John Lawrence, will be more readily understood if a brief account is first given of the views of the Marquis of Dalhousie upon the two questions which have just been stated. Of the possibility of a Russian invasion the Governor-General wrote to Sir C. Wood on the 13th of June, 1854, in these terms:—

> That if Russia should invade India with all the power she can command at present, her army would be exterminated, even if it ever reached the borders of India, is quite certain; that India is capable, and will ever be capable, so long as England shall remain what she is among the Powers of the world, to drive back any invasion that the power of Russia, Persia, and Central Asia combined could bring against our western frontier, I feel as confident in affirming as I do of my existence; and I should wish for no better lot than that such an invasion should be led by the Emperor in person, and that I should be the Governor-General when it came.

These may seem to be the words of an over-confident and perhaps a rash writer. But it must be remembered that the Eastern Question has in the twentieth century altered in many important respects from the conditions which prevailed in 1854, and it is as well therefore to correct any such impression by recalling to mind what those conditions then were. Russia was not then conterminous with Afghanistan, she had no place of arms at Khusk within striking distance of Herat, no steamers plying on the Amu Daria or Oxus, no military station at Pata Keser on that river; while of the three great posts which blocked the path of an invader seeking to pass the single gap in the mountain chain of the Caucasus and Hindu Kush ranges, namely, Merv, Meshed, and Herat, not even the first of these was in her grasp. Railway communications had not then placed in her hands the means of concentrating her military forces from the north and the west within a few miles of Herat upon the Afghan border, while practically the greatest success yet achieved by her up to 1854 was that recently gained by General Perowfski, who with difficulty made himself master of Ak Masjid in Kokan. In the direction of Balkh the country had neither been conquered nor colonised; the resources of Kokan, Khiva, and Bokhara were inadequate to support the advance of a Russian army even as far as the Oxus, still less through Afghanistan; Persia in its impoverished condition was unsuitable as a base of operations, and beyond it lay either the desert south of the Helmand or Afghanistan, a trap easy to enter but difficult to retreat from. Lord Dalhousie, however, secure as he felt from any immediate invasion, emphatically qualified such sense of security for the future by saying "that Russia has views upon India as her great object ultimately, and upon the

Euphrates and Persia immediately, as a necessary stepping-stone to India beyond, I have no doubt whatever."

Such being the position of Russia in regard to any project of invading India, the Governor-General turned to the question whether we on our side could operate with any useful effect against Russia in the circumstances then existing. It was impossible, he saw, to maintain a long line of communications through Afghanistan and Bokhara. It was unworthy of us to stir up the tribes against Russia unless, when the Crimean war should be over, we could protect such allies from the chastisement which would surely fall upon them; it was in every way wrong to send British officers to organise resistance if in the event of their imprisonment or murder we should be unable to avenge their sufferings. Geographical and climatic facts must be recognised. Even if the need of supporting Persia should arise, "its effectual defence at this moment must be sought in the fleets and armies acting against Russia in the west." With the close of hostilities he looked to "a general combination of European powers for repressing the further extension of the Russian Empire, which has just been brought about by the presence of real danger to them all." The strong objections which Lord Dalhousie entertained to the advance of an Indian force towards Central Asia were not shared in other quarters, and the credit due to him for carrying his point was enhanced by the opposition which he overcame. On the 18th of January, 1854, he denounced, in a letter addressed to Sir C. Wood, the proposal of Colonel Rawlinson, "that we should be at once in the thick of it by sending a brigade of troops to Baghdad. I cannot doubt that you will approve of my having wholly refused to do anything of the sort." But he foresaw

that a stronger pressure in favour of a forward policy would be applied to him from Bombay. Letters addressed to him by the Board indicated a tendency on the part of the Queen's Government to leave a large discretion in the hands of the Government of the western presidency. He pointed out therefore, on the 18th of February, that local governments could not be expected to take into their consideration many matters which nevertheless should not be left out, and earnestly requested that any orders from London for military or naval operations should be addressed to the Government of India, since "operations in the Persian Gulf will affect not Bombay only, but the whole of India." His anxieties were not superfluous, for at the end of May came the news that Lord Elphinstone had reported to the home authorities that he could send 10,000 men for service in Turkey, and that he had even specified the Nizam's contingent as available for this duty. It was time for the Governor-General to write plainly. He therefore pointed out that the troops offered by Bombay were inferior to those which could be secured in Turkey, and calculating the cost of transport and trans-shipment, came to the conclusion that money would be more serviceable than an indifferent force of arms. On a proposal being made that officers should be lent to Persia, he wrote to Wood on the 4th of August:—

> I told Lord Elphinstone that I had read it with surprise; for the suggestion it contained ran directly counter to the policy of his Government, and to the instructions he had received. No violation of neutrality would be more distinct than the despatch of English officers as leaders of Persian troops; and no better pretext could be desired by the Czar for the quarrel which he wishes to pick with the Shah. I therefore told Lord Elphinstone that I could by no means consent to officers of the Indian army

being so employed. The measure would be now, as it has been before, wholly useless, even if it were legitimate.

While thus successfully opposing ambitious schemes in Central Asia, the despatch of Indian troops to the Crimea, and the loan of Indian officers to Persia, the Governor-General with equal firmness resisted the demands made upon him from home for assistance in the shape of British regiments. He was in no wise a timid or a selfish ruler, but he realised, what his successor in 1857 failed to grasp, the danger of denuding India of its European force. From Ava, Nepal, and the Punjab the report reached him that exaggerated stories of British failure and disaster were current in the bazaars, and were credited in the palaces of the Native chiefs. Writing to Sir Charles Wood on the 30th of May, 1854, he said :—

> There is among the native population a most exaggerated idea of the power of Russia. Already rumours and alarms have been prevalent. Four days have not passed, as you will see by the newspapers, since the inhabitants of this very town in which I am were panic-stricken by a report that a Russian fleet was at the Sand-heads, coming to plunder Calcutta; and shops were shut, and money and ornaments buried for safety. With such a people as this to deal with, we must on no account appear to weaken ourselves at such a time. . . . I will gladly give you one of the regiments of Queen's Dragoons. I have a plan by which I can give you all the four Dragoon regiments and yet supply India with European cavalry. This plan you shall have during the summer."

In another letter he reverted to the same subject in these terms—"We must be able to put down disaffection promptly." The outcome of his remonstrances was that although, in the end, the Queen's regiments of cavalry, with the 25th and 98th regiments of foot were taken away, yet the European force was not reduced below

37,400 men,[1] and with that scant force Lord Dalhousie kept India tranquil.

This, however, was not the only service which he rendered to his country in the Crimean war. For though by no means indifferent to the political advances of Russia into Persia, he saw that discretion and strict neutrality were the best means of avoiding such a result. Persia, he thought, could inflict no real injury upon Russia, while any offensive action on her part

> would give pretext for retribution hereafter, or would at least lay the grounds for such ill-will on the part of Russia towards her as would make her position in after-times even weaker than it is. I would, therefore, by no means urge Persia to take active part in this war. On the contrary, I would encourage her to neutrality; and I shall be well content if we should be able to keep her up to that mark. . . . In any case, however, I feel that the maintenance of Persia is anything but a matter of indifference to us, and that everything which can be done ought to be done to save her from dependence directly or indirectly upon Russia.

There was, however, another and a better field open for diplomatic action, and it is well to quote the words in which Lord Dalhousie explained his proposals. On the 31st of May, 1854, he wrote to Sir Charles Wood:—

> Persia may be beyond our power, but Afghanistan we have far better means of defending against the designs of Persia, or against the designs of Russia acting through the agency of Persia. Too much has been written and done regarding Central Asia to admit of its being necessary that I should show that the Powers which inhabit that tract, or any single potentate who might hold it, are the natural barrier for India, and might, I believe, be made a most effective one. The events of 1838-42 are no proof that Afghanistan might not have been a barrier, they are proof only of the error which was committed in the way in which we went to

[1] Of these, 23,174 were Queen's troops, including 1460 cavalry, and 14,216 were European troops of the Company's army, including 6965 of the artillery corps.

work. Afghanistan hates Persia, an Afghan hates a Persian, a Suni hates a Shia. Every historical, national, and religious feeling is enlisted on the side of our interests against Persia and Russia her ally. The country is most difficult, therefore readily defended; poor in products, therefore, if defended for any time, impregnable. The people are in their hills good and effective fighters. Since, then, the interests of Afghanistan are identical with our own; since the country is defensible, and the people able and willing to defend it; and since, if it be effectually defended, it is an impassable barrier in front of our border; surely it is worth our while to come under some obligations, and even to be at some cost to keep it in a condition in which it can be of essential service to us. Of late years we have been too secure as to our position on the western frontier. The results of the policy which closed with 1843 disinclined us to have anything to say to the country in any way, and the state of our relations with it since 1848 has given no opening for the introduction of a policy of any kind. But there has now come a great change over the aspect of affairs. Persia has of late years renewed her approach to Herat. We are deeply interested in seeing that that "key" to Afghanistan does not pass into the hands of the Shah. Further, the revelations made of the continued ambition of Russia, the determination she has shown avowedly to pursue its ends, and the certainty that India is included among them—make it no more than prudent for us to provide against an evil, which is not great or imminent, but which is growing and will ever be coming. How to do this? I am as adverse as any man can be to any treaty offensive and defensive. I would eschew and repudiate all attempts to control the internal affairs of Afghanistan; and I would refuse to be directly or indirectly drawn into the quarrels of those who share the country between them. I would not seek to make petty alliances with the several chiefs. I would not consent to bind ourselves by any detailed provisions of treaty even with the chief of them, Dost Mahomed.

Such were his motives for taking action in Afghanistan, and we may pass on to the negotiations themselves, in the course of which many difficulties arose that have recurred in later history and are likely to reappear hereafter. The position of affairs at the time was complicated

by events some of which have been described in previous chapters. The Government of India had many and just grounds of complaint against the Amir. It will be remembered that Dost Mahomed had given serious offence by his behaviour in the second Sikh war; and his brother, the Barakzai Sardar Sultan Mahomed Khan, had been excepted[1] from the general amnesty. The Amir himself had acted against us in the teeth of full warning. For when in December, 1848, Captain Abbott, hearing that Dost Mahomed had entered Peshawar, wrote to express his confidence that the visit was a friendly one and mentioned that the Government of India was making vigorous preparations to crush the rebellion, the Amir impudently replied that he had come to gain possession of that province, the Derajat, and Hazara, and with gratuitous effrontery protested against the treatment which Dhulip Sing's mother was receiving at our hands. On the 6th of January, 1849, only six weeks before Dost Mahomed's troops fought at Gujarat on the side of the Sikhs, Lord Dalhousie addressed His Highness offering him the hand of friendship, and warning him of the consequences of any hostile intention. A week later Major Taylor, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, wrote to Mahomed Azim Khan, one of the Dost's sons, to inquire why he had sent troops to Bannu, the bearer of the letter being instructed to bring back all particulars regarding the Afghan force. An obscurely worded but polite reply was received by Taylor, who later on informed Mahomed Azim that if the Dost desired to enter upon the subject of friendly relations, he would do well to communicate his sentiments direct. On receiving this message the Amir saw that he had made a

[1] See vol. i. chap. vi. p. 216.

mistake, and on the 20th of July, 1850, he wrote to Taylor endeavouring to explain and justify his conduct during the war, further hinting that he should be glad if the past might be forgotten and the former friendship be renewed. Lord Dalhousie had been strong and wise enough to rest content with driving the Afghans in ignominy from the Punjab, and had refused to be dragged into useless hostilities with Afghanistan. At the same time he was not prepared to accept too readily the olive branch thus tardily extended to his subordinate. Policy as well as a proper sense of dignity dictated his reserve. An eastern potentate invariably mistakes anxiety or pressure as indications of alarm. Taylor was therefore instructed to reply that he did not know the sentiments of the Governor-General, but that any communication addressed to his Lordship would be forwarded at once. On the 31st of January, 1851, this letter was returned to Taylor in a mutilated condition with an intimation that it had been so received, and with a request that a fresh copy might be sent. Taylor was directed to comply, and to make it known that if the Amir would send a communication openly and by a proper messenger to the Governor-General, there was no doubt that he would be informed on what terms his past behaviour would be condoned. At this time Lord Dalhousie was not unwilling to let bygones be bygones, and on the 25th of August, 1850, he thus explained to Hobhouse the position he had taken up :—

The Amir has written to Major Taylor feeling his way to the "forgiveness of his fault." The absence of all relations between the Governments is mischievous in every way. It encourages the border tribes to rely on the Dost for aid or refuge, while his doubts of our intentions must make it his policy to keep up their animosity

against us. Declaration of peace between the two States would go far to obviate this, and I should be rejoiced to bring it about. But to that end I shall betray no solicitude.

A long interval, however, was to elapse before any definite result was attained. Mahomed Azim briefly acknowledged Taylor's letter in a reply dated the 30th of June, 1851, adding that his father would soon send a messenger as suggested.

But just as matters seemed to approach a settlement, a new offence was added to those for which no atonement had yet been made. The Amir, with small regard for consistency or good faith, and perhaps suspecting that the British were eager for his friendship, sent troops to attack some villages of the upper Miranzai. Until, then, His Highness should disavow and atone for this aggressive action, Lord Dalhousie declined to receive his messenger. But he let it be known that if the Amir would make atonement and send a letter, an answer to it would be given. The protracted silence which followed was broken in July, 1853, by a letter received by Mackeson, Commissioner of Peshawar, from Abdul Ghias Khan, son of a brother of the Dost, named Nawab Jabar Khan. The writer offered his services to establish British influence at Kabul, and at the same time hinted that he would take part if necessary in intrigues against the Dost. There was only one reply which could be given to such a suggestion. The Governor-General laid down his policy in distinct terms. He had no object or interest in countenancing intrigues with the Barakzai family, or any one at Kabul. It was enough that "a wholesome dread of the advance of our power beyond the Khaibar prevailed at the Afghan capital; that fear should be left to sustain itself, and should not be countenanced by threats or overt act, or

by any intercourse tending to mix us up with the affairs of Afghanistan."

1854. Experience has proved that there is no surer method of eliciting overtures of good-will from the ruler of Afghanistan than that of remaining inactive, and above all avoiding intrigues or menaces. Accordingly, when the whole position was changed, and the Crimean war induced Her Majesty's Government to press upon the attention of the Government of India the desirability of concluding some written agreement with the Dost, the Marquis of Dalhousie felt that the policy he had so far pursued enabled him to act with reasonable hope of success. He therefore wrote, on the 7th of February, 1854, to Edwardes, directing him to ascertain the feeling among the Afghans on the subject of the war between Russia and Turkey, and the movements of the Russians and Persians, giving him "*carte blanche* both as to measures and means for this purpose." Edwardes replied on the 24th of February, retailing all the news which he had been able to procure. The Amir was, he thought, too weak to be unfriendly. "He knows his own interests too well, I should expect, to provoke us any more. We are now too close to his door. A thousand little things show a feeling on his part to be friends with us, if we would let him. He is much ashamed, depend upon it, of his miscalculations in 1848-1849. My own feeling," he added, "is that we have much injured Dost Mahomed, and that we may well afford to let bygones be bygones." Edwardes for his part would "be very glad to see a new account opened on the basis of an open treaty of friendship and alliance."

The Commissioner of Peshawar had been given a free hand for a limited purpose. He was authorised to adopt his own means and measures for procuring infor-

mation, but not for shaping or concluding a treaty of alliance. It was necessary, therefore, to curb his ardour, and, accordingly, on the 7th of March, 1854, the Governor-General wrote to his subordinate, warning him against betraying too great anxiety for an arrangement. He pointed out that the home authorities hardly realised the position. They desired a formal renewal of friendly relations with Afghanistan in the belief that "there can be no reason why the Afghans should suspect and dislike us." We had, no doubt, injured the Amir as Edwardes had observed. But on the other hand, "Dost Mahomed behaved foolishly and wrongly in 1848-1849, and he has made no reparation for it. There is no need for a formal adjustment of the double balance. The items may now well be mutually dropped out of the account, and we may start fair." Emphasis was laid upon the advantage of showing no undue anxiety, and upon the need of avoiding detailed obligations. As Lord Dalhousie observed, "both sides had committed faults," and there was nothing to be gained by placing our own mistakes too prominently in the foreground, or making the first move towards reconciliation. On the contrary, the Dost had already made advances to us, and it was important to take up the negotiations from that point. The Amir, moreover, was himself in difficulties. He was quarrelling with his brothers at Kandahar, he hated the Persians, and knew well that they were only restrained from encroaching upon his territories by the intimation, conveyed in Lord Malmesbury's despatch of the 27th of October, 1852, that the independence of Herat and the integrity of Afghanistan must be respected. We need not, therefore, betray too great solicitude; and in the second place, we must avoid going too far. "From the first I have been,

and still am, adverse to any treaty beyond a mere declaration of friendship and alliance, *without any detailed obligations.* All small rights in detail become practically obligations upon ourselves." Having laid down the lines which diplomacy was to follow, the next question was the form in which the negotiations were to be opened. As to this the letter proceeded :—

In one view it seems simple enough. In 1850 the Dost said, "After all if I have offended you, you are a great nation and can afford to forgive." Though nothing came of this, yet now in 1854 we are willing to forgive and forget without exacting any terms. It would appear, therefore, that we have only to make an advance, to remind the Amir of what he asked us to do, to tell him what we are willing to do, and that the thing would be done. But in another view the affair is not so simple. Would not any advance on our part, without exacting anything, especially under present circumstances, be regarded as an indication of conscious weakness? With a civilised and sensible European Government we should run no risk of such misconstruction. But with an arrogant, irritated Mussulman power, would there not be a possibility that they would regard an overture as a proof of our necessity, and would they not be disposed to make our necessity their opportunity? Colonel Outram and Major Abbott, who have been here lately, were consulted by me confidentially. They inclined to think that overtures from us would be misapprehended. Your opinion appears to be otherwise. You think he is ashamed of his blunder in 1848-1849; and you speak of a "thousand little things" which show a feeling on his part to be friends with us if we would let him. This is the cardinal point of the whole question. I should, therefore, be much obliged if you would let me know more fully what these symptoms are on which you rely.

The Governor-General then went on to suggest that the way might be cleared by a friendly communication, which without showing any solicitude opened a door for the Amir's advances. If it succeeded, and if "he would make a treaty, I would make it at once, and would, if he pleased, even meet him or his eldest son at

the frontier to make it in person." Lord Dalhousie concluded his instructions in the following terms:—

As the sum of all I have written you will see,

1st, That we have never rejected any approaches made to us by the Amir.

2nd, That, having regard to present circumstances, we are quite ready, and even anxious, to be on good terms with him, and even to enter into a treaty with him.

3rd, That we abstain from making overtures to that effect, only because there is reason to apprehend that such an act might be misunderstood, and so become mischievous.

4th, That we are most desirous, nevertheless, of paving the way towards this object, and will give sanction and approval to anything which may advance us towards it.

After this letter had been sent the Nazir Khairulla, one of the fathers-in-law of the Dost, appeared on the scene, and further instructions which will be presently explained were given to Edwardes. But in view of misconceptions which exist as to the extent of the discretion left to Herbert Edwardes, it is convenient here to quote the following extracts from the Governor-General's letter to him, dated the 11th of April, 1854:—

I heartily hope, my dear Edwardes, that you may succeed in bringing this halting negotiation to a good result. If you do, it will be a feather even in your cap.

To this he added a postscript—

I have omitted two notable points. First, I wish everything kept out of the offices until this is over; and beg you to correspond with *me*.

Secondly, for whatever casual expenses you may see cause to incur in connection with these negotiations, I give you *carte blanche*,[1] confiding in your discretion.

[1] I have not overlooked the following passage, which has been quoted elsewhere as an extract from Lord Dalhousie's letters to Herbert Edwardes—"I give you *carte blanche*, and if you can bring about such a result as you propose,

The success of Edwardes's negotiations and of Lord Dalhousie's policy was not promoted in the earlier stages by any cordial approval from John Lawrence. Frequent letters passed between the Chief-Commissioner and Courtenay, the private secretary, as well as the Governor-General himself. What Lawrence's views were as to the policy proposed for adoption is shown in these letters. Writing on the 24th of March, 1854, he expressed his dissent from the views of Edwardes regarding the conduct of Dost Mahomed since the war.

He has certainly, in my mind, evinced his hostile feelings very decidedly. I believe that he has stirred up the hill tribes against us, if it were only to keep us employed. I fully believe, however, that the Amir is willing to be on terms of amity with us just now. It would greatly strengthen his position, and the chances in favour of his sons being able to maintain themselves at his death.

But his friendly feelings if useful to us are not essential.

We can hold our own against all comers. The satisfaction that a treaty would give in England appears to me the strongest argument in favour of the measure. There seems to be nothing in the present aspect of affairs in Europe which should induce us to adopt the extreme measure of making overtures to the Amir. I do not think we could do this without loss of dignity and prestige. All thinking men would say it must be a terrible crisis. Russia must be a frightful foe, when the Lords of the East, the English, backed by France and Turkey, hold out in this fashion the right hand of friendship to Kabul! We may satisfy ourselves, we will never satisfy others, that such a course is not dictated by a consciousness of weakness; and this knowledge will induce the Amir to make claims which to us are inadmissible.

it will be a feather even in your cap." The quotation appears in various books, but in none of them is the date of the letter given. The whole of Lord Dalhousie's correspondence with Edwardes is before me, and the nearest approach to the words quoted is that in the passages given in the text. The reader will, however, see that Edwardes was not given *carte blanche* for "bringing about such a result as you propose."

As to granting a subsidy, or even occasional help in cash, Lawrence wrote—

I cannot think that it would be expedient to aid the Amir with money under any circumstances. Asiatics do not understand this way of treating them. It would serve but to increase their arrogance. We should have increasing demands under various pretences, and the more we gave, the more would be wanted. During Sir John Malcolm's embassy to Persia, we spent large sums in that country to no purpose. During the occupation of Afghanistan, we were still more lavish of our treasure, and with similar results. I would simply recommend that we give the Amir to understand indirectly that we are willing to forget the past and to enter into friendly relations should he desire it. In the event of his making such proposals, a native gentleman such as Fouzdar Khan might go to Jalalabad or Ali Masjid to meet and conduct his son to Peshawar, with whom the treaty might be concluded by Your Lordship in person, if the time suited, or by such parties as you might name.

On the 3rd of April Lawrence writes again—

We must be very careful. If the Afghans are desirous of entering into negotiations, it will encourage them to make extravagant demands. The best attitude, perhaps the only safe one, with Orientals is that of complete superiority. What I apprehend is that the Amir and his son will see no great advantage, or rather affect to see none, in any treaty of amity. They will desire a treaty of offence and defence, in order that at least, under some pretext, we may bleed freely. The Afghans are proverbially fickle, faithless, and avaricious. The more we gave, the more would be required, and when supplies were stopped, we might expect that they would intrigue with our enemies in the hope of inducing us to open our coffers.

A month later he expressed himself even more strongly—

I look upon a Sikh chief as in every respect a more honourable and trustworthy man than an Afghan. Falsehood and villainy are the natural characteristics of an Afghan, and their rulers are

probably much worse than the majority of their people. The offer of Peshawar and Kashmir would prove irresistible, indeed a much less advantage would induce them to side against us. The Amir of Kabul would join with whichever party appeared the strongest, or which held out to him the greatest advantages. He would probably side with an invading army which occupied Herat. But if the invading army were worsted, he would for a trifle, perhaps for nothing, fall on it in its retreat.

Lawrence concluded as follows :—

I would not advocate that we pledge ourselves to aid the Amir with money in the event of attack. Should he desire it, a treaty of amity might be made, both parties exchanging assurances of goodwill to each other. . . . As a treaty of this kind would strengthen his hands, he will probably enter into one, if he finds he can get no more, and he will hold to it, so long as there may be no inducement to break it.

John Lawrence obviously did not give much encouragement to Lord Dalhousie in pursuing the course which he had marked out for himself, though by a freak of fortune it was he, and not Edwardes, who eventually signed the treaty of mutual peace and friendship which the Governor-General ratified on the 1st of May, 1855. More than a year afterwards, on the 26th of January, 1857, Lawrence found himself associated with Edwardes in affixing his signature to a further treaty which granted to the Amir a subsidy of one lakh a month during the war with Persia, gave us the right of establishing a native agent at Kabul, and in consideration of the existing friendship promised "to overlook the past hostilities of all the tribes of Afghanistan and on no account to visit them with punishment." But at the present time the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab looked coldly upon the project of the Governor-General, and urged caution upon his subordinate the Commissioner of Peshawar.

Edwardes, however, managed the delicate mission entrusted to him with consummate tact.

Soon after the receipt of Lord Dalhousie's instructions in the letter of the 7th of March, an old man of seventy-one, father-in-law of the Dost, by name Nazir Khairulla, introduced himself into the pending negotiations. He complained of great injustice at the hands of the Amir, and stated that he had been engaged for twenty years in trade at Bokhara where he had rendered services to Stoddart and Conolly through his agent Ahmad Khan. This agent had died in Kashmir some three years before, and the old man now sought the aid of the British authorities in recovering large sums of money due to himself from his estate. After a few interviews the real object of the Nazir's visit, which was from the first divined by Lawrence, began to leak out. Pushed by Edwardes, he repeated a conversation which, according to his own account, he had held with the Dost. "When I returned from Bokhara, I asked the Dost why he did not make overtures to the English for friendship. The Amir replied, 'I know them better than you. I tell you they will never forgive me': to which I replied that the English were powerful and could afford to forgive. 'Perhaps so,' said the Dost, 'but perhaps not. Suppose I make overtures, and the English reject them. It will then be known in Afghanistan that I have done so, and that no assistance will be given me, and I shall have weakened myself in public opinion. The risk is too great, and I won't run it.'" Having repeated his conversation, the old man proceeded to make his own comments observing in reference to the Amir that "if the war with Russia goes to any length, he will of course form alliances with your enemies in

self-defence. Now, if you wish it, I am ready to perform any service you choose. If you want to obtain Bokhara without sending an army, give Dost Mahomed money, which he very much wants, and tell him he shall have the first instalment when he is across the Oxus." Then the Nazir asked whether the English would conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the Amir, to which Edwardes, faithful to his instructions, replied in the negative.

It required all the tact and wariness that could be employed to deal with the old diplomatist, who with much plainness of speech showed how one-sided he considered the proposals which were made to him by Edwardes. But the Nazir in the end undertook to write to the Amir's favourite son, Sardar Gholam Hyder Khan, Governor of Jalalabad, and to ask him to consult his father on the subject of commencing negotiations for forgiveness and the establishment of friendly relations. In the meanwhile he insisted upon seeing John Lawrence in order to satisfy himself that Edwardes was acting by authority. In due course there arrived from Hyder Khan a letter without date, but received by the Nazir on the 10th of April, saying that he would himself proceed to Kabul to communicate with his father on the subject. Early in the following month a new envoy appeared in the person of Mufti Gholam Hyder, a native of Peshawar, who had in years past helped the Dost and his family to escape from captivity in Bokhara, and had since been treated with much confidence and favour by the Amir. The Mufti was more direct than even the Nazir. "What does friendship mean?" he asked. "What is the charge for it? What is the Dost to get?" Edwardes, who had no authority even to promise a subsidy, adroitly

replied, "Peace and security; assurance of keeping his kingdom; and liberty to turn his attention in any direction but this, from which he has so long feared reprisal." As Lawrence had foretold, the Mufti went on to speak of an expedition against the Sardars of Kandahar, and the necessity of saving Herat from the attack of Persia. Edwardes could only profess to regard these contingencies as remote, and repeat that the Amir had better write to the Governor-General without delay. He himself lost no time in writing, on the 5th of May, to Lord Dalhousie to warn him that money and substantive support would be demanded; and although he regarded a "defensive and offensive treaty as absurd," he added, "but if *bona fide* aggression come upon the Dost from our enemies in their attempt to march at us over his body, there cannot be two opinions as to justice and policy requiring that we should support him in resistance, and make his western frontier the battlefield instead of our own."

The Governor-General replied on the 24th of May—

> I daresay you are correct in your belief, that when negotiations are entered upon, the Amir's proposals will be of the same tenor as the remarks of the messengers. If they should be so, and if he should make assent to them a *sine qua non* in the formation of a treaty, it is more than doubtful whether we shall conclude one.

Of Edwardes's replies declining all interference in Afghanistan, and specifically refusing to give a pledge to recognise Sardar Hyder Khan's succession, Lord Dalhousie approved as being fully in accord with the sentiments of Government. But dealing with John Lawrence's objection to any gift of money, he added—

> I do not agree with him. I think his view founded on a fallacy. It proceeds on the assumption that the Afghans are

fools, whereas, I think, they are in general quite as clever as we are. The Afghans, it seems to me, must perceive that Russia, designing to swallow India, must make the first solid mouthful of Afghanistan, lying right across and commanding Russia's one and only line of communication with her resources and her base; consequently that the gift of Peshawar and Kashmir would be a very unsubstantial bribe. The Afghans no doubt hate us, but they hate the Persians at least as much, and the Russians certainly more. Their own destruction is involved in the success of Russia's supposed designs on India.

At the same time, though he might be "disposed to promise aid to the Dost if Russia or Persia should invade Afghanistan, the right of determining the nature and extent of the aid to be given being reserved wholly to the British Government," Lord Dalhousie could not incur a treaty of obligation so speculative in its nature without reference home. It may be remarked, however, that when the risk became less speculative, it was finally taken by the British Government almost in the precise terms suggested by Lord Dalhousie. But in present circumstances the home authorities declared that they would be "content with the formal re-establishment of friendly relations on the basis of letting bygones be bygones." Special care, however, must be taken that we do not enter into any stipulations which could be construed as involving us in engagements to support Dost Mahomed in any aggressive movements against other chiefs or states." A caution was added against the use of any language which might give just cause of umbrage to Persia. For the rest the matter was left to the discretion of the Governor-General.

Since the opinions of the Governor-General regarding a promise of money, and the probable attitude of the Afghans towards Russia have been quoted, it is well to put side by side with them the ideas of John Lawrence,

in view of the fact that this question at any rate has gained prominence by the lapse of years. Writing on the 8th of June, 1854, to Edwardes, Lawrence said, "My own idea is that a Russian-Persian army could, without much difficulty, overrun Kabul and subvert its government." In that case "a considerable portion of the people would be ready to join an invader who appeared to be really formidable, partly from love of change, and partly in the hope of something turning up to their advantage. If these views be correct, I think it follows that it would prove to the interest of the Kabul Government to join and not to oppose the invaders, their object being India." Assuming that the Russians would respect the independence of Afghanistan and merely ask for a safe passage through the country, Lawrence argued that—

> An invasion of India would afford a strong temptation to all the restless spirits of Afghanistan. There would appear more profit, glory, and even security in joining the Russian ranks than in running their heads against their iron battalions. The danger of being swallowed up would appear remote; that of being crushed in the event of resistance imminent and pressing. I do not hesitate to say that were I an Afghan with the Russians at my door, my voice would be to join them. We can hold out no adequate inducement to the Afghans to adhere to us, while their feelings and passions seem to be the other way. We hold provinces filled with their countrymen, the loss of which they lament. I feel persuaded that we can never reckon on their fighting our battles.

It would be outside the scope of this biography to discuss these conflicting opinions, but it is a singular coincidence that while Lawrence was writing his views at Murree, Edwardes was holding another interview with Nazir Khairulla, in the course of which he remarked that our interests and those of the Amir were

identical. The Nazir replied with warmth, "You have told me that several times. The Dost is not a wise man. Avarice, avarice, avarice, that is his wisdom. He is for the side which pays. That Russian Vickovitch promised him men and money without end. He jumped at it, and broke with the English. He has got so much wisdom that he will swallow an offer of Peshawar and Kashmir as soon as ever the Russians make it." Edwardes replied that Afghanistan lay on the road to India and would first be swallowed up, upon which the Nazir retorted, "Dost Mahomed would not look as far as that. If the Russians enabled him to take Peshawar and Kashmir he would take them." The whole truth, the Nazir observed, is that "the pivots of the world are hope and fear; the Dost has nothing to fear from you. You tell him he has nothing to hope, and then you leave him to the fear of the Persian."

Certainly Edwardes had a difficult game to play, as one weapon after another was drawn from his hand either by the astute envoy, or by the Governor-General, or by the home authorities. He would probably have failed, had it not been for help from an unexpected quarter. Hitherto there had been two envoys at work, but now yet another presented himself anxious to take the leading part in the negotiations. Thus a healthy rivalry ensued, and when its force was nearly spent, the Persians fortunately sent an agent to Kabul who caused an instant flutter there, offended the Dost by the proposals made, and turned his thought to the Government of India. The new party to the negotiations was a loyal adherent of the British, one Rahimat Khan, who brought a letter from the Governor of Kuram, Sardar Mahomed Azim Khan, son of the Amir, intimating his wish to be employed as his father's agent

in the transaction. He was informed that the first move must come from the Dost; but his appearance stimulated the activity of others who were already in the field. The outcome was that Edwardes was driven into a corner, and was asked plainly to state the terms of any treaty which would be acceptable to the British Government. He would gladly have avoided committing himself, since the orders of the home Government had not yet been received by him. But the Nazir proceeded to dictate his own version of such an agreement, and Herbert Edwardes made a memorandum of it on the same day, the 30th of June. The memorandum was to this effect:—

> I have spoken to the Commissioner Sahib, and after much talk it was settled between us that the Amir Sahib should be a friend to the friends, and an enemy to the enemies of the British Government. (Note.—This not to involve the converse. The British not to make an offensive and defensive treaty); and the British Government to enter into a treaty not to have a cantonment at Kabul, nor to place any representative there as at Teheran; and not to interfere in any way with such dependency or territory as the Amir is now in possession of. (Note.—Supposing the Dost on his side to keep the treaty.)

Such was the outline of the treaty which Edwardes and the Nazir sketched out between them, and it will be seen presently that it differed in many respects from the instrument finally signed. But the Commissioner was very sanguine about the result, and his confidence was so far shared by Sir C. Wood, that notwithstanding the more cautious language of Lord Dalhousie, he announced in the House of Commons that Her Majesty's Government expected the early renewal of formal relations with the Amir.

The Nazir despatched his letter, and heard of its safe

arrival at Kabul; but week after week passed without any move on the Amir's part. During this interval the Shah of Persia sent an envoy to the Dost, offering to mediate between him and his brother at Kandahar. The envoy, who gave offence to the Amir by withholding from him a sovereign title, ultimately returned to Teheran without accomplishing anything, and not a little chagrined at his failure. Then it was that the Amir himself began to feel his way towards direct negotiation. On the 15th of August the Mufti Gholam Hyder, no doubt at the Dost's bidding, wrote remonstrating with Edwardes on the encouragement he had given to Sardar Mahomed Azim Khan, and informing him that the Amir had decided to entrust the negotiations to Sardars Gholam Hyder Khan and Sultan Mahomed Khan. This letter also was brought by the Nazir, whom Edwardes informed that he did not intend to answer the Mufti. Lord Dalhousie approved of this policy, and on the 9th of September instructed Edwardes to "write to nobody any more until the Dost writes himself." But the introduction of the name of Sultan Mahomed Khan gave him time to decide upon a question of no little difficulty. This Sardar had been an open enemy to the Government and a treacherous friend to the Lawrences. He had, as already stated, been excluded from the amnesty; and although on the policy of letting bygones be bygones it would be necessary to forgive him, "that," wrote the Governor-General, "is the very farthest point to which I will go. Negotiations through him or communication with him I will not admit in any shape." Partly owing to this repulse of the Mufti's overtures, and partly owing to renewed intrigues at Kabul for securing the honour of being chosen as envoy, matters dragged on without result

until the 10th of October, when Mirza Hussain Khan, keeper of the royal seal, reached Peshawar with letters from the Amir to the Governor-General, John Lawrence, and Edwardes.

After a reference to the favours shown to his family by the British, the Amir, in his letter of the 23rd of September, 1854, addressed to the Governor-General, proceeded thus :—

> If on any occasion, with reference to the exigencies of the moment and in consequence of accidental causes, any untoward acts opposed to the ways of friendship and indicating a desire to separate myself from you, should have happened, and tarnished the mirror of your heart, the reason of them should not be looked for in any deliberate intention of my mind. The affairs of this life are ruled by fate . . . my heart in its distress has been for an age past desiring the medicine of your kindness and the salve of your compassion to heal its wounds.

Then, referring to what had passed between his son Sardar Mahomed Azim Khan and Edwardes, and to the despatch of Mirza Mahomed Hussain Khan as his envoy, he continued, "in view to the advancement of friendly relations, my hope is that, regarding me as one walking in the paths of affection and amity, you will write to me without reserve about the intentions of your heart." Upon the receipt of this letter the Governor-General proposed to his colleagues, Dorin, General Low, Grant, and Peacock, a reply in which they unanimously concurred. Touching lightly upon the general tranquillity in India, the conclusion of a treaty with Baluchistan, and the successes gained in the Crimean war, and adverting to our former relations with Kabul, the reply went on :—

> The events to which Your Highness has referred caused me pain and dissatisfaction. But the British Government is a great

power, and can well afford to forgive injuries it may sometimes receive from weaker States. The past is past; let it be forgotten. Let even the conduct of Your Highness' brother, Sardar Sultan Mahomed Khan, be forgiven and forgotten. Henceforth let the States over which we rule be united by bonds of friendship.

Finally, the Amir was invited to appoint an officer to "conclude a treaty of peace and friendship in such terms as may be agreed upon."

When this matter was disposed of, Lord Dalhousie, on the 22nd of November, put before his colleagues the draft of a treaty, with a proposal to appoint as his representative Edwardes, whose "well-known abilities, and the temper, discretion, and judgment shown during the semi-official negotiations, enable me to feel perfect confidence that he will perform the duty to the entire satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council." This draft, with a few verbal changes, was ultimately adopted and signed.

The treaty had better be without preamble, and consist of—

ARTICLE I.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Dost Mahomed Khan, the Amir of Kabul, his heirs and successors.

ARTICLE II.

The Honourable East India Company engages to respect, and never to interfere with the territories now in the possession of His Highness the Amir.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness Dost Mahomed Khan engages on his own part, and on the part of his heirs and successors, to respect the territories belonging to the Honourable East India Company; to be the friend of its friends, and the enemy of its enemies.

Lord Dalhousie added that, if it should be necessary,

Edwardes might add a note that we repudiated any desire to have a cantonment or a representative in Afghanistan unless other powers had one.

With the letter from the Governor-General, of which an outline has been given, Fouzdar Khan, who had commanded the levies raised by Edwardes in the second Sikh War, was duly despatched on his way to Kabul. He had not gone far when doubts were expressed as to the sincerity of the Amir. But these doubts, in which the Amir's envoy at Peshawar did not share, were dispelled by the tidings of Fouzdar Khan's reception at Kabul in a darbar held on the 23rd of December. On the 28th of the same month the Amir sent for Fouzdar Khan, and said: "I have appointed my son, Gholam Hyder Khan, as my representative, and he will start for Jalalabad on the 7th of January. You will go with him. It will rest with the English authorities to show honour to the Sardar." "He added," wrote Fouzdar Khan, "that if the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab were to meet the Sardar it would afford him great satisfaction, as it was only through the Chief Commissioner that these affairs could be brought to a conclusion. Doubtless it would be a great advantage could the treaty be made in the presence of the Governor-General himself, as there would then be no occasion for reference to Calcutta, and no apprehension that a succeeding Governor-General would annul the treaty; but as a guard against these drawbacks the Chief Commissioner should come to the meeting with the Sardar Gholam Khan, armed with plenary powers on every point." In reporting this to Temple, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Edwardes made no comment on the suggestion just quoted. The Governor-General, in a minute dated the 26th of January 1855, wrote:—

The Amir has responded by deputing his favourite son and designated heir. Such an act deserves that it should be met by us in an equally friendly spirit. Moreover, the Amir has specially expressed his wish that the Chief Commissioner should meet his son. If we were now to disregard that wish, the Amir might think that proper consideration has not been shown to himself or his son. I conceive, therefore, that the Chief Commissioner ought to be appointed to conduct the negotiations instead of Major Edwardes. I regret that that gallant and able officer should thus be deprived of the credit of concluding the negotiations which he has thus far conducted so well.

1855 Lord Dalhousie broke the news of this disappointment in a kindly letter to Edwardes. After telling him that he had previously been named as the British representative, he went on to say:—

I very much regret that the last letter should have rendered a change necessary, and should have compelled the Government, much against the wish of us all, to nominate the Chief Commissioner as the negotiator on our part. But the request of the Amir to that effect was so precise and so pointed, and the selection of his heir as his envoy rendered it so incumbent upon us to appoint our highest functionary to do him honour, that there was no way of escape from it. Nevertheless I am exceedingly sorry that you should not have had, as I intended you should, the crowning credit of bringing to a close the negotiations you have conducted so well and successfully to their present point.

John Lawrence, on the receipt of his instructions, wrote to Edwardes on the 9th of February, 1855, to tell him that they were unexpected, and he added: "I wish myself that you were to do it, sincerely, though after all the terms are quite unobjectionable, so far as we go"; and on the 14th of February he again wrote: "I am glad you are not disappointed about the treaty. As far as I go I should have been most happy that it had been entrusted to you; for I so far agree

with the Governor-General that I think that all the merit of the affair, whatever it may be, is yours."

Edwardes met the Afghan envoy at Jamrud, and accompanied him to Peshawar, where the Sardar was entertained by John Lawrence with great distinction. On the 1st of April Lord Dalhousie, then at Kotagiri in Madras, received a telegram from Peshawar, which had been carried by special mounted messengers for 200 miles of road, and had travelled for the rest of the distance along his new laid telegraph line, announcing the signature of the treaty on the 30th of March. He wrote at once to Edwardes: "I congratulate you and myself, and all else concerned, on the successful issue of negotiations, which have now lasted just a year." John Lawrence was informed by the Governor-General that he would be recommended for honours, whereupon he also wrote to Edwardes on the 24th of May 1855: "I hope he will not forget my coadjutor when asking for honours for me. I may say with perfect truth that I consider you deserve at least as much, if not more, for the late treaty than I do." Fouzdar Khan was given a life-pension and the title of Nawab; but Herbert Edwardes' share in the matter was left unrecognised, though not through any backwardness on the part of the Governor-General. The services of Lord Dalhousie were acknowledged on the 9th of June in these terms by Vernon Smith, who had succeeded Wood as President of the Board:—"The Government are much pleased with the treaty your Lordship has effected with Dost Mahomed; and I forwarded the papers respecting it to Her Majesty, who said they were extremely interesting." John Lawrence's reward was a K.C.B., gazetted in February 1856, a distinction which he had already deserved more than once for his splendid work in the

Punjab. As Lord Dalhousie wrote to Vernon Smith in submitting his name with others, "These recompenses for life-long labours have been right well earned in the cases now brought before you, and I shall very anxiously hope that they will not be withheld."

1854. The treaty with the Amir concluded by Lord Dalhousie was only one of a series of engagements which were subsequently made with Afghanistan, and although it exercised a powerful influence in keeping the ruler of Kabul quiet during the mutiny, much of its value was lost in the civil wars which ensued after the death of the Dost on the 9th of June, 1863. But the treaty negotiated on the 14th of May, 1854, by Major John Jacob with Nasir Khan, Chief of Kelat or Baluchistan, had more lasting results and was a far more binding engagement than the treaty of friendly relations with the Amir. It not only provided for perpetual friendship between the British Government and Kelat, but also admitted the ruler of that country and his successors into the Indian protectorate on terms of "subordinate co-operation." It opened his territories to British garrisons, and required the Khan to enter into no communications with other states without the consent of the Government of India. It provided for free commerce, and the protection of British territory from plunder and outrage, guaranteeing to the Khan and his successors a subsidy of 50,000 rupees a year on condition that these obligations were faithfully fulfilled. It remains to this day the solid foundation upon which later agreements have been based, and the most intimate relations between the two governments have subsisted since it was concluded. Lord Lytton raised the subsidy to one lakh, and other arrangements have since been made involving additional payments to

the Khan of Kelat whose frontier both with Persia and with Afghanistan has been clearly defined.

Lord Dalhousie recognised the value and foresaw the consequences of a treaty which "shall bind the Khan to us wholly and exclusively" as a move on the political board necessitated by the war with Russia. "We, on our part," he observed to Wood in a letter dated the 18th of April, 1854, "take no obligation upon ourselves except the annual stipend of £5000 which you have already sanctioned; and that only in the event of the conditions being observed and trade being protected annually. The Khan lately met Mr. Frere on the frontier; and the friendly spirit he then showed renders it probable that this object will be gained." Writing again on the 30th of May, he trusted that the Kelat treaty would prove an exception to the general fate of Asiatic treaties which "bind a ruler only as long as he pleases," because in this case his personal interest was enlisted on the side of maintaining it. He called attention to Major Jacob's tariff in the schedule as "a model of comprehensive brevity, which tickles the soul of a past President of the Board of Trade." He was therefore considerably annoyed when the President of the Board of Control repudiated the idea that he had sanctioned an annual payment to the Khan. All that the home authorities had meant to sanction was a single lump payment. But while he regretted the misunderstanding, the Governor-General observed on the 4th of August that:—

Looking to what we have gained by it in respect of trade, local security, and that defence against foreign enemies which the Government at home was anxious to obtain, I consider, as I have already stated, that the money is well spent and profitably invested. If he fulfills his compact your trade will gain greatly, and military

reductions may be made to more than Rs. 50,000 a year. If he does not keep his word, you pay nothing. While I say this, I repeat that I regret to find that I have exceeded the authority I supposed I had received. I request you to acquit us of doing so intentionally.

Lord Canning and his successors reaped the benefit of the agreement with Baluchistan. Nasir Khan died in 1857, and his half-brother Khudadad Khan was selected by the chieftains as his successor. But disputes ensued, and the British Government were glad to double the subsidy in order to strengthen the Khan's hands. In 1862 Khudadad Khan agreed to a delimitation of the Sind-Kelat frontier, and in the following year allowed the telegraph system to be extended from India into his territories. Although his reign during the next few years was a stormy period of disorder, even culminating in anarchy, the Khan acted loyally up to his engagements during the Afghan War; and he gave to the British a lease of the Quetta district and made numerous other concessions of the utmost importance to the defence of our empire in India. Thus the sagacity of Lord Dalhousie was abundantly justified by subsequent history, and long after he had rested from his labours his works followed him.

It must be admitted that the Baluch and Afghan territories occupy only a small portion of the extensive field of India's foreign policy, which in 1855 included the Strait-Settlements, now under the Colonial Office. Fortunately for Lord Dalhousie, the Company's dominions enjoyed a rare immunity from external troubles between 1848 and 1856. The savage tribes on the north-western frontier had been held by a firm hand, and the fate of the Lahore State was an object lesson which they had not forgotten even in 1857. In the territories of Oman

and along the littoral of the Persian Gulf little of consequence occurred. On the northern frontier Sikkim had been punished for its outrageous behaviour, and Bhutan had been made clearly to understand that its Duars on the side of Bengal would be annexed if further attacks upon British subjects were not repressed. On the east the Court at Ava had received a lesson which it was not likely to forget, although the King was too proud to acknowledge defeat by formally surrendering a province already taken from him. The main results of the Governor-General's administration in the department of external affairs were the two treaties of which a full account has been given in this chapter. The credit for them is due to the Marquis of Dalhousie, who steered a middle course between "masterly inactivity," and the forward moves suggested by Edwardes, or those advocated by the Government of Bombay. He went far enough, and not too far. He set the mind of Dost Mahomed at rest, enabled the Khan of Kelat to maintain his authority, and so arranged matters that the strain of the mutiny revealed no miscalculation or defect in this part of his administrative work. If he failed to impress upon the home authorities and his successor in office the paramount importance of maintaining an adequate force of Europeans in India, the fault lay with those who lacked his own powers of discernment and imagination. He hardly ever addressed the President of the Board on the subject of foreign affairs without repeating the warning that "India is tranquil because we are strong," and he never weakened her strength by pursuing a restless external policy beyond the military resources at his disposal.

CHAPTER IV

RELATIONS WITH THE NATIVE STATES

Lord Dalhousie's policy must be judged by the principles of his time—The policy of "subordinate isolation" then in vogue—The difficulty of combining protection with inactivity—Consequent distinction between independent and dependent states—Objections to such a distinction—The rule of non-interference stated in a minute on Hyderabad — Its reservations commented upon — Right of the paramount power to annex certain dependent states—The rule of non-interference applied to Bahawalpur—John Lawrence objects, but defers to the Governor-General — Lord Dalhousie's action approved; its consequences—The same policy followed in dealing with the Berar question—History of the contingent and of the Nizam's debt—Home authorities hint at annexation—The Resident inclined towards active interference—Lord Dalhousie hopes for an early settlement of the debt—Disappointed in that hope, he proposes an agreement mutually satisfactory—The Nizam is given the choice of three courses—He prefers to assign the Berar to British management—Exception to the rule of non-interference illustrated by the case of the sons of Tularam Senapati—Lord Dalhousie objects to titular sovereignties—His proposals regarding the King of Delhi—Objections of the Court of Directors—A compromise effected; its results—The treatment of the Nawab of the Carnatic—The Tanjore principality—Lord Dalhousie not responsible for seizure of Rani's property—The succession claim of the Nana Sahib.

THE story of the annexation of certain Native States will be told in the next chapter, and the reader will then be able to form his own judgment of actions which have been condemned with more vigour than discrimination. But it will be impossible for him to hold the balance true

without some insight into the guiding principles upon which the policy pursued towards the rulers of those territories in the middle of the last century was based. With the embittered memories of the mutiny so closely present to them, men were led to pass superficial and harsh verdicts upon the events which immediately preceded a shock so tremendous. At that time the correspondence and semi-official records of him who was condemned as the chief culprit lay hidden away from contemporary knowledge together with his private or personal papers. The storm has now passed and calm reason has resumed her proper authority. Different sides will still be taken by those whose principles and sentiments must always differ in regard to the treatment of protected states by their suzerain. But at least a patient hearing will be given to fresh evidence, and new issues will be raised. The lapse of time is not, however, entirely to Lord Dalhousie's advantage, for in the interval the whole attitude of the public mind has changed in regard to the rights and duties of a suzerain power. The old phrases of "subordinate isolation" and "non-interference" have given place to the new idea of subordinate union and common welfare. Intercourse has quickened, a higher standard of Native rule is now enforced, and no surprise is felt at the deposition of an Indian prince for gross misrule or even for such single crimes as would have been allowed to pass unnoticed in the first half of the nineteenth century. The traditions and principles which arrested the reforming hand of a Governor-General, and compelled him to ask himself whether the continuance of a Native State could be tolerated, and whether annexation was not better than insufferable misgovernment, have been entirely superseded by the modern practice of

intervening to correct abuses. Hence it follows that the impartial critic must detach himself not merely from the excitement born of the mutiny, but also from the situation which to-day confronts him, and from premises and axioms which are now accepted on all sides. In the present chapter attention will be called to the universal and inexorable rule of non-interference which in the middle of last century governed British relations with the protectorate, and to the distinction which was drawn between independent and dependent states.

For a just appreciation of Lord Dalhousie's attitude towards the Native principalities, it seems advisable briefly to review the history of British relations with them. Sir Alfred Lyall[1] has truly said that at the end of the eighteenth century "very few indeed of the reigning families in India could boast more than twenty-five years of independent and definite political existence, while the Rajput chieftainships, the only ancient political groups left in India, were threatened with imminent obliteration. From destruction these states were rescued by seeking shelter within the sphere of the political system of the English." That "political system," however, has not been uniform in its movement. It has in fact passed through three phases or periods, which I have elsewhere[2] ventured to describe as the period of "the ring-fence," extending to 1813, that of "subordinate isolation," which lasted until 1857, and that which followed the mutiny, of "subordinate union." Lord Dalhousie entered upon his office at a time when the policy of subordinate isolation was fully developed. His actions must be viewed from the standpoint of the

[1] *Asiatic Studies:* The Rajput States of India. Murray and Co.
[2] *Protected Princes of India.* Macmillan and Co.

system which he inherited. And he inherited not merely the changes introduced by the Marquis of Hastings, but also some part of the conceptions and theories which, though abandoned by that eminent Governor-General, still clung to the minds of those who remembered, and perhaps preferred, the policy of Lord Cornwallis. The essential element of the policy of the ring-fence was the refusal of protection to Native States lying beyond a certain limit, or in other words the avoidance of all ties or engagements which might possibly drag the Company beyond its own frontiers. The Company's servants knew well that the so-called states were not nationalities, but heterogeneous populations under dynasties or even upstarts of foreign race. But that knowledge only increased their fear of entangling alliances and compromising engagements. Conquest and annexation could only in the opinion of the day be avoided by having no concern whatsoever with their neighbours beyond the British pale. For it was felt that rotten administrations must speedily crumble when touched by the hand of reform. After a short time inexorable necessities of self-defence and the experience of the Pindari campaigns compelled Lord Moira, better known as Lord Hastings, to break down the ring-fence, and to fill in the map of India with protected states. He took from them the reality of international life. He deprived them of the rights of making war or of contracting engagements with their neighbours, forbade them to employ foreigners, and imposed restrictions upon their armaments. He left the Punjab as a buffer state, and Burma was still outside the Empire; but elsewhere he introduced a general political settlement defining the limits of each state, and leaving it in a position of subordinate isolation. At the

same time he rigidly marked off the internal administration of each prince as outside the sphere of British action; and in this policy he was followed by his successors. In short, protection was given to nearly every state, and with it a recognition of internal sovereignty. Lord Hastings' activity in making treaties was so great that little more in the direction of increasing the protectorate remained for future Governor-Generals. Conquest alone could give them fresh opportunities. But it is worthy of note that when these opportunities came, and when the limits of the Company's dominion were extended on the west in Sind and the Punjab, on the north in Kashmir, and on the east towards Ava, the British authorities adhered to the well-established policy of holding themselves aloof from all matters of domestic government. The engagements entered into in 1832 with Khairpur, in the following year with Bahawalpur, and in 1846 with Kashmir, all contained solemn assurances that the internal administration of those countries was to be wholly left to their rulers; and on the very eve of Lord Dalhousie's appointment, a Sanad, or title-deed, was conferred on the petty state of Jind, comprising an area of only 1268 square miles, which included the usual self-denying clause—"the British authorities will not entertain complaints of the Maharaja's subjects or dependants, or interfere with the Maharaja's authority." Thus one of the full attributes of sovereignty, which in the aggregate give to their possessor an international status or a position of independence, namely internal sovereignty, was alone left to the protected princes of India, and an excessive importance was attached in 1847 to the obligations imposed upon the protecting power by its promises to avoid interference with the domestic affairs of its allies.

Lord Dalhousie was thus committed to the policy of subordinate isolation. But he was not the man to be bound fast by a formula, or to be misled by vain phrases of independence. Standing midway between the time when all states outside the ring-fence were treated as "foreign nations" and the post-mutiny period in which all are protected, yet none are suffered to indulge in gross misrule or create intolerable scandals, he was not slow to discover that a principle of non-interference, combined with a guarantee of protection, must entail a responsibility for misrule which no civilised power could accept. The system of the ring-fence, which left states entirely outside the Company's protection, was reasonable; for if Native rulers indulged in extravagances, often of the foulest kind, and with the help of torture exacted from their hapless subjects the means of meeting the bill, it was, after all, no concern of the Company. The sufferers had at least the remedy of rebellion, and our Government in any case refrained from giving their rulers any moral support. But when Lord Hastings gave all the princes of India shelter within the British protectorate, and yet declared that the protecting power would not interfere in their internal administrations, there was the evident risk that the Company might thus become the blind instrument of a ruler's injustice towards his subjects. Already in 1848 it was obvious that the protecting power was incurring the reproach of indirectly conniving at the oppression so rife in the territories of the King of Oudh and other protected princes. Protection and absolute inactivity were an ill-assorted union, and Lord Dalhousie saw that one or the other must give way. The sole question was which of the two should be modified to suit the altered condition of affairs. The case against tampering with the sacred

principle of non-interference was strong. If once he began to correct misrule in a small state, he must do the same in a larger one. The Company had no public servants whom it could spare for the work of supervising reforms in the principalities. Nor had Lord Dalhousie at his command the military forces, the powerful support of railways, the influence of education, or the public opinion which, owing to his own administration, his successors were able to employ. It was therefore out of the question to depart from the rule of inactivity. There remained then the alternative of reducing the area of protection. Here at least a door of escape lay open. Every state had not the same permanent guarantee of protection. Some were dependent, or, as Lord Dalhousie called them at first, subordinate, and if there were no lineal male descendant to the ruler of a Hindu state of that class, the doctrine of lapse might be applied. Without any breach of faith the protecting power could refuse to renew its protection to an adopted son. Here then was a way out of the difficulty. Let a clear distinction be drawn between independent and dependent states, and let the protecting power, when it could do so with perfect good faith, withhold its protection from the latter, and then the right to misgovern would cease when the state lost its protection and its separate existence.

The distinction thus drawn may be open to criticism both in its principle and its practice. The Governor-General himself found it difficult to fix the line between independence and dependence, when he described Karauli as "in some sort a dependent state." But at least he made and worked upon the distinction, and adequate allowance has not been made for the fact by his critics, as, for instance, by Sir John

Strachey,[1] when he writes, "if the policy of Lord Dalhousie had continued to be followed, the extinction of nearly all the Native States of India would have been a question of time only," for it is certain that very few of the larger states in India which now exist would have been classed by the Marquis of Dalhousie as dependent. This will be made clear when we come to deal with the annexations, but it will be well here to place before the reader a few extracts from the Governor-General's minutes to explain the history of the new term.

And first some idea must be formed of the length to which he carried the theory of non-interference, or isolation. The affairs of Hyderabad called forth a definite declaration of the views held by Lord Dalhousie on the subject of the relations between the suzerain power and the independent states, a phrase then applied to all the Native States. As a prelude to introducing the reforms which had become necessary, the Resident at the Nizam's Court had proposed that the territories of that ruler should be ceded to the sole and exclusive management and authority of the Company for a term of years. In a minute dated the 27th of May, 1851, the Governor-General recorded his "entire dissent from, and disapproval of, the policy suggested." He reviewed our treaty engagements, and explained various instances of interference which had occurred in the past as due either to the Nizam's own consent or to exceptional conditions. Those conditions had passed away, for "in these days there exists no Native State whose power or whose influence renders it necessary for the security of our external relations, or for the maintenance of our alliance with the Nizam, that we should seek for the establish-

[1] Sir John Strachey's *India*, 1903, p. 462.

ment of any direct authority in the government of his kingdom." In the present case the Nizam had not asked for our intervention in his internal affairs, and our position as the suzerain power did not justify the action proposed by the Resident. The Governor-General's view of the Company's foreign relations with the protected princes was then set forth in these terms :—

> The acknowledged supremacy of the British power in India gives to it the right, and imposes upon it the duty, of maintaining by its influence, and if need be compelling by its strength, the continuance of general peace. It entitles it to interfere in the administration of Native princes, if their administration tends unquestionably to the injury of the subjects or of the allies of the British Government. But I recognise no mission confided to the British Government which imposes upon it the obligation, or can confer upon it the right, of deciding authoritatively on the existence of Native independent sovereignties, and of arbitrarily setting them aside whenever their administration may not accord with its own views, and although their acts in no way affect the interest or the security of itself or its allies. Still less can I recognise any such property in the acknowledged supremacy of the British Government in India as can justify its rulers in disregarding the positive obligations of international contracts in order to obtrude on native princes or their people a system of subversive interference which is unwelcome alike to people and prince.

The limitations to interference with independent states, as explained in this extract, were very strict. British interests, or those of the Company's allies, must be in jeopardy before "international" contracts could be broken. But no benevolent coercion was to be applied to independent sovereignties merely because their internal administration was injurious to their own subjects or distasteful to the paramount power. This principle upon which Lord Dalhousie acted was one that might have been laid down by Sir John Malcolm

or Mountstuart Elphinstone, so thoroughly does it accord with the doctrine of non-interference which they strenuously upheld. Indeed, among the letters left by Lord Dalhousie is one, dated the 31st of August, 1851, from this latter authority to W. Leslie Melville which in specific terms expresses admiration of the line of action adopted by Lord Dalhousie.

I am (says the writer) truly obliged to you for the gratification I have received from reading Lord Dalhousie's minute. It is equally admirable for the high principles it maintains, and for its correct view of the nature of our supremacy in India. I am persuaded that the course which it enjoins towards our allies is as conducive to our own prosperity as to the respect of foreign nations and posterity. I hope that some occasion may arise to bring it conspicuously before the public for the honour of the present Governor-General and the guidance of his successors.

New policies require either the creation of new terms or the appropriation of old terms to the altered condition of affairs. So it was when the development of the doctrine of lapse and its application to only one set of independent states demanded a fresh classification. At first Lord Dalhousie retained the term independent as applicable to all Native States which enjoyed internal sovereignty, and he divided them into those which were subordinate and those which were not subordinate. Satara, for instance, was independent in common with other sovereignties, but it had been created by the British, and when lineal male heirs failed to the house of Satara it was liable to be treated as a lapse. It was therefore an independent subordinate state. But it was soon felt to be a confusion, if not a contradiction of language, when a principality was termed both independent and subordinate. There was, however, some objection to discarding the former term,

inasmuch as there was no desire to limit the internal sovereignty of any subordinate sovereign so long as he continued to rule his state, and the denial of the title to principalities like Satara might seem to imply that the suzerain authority intended to assert a right of interference in their domestic affairs. The Court of Directors cut the knot by describing Satara as dependent, and after that decision the complicated phrase —independent and subordinate—gave way to the term dependent, which did not mean that the state thus described had lost its right to manage its own affairs so long as it was recognised as a Native State, but implied that under certain conditions the whole principality, with its independence and all its other rights of sovereignty, was liable to be treated as a lapse. The extracts which follow show clearly the evolution of the phrase dependent, and although it has been necessary to try the patience of the reader by this explanation, the time spent upon it will, it is hoped, not have been wasted. The following passages are taken from Lord Dalhousie's minute dated the 30th of August, 1848 :—

I take this fitting occasion of recording my strong and deliberate opinion, that in the exercise of a wise and sound policy the British Government is bound not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue as may from time to time present themselves, whether they arise from the lapse of subordinate states by the failure of all heirs of every description whatsoever, or from the failure of heirs natural where the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of the Government being given to the ceremony of adoption according to Hindu law. The Government is bound, in duty as well as in policy, to act on every such occasion with the purest integrity, and in the most scrupulous observance of good faith. Where even a shadow of doubt can be shown the claim should at once be abandoned. . . . Such is the general principle that, in my humble opinion, ought

to guide the conduct of the British Government in its disposal of independent[1] states where there has been a total failure of all heirs whatsoever, or where permission is asked to continue by adoption a succession which fails in the natural line.

In another minute, dated the 28th of January, 1854, Lord Dalhousie reverted to what he had written, and observed as follows:—

> The opinion which I gave was restricted wholly to subordinate states, to those dependent principalities which, either as the virtual creation of the British Government, or from their former position, stood in such relation to that Government as gave to it the recognised right of a paramount power in all questions of the adoption of an heir to the sovereignty of that state. The opinion I gave referred exclusively to "subordinate" states, to a dependent principality like Satara, and others that have been named.

Having now indicated the two prevailing ideas, first that protection carried with it no right of interference in a state's internal affairs, secondly, that protection might be terminated by annexation under certain contingencies in dependent states, I pass on to illustrate Lord Dalhousie's principle of non-interference by the leading case of Bahawalpur. Not long after his reception by the Governor-General, Bahawal Khan, the loyal Nawab of Bahawalpur died, and in accordance with his wishes was

[1] The use of the word "independent" here has proved a stumbling block to many. Sir Charles Jackson in his *Vindication of the Marquis of Dalhousie's Indian Administration*, p. 33, suspects that the word was a slip of the pen. He writes, "I know not how it is written in the original, but the whole argument of the minute requires that it should be dependent. See this passage set out in Mr. Kaye's work, p. 74." Sir Charles is, however, mistaken. "Independent" occurs not only in Lord Dalhousie's written copy of his own minute, but also in other parts of the minute as printed on p. 80 of the Return to an Order of the House of Commons, dated the 5th of February, 1849. Satara, although called a subordinate state, was described in the first paragraph of the minute as an "independent sovereignty," in the popular sense of the word. The Court of Directors, however, deliberately based their orders for annexation on the ground that it was a dependent state, mainly for the very reasons given by Lord Dalhousie, who described it as a subordinate state.

succeeded by his younger son, Saadat Khan. The elder son of the deceased, popularly known as Haji Khan, at once appealed to the Governor-General for support in enforcing his claims. Lord Dalhousie not only refused to take his part, but declared that he had no right to interfere, a doctrine which it will be noticed is wholly opposed to the practice of to-day. In a minute dated the 23rd of January 1853, he wrote :—

> This prince is confined by his brother as he was confined by his father before. The Government of India has no power or right to interfere with the Nawab, an independent sovereign, in the policy he thinks necessary for his security within his own dominions.

The doctrine of non-interference was, however, to be pushed still further. Disappointed in his hopes of assistance from the British, Haji Khan effected his escape from prison, summoned the Daudputras to his standard and took forcible measures to wrest the throne from his brother. It was now the turn of Saadat Khan, whose right to succeed had been admitted by the paramount power, to invoke its assistance. John Lawrence was afraid that anarchy and disorder once let loose in Bahawalpur would spread into his own province. On the 23rd of February, 1853, he wrote to the Governor-General in these terms :—

> I do not think that we can recognise Haji Khan as Nawab. The example might have a pernicious effect. It might incite others to similar attempts when opportunity offered. Natives consider that when we once recognise a chief, he is under our protection. It has the disadvantage of lessening the inducement to govern well and conciliate their subjects, but on the other hand it conduces to the preservation of public tranquillity. When a disturbance occurs, it is difficult to foresee how it may end. All the unquiet spirits in the country flock to the scene of conflict. Our prestige also to a certain extent is involved in the success of the *de facto* ruler. His

rival in attempting to depose him is guilty of contumacy to the paramount power.

This was sound sense and weighty counsel, as Indian statesmen of the present day will readily admit, and many times since the mutiny has the British Government declared, in the language used regarding Manipur by the Secretary of State on the 24th of July 1891, that "it is admittedly the right and the duty of Government to settle successions in the protected states of India generally." But in 1853 the views put forward by Lawrence were not orthodox, and it is not surprising that he abandoned his position at once on receipt of the reply of the Government of India. The orders then issued were based upon a minute written by Lord Dalhousie, from which the following extract is taken :—

It has long been the settled policy of the British Government not to interfere with other states in the selection of their supreme ruler. I am strongly of opinion that the simple fact of the supremacy of our power, or the mere fact of our having previously recognised a *de facto* ruler, ought not to be considered as binding us to maintain him. The Chief Commissioner informs us that Haji Khan's pretensions appear to be generally acceptable to the Daudputras. He is the eldest son of his father. There are no special reasons that I know of for his exclusion from the Guddee; and if his tribe desires to have him at its head, I conceive that we have no right to prevent it.

Lawrence was therefore told to dismiss all idea of forcible intervention. He was allowed to offer his mediation, but if it was declined he was to content himself with warning the parties that they would not be allowed to violate the frontier of the British dominions. Lawrence acquiesced without a word of protest, and on the 10th of March, 1853, wrote to Lord Dalhousie :—

I must admit that it was a mistake my proposing to aid the Bahawalpur Nawab. I am very glad to receive the public despatch forbidding it. I do not now think that even the surrounding chiefs will consider that we should interfere. From all I can gather they side with Mahomed Haji Khan. The Nawab seems literally to have no party.

This forecast was correct. Haji Khan took the field and quickly worsted his brother. Our deposed ally was granted an asylum in Lahore, from which he naturally kept up intrigues for his restitution. Thereupon, to guard against complications which might arise, he was confined as a State prisoner, and Haji Khan ruled in his stead. The Governor-General congratulated himself that "the incident has happily terminated," and Sir Charles Wood wrote on the 25th of April, "I entirely approve. You very wisely checked your Punjab people." But such scenes are apt to recur where the paramount power folds its hands and allows civil war to settle disputes as to succession. The Nawab who succeeded Haji Khan took his own steps to prevent a similar "incident" on his death. He put to death three of his uncles, and drove his subjects into rebellion. In 1866 he himself suddenly died, a victim it was believed to poison. He was succeeded by a child of four years, and the British Government was soon obliged to intervene, and to conduct the administration on his behalf. But it is not necessary to follow the fortunes of the house of Bahawal Khan any further. The account which has been given shows clearly the sincerity of Lord Dalhousie's adherence alike to the policy of his predecessors, and to his own declarations that the British Government had no mission "which imposes upon it the obligation, or can confer upon it the right of deciding authoritatively on the existence of Native

independent sovereignties or of arbitrarily setting them aside." The same spirit of regard for the rights of the Native States guided him in the settlement of his dispute with the Nizam which led to the treaty ratified by the Governor-General on the 8th of June, 1853, and known as the Berar treaty.

The provisions of this treaty have in recent years given rise to such heated controversy that it is necessary to glance briefly at the previous relations between Hyderabad and the British Government. How Lord Dalhousie viewed the transaction is clearly stated in his letter to Sir Charles Wood dated the 3rd of June, 1853:—

By this mail, he writes, you will receive another treaty which has been concluded with the Nizam, and which effects a permanent settlement of the Hyderabad contingent which has long been a vexed question in our politics. The Nizam has been treated most handsomely and liberally, and you will see that the most sentimental champion of Native powers cannot deny to this Government the admission of perfect good faith, generosity, and forbearance. I would not have entered upon a treaty at this time to attract notice, when so many other Indian matters press upon attention. But the business was in hand before this spasm of Indian discussion seized the British public. Moreover, the contingent were starving, and the advances by this Government had again reached half a million; so that they could not brook delay. Though I say it that shouldn't, the settlement is a good service done to the Company; and I am confident that it will commend itself to your approval.

In another letter, dated the 2nd of July, 1853, he wrote to the President, "the Berar Treaty is more likely to keep the Nizam on his throne than anything that has happened for fifty years to him." So thought Sir Charles Wood who, however, considered the terms too liberal to the Nizam, and so also the Secretary of State who, after a lapse of twenty years, applauded the

forbearance which Lord Dalhousie had shown. As for the Nizam, Colonel Low reported on the 19th of June, 1853, that he had expressed himself as much gratified with the tenor of the Governor-General's letter, which was read out in open darbar, and "was unusually good-humoured and even facetious in his remarks." Nevertheless, in view of the misrepresentations which towards the close of the last century were freely circulated as to the nature of the bargain, it is well to examine the circumstances with which Lord Dalhousie had to deal and to show with what firmness he withstood the pressure put upon him.

The contingent owed its existence to an overwhelming necessity for reforming the Nizam's army, which the events of 1803 brought to a crisis. Between 1723, when the Hyderabad Subadar, or provincial governor, partially shook off the control of the Moghal Empire and the year 1766, when the Company took over certain territory, and agreed to furnish the Nizam with a subsidiary force for his defence against external foes, the Nizam's position was very precarious. The French and the English were fighting for the mastery of southern India, while the ambitious ruler of Mysore on the south, and the Marathas on the north and west, threatened at any moment to crush Hyderabad between them. Intestine discord, and the weakness inseparable from the rule of a foreign dynasty, alien as it was to the people of the Dekhan in religion and habits, added largely to the dangers from without. The alliance entered into with the British in 1776, further strengthened by the offensive and defensive agreement concluded by Lord Cornwallis in 1790, alone saved the Nizam from these perils. A few years later, however, the British, embarrassed by their engagements with the

Peshwa, could lend no helping hand at the moment when the Marathas revived their claims against Hyderabad. As a consequence the Nizam, left to himself, was in 1795 compelled to sign the humiliating convention of Kardla, by which he surrendered territories yielding £350,000 a year, submitted to a present exaction of £3,100,000, and bound himself to pay an annual tribute to Poona. The only hope for Hyderabad in the future lay in a British alliance, and this Lord Wellesley granted in 1798. By the treaty of the 1st of September in that year the subsidiary force was made permanent and increased to six battalions, being again raised by another treaty in 1800 to eight battalions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry. The payment of this force was guaranteed by a territorial security, and it was settled by article 12 of the treaty of 1800, that in case of war the subsidiary force should be "joined by six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse of his Highness's own troops, with their requisite train of artillery and stores of every kind." Events soon compelled the British to call attention to this obligation, but the Nizam, now relieved from the pressure of his enemies, thought little of his engagements. The fall of Seringapatam, with the death of Tippu on the 4th of May, 1799, had already removed one danger from Hyderabad, and when the Maratha war of 1803-1804 broke out, the British found their ally neither inclined nor prepared to perform his part of the treaty of 1800. He hoped, no doubt, that the Marathas and the English would wear each other out. The Duke of Wellington in the course of his march through the Dekhan met with nothing but chaos. Not only was there no army to assist him, but the Nizam's Government was unable to keep the country free from hordes of banditti. He therefore represented to the

British authorities the urgent need for a reform of the Nizam's army, and for the maintenance of a national force to prevent "annihilation of the Government of the Suba of the Dekhan," while he sternly reprimanded his Highness for acts which savoured more of hostility than of alliance. Notwithstanding these grounds of complaints the Marquis of Wellesley admitted his ally to the fruits of his victory, and even conferred upon him a large tract of country taken from the Marathas, including the Berar districts. Lord Cornwallis, who had little sympathy with the policy of his predecessor, was also forced to write on the 21st of August, 1805:—

> Your Highness must be aware that the obligation of the defensive alliance cannot be considered to render the British Government responsible for the security of your Government against the evils of internal confusion and disorder originating in the defect of those arrangements which it is the duty of an independent State to establish and maintain.

After the withdrawal of the subsidiary force into its cantonments, a British officer, Lieutenant Russell, was, at the wish of the Nizam, deputed to undertake the reorganisation of his military forces. In 1813 the reformed force consisted of 17 European officers, 267 native officers, and 3652 rank and file, whose cost was made a first charge upon the revenues of Berar. But in the course of the next thirty years the whole administration of the country fell into the greatest disorder, and the force as then reconstituted was constantly employed in suppressing rebellions provoked by the cruel oppression of the contractors to whom the public revenues were farmed out. From time to time the Government of Hyderabad was extricated from insolvency only by the aid of the British authorities, who capitalised annual payments due by them on account of the northern

Sarkars, or else made other unsecured advances. British officers were lent to assist the administration, but their efforts were frustrated by the native officials; and at last, in 1843, Chandu Lal, the minister, resigned on the ground that the credit of Hyderabad was exhausted. On the 2nd of May in that year Lord Ellenborough informed his Highness that if he required further advances for the pay of the contingent force of reformed troops, a territorial security would be demanded. Lord Hardinge repeated the warning. No efforts, however, were made to pay off the debt. Such was the state of affairs when Lord Dalhousie entered upon his office.

Although the pressure upon his own resources to meet the cost of rebellion in the Punjab was very great, the Governor-General was resolved that no hasty or extreme steps should be taken. From the very first he resisted all extreme counsels from home which seemed to him unjust to the Nizam. He had hardly taken his seat at Calcutta when the President of the Board wrote to him on the 24th of January, 1848, in these terms:—

> The Court and the Board have after some discussion agreed upon sending you instructions which will enable you to take a far more decisive course in regard to the Nizam than has hitherto been adopted.

Then to justify intervention he added that

> If the Nizam were left altogether free from our control it is morally certain he would soon work out his own ruin, and bring about that state of things which would, in accordance with the treaty, justify and call for our interposition. And when we do so interpose, it will be idle to be contented with anything short of absolute supremacy—in other words, the Nizam's territories must in that case be absorbed in the great Empire.

Without considering the suggestion thus made to him by the highest authority at the very commencement

of his rule, full credit cannot be done to Lord Dalhousie for the moderation which he showed in completing the Berar assignment. He lost no time in assuring the President of the Board that he would do his best to give effect to a policy of which the declared object was to avert the necessity for future and violent interference in the affairs of an ancient ally. At the same time he went on to give a warning:—

> If the policy had been to put the treaty into the fire and walk over him; or if it had been the old story of the wolf and the lamb over again—a policy which has abundance of advocates both in this country and at home—I am afraid I must have asked you to find some other hand to guide it.

Other causes than that of a determination not to be driven too far led to a pause in the settlement of the question. General Fraser, compelled by his daughter's illness to leave Hyderabad for a time, was replaced by Colonel Low, a man new to his position; and Fraser himself on his return to duty had to be checked in his eagerness to force matters to a determination. The following extract from a letter to Hobhouse, dated the 25th of March, 1850, brings into clearer light the forbearance shown by the Governor-General:—

> India in general is quite tranquil. There have been plundering parties of a few hundred men in the Berar of the Nizam's territories. General Fraser makes mountains of these mole-hills, sends me more official papers on the march of a Subadar's party of the contingent than were produced by the battle of Waterloo, and dins into the Government day after day with provoking pertinacity his one remedy, the assumption of the Government by us—that is, by himself. They are going from bad to worse, and to that it must in all probability come at last.

Lord Dalhousie was, however, determined that his interference with the independent state of Hyderabad

should be strictly limited. He was convinced that, on the one hand, the troops could not safely be allowed to drift into disorderly practices for lack of payment of their subsistence allowances. On the other hand, public tranquillity would be equally endangered if sudden and large reductions were made in the force. He therefore caused the Nizam to be informed in October, 1848, that whilst the soldiers must be paid, he would assist to introduce economies if his Highness would enter honestly into an examination of the condition of his country and undertake reforms. For more than a year nothing was done. Meanwhile the debt to the British Government increased to £550,000, and the Resident reported that his Highness was unwilling either to reduce the number of his troops or to effect reforms in his administration. This intelligence compelled the Governor-General to declare that the debt must be liquidated by the 31st of December, 1850. In the course of the following year further advances of pay were required, and the debt stood at £700,000. Lord Dalhousie therefore informed the Nizam that certain districts would be attached, as a temporary measure, for the maintenance of the contingent, and for the liquidation of the debt to the Company. The Nizam took alarm at this specific threat, and promised to pay a moiety of the debt at once, and the balance on the 31st of October, 1851. The Governor-General rejoiced at the prospect of settling matters without recourse to stronger measures, and writing to Lord Broughton on the 30th of July, 1851, he said :—

The Nizam has been effectively roused by my letter. I have now every hope that we shall be spared the necessity of taking territory, and that he will pay up his eighty lakhs before November. He sets apart certain districts exclusively for the payment of the

contingent. He vaguely promises to reduce the Arabs, etc., but plainly has no intention of doing it. And finally, he has again appointed Saraj-ul-Mull as his Diwan, certainly the best man in his dominions. If these points are acted up to, as I am inclined to think they will, the matter will be satisfactorily settled.

Forbearance is too often misunderstood by Indian princes, and the only outcome of so much patience was the liquidation of part of the debt. The balance soon began to mount up again. The Nizam refused to reduce either his bodyguard or the contingent, and the men of the latter had to borrow at a high rate of interest in order to maintain themselves and their families. The time had now arrived when, notwithstanding the distraction caused by events in Burma, the disregard shown at Hyderabad to the representations of the Resident and to the obligations of treaty could no longer be tolerated. An end must be put to the evasions of the Nizam, and to the destitution to which the contingent was reduced. Colonel Low was therefore directed to demand an interview with His Highness, and to lay before him a memorandum of the debt of £450,000, and a draft treaty on the subject of the contingent. In his comprehensive minute, dated the 30th of March, 1853, the Governor-General explained his motives in the following terms:—

The monthly subsidy for which the Resident maintains a perpetual wrestle with the Diwan, and which transforms the representative of the British Government, by turns, into an importunate creditor, and a bailiff in execution, is the pay of the contingent. Were that source of demand and dispute once adjusted, there is no Native State in India whose relations with the British Government would, as far as we know, be more friendly and unruffled. The Nizam has been our ally for much more than half a century. This Government disclaims not only the intention but the wish of doing any act by which the independence of the Nizam can be in any way impaired.

Having dealt with the nature of the evil, the Governor-General proceeded to suggest the cure, placing on record his own opinion that if the Nizam refused to maintain the contingent, he was not by treaty bound to do so. At the same time he observed that the present ruler of Hyderabad had acquiesced in maintaining the force which his predecessors consented to establish, and had repeatedly declared his desire for its continuance. He was therefore not only liable for the cost of it, but also bound, if he desired its continuance, to provide effectually for its charges in future. The object of the proposed treaty was to make "a permanent and a mutually satisfactory settlement." With this object Lord Dalhousie sketched an outline of the treaty which he wished to conclude, and made the following abstract of its terms:—

The contingent force is formally established, to be maintained by the Government of India, and officered and controlled in all respects thereby. The fullest provision is made for its use by the Nizam during peace, while its abuse is guarded against on behalf of his subjects. Provision is also made for its use by the British Government in time of war, in the same manner as the force for which it is substituted. The Nizam is bound by this treaty to make over in perpetuity certain districts for the support of the contingent. And as an inducement to His Highness to consent to this arrangement, and in further proof of the friendship of the Government of India, these districts are declared to be accepted in full satisfaction not only for the pay of the contingent, but also for the interest of debt and for other annual payments due by the Nizam, and even for the principal sum of debt amounting to about half a million sterling. These terms are mutually advantageous to both the contracting parties. The Nizam especially will save a large amount of annual payments now made, and he will gain, besides an additional support to his throne, the very considerable aggregate sum just now mentioned. The Government of India will suffer a large immediate sacrifice; but it will gain the settlement of a vexatious question; and its

pecuniary loss will, from the nature of the country transferred, be eventually made good under our management and by our improving care.

Advantageous as these terms were, Lord Dalhousie anticipated, and his anticipations were correct, that the Nizam would not agree to so complete a cession of the districts. In that event the Resident was to ask for the assignment of their revenues, "the districts to be managed by the Government of India, and the civil administration fully made over to it, while the sovereignty over them remains with the Nizam." If that settlement were refused, then a third alternative was offered to the Nizam, namely, "the contingent must cease to exist." In this last case provision was to be made in the interests of the public peace for the gradual disbandment of the force. The arrears due to the men, and the regular payment of those retained during the gradual disbandment, were to be secured by the temporary assignment of specified districts. From the same source the debt to the Government of India, together with the outstanding advances made by it, was to be liquidated. Then "when all this shall have been effected from the revenues of the districts assigned, they will be restored to His Highness." Such was the third of the three courses offered to the Nizam. Scant justice has been done to the memory of Lord Dalhousie in respect of the Berar Treaty; and one can only assume that the writer who, perhaps unconsciously, borrowing a phrase from the minute just quoted, described the conduct of the Governor-General as "taking a sheriff's[1] officer's advantage of the Nizam," wrote without full knowledge of the facts. Lord Dalhousie resisted pressure put upon him by two Presidents of the

[1] Sir Edwin Arnold's *Marquis of Dalhousie's Administration*, vol. ii. p. 200.

Board. Even Sir Charles Wood wrote on the 8th of May, 1853, "What are you going to do with the Nizam? Everybody seems to suppose that he cannot administer his own affairs much longer." But Lord Dalhousie's hand was not to be forced. As we have seen, he rejected the counsel of interference offered by the Resident; year after year he extended the date of payment; and it was with genuine satisfaction that he accepted an instalment of the ever-increasing obligations. Finally, he offered His Highness a choice of solutions by one of which the contingent would have been abolished, and the hypothecated districts restored when the debt was discharged.

To this last proposal the Nizam demurred; but he accepted with gratification the second of the alternatives offered to him, and two of Lord Dalhousie's successors, Lord Canning and Lord Curzon, have built upon the foundation of forbearance and good faith which their predecessor laid for them. The treaty concluded on the 21st of May, 1853, was honourable to all parties. It reaffirmed the maintenance of perpetual peace and friendship between the two Governments. It regulated the use of the subsidiary force in times of peace and of war. It relieved the Nizam from specific and general obligations to render aid in the event of hostilities, and replaced the existing contingent by an auxiliary force called the Hyderabad contingent, consisting of 5000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and four batteries of artillery. It provided for their regular payment, for the liquidation of the debts to the British Government, and for other incidental charges, by the assignment of certain districts, including the Berars, "to the exclusive management of the British Resident, for the time being, at Hyderabad." The British Government on its part

undertook "to render accounts of its stewardship, and to pay the surplus to the Nizam." Such were the terms of the final settlement, and the spirit in which Lord Dalhousie devised and concluded it was that of a friend to the Nizam who desired to protect his ally from interference, and from the serious dangers of having to deal with "an importunate creditor or a bailiff in execution." Sir Charles Wood wrote on the 19th of August, 1853, "I am very glad of your settlement of the Nizam's affairs. The only point in your treaty which I doubt about is the accountability to him, and the paying over of any surplus." In short, such criticism as the Governor-General incurred was levelled at his excess of generosity.

The rule of avoiding interference in Native States, which has been illustrated by Lord Dalhousie's attitude during the civil war in Bahawalpur, and by his treatment of the question of the Nizam's contingent, was also proved by its exception. The Governor-General, in his minute dated the 27th of May, 1851, already quoted,[1] recognised a duty of intervention when the actions of the Native prince tended "to the injury of the subjects or of the allies of the British Government." Accordingly, when a petty chief in North Cachar engaged in hostilities with his neighbours in defiance of his agreements, the Government of India visited his offence with the penalty of annexation. The circumstances under which the sons of Tularam Senapati lost their estates gave no opening for controversy. At a time when the Burmese were extending their dominion in Assam, and, after the conquest of Manipur in 1819, were proceeding to annex Cachar, the Indian Government supported a native Raja, named Govind

[1] See page 114 above.

Chandra, in expelling the invaders. This Raja, with whom a treaty was made by the Company, was assassinated in 1830; and since he had no heir, Lord William Bentinck applied the doctrine of lapse, and annexed the country in 1832. Before the death of the Raja, one of his officers had rebelled against his master's authority in Northern Cachar, and this officer's son, named Tularam, had in 1824 taken part with the Burmese invaders. When Cachar was annexed, Tularam impudently claimed the country as his own. His claim was of course disallowed. At the same time he was permitted to retain possession of a tract north of the Naga Hills, comprising some 2160 square miles, mainly of hill and forest, under an engagement concluded in 1834, by which he was bound to commence no military operations against his neighbours without previous sanction. It was expressly stipulated that if he failed to abide by his undertaking the Company might take possession of his estates. On the death of Tularam in 1850, his sons broke the terms of the agreement, habitually disregarded the orders of the British, and without permission engaged in military operations in the course of which much blood was shed. Such behaviour could not be allowed to go unpunished. Orders were therefore given on the 27th of August, 1853, for the annexation of the tract, suitable provision as usual being made for the family of the late Tularam. The country itself was of no value, having an estimated net revenue of £100 a year, but its tranquillity was a matter of public importance. The Governor-General's proceedings passed by without any notice, and it may be assumed that they were approved.

A system which required the rulers of the protected states to be strong enough to deal with civil distur-

bances and to carry out their engagements left no place for "sham kings." Apart from this general consideration, Lord Dalhousie was too honest a man to bolster up semblances of royalty without royal powers. Thus he had objected to the proposal[1] made by Hobhouse on October the 23rd, 1848, for restoring a sham Maharaja to the throne of Lahore in "complete subjection without the name." He felt that appearances without the reality of authority were sure to shake Native confidence in our good faith. His policy towards the King of Delhi, the Nawab of the Carnatic, the Raja of Tanjore, and the adopted son of the Peshwa, was based upon this view. It is unfortunate that his proposals with regard to the House of Delhi could not be carried out before the mutiny, for the aged King survived the events of 1857; but apart from this, the Governor-General was practically overruled from home.[2] In February, 1849, he heard of the death of prince Dara Bakht, the recognised heir-apparent of Mahomed Suraj-ud-din, otherwise known as Bahadur Shah, King of Delhi; and since the next brother and natural heir, Fakir-ud-din, was only thirty years old, and born "long after the family had ceased to reign, and not until its sovereignty had been for many years a mere pageant," he considered that with the death of the King the existence of the dynasty of Timur should be closed. In a despatch dated the 16th of February, 1849, he therefore objected to the recognition of Fakir-ud-din as heir-apparent to the kingship, urging that upon his father's death he should be styled

[1] See vol. i. p. 238.

[2] In *The Indian Mutiny*, by Charles Ball, vol. i. p. 458, Lord Dalhousie's "omission to take advantage of the sanction accorded to his proposals" is referred to. The actual facts of the case were evidently not known to the writer.

prince, but should be called upon to vacate the palace. He also suggested that the prince and his immediate family should alone be exempted from judicial process after the demise of the King. Opinions were divided at Leadenhall Street, and eventually Hobhouse brought his influence to bear in favour of a modified proposal. At first, however, he was entirely in agreement with the Governor-General, to whom he wrote on the 3rd of October, 1849, in these terms :—

> I may tell you confidentially that the Court of Directors are inclined to differ with you on the Delhi question. But I entirely agree with you, and have requested the Chairman to withdraw a proposed despatch, and either to send one coinciding with your views, or to allow you to act as you propose without noticing your recommendation. In either case you will have your own way ; and the course you may pursue, even if you have no orders, will be approved by the home authorities. If the Court give way, so much the better; if they do not give way, then the despatch will be written from Cannon Row, and the Court will sign it—that is all the difference.

Writing by the next mail in the same spirit, the President said : "Let our friends in Leadenhall Street suggest what they please, your programme will be approved by the home authorities."

Meanwhile, however, Hogg wrote to his friend Lord Dalhousie to warn him of the storm that was brewing ; while General Sir A. Galloway, the Chairman of the Court, addressed him on the 7th of December, 1849, in these words :—

> The fact is that when, as is proposed, the palace shall no longer be permitted to be a sanctuary, but opened to our police, and its inmates, saving the King and his children, subjected to our courts of law, this of itself will abate the enormities which you have described as existing within its walls. Then as a place of strength being in possession of the King and commanding our

magazine, without artillery it cannot command any position beyond musket range, even if they had muskets. But in reality the palace is in military possession of our troops, and in truth the King and the royal family are little better than state prisoners in one of our forts. . . . As to depriving the lawful heir of the title of Badshaw, the Court was most strongly opposed to it. They perceive no object that can be gained by it of any moment; while it is possible that much evil may arise out of it by the indignity it would offer to the Mahomedan nationality. I fear that if the title were abolished the evacuation of the palace would become hopeless. The prince would of course be enraged by the indignity; and if he has one drop of the blood of Timur in his veins, he would rather sacrifice his life than quit the palace of his ancestors by compulsion.

With such views held by the Chairman, it is not surprising that nineteen of the Directors opposed, and only four—namely, Mangles, Hogg, Wrightman, and General Caulfield—supported the recommendations of the Governor-General. Hobhouse, confronted by this opposition, began to seek for a compromise. He pointed out to Lord Dalhousie that the opinions of the members of his Council had not been sent home, and, while declaring that he would still support the Governor-General, added, "I really am surprised that the Court should attach so much importance to the question. To me it appears confessedly insignificant;" and on the 22nd of December, 1849, he repeated the phrase with the remark, "but I regret to have so large a majority of my Leadenhall friends so strongly opposed to me in a business which is sure to give rise to much discussion both in and out of Parliament."

Hobhouse, however, fulfilled the letter of his promise. He compelled the Court to sign a despatch, dated the 16th of January, 1850, which gave sanction to the proposals of the Governor-General. At the same time

he wrote privately on the 23rd of the same month, confessing that he had never expected so strong an opposition, and that he had not as yet consulted either Lord John Russell or his colleagues on the subject. After placing before Lord Dalhousie every objection that could be raised to the proposals which had just received his official sanction, the President made this appeal:—

> I have the firmest reliance on your disposition to do what is most prudent, and I feel sure that should you see reason to alter your opinions, you would do so and inform the Court of the change.

Similar appeals were addressed from other quarters. As a consequence the Governor-General, on the 2nd of April, 1850, laid before his colleagues a minute in which he stated that, "with unfeigned deference to the opinions of those to whom I have alluded, I still hold the views that I then expressed." But while he could not give way in the matter of reducing the legal privileges of the great mass of the inmates of the palace, he was prepared to yield as to the withdrawal of the kingly title from the King's successor, and to use suasion rather than force "to remove him and his family from the palace in Delhi to that situated some miles off, and known as the Kutub palace." On hearing of this amended proposal, Hobhouse wrote warmly on the 7th of May, 1850.

> Your giving way will win golden opinions from everybody, and will enable you to have your way on other disputed matters. Of course you have not changed your opinion—nor have I—but I think you have determined wisely not to act upon your views.

Even the subordinates of the offices could not repress their satisfaction. Waterfield, the Secretary to the Board, wrote to Courtenay on the 7th of June:

Lord Dalhousie's conduct is a model for a man who, high in office, but still subordinate to some authority, withdraws his intentions, but does not change his opinions. Oh that all minutes were written in a similar tone and spirit!

The subject of this eulogy relished neither the compliment nor the abandonment of his purpose. On the 7th of February, 1852, he wrote to Sir Charles Wood in these words:—

I have carried my point at Delhi. By a secret negotiation the young prince has been assured of the succession, and he on his part has agreed to all the conditions of the Court, and has further agreed to relinquish the palace at Delhi. This further point would not have been pressed if he had objected. He did not, however. I regard it as of great importance. It is only to be regretted that the silly sentimentality of the Court interposed any impediment to taking the crown as well as the palace.

Even this measure of success did not satisfy him. More than four years later when bowed with disease and ordered by his doctors to forget India, he wrote on the 1st of September, 1856, to yet another President, Vernon Smith, as follows:—

The last mail says that the heir apparent of Delhi has died. If this be so, I hope Lord Canning will seize this favourable opportunity for renewing the proposal I made in 1849, that the kingly title should be allowed to die out. The Court then agreed, but so reluctantly that I did not think it right to act on such a consent. I think the Court would agree without reluctance now.

It can hardly be doubted now that Lord Dalhousie took a sounder view of the political situation than the Court of Directors which thwarted him, or the Board of Control which gave consent with one hand and took it away with another. The Governor-General was compelled to make some concessions when even graver questions than that of the kingly title were

at issue. He maintained, however, his opinion to the last, and pressed it upon the attention of the three Presidents of the Board. They failed to see how wise were his counsels. But they who on Monday the 11th of May, 1857, witnessed the attack made from the palace upon the Delhi magazine, and the cold-blooded murder of defenceless European prisoners, regardless of sex or age, murder of which the courts of that palace were the theatre, and to which the emblem of royalty in the kingly title of Bahadur Shah gave aim and purpose—they at all events must have felt that Lord Dalhousie was right and his superiors were wrong. They and not he were wanting in imagination.

> Yet, forsooth, had men looked seaward, they had seen the gathering cloud,
> And the little wind arising which should one day pipe so loud.

There is room for difference of opinion on one point, whether it was wise on the part of Lord Dalhousie to give effect to a part of his proposals when he was not allowed to carry out the whole of them. So long as the kingly title was enjoyed by Bahadur Shah or his descendant, and so long as the representative of the royal family was allowed to reside even in the neighbourhood of the imperial city, was it wise to tear from him empty symbols of majesty which were only displayed in the walled prison of his palace? Probably the Governor-General felt that the steps he was taking would inevitably lead to the withdrawal of the royal title, and strengthen the hands of his successor in getting the matter reconsidered. The monarchs of Persia and Afghanistan were wiser in their generation than the East India Company. If they spared the lives of those whom they had dethroned, they either

put out their eyes or otherwise rendered them incapable of resuming authority. The British believed in mercy and trusted to time. But Eastern people are apt to regard mercy as weakness and to measure time by centuries and not by generations. The same difficulty recurred in later days on the conquest of Upper Burma, and then the ex-King and his two Queens were wisely removed far from Ava to Ratnagiri on the western coast of Bombay. The situation at Delhi was a very difficult one, and if it could only be solved piecemeal in consequence of a generous but misplaced sentiment which was apt to judge eastern questions by western standards, then it may be held that Lord Dalhousie acted for the best under the circumstances. Another view of the matter is taken by a French writer, M^is. de la Mazelière, who writes as follows :—[1]

> Incapables de prendre une décision les directeurs ne changèrent rien à la situation de Bahâdur Shâh, et lui reconnurent un héritier, mais point celui qu'il désirait ; cet héritier devait quitter Delhi de jour même de son avènement. Agir ainsi c'était se faire du grand Mongol un ennemi sans lui enlever son influence.

If want of foresight was only too common at the time, there was at least one man in India during Lord Dalhousie's rule who looked ahead, and in discussing the future of the Nawab of the Carnatic took the same view of titular sovereignties. Lord Harris, Governor of Madras from 1854 to 1859, used words which the Governor-General in his minutes, dated the 14th of November, and the 19th of December, 1855, entirely endorsed. The Governor observed that "the semblance of royalty, without any of the power, is a mockery of authority which must be pernicious—that it is impolitic

[1] *Civilisation Indienne*, tome ii. p. 94.

and unwise to allow a pageant to continue, which though it has been politically harmless, may at any time become a nucleus for sedition and agitation," and that inasmuch as the whole legislative authority rested in the Company, and the habits of the Nawabs had been morally most pernicious, "there are strong reasons for altering the relations of the British Government with the Arcot family and changing its position." Accordingly on the decease of the Nawab, Mahomed Ghaus, in October, 1855, Lord Dalhousie, then about to embark for Rangoon on his last visit to that place, recorded his opinion that the title of Nawab of the Carnatic should not be continued to Azim Jah, uncle of the deceased, but that liberal provision should be made for the liquidation of the debts of the family, and for their support. His decision has been severely criticised by Arnold, and defended both as to law and policy by Sir Charles Jackson. The discussion turned upon the issue whether or no the treaty of the 31st of July, 1801, signed by Lord Clive, establishing Azim-ud-Daula in the rank and state of his ancestors, and vesting the administration in the Company, created a personal or a hereditary title. Lord Dalhousie agreed with Lord Harris that the treaty was purely personal, and although in 1819 and again in 1835, descendants of Azim-ud-Daula occupied the throne, this was only by the express pleasure and permission of the British Government. The considerations of policy which on those two occasions had recommended such special sanction, now no longer operated, and it was therefore decided to put an end to the title, privileges, and immunities. In a brief letter, dated the 22nd of December, 1855, the President of the Board, Vernon Smith, expressed himself as "quite disposed to agree

with your Lordship as to the lapse in this instance [Tanjore] as well as that of the Nawab of the Carnatic." In later years Azam Jah repeatedly appealed to the home authorities, but they declined to re-open the decision as to the abolition of the title of Nawab of the Carnatic, although in 1867 a new and inferior title of prince of Arcot was conferred upon him and his heirs by Her Majesty under letters patent. A pension, the dignity of a salute, and certain exemptions from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts were also granted. Thus, after frequent consideration of the matter, the views held by the Governments of India and Madras as to the construction of the treaty of 1801, and as to the question of policy were finally confirmed.

The Tanjore succession gave rise to controversy in respect of incidents which occurred after Lord Dalhousie's retirement, and for which he was in no way responsible. Sivaji, the last Raja of Tanjore, died in October, 1855, leaving neither son nor collateral male heir, but two daughters and sixteen widows. Since 1799 the Company had taken over the administration, and nothing had been left to the titular sovereign except authority in the fort and its immediate vicinity, subject to the control of the British. The Court of Directors held on the 16th of April, 1856, that "by no law or usage has the daughter of a Hindu Raja any right of succession to a Raj," and that it was "entirely out of the question that we should create such a right for the sole purpose of perpetuating a titular principality at a great cost to the public revenues." Such was also the view of Lord Dalhousie, who took care to observe that he was not dealing with a dependent sovereignty, but with a tributary state left without any lawful successor and therefore a dead

sovereignty, which "has come to a natural end. I think it would be unwise to seek to restore it by unusual means. The family should be treated with great liberality and kindness. Every fair degree of consideration should be shown to the place which was the seat of a native sovereignty. But the province should be incorporated in form, as it has long been in fact, with the dominions of the British Crown; and the revenues should be applied in such manner as will best promote the public good." It was not the fault of the Governor-General that his liberal intentions towards the family were not carried out after his departure. With the seizure of the personal and private property of the Ranis he had nothing to do; and if closer attention had been given to dates and facts, it is difficult to believe that any writer would have been guilty of the bitter remarks which have imputed to him—"resort to the technicalities of the law courts," and "a steady policy of seizing every chance of aggrandisement." Be that as it may, the reader has now before him the grounds on which Lord Dalhousie acted in dealing with titular sovereignties, the decisions of the Court of Directors, the object-lesson afforded by Delhi, and the subsequent confirmation by Secretaries of State of acts done by the Presidents of the Board or the Court to whose joint authorities they have succeeded.

This is perhaps the proper place to refer to one other decision passed in 1851, that which put an end to the allowance given to the late Peshwa, Baji Rao, who for more than a quarter of a century had drawn the splendid life-pension of eight hundred thousand rupees, which Sir John Malcolm had too liberally granted, and from it and from the proceeds of his landed estate had accumulated immense savings.

On his death, there was no question of maintaining the dignity of an ex-Peshwa, but the Commissioner had recommended a continuance of a portion of the princely pension to an adopted son called Dondu Pant, the notorious Nana Sahib, and the Lieutenant-Governor had expressed an opinion adverse to that of his subordinate. On the 19th of February, 1851, Lord Dalhousie wrote to inform Hobhouse that he did not intend to be misled by sentiment, and Hobhouse, who in the meantime had become Lord Broughton, expressed no dissent. Yet Kaye describes the action of Lord Dalhousie as "harsh," and Arnold seems to regard it as "grasping." There is no reason to doubt that the Peshwa's allowance was personal, and it is equally certain that the Bithur estate was continued rent free to the Nana Sahib, whose subsequent misuse of his resources might be quoted in justification of the Governor-General's decision. Lord Dalhousie's reasons, however, may be left to carry their own conviction as recorded on the 15th of September, 1851 :—

In thirty-three years the Peshwa received the enormous sum of more than two and a half millions sterling. He had no charges to maintain, no sons of his own, and has bequeathed twenty-eight lacs to his family. Those who remain have no claim whatever on the consideration of the British Government. They have no claim on its charity, because the income left to them is amply sufficient for them.

CHAPTER V

ANNEXATIONS BY LAPSE

General policy of non-interference—Issues raised by annexations—Lord Auckland's declaration in 1842—Views of the home authorities—The "law of lapse" explained—Sir C. Wood's views as to successions in independent states—Lord Dalhousie's principles of annexation—Strictly limited to Hindu dependent states—Hobhouse suggests annexation of Satara—History of that state—Views of the Bombay Government—Lord Dalhousie proposes and Court of Directors approve annexation—Question raised in Parliament—Misleading passage in Lord Dalhousie's Satara minute—Annexation of Jaitpur and Jhansi—Sambalpur annexed and misgoverned—Baghat annexed, but re-granted after the mutiny—Udaipur treated as a lapse, but afterwards added to Sarguja—Lord Dalhousie's mistake in treating Karauli as a dependent state—But his decision as to the succession correct—Annexation of Nagpur—Liberal treatment of the late ruling family—The Bhosla fund.

THE account given in the last chapter will have explained and illustrated the excessive regard which Lord Dalhousie had for the sovereign rights of the rulers of protected Native States. He called them "independent," and he treated them as such, allowing them to remain uncontrolled by those frequent engagements which his successors have found necessary, and carrying his doctrine of non-interference to the limit of allowing civil war in Bahawalpur. When their chiefs inflicted injuries upon the Company's Government the means of redress to which he resorted were those recognised by the law of

nations. Rulers who took the sword had only themselves to blame for the consequences. If kingdoms like Lahore and Pegu had provoked conquest and suffered the penalty of annexation, smaller chieftains like the sons of Tularam who violated good faith could not expect to be forgiven. The policy of non-interference could only be upheld by strictness in punishing flagrant rupture of treaties or engagements. On the other hand, when the Nizam became deeply indebted to the Company, ample time was given to him to meet his liabilities, notwithstanding that the needs of the Government of India were urgent, and in the general settlement which was ultimately arrived at the greatest forbearance was shown to him. The Mir of Khairpur committed a deliberate fraud, and the lenient penalty exacted for his forgery was the restitution of districts to which he had no title. The Raja of Sikkim insulted the British Government, seized its representative, and as a consequence was compelled by force to give up a tract of 1670 square miles. The removal of titular sovereigns was a necessary complement to the doctrine of independence. There was no place in the system of foreign relations with Indian princes for mock sovereignties. So far, then, as this biography has gone there was nothing in the field of foreign policy to justify the epithets of "grasping," "harsh," and "unjust," so recklessly flung at the Marquis of Dalhousie after his death. It has now to be seen whether the circumstances attending his annexations merit these and even stronger terms of censure.

To impute the mutiny of the Sepoys to one man and in particular to a single act in his eventful life, is as if one should blame or praise one set of figures in a long column on account of the total. Yet the policy of

lapse pursued by Lord Dalhousie was in 1857 and for many years afterwards treated as the main cause of that outbreak. Time and reason have now produced a strong reaction against the violence of expression which compared his annexation to "counting out the spoil of brigands in a wood," and represented the Governor-General as the author of "many unwise and unjust acts." Mr. Bosworth Smith shows a truer conception of public opinion when he refers to Lord Dalhousie in more measured language as an administrator whose "superlative merits were temporarily obscured by the share which his annexations were then supposed to have had in bringing on the mutiny." That the annexation of Oudh added fuel to the fire of discontent need not be denied, but here it must be remembered that Oudh was annexed as an act of State, and with no reference whatever to the law of lapse which is the subject of this chapter. Opinions may differ as to whether it was in any particular case wise to refuse sanction to the adoption of a son by a Hindu ruler who had no lineal male descendant. Granted, again, that sound policy and justice permitted annexation in certain circumstances, the question remains whether the Governor-General took a correct view of the circumstances in those cases where he applied the rule. To assist a judgment on these points an endeavour will be made presently to explain the rule adopted by Lord Dalhousie and the facts of each application of it. But before that part of the subject is reached two propositions must be proved. The first is that Lord Dalhousie did not invent the doctrine, and that, so far from extending its application, he restricted it to "dependent" states. It is true that the occasions for applying the policy were more frequent in his time than in that of his predecessors. But it was

an accident that between 1848 and 1856 so many ruling princes of dependent states should have died without male heirs. The second proposition is that considerations of justice only enter into the discussion in a very qualified sense. The expression "unjust acts" must be examined with proper regard to the fact that between suzerain and dependent powers there is no law of man by which the issues of justice or conformity to law can be settled. If an appeal to the law of God is intended, the point for determination is whether Lord Dalhousie's decisions commended themselves to his own conscience, to the judgment of the Government he served, and to public opinion.

Certain it is that the Governor-General not only acted according to rule and precedent, but was even encouraged to apply the rule of lapse by the authorities at home. So far back as 1834, the Court of Directors had laid down their policy in regard to certain adoptions in these terms:—"Wherever it is optional with you to give or to withhold your consent to adoptions, the indulgence should be the exception and not the rule, and should never be granted but as a special mark of approbation." In the course of building up their dominion, the Company had granted protection to numerous countries over which some upstart, some military adventurer, or some rebellious subject of a former dynasty, had acquired rule by violence. The British took the facts as they found them, and attempted no general investigation into titles. They suffered the states to exist because they were in existence. They simply brought into their system a number of separate groups just as they happened to find them at the moment when they resolved to substitute order for anarchy. They imposed a sudden peace upon hundreds

of princes and chiefs whether they held their own or had usurped the rights of others. Their toleration went so far as to forgive gross injuries. Occasionally they had saved, out of the wreckage of a state that made war upon them, a dependent principality like Satara, which they bestowed as an act of policy upon a ruling family. Oudh itself was restored to its Wazir after his defeat at Buxar. There were states which British policy had called into existence, and the same policy might, if it could do so without breach of public faith, limit or terminate their sovereign rights. There were other principalities of independent and definite political existence with as good a title to sovereignty as the British could boast. But the majority of the Native States that still exist owe their preservation, and in rare cases their existence, to the policy pursued by the company of merchants who resolutely tried at first to avoid extension of their dominion. After the Pindari war a new idea dominated the British, and by the year 1834 they clearly foresaw their future responsibilities, and desired to consolidate their territory. It was thereafter contrary to their aims to re-grant states. It was better for themselves they thought, and for their protected allies, to take advantage of their reversionary rights, and to add to British dominion any countries that might lapse owing to the failure of heirs. It was in pursuance of this policy that in 1840 sanction to adopt an heir was refused to the widows of the Angria family who ruled in Kolaba. So, too, it has already been shown in a previous chapter[1] that Mandavi was annexed and treated as a lapse by Lord Dalhousie's predecessors. Again, in August, 1842, the titular dignity of the Nawabs of Surat was extinguished,

[1] Vol. i. chap. iv. p. 133.

and the occasion was taken by Lord Auckland's Government to declare their intention "to persevere in the one clear and direct course of abandoning no just and honourable accession of territory or revenue, while all existing claims of right are at the same time scrupulously maintained." There was neither shame felt nor secrecy employed in this pronouncement of public policy which was made before Lord Dalhousie took office. His appointment as Governor-General was followed by no change of policy in the treatment of lapses. On the contrary, in a letter dated the 7th of February, 1849, Sir John Hobhouse wrote as follows:—

> It seems fated that you should have plenty to do in your day. Who knows but that in a plain coat you may add more millions of men to the Empire than any one of your predecessors in epaulets? Of course all this will or may be done against the inclination of everyone concerned, particularly of yourself.

The same language was used by nearly every President of the Board of Control from the beginning to the end of Lord Dalhousie's term of service as Governor-General. Sir Charles Wood, it is true, adopted a more cautious attitude, and after the mutiny laid down a new policy, which he set forth in the following passage of his despatch to the Government of India, dated the 26th of July, 1860:—"It is not by the extension of our empire that its permanence is to be secured, but by the character of British rule in the territories already committed to our care; and by practically demonstrating that we are as willing to respect the rights of others as we are capable of maintaining our own." Yet even he was ready to annex "with a good case." Fate indeed, as Hobhouse had prophesied,

provided the Marquis of Dalhousie with many occasions for taking with a good case, and a less strong or consistent Governor-General might have held back. But he regarded public policy more than his own personal inclinations or the criticisms which he expected. He never closed his eye to the vision of railways, canals, and other public works which he designed for the benefit of India, including the Native States, and which he could not carry out without consolidating the scattered dominions of the Company, and improving the revenues. Therefore he accepted the occasions which presented themselves for removing breaks of gauge in jurisdiction and administration, and for bringing into order and unity the British territories which had been acquired with no systematic design. On the 24th of April, 1854, Sir Charles Wood wrote with reference to one of these occasions—

> I agree with you in wishing that Nagpur had not fallen in just at present. It might have waited with advantage to us, and with no detriment to its inhabitants, as I hear that it was tolerably administered. I am by no means impatient to absorb all these states, though I suppose it will come to this in the end. However, we cannot control the time of falling in, and it would be absurd to make a new grant simply because the time was inopportune.

The expression "new grant" deserves notice. The common phrase "annexation" lays emphasis upon a single, and the most invidious, feature of the policy of lapse. It is to be borne in mind that the states brought under British dominion by the so-called "law of lapse" were states which could not, according to the practice of the day, be continued under Native rule without a formal re-grant to an adopted son when the dying ruler had no lineal male descendant entitled to succeed.

"Law of lapse" is as loose an expression as that employed in the condemnation of the Governor-General's proceedings as unjust, or by himself in his own defence that he had acted with justice. Those who appeal to justice must understand the narrow sense in which such phrases apply. It was a well-established principle in India that in the absence of male issue the ruler of a subordinate or dependent state could not defeat the reversionary rights of his superior by introducing an adopted son, or bequeathing his principality to another without the sanction of that superior. Hindu law required for ceremonial purposes the continuance of the family by adoption. It recognised the right of the child adopted to succeed to the private property of the deceased adoptive father. But it drew a marked distinction between public and private estates, between a principality and personal property, and between sovereignty with its attributes and other property. The issue, whether the Native State should, in the circumstances under consideration, be continued or absorbed, rested with the overlord. In the time of the Peshwa, ready money was worth more than dominion over a state with a disputed succession. The Peshwa therefore usually sold the *sanad* or title to adopt to the highest bidder. He charged a *nazarana*, or succession duty, and if the party who paid it could not hold his own, the suzerain was ready to issue a second *sanad* on payment to someone else who could. The British Government had a perfect right either to follow this precedent or to introduce some other plan in regard to successions. Lord Dalhousie, with the approval of the Home Government, refused to sanction an adoption, when a dependent state lapsed for want of a male heir, if

he thought that public policy demanded annexation. But he made ample provision for the families of those who thus lost their sovereignties. They who condemn his acts as unjust forget that justice presupposes laws, and laws involve the existence of a society which can enforce its ideas of right and wrong. There never was, and there is not now in India, any supreme court having jurisdiction over states or property outside British India, and capable of deciding questions between the paramount power and its subordinate allies. Nor, again, does international law provide a remedy; for the Indian protected princes are not members of a society of nations. In the absence, then, of constitutional or international law, questions of right or wrong must be decided by the highest executive authorities, by the conscience of the chief actors, or by public or private judgments. The President of the Board, the Courts of Directors, and the public opinion of the time confirmed Lord Dalhousie's proceedings. Posterity has not reversed his decisions. If they are still challenged, his defence must lie in the vindication of his policy on grounds of public utility, and in the evidence that he applied that policy in each instance to the proper class of chiefships and in the circumstances in which a lapse had really occurred.

His guiding principles will be gathered from the following correspondence. On the 9th of May, 1854, the President of the Board complained that Lord Dalhousie had dealt with Karauli and Tehri without first referring home. He went on to express his own objections to adoptions, a view which after the mutiny he modified. He had already told the Governor-General that he was opposed to "far-fetched adoptions in order to defeat a lapse"; he now told him that in cases of

succession to an independent sovereignty where no question of lapse was raised, he preferred the selection of a competent ruler to an adoption. "I am," he wrote, "against bolstering up the system of adoption unnecessarily. If it has been the long-continued custom, and is strictly according to rule, I do not wish to break in upon it; but where these two conditions do not exist, and you still wish to maintain a Native ruler, I would place on the throne the Native whom I considered the best calculated to govern the country well, and be most acceptable to the people and friendly to us." By such means he thought that a guarantee might be afforded that the state would be governed well and friction with the British power be avoided. It may occasion surprise to those who have gained experience of the modern system, that it should have occurred neither to the President of the Board, nor to the Governor-General, that an adoption offered a more excellent way of attaining these objects. Since the mutiny, the plan of allowing an adoption with its long minority has been found the best means of introducing the temporary control of the paramount power, and correcting the abuses of the Native administration during such minority. Those who recognise the advantages of the new policy must bear in mind that such a solution was opposed to the rigid principle of non-interference in a Native State which was followed in 1850, and of which an instance has already been given in the case of Bahawalpur. True to that doctrine Lord Dalhousie replied warmly on the 29th of June, 1854:—

I repeat that a Hindu principality, such as Tehri, not tributary, nor subordinate, and not having the British Government as its paramount in the technical sense, has a perfect right to regulate its own succession; and the Government of India has no more

right to interfere with it than it has to meddle with the succession of France.

This unqualified declaration indicates at once the long interval between the doctrines now applied and the views of a former generation as put on paper by a Governor-General in the 'fifties. No one hears to-day of the "independence" of Native States, or compares the protected semi-sovereignties of India to the nation of France. The division between dependent and independent states, or between subordinate, tributary, and non-subordinate chiefships, has been swept away. Large or small, old or new, all Native States are recognised as equally entitled to protection, equally outside the sphere of British law, and equally liable to interference when the supreme necessity arises. If the object in view is to improve their administration and to insure their co-operation, it is attained without the sledge-hammer of annexation or any scruples about their independence.

In 1854 it was far otherwise. Reviewing his past course of action, Lord Dalhousie wrote on the 13th of June in that year :—

I had a definite principle of distinction in my mind, and I think it is a sound one. There are three chief classes of Hindu States in India.

1*st*. Hindu sovereignties which are not tributary, and which are not and never have been subordinate to a paramount power ;

2*nd*. Hindu sovereignties and chiefships which are tributary, and which owe subordination to the British Government as their paramount, in the place of the Emperor of Delhi, the Peshwa, etc. ;

3*rd*. Hindu sovereignties and chiefships created or revived by the sanad (grant) of the British Government.

Over principalities of the first class I contend that we have no power whatever, and have no right, except that of might, over their adoptions.

Principalities of the second class require our assent to adoption, which we have a right to refuse, but which policy would usually lead us to concede.

In the principalities of the third class I hold that succession should never be allowed to go by adoption.

Whatever we may think of this classification by the light of modern theories, it commended itself to Sir Charles Wood, who, on the 9th of August, expressed his views in these terms :—

To prevent mistakes I will tell you how I distinguish them.

First. States which have from a time antecedent to our rule been independent or quasi-independent, not tributary or owing more than nominal allegiance to any superior.

Secondly. States dating from a similar period, but owing their origin distinctly to a grant from some authority to which we have succeeded, and tributary.

Thirdly. States owing their origin to our grant or gift.

In the first class I apprehend that an adoption properly made ought, as a matter of course, to be recognised. In the second, we may or may not recognise it as we choose, recognition being the general practice. In the third, if heirs fail, according to the terms of our grant, we annex.

Such was the policy of annexation which Lord Dalhousie pursued in the case of seven states, and proposed half-heartedly to apply to Karauli; and it is evident that it was a policy of restricted application.[1] Yet there are many writers, besides Sir John Strachey, who still refer to Lord Dalhousie's rule of lapse as if it threatened the existence of every principality. Such language was perhaps natural when the excitement of the mutiny led men to indulge in bitter and exaggerated language. But it is time now to correct false impressions which took root in that heated atmosphere of contro-

[1] Nothing can be clearer than the explanation of his policy by the Marquis of Dalhousie, even in the case of Satara, on p. 35 of the Return "Rajah of Berar," ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 26th of July, 1854.

versy, and to challenge the statement that Lord Dalhousie's policy rendered the extinction of "nearly all the Native States of India a question of time only."[1]

Such a contingency never entered into the mind or the plans of the Governor-General, and it is due to his memory that we should remember how large a number of states in India fell in the first of his categories exempt from all danger of lapse. From Baluchistan along the whole northern border of India up to Burma, all states, except Kashmir and a few Hill states, were immune. In the next place, none but Hindu dynasties were threatened. Of them, the Rajput states, whether in Central India, Bombay, or Rajputana, could with rare exceptions claim to be neither tributary nor subordinate to the Peshwa, or to the Moghals, in the sense intended. The aboriginal chiefships protected by the forests and mountains of the Dekhan were equally secure from lapse. It is true that a large number of the smaller Hindu states came into the second category, but of them Lord Dalhousie expressly wrote that our policy would usually concede the right of adoption. Finally, none but dependent Hindu states were liable to the risk of lapse, and then only when sanction was necessary to adoption. In plain truth nothing either in the policy or in the actions of the Governor-General can be found to justify the popular error that he sought to suppress nearly all the Native States. His scheme was one of rectification and consolidation, and in carrying out that great plan he annexed about half-a-dozen principalities.

It was perhaps unfortunate that the question of annexing Satara came up for decision before the

1848.

[1] Sir John Strachey's *India*, 1903, p. 462.

Governor-General had time to make himself familiar with the complicated problem of the position of the Native States, and when his attention was occupied with rebellion in the Punjab. Not that fuller knowledge would have modified his action, but it certainly would have led him to qualify his language. It must also be noted that while Lord Dalhousie's mind was yet open, the very first letter which he received at Calcutta from Hobhouse, dated the 24th of December, 1847, contained this obvious incitement to annexation :—

> The death of the ex-Raja of Satara certainly comes at a very opportune moment. The reigning Raja is, I hear, in very bad health, and it is not at all impossible we may soon have to decide upon the fate of his territory. I have a very strong opinion that on the death of the present prince without a son, and no adoption should be permitted, this petty principality should be merged in the British Empire; and if the question is decided in my "day of sextonship," I shall leave no stone unturned to bring about that result. But, of course, I should like to have your opinion on the subject.

Did ever Governor-General enter upon a line of policy with stronger pressure from higher authority? But although Lord Dalhousie never sheltered himself under this pronouncement, his critics ought in honesty to have referred to it. For himself he was not long in discovering that Presidents of the Board began to waver when members of Parliament threatened proceedings in the House, and he therefore took care that his minutes and despatches should contain a full statement of his reasons for the course pursued by him. On the 7th of May, Hobhouse wrote to say that George Thompson and other members were agitating in favour of an adoption, and he added, "I am tired and never wish to hear Satara mentioned for the rest of my days."

Satara, however, gave rise to a controversy which was not set at rest for many a long day. The facts are not difficult to follow. This prosperous little state, situated in the Dekhan and interposing a long strip of foreign territory between the Company's large military stations of Poona and Belgaum, had originally been fixed upon as his retreat by Shahuji, the grandson of Sivaji, founder of the Maratha power. When Shahuji found that the real authority in the Maratha confederacy had been usurped by his Brahman minister, Balaji Vishvanath, who founded the line of Peshwas, he betook himself to Satara, seventy-five miles from Poona, and gave himself up to a life of pleasure. His successors continued to live there as utter puppets or prisoners of the Peshwas until the overthrow of the Peshwa's power at the battle of Kirki in 1817. Out of the wreckage of the Maratha dominion Lord Hastings determined, as an act of policy, to preserve Satara as a separate state, and to maintain its Raja in comfort and dignity. By a treaty dated the 25th of September, 1819, the Raja Pratap Sing was recognised under the condition that he should hold no communication with other powers or states under pain of forfeiting the advantages conferred upon him. Pratap Sing failed to abide by this engagement. Convicted of entering into negotiations with Goa and Nagpur, and even of tampering with the fidelity of the Company's 23rd Regiment of Bombay Infantry, he was deposed and removed as a pensioner to Benares in 1839. The Company might now for a second time have annexed Satara. But instead of doing so they thought it expedient to recognise as Raja one Shahuji, or Appa Sahib, the brother of the ex-Raja. In making this proposal, Sir J. Carnac, Governor of Bombay, observed that neither

the deposed Raja nor his brother had any children or were likely to have any. He added—

> It follows, therefore, that on the demise of the new Raja the Satara state would lapse to the British Government, unless indeed it should then be judged expedient to allow this line of princes to be continued by the Hindu custom of adoption, a question which should be left entirely open to consideration when the event shall actually occur.

The contingency expected arrived in due course. The ex-Raja died at Benares in 1847 without a child of his own, and without recognition of the son whom he had adopted. The Raja who had succeeded him on his part refused to adopt the child selected by his brother, and leaving no issue of his own he too died on the 5th of April, 1848. But on his deathbed he hastily summoned a lad named Venkatrao and adopted him. Intelligence of this event reached Lord Dalhousie just as he heard of the "ugly occurrence at Multan." He issued orders to the local Government to do nothing which would commit him to recognise the adoption, and then awaited the report and opinions of the members of the Government of Bombay.

When these documents reached him he found that Lord Falkland, who had meanwhile succeeded Sir G. Clerk in the Government of Bombay, and both the members of the Governor's Council, Reid and Willoughby, concurred in the view that justice and fairness admitted of annexation, while public policy, and in particular the advantage of consolidating the Company's dominion, told in favour of applying the doctrine of lapse. Sir George Clerk had, it is true, thought otherwise. He held that our views and practice in regard to adoptions had been capricious. He allowed, however, that "we have no Hindu laws to guide us in such cases," and

that our treaties were ambiguous. Annexation, he frankly admitted, would give us the connecting link between our Dekhan and Southern Maratha country, but this advantage might be gained by means of an all-powerful influence based upon adherence to the spirit of our treaties. In the midst of these uncertainties, the late Governor of Bombay was for recognising as heir the son who had been adopted.

Lord Dalhousie reviewed the whole position in his minute dated the 30th of August, 1848. That and other papers have been published,[1] and it will suffice to say that he arrived at the conclusion that both as a matter of right and as an act of sound policy the British Government ought to refuse its sanction to adoption and should annex Satara. The right of the adopted son to succeed to the private property, and the claim of the family and servants to liberal allowances, were recognised by him, and provision was made accordingly. The same view was taken by the Court after a warm discussion at Leadenhall Street. Sixteen Directors agreed with Mr. Mangles that Satara was a "dependent" state, and only six raised their voices on the other side. On the 24th of January, 1849, thirteen Directors signed the despatch which ordered annexation and settled the rule of lapse in these terms:—

"The result of our deliberations," they wrote, "is that we are fully satisfied that by the general law and custom of India a dependent principality, like that of Satara, cannot pass to an adopted heir without the consent of the paramount power; that we are under no pledge, direct or constructive, to give such consent; and that the general interests committed to our charge are best consulted by withholding it."

[1] Return to an order of the House of Commons dated the 5th of February, 1849.

Such was the doctrine of lapse laid down by the Court for the guidance of its Governor-Generals; and it is necessary to remember that the President of the Board of Control did not use his powers to modify the terms of it. On the contrary, he told Lord Dalhousie that he entirely concurred, and he was prepared to justify himself if he were attacked in Parliament. The House of Commons had already acquired some acquaintance with the history of Satara. In 1847 Hume had moved a resolution for an inquiry into the deposition of the ex-Raja. Hobhouse spoke on the subject at great length on the 6th of July, 1847, and Hume's motion was defeated by 44 against 23 votes. Hume and his friends now warmly resented the annexation, and at last secured Tuesday the 26th of June, 1849, for the discussion. But the interest of the House was languid, and when again the 6th of July was fixed for the debate, the affairs of Ireland intervened and put an end to further agitation. It may therefore be said that public opinion supported the decision of the Governor-General.

But it must be admitted that his minute went further than either the public or he himself was really prepared to go. The following passage in it has often been attacked as implying that under no conditions would Lord Dalhousie give his sanction to an adoption:—

> I hold that on all occasions where heirs natural shall fail, the territory should be made to lapse and adoption should not be permitted, excepting in those cases in which some strong political reason may render it expedient to depart from this general rule.

This is the sentence which Sir John Strachey quotes to prove the danger of universal annexation. But on several occasions Lord Dalhousie wrote to Hobhouse

and Wood to point out that his words, when read with their context, only applied to dependent Hindu sovereignties, and on the 25th of March, 1850, he made this confession to the former :—

> I have not a word to say to anybody who believes from my minute that I meant to intimate an opinion that Government should withhold its assent from all adoptions of Hindu princes. It is scandalously ill-expressed, and bears doubtless the above construction. I deserve to be abused for expressing myself so loosely, and I shall give my cheek to the smiter.

It need only be added as some excuse for the author that his minute was written at the end of a Calcutta August, when in the sultry discomfort of the climate a mass of business, and especially the anxieties of the Punjab rebellion, were pressing heavily upon his mind. But later on, in his minute[1] on Nagpur, he set forth his views in unmistakable terms, and in every case except Karauli he kept uniformly within the lines of policy which have already been stated. Actions are, it must be admitted, the best proof of a man's intentions, and it is hardly fair to single out a loose expression in a single minute and proclaim it as a conclusive proof of a Governor-General's policy.

The annexation of Jaitpur, a petty state of 165 square miles, followed close on the heels of Satara. Then after an interval of five years, another and more important state, that of Jhansi, situated in the same part of India as Jaitpur, with an area of 2532 square miles, also fell in under the doctrine of lapse. It will save some repetition of the facts if we deal with both of these annexations together. They were strictly in accordance with the rule laid down by the Court of Directors; and the extension

1849.

[1] See minute quoted at the end of this chapter, p. 178.

of British dominion over this part of Bandelkhand was a great step in the work of consolidation which Lord Dalhousie rightly regarded as a matter of the highest importance. The tract of country known as Bandelkhand lies south of the Jumna and north of the Jabalpur districts of the Central Provinces. Its strategical value was early recognised by the Peshwas when they began to dream of an Indian Maratha empire, and a suitable occasion for intervention presented itself to them while the Bandela States were struggling with the Pathan chief of Farukhabad. Baji Rao Peshwa then interfered to rescue the Raja of Kalinjar, and as a reward for his services demanded and obtained an estate near Jhansi and a considerable portion of eastern Bandelkhand. At that time Jhansi itself still belonged to Orcha, then known as Tehri, and the Marathas proceeded to take it also. The Peshwa, however, was not long in discovering that he could not control Bandelkhand from distant Poona, and he therefore adopted the plan of parcelling out his acquisitions in that part of Hindustan amongst his subordinates and adherents, retaining for himself sovereign rights and tribute. The Company in its turn, when it was confronted by the probability of hostilities with the Marathas, was equally alive to the value of this country as a chain in its communications. Accordingly, by various arrangements arising out of the Treaty of Bassein, concluded with Baji Rao on the 31st of December, 1802, Lord Wellesley obtained a cession of territory in Bandelkhand worth £361,600 a year. The new districts were with truth described as "disturbed and ravaged by rebels," and in asserting their rights the Company came to blows with some of the local chiefs and to terms with others. Then, on the fall of

the Peshwa in 1817, all his sovereign rights were formally transferred to the British, who thus became the undisputed suzerain power in Bandelkhand, and lost no time in introducing a political settlement. Amongst the numerous chiefs whose titles were confirmed or recognised by them were those of Jalaun and Jaitpur. The former of these states was confirmed in the possession of Nana Govind Rao by Lord Hastings, under an agreement dated November, 1817, whereby the chief, his heirs, and successors, were recognised as rulers of the state. Nana Govind Rao was succeeded by his son, and on the death of the latter in 1832, the widow was allowed to adopt a son. The son then selected died in 1840, and sanction to a second adoption was withheld, the state being treated as a lapse by Lord Ellenborough. The other state, Jaitpur, deserved less consideration, for in 1842 its Raja was deposed for rebellion. But the principality was continued under the rule of Raja Khet Sing, who died in 1849 without male issue. Thereon Lord Dalhousie annexed it, following the precedent set by Lord Ellenborough. It may be admitted that these acts, however justifiable, created some alarm in the minds of the neighbouring chiefs, many of whom joined the mutineers in 1857 and suffered for their disloyalty.

1854.

The circumstances of Jhansi, another Hindu dependent principality, were somewhat similar to those of its neighbour. In 1817 Rao Ramchand was created by Lord Hastings hereditary ruler of the state on the terms of "subordinate co-operation." When he died childless in 1835, his uncle, Raghunath Rao, a leper, was recognised as his successor in preference to a son adopted on his deathbed. The new Raja ruled infamously, and the public revenues fell from eighteen

lakhs to about three before his death occurred in 1838. As he left no lineal heir, his brother, Gangadhar Rao, was acknowledged as his successor, and he too proved so unfit to rule that the country was administered for him by the British. In November 1853 he died, leaving no issue, but having adopted a son on the day before his death. Lord Dalhousie, in a minute dated the 27th of February, 1854, examined the whole position; and quoting a memorandum written by Sir Charles Metcalfe on the 28th of October, 1837, in which the right of a grantor to resume such an estate on failure of heirs male of his body was emphasised, he held that the doctrine of lapse laid down by the Court of Directors in the case of Satara on the 24th of January, 1849, was clearly applicable. "The dependent nature of Jhansi does not admit of dispute." So he expressed himself; and it is obvious that the state was both dependent and tributary, revived more than once in recent years by the British Government, and therefore in the third class of his classification of states.

"There is no heir," he wrote, "of the body of the late Raja—there is no heir whatever of any Raja or Subadar of Jhansi with whom the British Government has at any time had relations; the late Raja was never expected by his own people to adopt, and a previous adoption by the Raja, whom the British Government constituted hereditary chief of Jhansi, was not acknowledged by the British Government. Wherefore it follows that the right to refuse to acknowledge the present adoption by Gangadhar Rao is placed beyond question."

If the question of right was thus settled, the question of policy was even less open to doubt. The country "lies in the midst of British districts," and the administration of British territory would, as Lord Dalhousie held, be improved by its annexation, while the people of Jhansi

would gain the benefits of a progressive, firm, and peaceful rule. The territory was therefore added to the North-Western (now known as the United) Provinces, and ample provision was made for the Rani and those whose livelihood was affected by the transfer.

It is necessary now to go back to the year 1849, and examine the circumstances in which the three small states of Sambalpur, Baghat, and Udaipur were treated as lapses in that and the following years. It would be hard to deny that the doctrine approved by the Court applied to these cases, or to assert that the claimants were unjustly treated. But on the question of policy there is room for difference of opinion, and in two of these instances Lord Canning partially revised the acts of his predecessor.

Sambalpur lies on either side of the Mahanadi, a river which discharges itself into the Bay of Bengal not far from the mouth of the Ganges. In the period with which we are dealing it was regarded as part of the south-western frontier of Bengal. To-day it is included in the Central Provinces. The Raja of Nagpur had conquered it, but was unable to govern it. It had in fact become the scene of constant disturbances and disputed successions, until in 1820 the British Government attempted to establish order by recognising Mahendra Sa as its Raja. After his death in 1827, the old disorders resumed their sway, and British troops were called in to suppress a rebellion. This being effected, Narayan Sing was replaced on the throne and the troops were withdrawn. A pretender, however, appeared in the person of Surendra Sing, who for murder and insurrection was seized and sentenced in 1840 to imprisonment for life in the British jail of Chutia Nagpur. Nine years later, Narayan Sing

1849.

brought his troubled reign to a close, leaving his country—which was then reckoned as covering an area of 4693 square miles—utterly impoverished, and with an annual revenue of only £7300. As he died without issue, the state was treated as a lapse. For the events which followed the Governor-General must no doubt bear the blame that attaches to ignorance of what was going on around him. Unknown to him or any of his government at Calcutta, the same influences were at work as in the country of the Santals, and the Bengal authorities were not alive to their responsibilities. In a pestilential climate, with no roads or comforts, the Europeans were apt to leave matters to their subordinates. The country could not be governed at all without incurring expenditure, and native officials were accustomed to regard the land revenue as a ready and unfailing source of supply. The land tax was therefore at once increased by 25 per cent. The tax-payers, especially the Brahmans, appealed to the nearest English official, but their complaints went by unheeded. The local administration was still starved, and in 1854 a further addition of one-fourth was made to the land assessment. No wonder, then, that the people thought they had little to gain from British government. When therefore the mutineers in 1857 released Surendra Sa from prison, he was welcomed back by his people. Hunted down and driven from jungle to jungle, he at last surrendered himself; but with rest his spirits returned, and he escaped from his warders and lived for years to spread terror in the villages by his wholesale murders and outrages. He was at last caught in 1864, and by this time the British grip upon the administration in the dark corners of India had been strengthened. Order was restored and has been since

maintained, and the people of Sambalpur have learnt to appreciate the benefits of their incorporation in the British dominions.

While Sambalpur after its annexation ceased for ever 1851. to be a Native State, the proceedings followed by Lord Dalhousie in the case of Baghat were ultimately so far modified as to avoid a lapse. The history of that small state, in its connection with British rule, is this. During the Nepal war in 1815, Baghat suffered heavy losses of territory owing to the behaviour of its Raja. Three-fourths of its area were taken and sold to Patiala, while the remaining quarter was restored to its Raja Mahendar Sing. The Raja died without issue on the 11th of July, 1839, and Lord Auckland treated his state as a lapse "under the rule by which Jaghirs and other rent-free tenures lapse to the State on failure of heirs." The annual revenue was then only £700 a year, and the Court of Directors were disposed to be liberal where so small an estate was involved. They pointed out that the deceased had left a brother, Bijai Sing, who was eligible, and Lord Ellenborough who had then succeeded as Governor-General restored to him a part of his brother's dominions. But he took the opportunity of retaining Kasauli, which was wanted as a Hill cantonment, purchasing it of Bijai Sing for £500. The new ruler died on the 9th of January, 1849, shortly after the recognition of his title, and Mr. Edwards, the Superintendent of the Hill states, recommended that Umed Sing, the first cousin of the deceased, should be placed on the *gaddi*. Lord Dalhousie saw that the case was open to doubt, and on the 14th of April, 1849, he addressed the Court, inquiring whether they intended to recognise the custom of collateral successions in the Hill states of the Punjab. On the

21st of November the Court replied that as a matter of right none but a descendant of Mahendar Sing was entitled to succeed, and pointed out that the succession of Bijai Sing had only been sanctioned as an act of grace. They left it therefore to the Governor-General to decide the question upon his own views of policy. Lord Dalhousie thereupon annexed the state in 1851, making provision for the family and dependants of the deceased ruler, who, however, refused to receive the pensions offered, and kept open their claim until after the mutiny. At that time Lord Canning, naturally viewing things from a new standpoint, revised Lord Dalhousie's decision in the matter of lapse. Satisfied that his predecessor had right on his side, he yet thought it would be more politic to enter into a compromise. Instead of restoring the whole of the property to Umed Sing, he charged the state with a payment of tribute, and required the new Raja to resign a certain property regarding which a dispute had meanwhile arisen. Subject to these deductions, Baghat was in 1862 re-granted by a *sanad* to the son of Umed Sing as a perpetual grant to him and "the heirs of his body."

1852. The principle upon which Lord Dalhousie had acted was thus affirmed although Baghat still remains outside British India. The same result followed in the case of Udaipur, where also Lord Canning modified the decision of his predecessor. Udaipur, which to-day forms one of the petty states in the Central Provinces, was in 1833 subject to the south-western frontier agency of Bengal established by Lord William Bentinck after the suppression of the Kol rebellions. Its chief, who ruled over an area of some 2300 square miles, was a tributary and subordinate of the Raja of Sarguja, who was bound by an engagement to preserve order in his country.

The Udaipur chief and his brother, who lived lawless lives, being convicted of manslaughter, were sent to prison, and as the former had no son his estate was in 1852 declared to be a lapse. During the mutiny the two brothers escaped from prison, and re-established their authority for a short time in their former territory. In 1859 the survivor, one of them having since died, was captured and transported. The Raja of Sarguja had meanwhile behaved with loyalty in the mutiny, and although Udaipur was still technically treated as a lapse, it was conferred in 1860 as a reward upon that chief. The history of Udaipur affords many points of parallel to that of Sambalpur, and it may be admitted that the action taken by Lord Dalhousie exercised some effect upon the events of 1857. But apart from any considerations of policy, there is room for the contention that if the estate was rightly treated as a lapse, the reversionary rights of Sarguja were stronger than those of the British Government.

The next case, that of Karauli, must always be considered as the least justifiable of the measures taken by Lord Dalhousie in connection with the Native States. The material now available throws considerable light upon the aspect in which he saw matters and upon his course of action. It is important to remember that two distinct questions came before him; the first was whether Karauli was a Hindu state in the second class described on a previous page,[1] and therefore one in which leave to adopt might be refused. On this he decided in the affirmative and the Court overruled him. The other question was whether Madan Pal should be recognised as successor to Narsing Pal, who died in 1852, in preference to Bharat Pal, whom the home

[1] See p. 155 above.

authorities had favoured. On this issue Lord Dalhousie was undoubtedly right and the Court were convinced by him.

As to the first question, two issues had to be considered. First, whether the state was one which could according to rule be treated as a lapse; secondly, whether it was politic so to treat it. If Lord Dalhousie was wrong in his classification of the state, his reasons are certainly not wanting in force. On the question of policy it must be admitted that public opinion has uniformly considered it a mistake to annex any of the Rajput states merely because the late ruler died without a son, and it has caused surprise that the Marquis of Dalhousie should not have recognised the political danger of applying the rule of lapse to these ancient houses. Upon this particular point the correspondence now exposed to view throws light. It shows that the Governor-General was not blind or insensible to the force of the opinions which were then held by those who differed from him. He gave way to the temptation of strong men, the love of consistency, but he plainly told his superiors that he expected to be overruled. On the 2nd of September, 1852, he wrote to the President Herries to say that he was addressing Hogg on the subject of Karauli because he believed that the Court took a special interest in questions of succession, and his letter to Hogg, sent by the same post, ran in these terms:—

In my last letter I forgot to allude to the Karauli adoption which has been submitted to you. Though, no doubt, on the principle laid down in 1849, the preponderance of strict argument is in favour of negativing the adoption, I am quite prepared to see the Court take the more liberal view and desire its recognition. It is not worth creating any alarm about; and perhaps after all it may be politic to let alone these Rajput states, even though we have strict right on our side.

Then follows a postscript :—

Since I wrote about Karauli I have received a letter from Colonel Low, in which he urges the *policy* of recognising the adoption with reference to Rajput's feelings, so earnestly that I think it right to send you an extract from his letter. He is a temperate and safe man, and his views will probably incline you still more to the liberal view which I have anticipated that the Court would take. On the question of *right*, I would not have deferred to him ; on the question of *policy* as regards Rajputana I do not wish to insist upon my opinion against his.

On receiving the decision of the Court of Directors adverse to himself, he at once wrote to Sir Charles Wood on the 5th of March, 1853, as follows: "I am very well content with your decision about Karauli." If, then, it is admitted that the Governor-General was wrong in his view of the Karauli succession, it is only fair that he should receive such credit as is due to an evenly-balanced mind and to the honest desire to place all sides of the question before the Court. We may now examine the facts.

Karauli, a small Rajput state of 1260 square miles, had paid tribute to the Peshwa, whose rights were transferred to the Company by the treaty of Poona in 1817. On the 9th of November of that year Lord Hastings took the country under his protection. The conduct of the Maharaja and his successors was not free from blame. One Maharaja had supported a rebellion in Bhartpur contrary to the treaty; during the rule of another British interference was on four occasions required to settle factious disputes; heavy debts were due to the Company, and at no time was public tranquillity properly maintained. But on the other hand, there had been a succession of adoptions on the failure of heirs of the body, and few rulers in India

could claim a more remote ancestry. As Sir C. Wood humorously wrote on the 9th of August, 1854: "I was told that all other Rajput chiefs descend from the Sun, but he of Karauli from the Moon, which it seems is a more ancient luminary than her more potent brother." From such a stock Narsing Pal, himself an adopted son, had descended to rule at Karauli. He had lately died, while still in his minority, on the 10th of July, 1852, having, as was stated, adopted on the eve of his decease a distant relative named Bharat Pal, and leaving a much nearer kinsman, Madan Pal.

Was Karauli a dependent state? That seemed to the Governor-General the main question. He was forced to the conclusion that it was "in some sort" a dependency, and there was clearly reason in his arguments. On the 18th of September, 1854, he justified himself to Wood in these terms:—

> My second class of Hindu principalities contained those which "are tributary or owe subordination to the British Government as their paramount, in place of the Emperor of Delhi, the Peshwa," etc. If you will look to the treaty of 1817 you will find that Karauli was subordinate to the Peshwa and tributary to him; and that after his downfall that principality acknowledged the "supremacy" of the British Government and became tributary to it, the tribute being specially remitted by an article of the Treaty. Thus at all points Karauli falls into the second class.

The line which Sir Charles took avoided a finding on the precise question raised, but adopted a common-sense view of the difficulty. The President declared that he was ready to annex in a clear case, but not when a case had to be made out, and he did not hesitate to say that he thought that no case was made out as regards Karauli. Karauli, therefore, was not to be treated as a lapse. As an outcome of the incident the

authorities at home were led to desire some clearer classification of states liable to the rule of lapse. This view was expressed by Wood on the 25th of November, 1854, when he wrote to apologise for his mistake in attributing to the Governor-General an intention to annex Tehri, a step which Lord Dalhousie certainly never contemplated.

"I must confess," he wrote, "that I did you some injustice. *Culpa mea*, as a penitent would say. I should, however, like to have something more uniform and intelligible laid down. You will see what a confusion there has been, every conceivable variety of course pursued, and I think the character of the British Government suffers. I want to see my way to something certain or clear if I can, but the recent opinions altogether upset the notions I had formed, and I want to be enlightened."

The Court decided not only against the annexation of Karauli, but also in favour of the adoption of Bharat Pal. But, while they were deliberating, a strong party had been formed in favour of Madan Pal, whose claims were supported by some of the leading Rajput states. An inquiry was ordered, and a series of legal objections to the adoption of Bharat Pal was formulated on the ground that his adoptive father was a minor, and that in the hurry of events various obligatory ceremonies had been omitted. More important than these considerations were the general feeling in Karauli and the determined support given to his rival by the nobles and feudal retainers of that country. As the Governor-General wrote to Wood on the 29th of June, 1854:—

The adoption had, even according to their own forms, been invalid. The people of Karauli asked for Madan Pal, a man of mature years, for their chief. All the Rajput states were formally consulted, and they declared that Madan Pal ought to succeed

Accordingly, the Court of Directors having sanctioned a native chief, and the Rajput states having the recognised right of electing their chiefs in failure of adoption, which the Bandela states have not, Madan Pal was recognised as Chief of Karauli by me.

If Lord Dalhousie erred in raising the question of lapse, he certainly did not err in going against the decision of the Court as to the choice of a successor. Maharaja Madan Pal Sing repaid his election by steadfast loyalty in the mutiny, and rendered such signal services that the British Government raised his salute to seventeen guns, and remitted the debt of £11,000 due by his state, of which mention has already been made. It is enough to conclude this account by observing that the Marquis of Dalhousie placed clearly before the home authorities the "alarm and dissatisfaction" which a refusal to sanction the adoption would create, that he explained in detail the exceptional position held by Karauli in that part of India, that he invited the other Rajput states to advise him as to a successor to Narsing Pal, and that not only the Maharaja of Karauli thus adopted, but all other Rajput chiefs, were firm and staunch in their loyalty during the rebellion of 1857.

1854. Of the annexation of Nagpur Sir Charles Wood wrote in these terms on the 8th of March, 1854:—

You will have seen by a former letter that I encouraged your annexation of Nagpur, to which I have heard of no objection, even from John Mill, who is the great supporter of Indian independence in the East India House.

On the 8th of April Hogg wrote to the Governor-General:—

We shall probably have a discussion some time or other respecting Nagpur. There never was, and could not be, a clearer case. Still Sullivan, at the dinner to Lord Harris, selected that

occasion as appropriate for declaring his opinion that the annexation of Nagpur exceeded in iniquity the Russian aggression.

Time has not led statesmen to take a different view of the case from that expressed by Sir Charles Wood, for such grounds of complaint as the annexation gave rise to are based upon what Kaye calls "the spoliation of the palace," and the treatment of the Bhosla fund, which must be dealt with apart from the question of lapse. The circumstances of the annexation are easily explained. The rulers of Nagpur only dated from the middle of the eighteenth century, when Raghuji Bhosla, a robber chieftain, established the Maratha supremacy over the country lying between the Narbada and the Godaveri, and extending from the Ajanta hills eastwards to the sea. On his death in 1755 his son and successor, Raghuji II., conspired with Sindhia against the British, and suffered defeat at the hands of the future Duke of Wellington at Assaye. A second disaster overtook him at Argaon, and the ruler of Nagpur was obliged to sign the treaty of Devgaon on the 17th of December, 1803, whereby he lost Berar and Katak, with other portions of his dominions. He died in 1816, and after a long interval Appa Sahib was recognised as his successor. The new ruler entered into secret alliances with Gwalior and the Pindaris, and suddenly fell upon the British Resident and his guard. On the 26th and 27th of November, 1817, the brilliant action fought at Sitabaldi defeated his plans, and Appa Sahib soon afterwards surrendered himself to the British. He was provisionally restored to power, subject to certain cessions of territory; but as he persisted in his treacherous conduct, he was finally arrested on the 15th of March, 1818, and eventually died in exile in 1840. Nagpur was for the second time the lawful prize of conquest,

and again the Government of India held its hand, elevating to the throne a relative of the deceased, a child who took the name of Raghuji III., and appointing the Rani Baka Bai as his guardian. In 1826 Lord Amherst concluded a formal agreement with the new prince which recited the fact that Nagpur had lain "at the mercy of the British Government," and that the "Maharaja's *masnad* was at its disposal." The state was recreated on certain conditions of subordination, and Mr. Jenkins carried on the administration for the young Raja. On attaining his majority, Raghuji succeeded to power, and enjoyed it until his death on the 11th of December, 1853.

In a voluminous minute dated the 28th of January, 1854,[1] Lord Dalhousie had no difficulty in proving that Nagpur was a dependent state conferred by the British upon Raghuji Bhosla, his heirs and successors, and that he had died without heirs natural or adopted, leaving no one who had a claim to the sovereignty. He took the occasion to observe that his doctrine had been wrongly interpreted, and that his opinion in favour of lapses was "restricted wholly to subordinate states, to those dependent principalities which, either as the virtual creation of the British Government, or from their former position, stood in such relation to that Government as gave to it the recognised right of a paramount power in all questions of the adoption of an heir to the sovereignty of the state." In all such cases he would take advantage of any lapse, if this could be done with the most scrupulous observance of good faith. The political and geographical position of Nagpur induced him to follow his general principle on the occasion

[1] Printed in Return to an Order of the House of Commons, July 26th, 1854, "Rajah of Berar."

then presented. The annexation of a territory of 80,000 square miles would not only give the Company a revenue of forty lakhs of rupees, but it would consolidate their scattered dominions, and enclose Hyderabad in a ring fence. The road between Calcutta and Bombay would lie almost entirely in British territory, and, in short, "the possession of Nagpur would combine our military strength, would enlarge our commercial resources, and would materially tend to consolidate our power."

But it was an essential part of his plan to make generous provision for the family and dependents of the late Raja. His arrangements in this respect were approved by the Court of Directors on the 15th of November, 1854, as "liberal and judicious." To the Rani Baka Bai, the late Regent, a stipend of £12,000 a year was assigned, to the eldest widow of the late Raja £5000, and to each of his four other widows £2500. Provision was also made for the surviving widow of Appa Sahib, and for the other ladies of the Zenana. In addition to these annual stipends, aggregating £30,000, every lady was allowed a share of the jewels, furniture, and other property left in the palace. The residue was to be sold so as to form a fund for the benefit of the Bhosla family.

If Nagpur was by far the largest and the richest of the states annexed by Lord Dalhousie under the rule of lapse, being about four times the size of the province of Pegu, and by one-half again larger than the conquered districts of the Punjab, 50,400 square miles, it was also the acquisition to which the least exception could be taken. Twice the conqueror's hand had been stayed, and when death removed Raghuji there was not even the pretence of an adoption. Nevertheless the circumstances which followed gave to the detractors of Lord

Dalhousie an occasion for imputations of harshness which none of his actions justified. It was inevitable that when the palace ladies were asked to choose the jewels and other articles which they would wish to retain, complaints of severity should be made against the officials who superintended the division. In October, 1854, the native officer charged with collecting the property was attacked and wounded inside the palace. It was then discovered that a regular plan of resistance had been organised by the Rani Baka Bai, and peace and order were only restored by recourse to military aid. A serious warning was given to the ladies that they might forfeit the consideration promised to them if they did not desist from intrigues. But they paid little heed to this kindly advice, and removed a large quantity of gold mohurs to their quarters. On hearing that it was proposed to invade the sanctity of their apartments in quest of treasure, the Governor-General wrote, on the 26th of December, 1854, that "it would be desirable rather to fail in obtaining the mohurs than to enter the palace apartments for that purpose." To the very last he desired his officers "under every provocation to shew the ladies the courtesy and forbearance which was due to their rank, their sex, and changed condition." At the same time he hoped to overcome their petulance, and to convince them that the treasure accumulated in the palace was not private property, "but public revenues hoarded by the Raja, which ought to have been applied to the payment of arrears due, and should now be applied to the purpose on which it ought to have been expended."

It is unnecessary to enter into the controversy as to the ultimate disposal of the Bhosla fund. The debts of the household and the stipends of the pensioners were

paid. The selection of jewels which the ladies refused to make was made for them, and by the sale of the residue £200,000 were realised. When Lord Dalhousie left India the fund remained intact, and the responsibility for its disposal rests, whether for praise or blame, upon other shoulders. Kaye, in his *Sepoy War*, complains of the "spoliation of the palace," and darkly hints that "the gain of money is not worth the loss of character." To that insinuation the account just given must furnish its own reply. The main conclusions which it has been the object of this chapter to enforce are that Lord Dalhousie did not invent the doctrine of lapse, that he limited its application to dependent states that except in the case of Karauli his proposals were subjected to the fullest discussion and approved on all sides, and that his fearless and honest discharge of duty in annexing seven states out of a total of some five hundred principalities in the country, added immensely to the strength of British rule, and sacrificed no principle of good faith.

CHAPTER VI

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION

Lord Dalhousie and Sir C. Wood both of one mind—Creation of imperial public works department—Public works loans advocated—Similar departments in Madras and Bombay—Telegraph system completed in spite of opposition—Morse system introduced before the mutiny—Complete programme of railways laid down—Contracts made with leading railway companies—Lord Dalhousie's principles of railway administration—Effect of railways upon the mutiny—Roads and canals—Reforms in postal system—The Governor-General's contribution to the Educational Despatch, 1854—His introduction of the scheme of education—Organises a jail department—Suppresses Suttee, infanticide, and human sacrifices—Abolishes forced labour—His financial reforms—Forest and survey departments created—Concise annual reports introduced.

THE dazzling successes gained by Lord Dalhousie in wars and in the field of foreign policy are apt to throw into comparative shade his equally great achievements in the conduct of the home affairs of the Government of India. Yet mainly to his sagacity the country owes its present system of decentralisation of management in every department of the administration. Amply, indeed, did he redeem the promise made on bidding farewell to the Court of Proprietors, that he would do his best "to suggest and carry out those great measures of internal development which you are so desirous of promoting." His expressions of regret at the wars with

the Punjab and with Ava were no mere display of rhetoric or idle tales of self-deception, for to him a military campaign meant interruption of his projects of reform and disorganisation of his finances. It was his chief ambition to turn to account in India the lessons he had learnt at the Board of Trade, and when he found that Sir Charles Wood and himself were of one mind, he threw himself heartily into the work of moral and material progress throughout the Company's possessions. One cannot read the correspondence which passed between Calcutta and Cannon Row without marking the constant occasions upon which the same ideas and ambitions prompted the Governor-General and the President. Not only do we find a project suggested by the one crossing in its passage by mail a similar proposal made by the other, but the very language of the correspondents shows that "hearty agreement with your views" which each correspondent in his turn repeatedly expressed. A careful comparison of dates is needed in order to be sure to which of the two should be given the credit of the first move in any important undertaking. The fundamental axioms of Lord Dalhousie's policy were the separation of the functions of government, and the responsibility of heads of departments. Not that he in the least favoured the "departmental spirit," and its tendency to over-centralisation, which has grown to be the danger of modern times; but he insisted upon assigning special duties to qualified heads. He swept away Boards that were slow to act and prone to long minutes, and lightened the burden on the shoulders of the Governor-General in Council or the provincial Governments. The systematic changes which he wrought in the business of administration will be realised if some account is given of the old order or

disorder prevailing up to his time in such matters as public works, post offices, education, and other branches of the public service.

Events have moved so rapidly since the mutiny that it is difficult to understand how such a medley of mismanagement could have been tolerated by his predecessors. All proposals for public works, in whatever part of India, found their way to the secretariat of the Supreme Government either in the Home or the Foreign department, according to their character. Some were dealt with by the receiving office; others were passed on for the consideration of the Financial department. The Governor-General soon discovered that "to send the project to the Military Board would have been to consign it to a limbo whence it was hopeless to expect it to emerge in any reasonable time." In public works other than those of a military nature, there being no Chief Engineer attached to the Government of India, all that could be done was to consult the officer in charge of the Bengal railways whenever the opinion of an expert was required. This "patchwork system" was intolerable to the Marquis of Dalhousie, who looked forward to an active and systematic prosecution of public works; and he therefore determined to establish a separate department for the consideration and direction of all questions of that class. The appointment of a Secretary and an Assistant to the Government of India selected from the corps of Engineers was the first step in the constitution of "one great separate branch of internal administration, conducted upon settled principles, and with the advantage of the best scientific and professional advice." The next step was to disentangle the expenditure upon new public works from the confused mass of the accounts of India.

An injurious misapprehension, wrote Lord Dalhousie, prevails as to the extent to which works of public improvement have been introduced by the Company's Government. Large advances have been annually made from the current income of the year, and thereby the deficiency, which for so many years existed, was aggravated or partially caused. The public has had no knowledge of the details, but it has been fully informed of the adverse balance. It has been wont to reproach the Government as bankrupt by mismanagement, and to revile it for its supposed inability to spend money upon public works by reason of its adverse balance.

To counteract this erroneous and harmful impression, orders were issued that the accounts should be so framed "as to prevent the public from confounding expenditure on the construction of new public works with ordinary annual charges of maintenance"; and in taking this precaution Lord Dalhousie anticipated an almost identical scheme enjoined by the Court a few months later.

When, however, he desired to push on his operations at a quicker step, he found that the Court of Directors were not prepared to keep pace with him. They, it is true, echoed his sentiments, and with pious self-satisfaction declared, on the 5th of July, 1854, their conviction "that a due regard to the welfare of the general community demands a large and liberal expenditure on works of unusual magnitude, such as the restoration and construction of works of irrigation, the formation of new lines of road and water communications, and the improvement of harbours." But they could only be persuaded to agree that "the cash balances should be applied to such works as rapidly as circumstances will allow." Lord Dalhousie was not satisfied with that rate of progress; nor in the matter of cash balances did he find comfort in Sir C. Wood's

assurance that nine millions was a sufficient sum. "Pray recollect," was his reply, "that the Punjab and Pegu have been added. You are not safe now under ten millions." For, with all his enterprise, he refused to run any unnecessary risks in finance, and he reminded the President of what he had written in August 1853:—

> I am a Scot, and prefer to do what I have to do cannily as well as boldly. I must beg you to recollect that we have no Bank of England here on which to fall back if anything goes wrong, and that the surplus cash balances on which you rely so much are not *here*, but scattered over the empire.

He was, indeed, willing to use his cash balances to the fullest extent, but at the same time he wanted more. Two ways only, as he saw, were open to him for obtaining

> the universal fuel, money. It can be got by reduction of debt and by bold and judicious reduction of the masses of military expense. The former we are now doing; the latter I propose to do, but I shall fail unless I am strongly backed. In saying that I would reduce military expenditure, let me add that if I get my own way I will make the military strength of India greater than it ever was before, and yet leave you a large balance of saving.

So he wrote on the 3rd of June 1853, and his share of the undertaking was fulfilled. He converted the 5 per cent loans of some twenty-eight millions into the 4 per cent loan of 1854-55; and although the Crimean war frustrated the execution of his economies in military expenditure, he largely increased the strength of British control by linking all parts of India together by the telegraph, and improved means of communication. His conquests and annexations, excluding Oudh, added three millions a year to his ways and

means. But he soon found that cash balances, though sensibly increased by these devices, would not enable him to go as fast as his wishes and his prudence alike prompted. He therefore threw his whole energies into the task of persuading the Court that "money spent upon the construction of new public works constitutes in reality an expenditure of capital, and is a sound investment." This was too bold and novel a doctrine for his masters, who were ready to let the Governor-General spend his cash balances upon public works, but demurred to his raising loans for that purpose without their special sanction. As, however, his term of office drew to a close, he took upon himself the responsibility of opening a loan for public works, and in a letter to Wood, dated the 16th of March, 1855, he justified himself in these terms :—

> An impediment to this course appeared in a passage of a recent despatch[1] from the Court, wherein we were prohibited from raising any loan for public works without previous reference to the Court, which in the present case was impracticable. It seemed to me, however, that this impediment was apparent, not real; and that your prohibition could not extend to the circumstances in which we are now placed. You preferred to carry on public works by spending surplus balances rather than borrowing. But affairs here have wholly changed since that despatch was written. The surplus cash balances are gone—they do not exist. Your prohibition against borrowing for public works could not be intended to remain in force, because you had declared that such works were to be carried on under all circumstances. It is only by borrowing that they can now be carried on.

Before the letter was posted at Ootacamund, news reached him that the financial stress at Calcutta had become so acute in consequence of unexpected drafts to the amount of 192 lakhs made upon the Treasury from

[1] Despatch dated the 20th of December, 1854, No. 96.

London, that a public works loan[1] for 275 lakhs had been opened in Calcutta at 5 per cent, with a guarantee against repayment for fifteen years. By the time that this intelligence was received in England, changes of tenure had occurred both in the office of the President of the Board, to which Vernon Smith had succeeded, and in the chair of the Court, which was now held by Elliot Macnaghten. The authorities admitted the justification for the act, although they regretted that the 4 per cent loan had been so recently closed. They raised their rate of exchange from two shillings and a penny by an additional penny, and authorised India to draw upon London to the extent of £500,000 if need were. Lord Dalhousie's views have been adopted by his successors, and a loan for the execution of original public works is now an established principle of Indian administration. Indeed, out of the total public debt of India on the 31st of March 1902, namely £227,249,000, no less than £170,000,000 represented property in railways owned or purchased by the State or advances made to railway companies, while the country's assets in irrigation works exceeded twenty-four millions sterling.

Having re-organised his own public works, Lord Dalhousie proceeded to set the provincial administrations in order. From Madras he received the reports of a Commission of Inquiry, "constituting," as he plaintively observed, "three quarto volumes, which extend, exclusive of appendix, to 577 very closely printed quarto pages," and from Bombay a "clear, sensible, business-like composition." In Madras there had been no less than three departments of public

[1] The public works charges for 1853-54 were 252 lakhs, while those from 1854-55 were estimated at 299 lakhs.

works, one under the Board of Revenue, another under the Military Board, and a third the office of the Superintendent of roads. In Bombay the Military Board had been the one controlling authority, operating through a staff of engineers or else through the Superintendent of roads and tanks. The Madras Government desired to associate a civilian with two engineers and form one Board of public works, while Bombay would let things remain as they were. "My own opinion," wrote Lord Dalhousie on the 30th of June 1854, "has long been decidedly in favour of placing a single authority at the head of every public department. In that form only can sustained promptitude of action be maintained and real responsibility enforced." Sole authority and undivided responsibility, with an adequate number of subordinates for irrigation, roads, and buildings, were the essential features of his scheme of management. "The tendency of all Boards to dilatory procedure is invariable," wrote the Governor-General, who, as has already been shown, only endured the Board of Administration in the Punjab because his hands were tied. As regards funds, he was opposed to an invariable assignment of a fixed sum for each branch of expenditure, or to "leaping at once from the listless apathy of the past into a state of volcanic energy." He was equally averse to surrendering an annual sum of forty lakhs to the Government of Madras without further control from the supreme Government. Each Government was desired to take a comprehensive survey of its wants, separating works of maintenance or repair from those of original construction, on account of the former of which an annual recurring grant of funds would be made by the Government of India, while the provision for new works would depend upon the state

of balances or the raising of loans. Further, great stress was laid upon the admission into the service of other officers than those the corps of engineers could afford.

> I not only advocate the admission of officers of artillery or of the line, but I also recommend that employment be given to gentlemen, educated as civil engineers, who may not be in any branch of the Company's service. It can only be by having recourse to such a measure that the department of public works can be carried on hereafter in India on the scale to which it will be undoubtedly extended.

In the same spirit he attached great importance to the provision of engineering colleges for the education of candidates for employment in the department, pressing upon the Government of Madras the extension of Major Maitland's school, or its incorporation with a larger institution on the principle of the Thomason College at Rurki; urging the Government of Bombay to attach an engineering class to the Elphinstone College, and addressing similar advice to Bengal. All sections of the population were to be encouraged to enter such institutions, "Europeans, East Indians and Natives, artificers, foremen, overseers, surveyors, or civil engineers." It will thus be seen that Lord Dalhousie well and truly laid the foundations upon which the great departments of public works in India are built. If he did not anticipate the extent to which decentralisation and the system of provincial contracts have been carried in the last quarter of a century, he rendered those reforms possible for his successors. For he created the secretariats; and himself recognising, he brought others to recognise, the predominant claims of works of public utility upon the credit as well as the revenues of India.

The Governor-General was as resolute in executing as he was skilful in designing plans of reform. He

bequeathed to those who came after him not only a reorganised system of administration, but a length of nearly 4000 miles of telegraph connecting Calcutta with Peshawar, Madras, and Bombay, 146 miles of railway open to traffic, and 530 miles of the Ganges canal, which even in its then unfinished state was reputed to be the greatest work of irrigation in the world. Telegraphic communication was the most powerful weapon with which Lord Canning confronted the mutiny, and had his predecessor been less strenuous and persistent in recognising its importance, that modern invention would not have been ready to his hand. One difficulty after another was started as soon as the Governor-General put forward his scheme of introducing the telegraph into India. Roads were bad, jungles pestilential, and there were no police to protect the line or the working staff. It was pointed out that the excessive heat, the abnormal disturbances caused by thunderstorms, the torrents and size of the rivers, the properties of the soil, and the lack of expert advice, clearly indicated the desirability of waiting until further experience had been gained in Europe. Then followed the exhaustion of the finances due to the Sikh rebellion, and the Court grew anxious as to the future. But Lord Dalhousie was not to be daunted, although the obstacles[1] proved to be as great as they had been predicted to be. He found on the spot a professor of chemistry in the Medical College at Calcutta, Dr. W. B. O'Shaughnessy, who entered heartily into his schemes, and satisfied him

[1] In his minute, dated the 28th of February, 1856, he wrote, "The difficulties which have been encountered in the construction of the Indian telegraph lines were such as have no existence in the civilised and cultivated countries of Europe. On the lines laid down, seventy principal rivers have been crossed. Some of these have been of great extent. The cable across the Soane measures 15,840 feet, and the crossing of the Toonbuddra River is stated to be not less than two miles in length."

that he could carry them out. On the 26th of March, 1850, the Governor-General wrote :—

Notwithstanding the continued pressure on finance, I regard this matter of electric telegraphs as of such infinite moment in India that I recommend the sanction of Government to whatever sum may be necessary for conducting the experiments on a scale sufficiently large to enable those charged with it to carry on their labours with rapidity and the fullest efficiency.

His colleagues agreed, and a committee composed of Colonel Forbes, Captain Broome, and Captain Thuillier was associated with O'Shaughnessy to lay a line partly underground and partly overhead between Calcutta and Chinsura as an experimental measure. To prevent tedious delay Lord Dalhousie intimated to the Military Board that they were not called upon to exercise any authority over O'Shaughnessy, who would report directly to himself. The doctor designed and made in Calcutta a receiving instrument, a small galvanoscope, which answered all expectations and satisfied the committee that his plans would succeed, and in 1852 Calcutta was brought into communication with Kedjeri in Diamond Harbour, a distance of 80 miles. But the authorities at home were still sceptical and timid. Lord Dalhousie strained every nerve to win over the President and the Chairman, and at the critical moment applied to the Court for permission to send O'Shaughnessy to England that he might convince the doubtful and support an official recommendation in favour of an immediate construction of a system of telegraphic communication from Calcutta to Agra, thence to Peshawar and Bombay, and from Bombay to Madras. Lord Broughton had then given place to Mr. Herries, and to the latter Lord Dalhousie wrote on the 24th of April :—

I beg very earnestly your attention to my proposals, and hope

that you will enable me to commence at once this improvement of vital importance to the country both politically and commercially.

His persistence was rewarded, and by the following December he was gratified to learn that 3150 miles of wire had been ordered and would be sent out as soon as possible. In order that he might impress his own vigour upon the execution of his plans, he appointed O'Shaughnessy on his return from England to be Superintendent of Electric Telegraphs in India, placing him in direct communication with the Government in the Home Department. Every detail was thought out and arranged. The demands of the Punjab had exhausted his supply of covenanted civilians, and recent experience had demonstrated the risk of military officers being withdrawn from their duties when at any moment their services might be required for war. The Superintendent was therefore required to appoint as his subordinates civil servants who were not of the covenanted branch, and no soldiers were to be employed. "Uniformity of management and unity of authority" were to be his guiding principles, but care was enjoined in the dealings of the department with local governments in order that friction might be avoided. The whole of India realised that the Governor-General was in earnest, and although a commencement of the line to Agra was not made till November, 1853, yet on the 24th of March, 1854, the first telegram from Agra, distant 800 miles, reached the Governor-General at Calcutta within two hours of its despatch. On the 8th of the following February he was able to write to Sir C. Wood in these words:—

The electric telegraph was opened to the public on the 1st instant from Calcutta to Madras, Bombay, and Attock. They had a grand ceremony, but I am sorry to say that my health has so

failed of late as to render me incapable of taking more than a small share in it.

He went on to dwell with just pride upon the immense advantage which the execution of his plans would confer upon the Government in making full use of their military resources—an anticipation soon to be verified. For within a few hours of its completion the line to Madras was employed to order the 12th Lancers to march from Bangalore to the coast *en route* to the Crimea, whither they had suddenly been called upon to proceed, and less than a day sufficed to arrange with Bombay for the despatch of the 10th Hussars from Poona, a matter which would otherwise have occupied a good month. But though more than satisfied with the results achieved, he was quick to perceive the uncertainty and inevitable delay involved in the use of the galvanoscope. On the 4th of August, 1855, he again pressed the authorities at home to allow O'Shaughnessy to proceed to Europe and to America in order that he might study the Morse system of transmitting messages, and profit by the latest experiences gained by those Continents. This proposal was sanctioned, with the result that on the eve of the mutiny the Morse system was introduced into India at a very trifling additional outlay. When Lord Dalhousie left India he had at the cost of £217,000 provided the country with about 4000 miles of single telegraph, from which already a revenue of £23,000 was derived. The charges of transmission compared favourably with those in Europe, twenty-four words being carried a distance of 400 miles for three shillings; and while the advantages conferred upon commerce were large, the military and political gains were of incalculable value.

It was not, however, for him to reap the full fruits

of his labours in the development of railways. The Crimean war, following those in Burma and the Punjab, threw a great strain upon the army, and it was impossible to provide engineers for all the needs of India. The state of the money market checked enterprise, and moderate as were the wants of India, whether for civil engineers or for railway material, they could not be met. On the 13th of July, 1854, Lord Dalhousie addressed an earnest appeal to the President of the Board urging him to use his influence with the Court to expedite the despatch of a few locomotives which had been ordered months before. But neither delays nor difficulties turned the Governor-General from his purpose. Declining to accept the compromise offered by Sir C. Wood, who had told him that Brassey and other contractors would not move, and had suggested the adoption of lighter rails, he remarked :—

> You may rely upon it that knocking up a corduroy railroad is a short-sighted policy. I am all for making them here as cheap and as quick as possible, but they must be solid, or the money may as well be dropped into the Bay of Bengal.

If he could not build railways for lack of money, the "universal fuel," or from want of engineers or material, he could at least settle the programme and complete the necessary surveys. Hampered in one direction and thwarted in another, he still carried all the preparations forward, opened the first few sections of the leading lines, and left his plans and foundations for his successor.

A glance at the progress of negotiations with the great railway companies will illustrate the soundness and the extent of his projects. In 1845 a line from Bombay to Kalian and thence to the Malsej Ghat had

been surveyed. But it was not until 1849 that the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company entered into the first contract with the East India Company to construct an experimental line of thirty-five miles as part of the line thereafter to connect Bombay with Berar and the country east of it. Colonel Kennedy, who was appointed to report fully upon the proposals of the G.I.P., submitted his report in 1852. Thereon the Governor-General, whose copy of that document now before me bears witness to his thorough study of it, entered with great detail into the discussion and laid down the general plan of communications. The first section of the Bombay line, the first line constructed in India, was opened to traffic on the 16th of April, 1853. At the end of December, 1854, the route by the Bhore Ghat was selected by the Government of India for the line to Madras; while, after an exhaustive consideration of other routes, the Thal Ghat was in September, 1855, chosen for the line to Khandesh. The survey of the line to Nagpur was then taken up, and the scheme was recommended to the Court for sanction on the 2nd of December, 1855. In October of that year the fourth section of the line to Wasindra was opened to traffic. Meanwhile a beginning had been made from the side of Calcutta. There too, and in the same year that witnessed the contract with the G.I.P.R., another agreement had been made with the East India Railway Company for the construction of an experimental line, at the cost of one million sterling. In 1850 Howra was chosen as the starting-point of the route to Rajmehal, with a branch to the coalfields of Raniganj, and the work upon it was commenced before the end of the year. The next year saw the beginning of the survey from Bardwan to Rajmehal,

which, in 1852, was carried forward to Allahabad and thence on to Delhi. Sanction was obtained to the execution of these several schemes, and part of the capital required for them was raised, the interest being guaranteed by Government. The official opening of the whole line from Howra to Raniganj, a distance of 120 miles, took place on the 3rd of February, 1855, the first section from Howra to Hooghly having been opened to the public in the middle of August, 1854. Thus enough was done to ascertain and to overcome all preliminary difficulties, while very extensive surveys and plans for the future were approved before Lord Dalhousie left India. The Madras Railway Company entered into its first contract in 1852. The local Government, however, took a different view of the route to Bellary from that advocated by the Government of India, and a reference to the Court delayed the final decision. Still, the Governor-General was able to travel for fifty miles on the line to the Malabar coast before he quitted Madras. In the same year, 1852, the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Railway Company was organised, and a survey to Baroda undertaken. But the Court disapproved of the Governor-General's orders granting to the Company a concession for the line to Ahmedabad, they being inclined to favour a line up the Tapti valley. Eventually, however, Lord Dalhousie's views prevailed, and a survey northwards from Ahmedabad to Delhi, and another from Broach to Agra, were carried out. The Sind Railway Company was the last to enter into a contract, in 1855, for the construction of a line from Karachi to the Indus, but although the survey was ordered, little progress had been made before the arrival of Lord Canning. This brief outline of contracts and

projects will suffice to show that the years 1848-56 were years of preparation, survey, and discussion, fruitful of consequences in the future.

They were, indeed, fruitful years, in which the main principles of railway policy were laid down by one who had gained an exceptional experience at the Board of Trade and was now, fortunately for India, given a free hand. Those principles have stood the test of time, although it must be admitted that the enormous changes which after years brought about in the credit of India and in improved means of constructing and working railways produced a succession of revolutions in the policy of Indian Governments. These changes enabled Lord Lawrence, in 1869, to show unanswerable cause why a public guarantee of interest to private companies was no longer required, and why the interference and control exercised by the India Office should be strictly limited. Owing also to his influence, the introduction of a narrower gauge than 5 feet 6 inches was then sanctioned, and in the construction of railways the State took the place of private enterprise, whether aided or unaided. Then came another change. The Famine Commission appointed in 1880 insisted upon the active prosecution of famine protection railways, while the Parliamentary Commission of 1879 on Indian Public Works had limited the funds to be borrowed for productive works, whether of irrigation or railways, to two and a half millions sterling annually. The Government of Lord Ripon demurred to these restrictions, and in 1884 a fresh era of Companies' lines conjointly with lines constructed and administered by the State was inaugurated. Thus in this respect time has brought about a partial reversion to the original policy, and through all these

changes the main principles laid down in the 'fifties have been adhered to.

The Marquis of Dalhousie found the country without a single mile of railway. He left it with nearly 300 miles either open to traffic or under construction. The result seems petty compared with the 26,500 miles now open; but his greatest legacies were the masterly programme which his successors completed, and the avoidance of those initial errors which in England produced so rich a crop of financial and administrative disasters. He saw clearly that the experimental lines would make or mar the reputation of railways, since he had neither the funds nor the public credit nor the skilled engineers which those who followed him have commanded, and the only foundation upon which he could build was public companies and their experience of profits. Every effort was strained to ensure the success of these pioneer lines, more especially as it had been generally predicted that Indian railways must depend upon their goods traffic and not upon passengers, whose poverty, timidity, and caste objections, it was alleged, were insuperable obstacles. His exhaustive minute dated the 4th of July, 1850, set forth the object in view as intended to prove—

> Not only that it is practicable to construct railways in India as engineering works, but that such railways when constructed will, as commercial undertakings, afford a fair remunerative return on the money expended, so that the public may thereby be encouraged to invest their capital in similar works in other parts of India.

Every question was examined—the route, the gauge, the provision of land and timber, the creation of a railway department to expedite business, and a hundred other details. Frequent reference was made

to his experiences at the Board of Trade and the mischievous error into which the British legislature fell of permitting the introduction of two gauges into the United Kingdom. In another minute, that of the 20th of April, 1853, he adverts to the atmospheric lines to Croydon and in Devonshire. "Those," he writes, "who used to travel by the South-Eastern Railway will remember the very common spectacle of the carriages standing on the atmospheric line motionless for want of power to move them," and he was not prepared to run the risk of a similar experience "when a train should be descending the Thal Ghat on a gradient of 1 in 37 with curves of 30 chains' radius for seven miles together." His strong plea for the employment of companies "directly but not vexatiously controlled by the Government of the country acting for the interest of the public," was based upon considerations of the popular disposition in India to leave everything to the Government, upon the limitations in their European agency and means of construction, upon the tendency of officials to extravagance, and the need of enlisting other agencies in the wide field of Indian development. In an earlier minute,[1] dated the 4th of July, 1850, he had written more fully on the subject of control in these terms :—

I trust that the East India Company will ever avoid the error of viewing railways merely as private undertakings, and will regard them as national works over which the Government may justly exercise, and is called upon to exercise, a stringent and salutary control. This control should not be an arbitrary right of interference, but a regulated authority, declared and defined by law, which is not to be needlessly or vexatiously excited; but

[1] Horace Bell in his *Railway Policy in India* seems, from the footnote on p. 12, to attribute this quotation to the minute written in 1853. It was, however, written in 1850, as shown in the text.

which, in my humble judgment, is necessary at once for the interests of the State, and the protection of the public.

Space forbids any attempt to summarise the lengthy minutes of the Governor-General upon railway administration. But it may be noted that he touched upon other matters of public policy such as the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, and laid down principles which were afterwards accepted by the legislature. One incidental result of his advocacy of private enterprise may also be mentioned in pursuance of a purpose which I have endeavoured to keep in view in writing this biography. In a subsequent chapter an effort will be made to examine the influence which his various undertakings had upon the course of events in the mutiny. It is therefore convenient to call attention here to an indirect effect produced by the employment of unofficial European agency in the construction of railways. If it is held that the conquest achieved by Europeans over the rivers and other forces of nature in India "turned the world upside down," and gave cause of offence to orthodox Hindus by shaking the public confidence in their legends and religious beliefs, it must be remembered that it also brought into the field material that strengthened the hand of government in the desperate struggle that ensued between civilisation and bigotry. The improvement in the means of communication, although the greatest, was not the only advantage gained. The railway companies' engineers and servants took their part in the restoration of order, side by side with public officials. They entrenched camps and shouldered their muskets when the supreme trial arrived. The story of the defence of Arrah is one of thrilling interest, and is well told by Trevelyan in his *Cawnpore*. It will be

remembered that he describes Boyle, an executive engineer in the service of the East Indian Railway Company, as "the Vauban of the siege," and it is clear that without his skill and forethought, Wake and the other sixty-five occupants of the Collector's house could never have held their own against thousands of armed rebels from the 27th of July to the 4th of August, 1857. Nor was this by many the only occasion upon which the railway engineers rendered noble service to their country.

Limitations of space also forbid even a catalogue of the roads and irrigation works prosecuted during the administration of India between 1848-56. In the final review of his term of office, dated the 28th of February, 1856, and ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on the 30th of May, 1856, Lord Dalhousie gave a list of them covering many pages. Some of these works have already been noticed in the chapters on the administration of the Punjab and Pegu. Many, including the Ganges Canal, had been planned by his predecessors; others were considered and recommended by the local governments, especially in Madras. But in the then state of centralisation and financial pressure none could have been carried out without the strong support of the Governor-General, whose letters to Wood show how keenly interested he was in the promotion of the material development of India. It was with no little pride that Lord Dalhousie pointed in the following terms to his expenditure on public works as proof of what he had accomplished in the last three years of his tenure of office.

The charges in the year 1853-54 rose to £2,525,000, those for 1854-55 rose still higher to nearly £3,000,000 sterling, a very large proportion being spent on new works. The charge for

extraordinary public works alone in the year 1855-56 is estimated at £2,250,000. The simple statement of these figures affords the means to all of forming at once an estimate of the real extent to which the Government of India, in recent years, has carried the execution of public works designed for the improvement of the Indian territories.

The 8th of April, 1854, was a day of mixed satisfaction and disappointment to him, for he was unable to attend the formal opening of the main stream of the Ganges Canal after the completion of the labour of eight years at a cost of £1,400,000, of which he himself had provided all except £170,000. "No financial pressure," he wrote, "no exigencies of war were suffered to interrupt the progress of that great work. I trust that I shall not be thought vainglorious if I say that the successful execution and completion of such a work as the Ganges Canal would, if it stood alone, suffice to signalise an Indian administration." Its length of 525 miles was modest compared with the total length to-day of that and of the Lower Ganges Canals and their distributaries, which aggregate more than 9000 miles and irrigate 1,800,000 acres. But even in 1856 it exceeded "all the irrigation lines of Lombardy and Egypt together," and was justly claimed by Mr. Thomason as "unequalled among the efforts of civilised nations." On the 13th of May, 1854, Lord Dalhousie thus pressed upon the President the claims of its engineer for a reward.

I shall be surprised if this record of the Ganges Canal does not make your heart swell within you, as mine has done, at the recital of deeds so honourable to our British name, and of such benefits to millions of the human race. If it does, and I know it will, let me claim honour, high honour, for the man whose genius has designed, and whose skill, energy, and perseverance have wrought this great work. Colonel Cautley, in health utterly

broken, returns to England by this mail. If he should incline to civil honours of the Bath, then I pray you to think of nothing less than K.C.B.

Of other great works completed in his time, the following may be mentioned: the Kistna delta system and the Palar anicut in Madras, the Indus inundation canal in the Punjab and smaller canals in Multan and Sind. Nor did Lord Dalhousie forget the duty due to the past. He ordered the repair of the famous Kutub Minar near Delhi, and of other monuments of the architecture of former dynasties, and in eloquent terms impressed upon all the Governments of India the duty of preserving from ruin ancient buildings of historic interest. This short notice of his contributions to the public works of India may be concluded with an extract from Sir C. Wood's letter dated the 21st of August, 1854.

You must not take what I said as blaming you. It is rather, as it turns out, that you had not told me what you are doing. In respect of public works I have learnt since I wrote to you, that nearly if not all that I wished to see done, has been done; but I had not heard of it when I wrote to you, and if you will hide your good deeds under a bushel for a time, you must not complain if I don't know of them.

There have been some who have complained of "feverish haste and dangerous activity" in pushing on public works, and have attributed the mutiny in some measure to these qualities in the character of Lord Dalhousie. It is well therefore to bear in mind that Sir Charles Wood was as anxious as the Governor-General to see a rapid advance along the whole line of material progress, and gave his hearty assent to the proposals of the Government of India.

The development of postal communication was a

natural corollary to the introduction of railways and telegraphs, and Lord Dalhousie proceeded with the same caution and thoroughness that marked his course in other departments. In 1850 he appointed a Commission consisting of one member from each Presidency—Courtney for Bombay, Forbes for Madras, and Beadon for Bengal—to examine the existing system, and to report on the best means of improving it. The result was the establishment of one uniform single rate of postage throughout the country, irrespective of distance, of half an anna for letters not exceeding a quarter tola in weight, and two annas for newspapers, an anna then representing three halfpence. Postage stamps were introduced in the place of cash, and the privilege of franking was limited to as few officers as possible. Later on the consent of Her Majesty's Government was obtained to the adoption of one uniform rate of postage at sixpence the half-ounce between England and India. These measures meant that postage in India was reduced to one-sixteenth of its former cost and that, in his own words, "a Scotch recruit who joins his regiment at Peshawar may write to his mother at John o' Groat's House and may send it for sixpence, which three years ago would not have carried his letter beyond Lahore." The step was a courageous one to take at a time when the treasury was low. But the sacrifice of revenue proved less than was expected, and "the widespread beneficial consequences" which the Governor-General predicted were soon realised by his successors. When he left India 753 post offices had been opened in the country. He had also laid down the principle that the postal system should be an imperial concern, under "a distinct department superintended by the Director-General under the immediate

control of the Government of India." To this view the Court at first demurred, and Lord Dalhousie thus appealed to the President of the Board on the 27th of April, 1853:

> The Court objects to a Director-General who shall not be controlled by Madras and Bombay, on the ground that it is different from other departments. But the Post Office is different from other departments, and requires a different machinery. I assure you that unless there be one uniform power, at least to introduce the system, it cannot be done. I pray you therefore to interfere, and to force the Court to let us have what England and America have equally found to be indispensable. At least let us have it for a time.

The Governor-General, who had divested himself of the administration of Bengal, and had given numerous proofs of a decentralising spirit, was entitled to be heard. He carried the day, and no two opinions have since existed as to the advantages of centralisation in the postal department.

In the matter of education posterity has never given to Lord Dalhousie the credit that is his due not merely in organising the departments of public instruction, but also in laying down the principles to be followed. On the contrary, an idea has frequently gained currency that the celebrated despatch from the Court, dated the 19th of July, 1854, was not only inspired by public opinion at home, but was also intended as a gentle rebuke to the Governments of India, who had neglected the subject. So far as Lord Dalhousie himself was concerned such a suspicion is altogether unfounded. From the first he was an enthusiast in the cause of education, and it has already[1] been seen how readily he took up the work of Bethune in female education, how he advo-

[1] Vol. i. chap. xi. pp. 382, 399.

cated the creation of engineering colleges, and lost no opportunity of inspecting schools in the course of his tours. His diary is full of hope and confidence that the measures then being set on foot would before long enable the natives of the country to take a larger part in its administration. From his correspondence with the President of the Board a few extracts may be given which will throw some light upon his share in this branch of national development. On the 19th of August, 1853, Wood wrote to the Governor-General in these terms :—

> I am also a good deal at sea on education, as indeed we all are in England. Everybody is for doing more than we do, and no five people agree as to what ought to be done. I have had no time to look into it myself, and I don't see anybody who can give me a very unbiassed opinion, so I shall be the more obliged to you for enlightening me about it. I should wish you to desire somebody to prepare a report showing existing matters as they are, and also what is feasible in the way of extension.

In reply Lord Dalhousie wrote to point out various sources of information already available in the Board's library, adding that "Trevelyan is a Pundit on education, and will at once point out what you want." But he also added to the existing stock of information. On the 17th of November, 1853, he wrote :—

> I have now on its way a very large proposal for native education in the three divisions of the Bengal presidency. Another proposal for a general college here is also on its way. These I am sure, from what you have already said, will meet with a favourable reception from you.

Several schemes for vernacular education in the Punjab and elsewhere were commended to Wood's approval. When therefore the despatch of the 19th of July, 1854, arrived it was with extreme surprise that

the Governor-General saw no sort of notice of what his Government had already done, and no mention of the proposals made by it. His disappointment was hardly mitigated by the confession made by Wood, who wrote on the 9th of August, 1854, as follows:—

The scheme for vernacular education in the North-West Provinces never came up at the time when you sent it, and I only disinterred it from the East India House on the receipt of your letter. We shall certainly approve it. You seem, as you say, to have fairly done your best as to education. We approve all you have proposed.

Although naturally nettled at this tardy approval of his own proposals, and the omission of all notice of them in the great despatch, Lord Dalhousie suffered no personal feelings to damp his ardour in introducing the larger schemes proposed by the Court. This despatch holds so high a place in the history of education in India that the following extract from Wood's letter of the 24th of July, 1854, will be interesting to many as showing the genesis of the new departure:—

Macaulay, Lord Glenelg, Bayley and Prinsep, Marshman, the Church missionaries, Berry, Mouatt, Beadon, and everybody we could think of here, as being an authority on the subject, have been consulted, and have cordially approved the scheme. So I hope that it will be well received in India, and that you will be able to set it going under your auspices. I am aware that however good a scheme of this kind may be, the practical working of it is of more importance still; and much more will depend upon the men appointed to carry the details out than on any skill in devising it. I shall be personally obliged to you to give as much countenance to it as you can. I am very well pleased to see what you have done with your Presidency College at Calcutta. It harmonises very well with our University scheme.

The Governor-General was asked for his "countenance," and he gave his heart to the work. On the 8th

of February, 1855, despite his illness, of which he wrote, "I have committed a great error in not quitting India at this time," he informed the President that he had launched the education scheme, and would "go through with it now dead or alive," adding, "I have no doubt that if I live I shall see the whole organised and in complete operation (so far as this can be effected at once) before I leave India." Wood thanked him cordially for his exertions, making at the same time opportune remarks on the importance of charging fees, however slight, for primary education in order that "the parent and pupils may duly value what they are acquiring," and before leaving the Board expressed the obligations of the Government to the Governor-General for the success which had attended his efforts. Thus if the honours of devising the comprehensive system of education for India may be shared between Sir Charles and the Marquis of Dalhousie, there is no question that the whole credit of putting the plan into practical shape rested with the latter.

Frequent mention is made in the Governor-General's diary of his visits to jails, and his deep impression that reforms were needed in this branch of the administration. Mr. Thomason, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, had already led the way by placing prisons under an inspector. Lord Dalhousie followed his example in the Punjab, and confident "of the improvement which the new system will effect in the health, the security, and the habits of the criminals upon whom it will operate," he in October, 1853, recommended the Court to sanction the appointment of an Inspector of Prisons for Bengal also. From northern and eastern India the system was extended to Madras and Bombay. By further reforms the practice of trans-

porting European civilian prisoners to the Colonies was discontinued, separate jails being built for their incarceration; the custom of branding convicts was abolished; and provision was made for the custody of criminal lunatics. The law was also altered so as to secure for accused persons the benefit of counsel.

Against revolting practices tolerated by public opinion in India, such as infanticide and Suttee, Lord Dalhousie did not hesitate to assert the will and the duty of a civilised Government to declare war. On the 8th of August, 1853, he recorded "in the strongest language of cordiality and sincerity the high and grateful approbation with which the Government regards exertions on the part of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab and other public officers, which are so eminently calculated to reflect honour on the British name, and to add to the material happiness of the people whom Providence has lately confided to our care." The proposals made by John Lawrence and Montgomery were warmly approved of, and while the Governor-General agreed with the former that secret espionage on the part of the police should be avoided, he wished to have the sentiments of the Government as to infanticide "openly proclaimed." Recognising that religion as well as the social influences of pride of birth or of the purse led to "this horrible crime," he nevertheless considered it a duty to declare that the destruction of female children was murder, and would be punished as such. At the same time rewards and honours were conferred on those who boldly took the side of Government in denouncing the crime. In the case of Suttee the action of his predecessors was carried a step forward. They had already made the act illegal in the Company's dominions, and had denounced it in the Native States. Lord Dalhousie not only

repeated these remonstrances in general terms, and in particular to the rulers of Alwar, Bikanir, and Udaipur, but also gave signal proof of his determination to punish as well as to condemn. The Rawal, a chief of Dungarpur in Rajputana, had been removed from authority in 1852, and his country placed under a Native agent. During this interregnum a Thakur's son who took part in the rite of Suttee was imprisoned together with the two Brahmans who had abetted the crime, the Thakur himself being heavily fined for connivance in the act. In another part of India a still more odious crime than that of immolating widows prevailed in the form of human sacrifices or Meriahs. For permitting widows, even under the influence of drugs or of priestly suasion, to perform the supreme act of self-devotion, and follow their husbands to the grave, the plea of noble self-sacrifice and of a grand example of human love has always appealed to Hindu sentiment. But for the degraded practice of fattening prisoners, and offering them as sacrifices to idols, no excuse can be made. Accordingly in the hills and forests of Orissa military force was employed to release the victims, and constant pressure was brought to bear upon the aboriginal tribes to induce them to abandon the horrible custom. No other methods could have succeeded, for education has not even yet reached these backward denizens, nor have cases of Meriah passed entirely out of the calendars of Indian crime.

In his reforms, as well as in his financial transactions, Lord Dalhousie was a "Scot," preferring to act cannily as well as boldly. His whole nature was opposed to violence or compulsion; and he had not proceeded far on his first journey into the hills before he discovered that the coolies who carried his records

and baggage were impressed into the service. It did not mend matters, in his mind, to find that the Hill Chiefs were under written obligations to supply Government with labourers, or that Government had laid down rules that the men were to be paid. For he was not slow to observe that "the money was usually taken from the coolies by their own chiefs on their return," and the labourers "were forced to travel great distances, and in many ways they suffered oppression from the duty." Like a wise man he came to the conclusion that "the system was unavoidable" so long as human labour could alone be employed on mountain paths. He therefore recognised the necessity for a system of roads to the Sanitaria, hill stations for troops, and civil stations in the hills, along which transport animals and even carts should be able to pass. By these judicious means he established communications between the plains and Sabathu, Kasauli, and Simla, preventing recourse to *begari* or forced labour, which he could not cure. When the Indian press attacked him for extravagance in spending money on roads for his comfort and his own escape from the plains, he held his tongue; but when Hogg wrote to tell him that these calumnies had been repeated in the House by Joseph Hume, he replied in the vigorous terms which have already been quoted.[1]

Lord Dalhousie recognised the fact that a sound fiscal system lay at the root of all reform. But while he was building up the empire, he was unable to carry out that entire reorganisation which the situation needed. It was not until dominion had passed to the Crown that, in 1860, Mr. James Wilson introduced the system of annual budget estimates, with sanctioned

[1] Vol. i. chapter x. p. 370.

grants for each sub-head in every province. Still, it may be justly claimed that Wilson's reforms—the budget in the Legislative Council, the introduction by Lord Mayo in 1870 of provincial finance, and the larger schemes of decentralisation which followed in 1877 and 1882—were rendered possible by the results of the administration of Lord Dalhousie. In his time the absolute control of all the finances of India by the Supreme Government, even down to the smallest provincial detail, was considered essential. Nevertheless, he introduced several salutary changes. He quickened greatly the preparation of the estimates and accounts of the year. To the reports which were prepared by the Financial Secretary in order to accompany the despatch sending home these figures, he added a special annual review of the changes in the main sources of revenue or expenditure, and a complete analysis of the accounts and of the estimates. He abolished the office of Government agent, whose sole business it was to buy or sell public securities for purchasers or sellers. He commenced a revision of civil salaries throughout the empire, which was completed in subsequent years. His conversion of the 5 per cent loans of 1825-26, 1829-30, and 1841-42 into a 4 per cent debt effected an annual saving of £300,000. His conquests and annexations, exclusive of Oudh, added three millions a year to the public revenue,[1] which on his arrival stood at twenty-six millions. His predecessors bequeathed to him an annual deficit in the accounts; and the

[1] For the revenues of Satara, Nagpur, the Punjab, and Pegu, see Return 522, ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, the 2nd of August, 1861. The figures which follow are based on the official returns of the time; but it must be remembered that grave fault was afterwards found with the whole system of Indian accounts, and some of the official returns were challenged by a committee of inquiry as misleading.

Punjab war of 1848-49 was a costly undertaking. But in the four following years his annual surplus varied from £360,000 to nearly £580,000; and although from 1853-54 a deficit reappeared, it represented an investment in canals, railways, and telegraphs, from which his successors derived large profits. The return presented to Parliament of the revenues of his last year of office showed the total receipts from all sources at £30,817,528 against charges amounting to £28,372,901, leaving a surplus of £2,444,627. Of the revenue as thus shown more than half accrued from land, excise, and sayer (*i.e.* miscellaneous), while nearly four millions were derived from opium.

The Marquis of Dalhousie also led the way in developing the material resources of India. There was hardly a corner of the field of profitable enterprise that he did not prospect. His encouragement of the tea industry has already been mentioned. He foresaw the importance of forest conservancy, and published a set of rules for "preventing unthrifty management of the forests on which we must depend for the supply of timber." The first Conservator of forests was appointed by him in Pegu. In that province and in the Punjab he instituted a scientific examination of the coalfields, and deputed Mr. Oldham to survey the Narbada valley for the same purpose. Iron was similarly searched for in various parts of the territories of the Company. Nor was the health of the people neglected. The number of dispensaries was largely increased, the medical service was opened to natives, and, as will be shown hereafter,[1] a scheme for the reorganisation of the Medical department was recommended to the Court.

In the next chapter some account will be given of

[1] Chapter viii. p. 270.

those reforms in the Legislative department, in the separation of Bengal from the direct control of the Governor-General, and in the constitution of the civil service which lay beyond his own powers of administration and required imperial legislation. The charges introduced into the Military department will also require separate treatment. But this sketch of his internal administration would be incomplete without reference to the steps which he took to bring the administration under review by means of annual reports. It is the fashion at present to depreciate the immense value of such reports, and to condemn them because they have been suffered, contrary to the intentions of him who originated them, to run into inordinate length. Those who have taken part in the government of India know the value to themselves of perusing these records which Lord Dalhousie introduced in order that they might show "the incidents which may have occurred during the year within the several jurisdictions of the provincial Governors, and state the progress that may have been made in each principal department of the civil and military administration." Their author looked forward to them as forming "a happy record of peace, prosperity, and progress"; and it is worthy of note that Sir Charles Wood was equally sensible of their value. On the 9th of December, 1854, the President wrote—

> There is a great desire here for yearly or biennial reports from the presidencies, like what are called the blue books from the Colonies, detailing the progress made in each year, the state of the revenue, etc. Do you think that this could be done? It would afford a record of the good deeds of the Government.

It was with satisfaction that the Governor-General replied on the 21st of January, 1855—

I am glad to have anticipated your remark regarding periodical reports from the different local Governments. I proposed it some time ago in a minute which is now on its way to you. Having regard to the feeling that the control of the Supreme Government is very unpalatable to the presidencies, I thought it expedient to carry the Court with me, and to have the weight of its previous approval in support of an innovation which, I apprehend, will not be popular with them.

Thus the foundation of the annual statement presented to Parliament, exhibiting the moral and material progress and condition of India, was laid by Lord Dalhousie; and upon it the British legislature built when, in 1858, it passed section 53 of Statute 21 and 22 Vict. c. 106. It was, however, no part of his plan to encourage an "exuberance of verbosity." He had, indeed, adopted in his own Council the rule of allowing only one minute to be written on the papers, and of then settling the matter in Council after oral discussion, "feeling the necessity of so limiting the practice of recording opinions in writing as to prevent the risk, otherwise imminent, of the transaction of business becoming a paper war." Writing to Hobhouse on the 26th of February, 1851, he stigmatised the Board of Revenue, the Military Board, and the Government of Bombay as the chief offenders in this respect. Of the last he wrote—

The Government of Bombay are like an electric telegraph; they for ever talk at one another on little slips of paper, even when they are collected. The absence of the Governor at Poona opens a door for this; but still there is no reason why Bombay and Poona should pelt one another with paper pellets, any more than Simla and Calcutta. The use of minuting is wholesome, the abuse of it in no way necessary.

In order, therefore, that he might put a stop to such "an exchange of fire of minutes," he introduced restric-

tions into his own Council, and advised the Governors of the other presidencies to do the same. Thus having passed a self-denying ordinance for the higher officers of State, he was not disposed to allow undue latitude to their subordinates. If in the lapse of time these annual reports have grown to undue dimensions, as certainly was until lately the case with some of them, the blame does not attach to the Marquis of Dalhousie, but to those of his successors who allowed deviation from his original plan.

CHAPTER VII

THE LAST CHARTER

Lord Dalhousie's essay on the Government of India—Its influence upon legislation in Parliament—No one anticipated that the Act of 1853 would be the last Charter Act—Brief review of the history of the Company between 1600 and 1784—The Act of 1833 described—Political constitution of India examined—Lord Dalhousie's views on the powers of the Governor-General—How far they were adopted—His legislative proposals—The decision of Parliament upon them—The new Legislative Council introduced—Objections raised to the Law Commission in England—Independence claimed for the Council in Calcutta—Sir Charles Wood's fears—Lord Dalhousie's action severely criticised—Was the Council allowed to be a Court of inquest?—Did it challenge the authority of Government and of the Court?—Did it disturb the public mind?—Remarks on the controversy—Lord Dalhousie's views on the Government of Bengal—Arguments brought forward against its severance from the charge of the Governor-General—The difficulty about patronage—The question of military control—Halliday appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal—Lord Dalhousie's views about the presidencies of Madras and Bombay—Abolition of Fort William College, and introduction of system of examinations—Service rules and privileges—Changes in constitution of Court of Directors—Military changes introduced by the Charter Act.

THE catalogue of reforms introduced by Lord Dalhousie into the structure of the Government of India, and into the department of Home affairs, is not exhausted by the account given in the last chapter. To him India owes its Legislative Councils, the detachment of Bengal from the direct control of the Governor-General,

and other changes which will now be explained. It does not detract from his title to credit for these measures that they were sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government and by Parliament, for they were suggested by the Governor-General in a masterly essay consisting of 167 paragraphs, dated the 13th of October, 1852, and entitled "The Government of India." Of it he writes in his diary on the 17th of October in these terms—

> I have been hard worked by a paper which I have been preparing for the President and Chairman, suggesting the changes and improvements which I think ought to be made in the administration of India by means of the new Act. I have been obliged to write it as I could find time from the current business. During last week and this I got five continuous days' work at it, and in that time I began and finished it.

The home authorities had specially asked the Governor-General to give them his opinion on the changes to be introduced when, as they loosely described it, "a new Charter is granted to the Company." It is clear from a letter written by Sir J. Hobhouse on the 4th of January, 1851, that Lord John Russell's Government were anxious to avoid too much discussion of Indian affairs. "We are threatened," he wrote, "with a great movement when the Indian Committee comes to be proposed. Whether it will be asked for next Session I do not know. As at present advised I see no great reason for any inquiry at present. The new Charter will not be wanted until 1854, and it will be quite time enough to introduce the Bill the year before. If the Committee must be appointed, I should say that 1852 would be quite time enough to call for it, and then, I trust, the matter will be in other hands." Three weeks later he added the opinion that "if any

change is to be made in the provision of the Act of 1833-34, that change should be made by the Government of the day according to the best advice at their command. In fact, the Company's Charter was a commercial Charter, which was taken away, or superseded by the last Act, and, excepting the payment of dividends on Indian stock, the whole law by which the Government of India is vested in the Company involves only political questions more suited to a Cabinet than to a Committee of Parliament." This view was evidently shared by Lord Derby, who informed the House of Lords that the withdrawal of the governing powers of the Company would entail the restoration of their commercial Charter. The force of this remark will become apparent at a later stage of this narrative.

Few chapters in the history of public affairs in England reflect more light upon the accidents and, it may be added, the mistakes of our legislature than that which deals with the passing, on the 20th of August, 1853, of the East India Company Act, 16-17 Vict. c. 95, continuing the territories in India until further notice under the Government of the Company in trust for Her Majesty, her heirs and successors. It has been seen that Hobhouse, although opposed to a preliminary Committee of inquiry, guarded himself by a reference to "other hands" and "the Government of the day." This cautious reservation was a shadow cast by coming events, and the storms which presently swept over the field of British politics turned men's thoughts into other directions than India. Thus it happened that the Act, hotly disputed at first, was passed without much difficulty, and without even waiting for the reports of the Committees, which, after all, "the Governments of the day" were obliged to appoint. On

the 21st of February, 1851, Lord John Russell and his cabinet tendered their resignations to the Queen. Then, writes Hobhouse, Lord John "came back on Monday the 24th of February, but resigned his commission again, and Stanley was master of the field the Tuesday and Wednesday following, and did not give up his commission until Thursday afternoon." Once more Lord John Russell was in office, but Hobhouse, now Lord Broughton, added "at least for the present." The present did not last long. The ministry, thanks mainly to the fact that public attention was engrossed by the Great Exhibition, staggered on for a few months, and survived by only a few weeks the retirement of Lord Palmerston from its ranks. While it lasted nothing was done in the direction of a Committee of inquiry. The first letter which Mr. Herries, as a member of Lord Derby's ministry, wrote to Lord Dalhousie is dated the 8th March, 1852, and on the 2nd of April Lord Derby moved in the House of Lords the appointment of a select Committee to inquire into the operation of Act 3 and 4 William IV. c. 85, and to report their observations thereon. He indicated, however, his own preference for a continuance of the existing system as best calculated to secure, "a matter of infinite importance," the exclusion of Indian affairs "from political squabbles and party contests." Lord Ellenborough followed with an attack upon the Directors, and the appointment of a Committee of thirty members was agreed to, including Ellenborough, Canning, Hardinge, Gough, and Broughton. On the 19th of April Herries carried through the House of Commons a similar motion for a Committee of thirty-one members, and in doing so paid a graceful tribute to the administrative success achieved by Lord Dalhousie.

The Committee had not long been at work when Parliament was dissolved in July. When the new House met in November, 1852, the Committee was re-appointed, five new members, including Macaulay, Stanley, and Palmerston, taking the place of those who had lost their seats and were "no longer available." Once more their labours were interrupted, for in December Lord Derby resigned on the defeat of Disraeli's budget, and Lord Aberdeen formed a coalition ministry of Whigs and Peelites, with Wood at the Board of Control. By this time the volume of evidence taken by the Committees was considerable, but their minutes of evidence had been "reported" without further "observations." The new Government was soon obliged to come to a conclusion as to whether it would await the final observations of the Committees or proceed at once with legislation. Mr. Bright complained of "a good deal of vacillation on the part of the Government," and a letter from Hogg repeats the rumour that "the Cabinet was divided as to whether it would not be wiser merely to pass a short Act continuing the existing powers for another year." Be that as it may, all doubts were set at rest when, on the 3rd of June, 1853, Sir Charles Wood, in a speech which lasted more than five hours, introduced and explained the provisions of his East India Company Act. Thus it happened that by different routes successive governments arrived at the point indicated by Hobhouse in January, 1851. The question had to be decided by the Cabinet, and not[1] by a Committee of Parliament; and in

[1] Speaking in the House on the 9th of June, 1853, Mr. T. Baring, Chairman of the Committee, said he rejoiced to see the Bill introduced, and he considered that there were quite sufficient data for the House to go upon without waiting for the conclusions of the Committee, which would still continue its inquiries.

arriving at this conclusion the Government were guided by Lord Dalhousie, whose suggestions and views they for the most part adopted. Indeed, large portions of Wood's speech in the House were taken direct from the Governor-General's Essay.

Parliament in 1853 little dreamt that it was adding the last stone to the edifice reared by the most famous Company ever known to history, a body of subjects, trustees for the Crown, who employed "an army of 285,000 soldiers," and "ruled over at least 150 millions of men." On the contrary, Lord Derby spoke of the Sepoys and other servants as men who "vie with each other in their loyalty and attachment to the Company," and no prophet of impending mutiny dropped a note of discord on the floor of the House of Commons. The course of events has, however, lent a special interest to their proceedings, and the legislation of 1853 will be more easily understood if a short review is given of the history of the Company whose powers were now brought under discussion.

One must look back to the closing years of the sixteenth century to find the causes which led to the opening of commerce with the East. The wars with Philip of Spain dislocated the course of trade between Portugal and the cities of Amsterdam and Antwerp, forcing the Dutch into new fields of enterprise. The Government of the Netherlands supported its merchants in raising capital for the Dutch East India Company. The long-headed men of business in London responded by obtaining from Queen Elizabeth a charter on the 31st of December, 1600, which conferred upon the London East India Company the exclusive privilege of trading to all parts of Asia, Africa, and America, beyond the Cape of Good Hope, eastwards of the Straits

of Magellan. Notwithstanding this Charter and its confirmation by James the First, licenses for private trade with the East were granted to interlopers which, during the "frowning times" of the civil war, entailed heavy losses upon the Chartered Company. The Restoration of Charles the Second did not mend matters. In the storm through which the constitution had passed, legal flaws had been discovered in the issue of charters by the Crown without the sanction of Parliament, and "interlopers" took advantage of them to embark in the trade in opposition to the London Company. In 1693 the Company failed in the payment of a duty of 5 per cent which had been imposed upon their stock by Parliament in the reign of William and Mary, and as a penalty their charter was made terminable upon three years' notice. In 1698 a war loan of two millions was raised by the State at 8 per cent in consideration of the grant of certain rights of trade to the subscribers who were constituted a general society "trading to the East Indies," and were usually called the "English Company." The right of winding up the new and also the old Company after 1711 at three years' notice on repayment of the loan was reserved. Experience soon proved that there was no room for the rival operations of two chartered Companies, and under the award of Lord Godolphin they were formally united in 1708 by an Act passed in the sixth year of the reign of Queen Anne. Foreign wars had exhausted the public treasury, and the "United East India Company" advanced to the State in that year a loan of £1,200,000 without interest, in return for an extension of their commercial privileges. Loan followed loan until public attention was drawn to scandals caused by the display of private wealth made by the Company's retired

officials, and by ugly rumours regarding the abuse of their governing powers. But the public conscience was easily quieted by the distribution of liberal dividends, and by the profitable transactions of the State with the powerful corporation. At last the fiction of their immense wealth was dissipated, and when the Company had to come to Parliament for a loan to prevent bankruptcy, the public grew virtuous and insisted upon an inquiry into their affairs. Thereon the Regulating Act of 1773 was passed, Statute 13 Geo. III. c. 63, which established a supreme court of judicature, raised the qualification of a proprietor with a right of voting to £1000, leaving the directors' qualification at £2000, and constituted the first Governor-General of Bengal with four Councillors as the supreme authority in India. At the same time civil officers were forbidden to receive presents or to engage in private trade. In 1784 a further step was taken by Pitt's Act, Statute 24 Geo. III. Sessions 2, c. 25, which established the "double Government," whereby a Board of Control, made up of six Commissioners, was vested with the power of directing and controlling all acts that related to the civil or military government, or the revenues of the British territorial possessions in the East Indies. At the same time the Court of Proprietors lost their power of overruling resolutions of the Court of Directors, and the Governor-General's Council was reduced to three members. In 1786 the Governor-General was given authority to override his Council.

The main result of the legislation of the eighteenth century was to bring the United East India Company under the direction of the Home Government, and yet to leave them a commercial as well as a political body. In 1813 a fundamental change in their position was

made by the Statute 55 Geo. III. c. 155. Their monopoly of trade with India was thrown open to the public, that with China being left with them. The "undoubted sovereignty of the Crown" over the territories of India was affirmed, while the government of them was left in the hands of the Company for twenty years. On the expiration of that term, the first reformed Parliament, by an Act, 3 and 4 Will. IV. c. 85, passed in 1833, renewed the charter for another term of twenty years, and put a stop to their trade altogether, while the Board of Control became in effect the President alone, he being at the same time a member of the Cabinet. As Mr. Herries stated in 1853, "they ceased to be traders in any character whatever. All their possessions were made over to the Crown, their commercial assets were disposed of, their future power of trade entirely annihilated so long as the Act continued in force." To this description Lord Derby added the explanation that the period of extension of political power was practically forty years, not twenty, inasmuch as they could demand, if their governing powers were withdrawn in 1853, repayment of their stock at the rate of £200 sterling for every £100 of stock within a period of three years. "If your lordships," he said, "now think fit to withdraw the political power vested in the Company, their commercial charter would be re-established; and if you should decide to continue to the Company the political power which they now enjoy, so far from that being a renewal of the charter, it would be but a renewal of the condition under which that charter remained in abeyance."

Such was the position of affairs when Parliament met in 1853 to decide upon the future government of India under the United East India Company. But in

order that the proposals made by Lord Dalhousie may be thoroughly understood, it is necessary to emphasise some parts of the political constitution of the Company's territorial possessions as fixed by the Act of 1833, and those which preceded it. The superintendence, direction, and control of the whole civil and military government of those territories and their revenues were vested in the Governor-General in Council. The Governor-General might overrule his Council; although Lord Dalhousie was able to say that "during the five years in which I have administered this Government, no instance of it has occurred." In the event of necessity, the Governor-General was authorised to proceed to any part of India without his Council, and alone to exercise all powers of the Governor-General in Council except those of legislation. During his absence he might appoint a President in Council to discharge all duties or exercise all powers which he did not reserve to himself, an Act being passed by the Indian Legislature declaring the measure of authority assigned to each party. The members of the Executive Council of the Governor-General were the Commander-in-Chief and three ordinary members, one of whom was, in practice, a military officer, the other two being members of the Bengal Civil Service. As a matter of fact the Commander-in-Chief was generally absent, and took no part in the proceedings of the Council. The whole legislation of India was conducted by "the Governor-General in Council," an English barrister being added as a fourth ordinary member, but without the right to vote on matters other than projects of law. The two presidencies of Madras and Bombay submitted their schemes of legislation to the Supreme Government by which, if approved, they were passed into law.

A Law Commission, of which Macaulay was the leading member, was appointed in 1833, and its recommendations still awaited enactment by the Legislature in Calcutta. Apart from his Council the Governor-General was also Governor of Bengal, having power to appoint one of his three colleagues as a Deputy Governor of that province should he desire to do so; that colleague at the same time discharging his duties on the Supreme Council. The two presidencies of Madras and Bombay were under Governors almost invariably sent out from England, aided by Councils consisting of the local Commanders-in-Chief and two members selected from the civil services of those presidencies.

The three leading points to which Lord Dalhousie devoted his main criticism were the position of the Governor-General, the legislative machinery, and the government of Bengal. He also offered suggestions regarding the presidencies, the patronage of the Court, and the strengthening of his own Council. On the first of these leading topics he strongly advocated the retention of the supreme control vested in himself in Council. "So vast a machine as the general government of India, by which so huge a mass of territory, of population, and of revenue is to be ordered, can never be safely worked unless there be unity of authority and of purpose in the direction of it, and in the control of its resources." Such a central control had never been, and need never be, "exerted in petty interference with the local administration of the presidencies," but its retention was, in his opinion, essential to the safety and welfare of the empire. He was equally firm in claiming the right to overrule his Council, holding that such a power would hardly ever be used, and that his

"responsibility to the Court, to Parliament, and to the Crown afforded a full guarantee that this great power will never be exercised without very weighty reasons." It was also a matter of importance in case of wars, disturbances, and even in the interests of the regular administration that he should see with his own eyes the work of his own instruments, "praising when it is well earned and visiting with prompt rebuke those who lag behind, and acquainting himself with localities and local questions." It was therefore necessary for him to retain the power of distributing the work of government during his absence from the presidency and his Council. He referred to the value of his own tours, "not for the purpose of self-defence, still less of self-laudation, but in order to refute the allegation that the absence of the Governor-General from the presidency must be injurious to the general affairs of India." Dealing with his own position, he thought that authority over her Majesty's troops in India, and her naval forces in the Indian seas, should be specifically conferred upon him by Royal Commission. As to the former he wrote:—"I beg not to be understood as desiring to obtain for the Governor-General the position of Viceroy,[1] or even the commission of Captain-General, which was conferred upon Lord Wellesley. I seek only the public confirmation of the power which he actually holds now, but which, if it were granted him in terms under the sign manual, would give weight to his exercise of it and confirm the influence of his high position." He urged that the title of His Honour, "which alone

[1] The Governor-General of India is neither by his commission nor by any Act of Parliament recognised as Viceroy. The title was used in the Queen's gracious Order in Council published in India on the 1st of November, 1858, taking upon herself the government of the territories in India administered in trust for the Crown by the Company.

now belongs to his office, and is hardly above that of a London police magistrate," should be exchanged for that of His Excellency, and in regard to his salute he wrote:—"The Governor-General receives a salute of nineteen guns. Excepting with reference to Native princes, it is not desirable that he should receive more. But with special reference to them it is open to question whether it is not practically expedient that his salute should be fixed at twenty-one guns," which the Kings of Delhi and Oudh and other princes in India received. "The power of the British Government is now on all occasions styled 'the paramount power.' It is so in reality, and I think that every outward symbol of paramountcy should attach to the office of its representative."

His proposals thus summarised were generally accepted, and the law which provided for most of the powers claimed by him was left in force. As regards control over the Navy, he was told that the improvement of his Indian marine would give him all the facilities he required for the purposes of India. In order as far as possible to avoid controversy, it was considered undesirable to lay before Parliament any proposals for strengthening the Governor-General's legal position, but he might rely upon the support of the home authorities. It was otherwise with the reform of the Legislative Council, in respect to which legislation could not be avoided. Upon that subject Lord Dalhousie's arguments carried conviction, and he succeeded in obtaining an enlargement of his own Legislative Council, and in getting the member of Council charged with the work of legislation raised to the full privileges of an ordinary member of the Supreme Council.

His plea for the entire reconstruction of the Indian Legislature was, indeed, unanswerable. The existing system was, as he proved, unworkable. His two colleagues, members of the Bengal service, "could know nothing about the local legislation required for Madras and Bombay, and have no skill in the technical difficulties which attach to legislative enactments." The executive duties of the Governor-General left him no leisure to attend to the details of legislation. Neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the military member of Council could "by any possibility know anything about the matter." Even the fourth member added specially for the purpose, "although profoundly versed in English law, is as profoundly ignorant of all laws prevailing in India, whether Hindu, Mahomedan, regulations or acts. He knows absolutely nothing of the inhabitants, the tenures, the practice or the habits of the country to which he comes, and from which he is probably withdrawn when he has mastered these difficulties." Although the Governor-General criticised the selection of an English barrister in these strong terms, he subsequently modified his opinion on this particular point. Writing to Wood on the 21st of March, 1853, he said:—"I have doubt on one point only—the abolition of the English lawyer. Men whose opinion I respect consider that the Advocate-General would not be capable of the work." In other matters he adhered to his scheme, the main object of which was the association with his own Executive Council of extra members, including Judges of the Supreme and Chief Courts, a member of the Board of Revenue, and the Advocate-General. His own Council ought, he thought, to be recruited, not from Bengal only, but from the three presidencies. The Advocate-General, assisted by the barrister, if he was

still retained, was to draft the Bills, and when they came under discussion in Council, other members, including the officials mentioned above and also a few European and Native gentlemen, taken from unofficial as well as official ranks, were to consider and pass them. To education he looked as an agency that would qualify the natives for a share in the legislative work of India. "Indeed," he added, "amidst the general unfitness there are already some Native gentlemen whose intellectual qualities, whose experience of our government, and whose extensive and minute knowledge of Indian details would render any one of them a very valuable member of the Legislative Council. For my part I should be personally glad to see such a gentleman appointed at once under the new Act." [1]

The Bill passed through the House of Commons on the 29th of July, 1853, divisions being taken on several occasions in the course of its passage, but no changes of real consequence were made in its original provisions. "Young India mustered twenty-four after all this boasting," wrote Wood, who in his letter dated the 8th of June, 1853, described the provisions of the Bill in these terms:—

At home we have launched our India Bill after some hesitation. A letter of yours to Argyll confirmed the waverers. I have myself never had the least doubt on the subject; and so far it has been well received, except, of course, by Bright and Young India, whom nothing will satisfy but breaking the Directors. We were anxious to make no more changes than we could help, for the present House of Commons is a very uncertain one. I think we do all that is essential. At home the Court of Directors are to

[1] When Parliament failed to give the Governor-General the right of appointing a Native to his Council, he nominated Babu Prosonno Kumar Tagore to be Clerk-Assistant of the Council, informing Wood on the 13th of July, 1854, that he was "a man of ability, learning, wealth, and influence. He is brother of Dwarkanath Tagore, and has much weight here."

be reduced to eighteen, of whom six will be named by the Crown from Indian servants of ten years' standing, either in the Crown's or the Company's service. The patronage of Haileybury and Addiscombe is opened to competition. In India the nomination of Executive Councillors is to be approved by the Crown. The Legislative Councillor is to sit and vote always. The Legislative Council is to be enlarged by a member from each presidency or Governorship, and by the addition of the Chief Justice and one Judge of the Supreme Court about to be constituted, and power given to add two more members. The Governor-General is to have a veto. The controlling power of the Governor-General and his discretion as to absence are to be left as now. The presidencies of Madras and Bombay remain as at present, but power is given to separate Bengal and make it a permanent lieutenant-governorship. Power is given to create a new presidency or lieutenant-governorship if needed (*i.e.* Punjab and Indus); and to alter or regulate limits of presidencies from time to time.

Other details as to salaries were then given, and Wood proceeded :—

We take, I think, all your suggestions for India, except enacting in plainer form your powers and those of the Governors of the presidencies when absent. After much consultation we thought it wiser not to attempt this, lest we should have limitations forced on us. I will only add that I am more anxious than ever that your knowledge, experience, and authority in India should be available for carrying out the changes to be made by the Bill, and how earnestly I hope that you will remain there long enough to do this.

The extract just quoted confirms what has been said as to the source from which the changes introduced into the Government of India by the Act of 1853 were derived. But India and the Company not only owed the suggestion of these reforms to Lord Dalhousie; their successful introduction into practice was due also to him. The unsatisfactory change introduced by the law of 1833, which deprived the local Governments of the power to make regulations, a right which they had

exercised with considerable benefit to their subjects, was not rectified. The various provinces of India had to wait until 1861 for the restitution of their powers of passing laws other than those affecting debt, the post office, the army, foreign relations, copyright, and certain other excepted matters. But, at least, they secured, under Lord Dalhousie's proposals, a recognised position in the Imperial Legislature of India, and a nominee of each Governor or Lieutenant-Governor selected from the Civil Service was present in the Council of India to undertake or support legislation required by his province. The Governor-General needed no spur from the President to enlist his hearty co-operation in bringing his "reformed Parliament" into active work. He corresponded with the local Governments on the choice of their nominees; and having nominated Halliday as Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, he replaced him on his own Council. He recorded a minute on the 17th of May, 1854, drafted a set of standing orders for the conduct of business, and on the 20th of May, 1854, summoned his first meeting.[1] In his diary, dated the 12th of October, he gives the following account of what followed:—

By the beginning of June the Council was in operation, and since that time has gone on steadily working, and settling itself into regular routine. By the Act it is my duty to take the chair whensoever I may be present. Hence I am obliged to act both as President of the Council, and as Chairman of it when in Committee. The Legislative Council transacts the business before it on much the same system as is observed in our own Parliament, but more approaching to the manner of the House of Lords than

[1] The Standing Orders were referred to a Committee and adopted on the 19th of August, 1854. The first Council consisted of the Governor-General, Sir Lawrence Peel, J. A. Dorien, Colonel Low, J. P. Grant, Barnes Peacock, Sir James Colvile, A. J. Mills; and D. Eliott, A. Malet, and C. Allen representing respectively Madras, Bombay, and the North-West Provinces.

of the Commons. The number of the stages of each Bill and the opportunities of debate are accordingly diminished. A Bill is read, after notice given, a first time without debate. After notice given it is read a second time, debate being taken on the principle of the measure. It is then referred to a committee of three, who, after publishing and giving the public three months to comment upon it, give in their report suggesting such amendments as they think necessary. The Council then resolves itself into a Committee of the whole Council upon the Bill. Finally, after notice given, the Bill is read a third time and passed. The questions are put and the sense of the Council taken in the same manner as in Parliament. If there be a division the clerk calls over the names, beginning with the junior, in order that the Governor-General may not, by voting first in order, exercise an undue influence upon the minds of the members! In the material form of our meetings we have adopted a good deal of the American plan. The Legislative Council meets in the Council Chamber. The members are seated in a semicircle, each having a desk before him for his books and papers. The table for the clerks is placed at the upper end of the semicircle, and the President's chair beyond it. At first, with the exception of the judges, the speaking was felt to be an unpalatable novelty by most of the members. Mr. D. Eliott even proposed that members should be allowed to read their speeches on the ground that many members would not be able to speak *viva voce.* He gave himself as an instance. But as he had made an excellent speech in proposing his motion, his *argumentum ad hominem* was held to be null, and his suggestion was negatived without a division. The Council has already done a great deal of work, and I have no doubt will fulfil the expectations it has raised.

In his zeal for the independence of his new Council the Governor-General objected to one provision of the Act of 1853, which empowered Her Majesty by Commission to appoint persons in England to consider the recommendations of the Law Commissioners and to report upon reforms proposed by them, giving them power to examine witnesses and call for documents, but of course not to undertake legislation. In a letter

to Wood, dated the 18th of September, 1854, he wrote :—

You refer to your Commission at home. You say that you "hear rumours from Calcutta of some jealousy of the Commission," and you call upon me to discourage all such feelings. You will perhaps recall to mind that from the first proposal of the measure I expressed freely to you my opinion of its inexpediency, and I was not singular in my opinion. "Jealousy of the Commission" there is not, for all the power is on one side and none on the other. But disapprobation there is, and I do not believe there is a man in India, attending to such things, who did not view the formation of that body with dislike and regret. Its institution to bring forward the measures of the Law Commission was regarded as an unmerited reproach on the former Council of India, as though that body had neglected its duties, when it was morally and physically impossible that such legislative duties could be performed by five men charged besides with the executive administration of this great empire. Further, it was regarded as an anomaly that a body, whose only portion having Indian experience was composed of a retired Chief Justice, a retired Councillor, and a retired Sadr Judge, who had all left this country years ago, should be thought more capable of preparing Indian legislation than the actual Chief Justice, Councillor, and Sadr Judge, all of them as able as their predecessors, and having the advantage of living on the scene, of sharing in the events, and communicating with the people of this country.

Turning then to a suggestion made by Sir C. Wood that no legislation should be introduced without prior submission to the authorities at home, Lord Dalhousie urged that although the President's authority over the Executive Government of India was complete, his authority over the Legislative Council was confined to the power of disallowing an Act. He submitted that the creation of the new Council had only emphasised that contrast.

You have instituted by law an independent body of ten or twelve English gentlemen, and it is right you should know early

that you will find them asserting their legislative independence. They will, I am certain, receive with respect any reports of the Commission which the Directors may send. They will consider them with care. But they will assuredly not submit their legislation for the previous information of the Commission, nor will they stay their legislation to await indefinitely what the Commission may be expected to bring forth.

Sir Charles replied somewhat sharply to these contentions. He had already written in June to tell the Governor-General that he need not fill up all the places in the new Council at once, but might wait until some special need occurred for their services. "Surely," he had said, "with four additional gentlemen who will not have anything else to do, you may do all that is needed in an ordinary way. I do not want to see a debating society, but a working body of committee men." He now thought it necessary to go a step further. On the 23rd of December, 1854, he wrote :—

I come now to an important matter, which is your letter as to the members of the Legislative Council; and I am afraid that you are inclined to place them in a position which I do not think and never intended that they should occupy. I never wished to raise up a great independent body in India. I look to the Governor-General. . . . I look upon all the Councils, Secretaries, etc., as so many machines for lightening the labour of the Governor-General, and for doing what I may call the mechanical work of the Government. I have made him more absolute than he was in the Executive Council, and I do not wish to make the Legislative Council a body which does more than aid him in law-making. The Executive Council is to aid him in administrating, the Legislative Council in law-making. I admit of course that the latter must be more independent, but I do not wish to make it a body that is likely to take upon itself more weight or authority than is necessary for the purpose of elaborating laws. I do not look upon it, as some of the young Indians do, as the nucleus and beginning of a Constitutional Parliament in India.

The President concluded by declining to allow a

legislative councillor to take furlough out of his five years of Council. Lord Dalhousie was not induced by this explanation to abandon either his opinion or his hopes. On the 16th of March, 1855, he wrote :—

> I am unable to see that I have conceded to the Legislative Council any greater power than the law clearly confers upon it, or that I have sought for its members any position beyond that which is requisite to make the body fully efficient. I must be guided by the Statute of 1853. Its provisions have given to the Legislative Council the independence which I have ascribed to it. The Governor-General cannot help himself. Except in the final veto after the passing of an Act, he has none of that overruling power over the Legislative which the law gives him over the Supreme Council.

After urging the importance of choosing the best men for the post, he concluded : " Wherefore I trust that precedence of some sort may be granted to legislative councillors, and that the same sick leave may be granted to them as to other members of the service."

The President of the Board and the Governor-General were so entirely in accord upon most administrative questions, and both of them were so anxious to reform the institutions of India upon liberal lines, that it is impossible to pass lightly over their difference of opinion on this particular matter. It was no mere passing disagreement. Even after the death of Lord Dalhousie Sir Charles Wood reiterated his objections to the position assumed by the Indian Legislature under the Act of 1853, and the detractors of the late Governor-General eagerly seized upon the measure as one of the most mischievous acts of his administration. Speaking in Parliament as a member of Lord Palmerston's Ministry, Wood said, on the 6th of June, 1861 :—

> The Council, quite contrary to my intention, has become a

sort of debating society or petty Parliament. It was certainly a great mistake that a body of twelve members should have been established with all the forms and functions of a Parliament. They have standing orders nearly as numerous as we have, and their effect has been, as Lord Canning stated, to impede business. . . . I think that the general opinion both in India and England condemned the action of the Council when it attempted to discharge functions other than those which I have mentioned—when it constituted itself a body for the redress of grievances, and engaged in discussions which led to no practical result. I find that the Vice-President, Sir Lawrence Peel, expressed a very decided opinion against it, and says of the Council in a short memorandum: "It has no jurisdiction in the nature of that of a grand inquest of the nation. Its functions are purely legislative, and are limited even in that respect. It is not an Anglo-Indian House of Commons for the redress of grievances, to refuse supplies, and so forth." These obvious objections were pointed out to me by the Government of India last year, and it was my intention to have introduced a measure on the subject in the course of that session.

Three definite charges were brought against Lord Dalhousie in connection with his reformed Council for making laws and regulations. He had allowed it to take up grievances and thus weaken the Executive; he had permitted it to challenge the authority of the local Governments, and even of the Court of Directors; and its proceedings had agitated the public mind and so predisposed the people to rebellion. These specific charges admit of inquiry and adjudication, but behind them lay a larger question, and that was whether the thin end of representation was being introduced. There is nothing to show that on the essential question of principle any real difference of opinion existed. It must be admitted that Lord Dalhousie started the new system of making laws with some flourish, but it does not follow that he contemplated the introduction of the

parliamentary system into India. The neat trim volumes, modelled on Hansard's Parliamentary Records, which recorded the proceedings of Council from 1854 to 1862, were devised by him. He desired his legislators to rise from their seats when they spoke in Council, and the elaborate standing orders were drafted by himself on the model of those familiar to him in the House of Lords. Messages from the Governor-General were brought in by a member and presented with grave formality. These were not stage performances merely devised for effect. The first President of the new assembly claimed for its members, publicity, freedom, and an honourable position. The special precedence and privileges of leave which he sought for them were outward tokens of the dignity and importance with which he desired to invest their office. That was the very reason which induced the home authorities to refuse in 1855 concessions which have long since been accorded without any thought of danger to public interests. It was feared in the 'fifties that the Governor-General was taking action which would entirely alter the constitution of the Indian Government. But he knew that no authority could continue to rule unless it could pass the laws needed for the conduct of public affairs. By the nature of the case, and in the interests of India's jarring communities, the British Executive must rule the territories of the Company "despotically," as one President had observed, and there was no room in the scheme for a "Constitutional Parliament." Lord Dalhousie had created some alarm in the minds of the Directors by suggesting that one seat in the Council might be filled by a native legislator. It was feared that a deep design was veiled under the cloak of the forms and standing orders of his new assembly. Even

if he himself could be trusted to keep his colleagues in order and to repress any serious tendency on their part to interfere with the Executive Government, it was urged that his successors might be less careful, and that matters which now seemed trivial would soon become serious. Was there not reason to fear that the representative system would be introduced by a side-door? There is nothing, however, in the Governor-General's "Essay on the Government of India," or in any of his letters, to indicate that he ever contemplated any weakening of the authority of the Government of India. The selection of councillors remained in the hands of the Governor-General, and this being the case, he held that the efficiency of the Council depended upon its full exercise of the liberty conferred upon it by law, and that it was sound policy to invest a body, who could be fully trusted to support Government, with all the outward symbols of confidence and high honour. The difference of opinion between him and the President was, he believed, due to misunderstanding, and events would show that there was no danger in making the concessions which he had sought.

The best method of testing the truth of the charges which have already been mentioned, and which received some support from the speech of Sir Charles Wood, is by reference to the transactions of the Council up to the end of February, 1856, for its proceedings when in the hands of Lord Canning are not evidence against Lord Dalhousie. What, then, is the foundation for the charge that he allowed a Court of Inquest to be established over the actions of the various Governments of India? It is of the very flimsiest character. It is quite true that attempts were made to bring grievances before the Legislative Council, but these attempts most

signally failed. On the 29th of July, 1854, Ram Ratan Bose, a clerk dismissed for corruption, besought the Council for redress, and on the 24th of February, 1855, Subhaputty Pilay of Bangalore complained of the action of the Commissioners of Mysore. Again, on the 10th of November, 1855, Cottah Kitchenna Chetty of Madras preferred an appeal against the decree of the chief Civil Court. But in every case the petition was ruled to be inadmissible "as not connected with the business of Council." Thereon a few ingenious petitioners wrapped up their grievances in the form of projects of law, but their devices carried them no further on the road of redress.

The next charge of the indictment was that the authority of the Local Governments and of the Court of Directors had been challenged. It is perfectly true that the former were so sensitive as to consider themselves disgraced by the public rejection of certain Bills which they brought before the Council. Thus the municipal law "to modify Act XXVI. of 1850" for Bengal, and the Bombay "Stamps Bill" were severely criticised and withdrawn. But no one can read the debates without concurring in the sentence of death passed upon these projects of law. The Council was no respecter of persons, and the Court of Directors suffered the same indignity of "rejected addresses" with other bodies. There, indeed, lay the real ground of complaint, and the *spretæ injuria formæ* which was never forgiven. The incident is memorable in Indian history, and assuredly reflects no discredit either upon the Council or upon the Governor-General. The story is soon told. On the 13th of February, 1855, the Governor-General assented to Act VIII. "to amend the law relating to the office and duties of Administrator-General." When

the Court of Directors had examined the Act, they pointed out in a despatch, No. 84 of 1855, that whereas they had desired that the commission to be charged by the Administrator-General of Bengal should be 5 per cent upon all funds received by him, two-fifths of which was to be paid into the public treasury, the Act fixed the charge at 3 per cent which the Administrator-General was to retain. They stated their views at length, and concluded as follows: "We must disallow so much of the Act as is inconsistent with our present orders, which we desire may be strictly followed out." Sir Lawrence Peel at once defended, by sound arguments, the scale of commission embodied in the Act, and at the meeting of the Council held on the 13th of October, 1855, he "claimed for the Legislative body, to which he had the honour to belong, independent action. The Honourable Court had the power to annul any Act which the Legislative Council might pass, but they had no power to send their orders to the Council to pass a particular measure." On the 8th of December, 1855, the Council, presided over by Lord Dalhousie, carried unanimously a resolution, moved by Peacock, which affirmed the propriety of the Act called in question, adding that "this Council, admitting to the fullest extent the right of the Honourable Court to disallow any law made by the Governor-General in Council, and the duty of this Council thereupon to repeal such law, desires to record its opinion that the Honourable Court has not the power to disallow any part of an Act, unless the same relates to two or more subjects so wholly unconnected that the point disallowed amounts in substance to a distinct law." Another clause affirmed that "in the judgment of this Council the Honourable Court of Directors does not possess the right to require

the Council to pass any law which the Honourable Court may think fit to direct." Lord Dalhousie was not one to shelter himself behind his colleagues. By the same mail he wrote to Mr. R. Vernon Smith, President of the Board :—

> Last year I took the liberty of warning your predecessor that the Legislative Council, which the late Statute has created, would assert its independence, and would not recognise any right in the Court to direct the course of its legislation, or any other right than that of disallowing an Act. It has so proved. On my return I found the Council in arms, and a report adopted which will end in a resolution. I respectfully advise the home authorities to get rid of this difficulty as soon as they can. We are certainly unanimous, and twelve successors would be equally unanimous to-morrow.

Lord Dalhousie was unassailable in his defence both of the Council and of the law. The Administrator-General's Act was not amended until 1860, and then not in regard to the clauses to which the Court had taken exception.

There remains only the third point in which the action of the Council needs explanation. It was also charged with the offence of disturbing the public mind. One Act in particular, "the remarriage of Hindu widows," provoked comment in the days of the mutiny, and this was laid at the door of the Governor-General. What, then, are the facts? The Bill was read for the first time on the 17th of November, 1855, introduced by Grant, and seconded by Sir James Colvile. But it was not passed until the 25th of July, 1856, when it was approved by Lord Canning. It is still the law of the land; and although, no doubt, the discussion of it created some ferment in the native mind and offended Hindu orthodoxy, not a remark was made to which exception can properly be taken. It is inevitable that the public

discussion of projects of law should give some offence, but in a country to which liberty of the press had already been conceded it was only proper that freedom and publicity should be allowed to its legislators.

If Lord Dalhousie erred at all he erred from excess of zeal. There was every justification for his desire to reform the Council. India had outgrown a legislative assembly consisting of less than half-a-dozen overworked officials who discussed projects of law on paper and promulgated them as Acts without public discussion. But it was not wise to herald with the sound of trumpets a change, which according to English notions was delusive. The political cravings of Western people are satisfied with nothing less than representative institutions. The East is essentially opposed to them. The application to the Calcutta Council of orders and forms transplanted from Westminster alarmed the experts in Leadenhall Street, and created in Bengal an exaggerated idea of the intentions of the Governor-General. He himself knew the extent of his own powers, and was not likely to hesitate in repressing any dangerous tendencies. If by any chance the official legislators should travel beyond their province, or parade their independence, the remedy lay with the President who should direct their proceedings. During his term of office Lord Dalhousie checked the discussion of grievances, and kept debate within reasonable limits. But the independence which he claimed might, it was argued, be misused by others, and it cannot be denied that his zeal for the Council's freedom of action was calculated to arouse fears that were justified by the course of events after his retirement from office.

While opinions differed and still differ regarding the enlargement of the Legislative Council, the advantages

of recognising Bengal as a province of the empire under a Lieutenant-Governor are no longer disputed. Yet this desirable reform did not at the time pass without challenge. Lord Dalhousie did not mince matters in condemning the system under which the Governor-General or his Deputy, being a member of his Council, was charged with the administration of so important a province. In his essay he wrote :—

> The Deputy has always in practice been President of the Council also. Thus his undivided attention can no more be given to the local affairs of Bengal than can that of the Governor-General. The Deputy-Governor cannot leave Calcutta to visit the districts; for if he does he stops the business of the general Government and of legislation. Thus it has come to pass that although the Local Government of Bengal has been held by Deputy-Governors for twelve out of the eighteen years which have elapsed since the passing of the Act of 1834, no Deputy-Governor has ever visited the districts any more than the Governor-General. And so great are the anomalies which have influenced the fate of this valuable and important province, that for three and a half out of these twelve years of deputed rule the functionaries, in whom was deposed the entire civil administration of Bengal, have been veteran generals of the Bengal and Madras armies!

The result of such a system was written large on the annals of Bengal. Lord Dalhousie could not but contrast the progress attained in the Upper Provinces during their government by Lieutenant-Governors chosen from the civil service with "the stagnant Lower Provinces." "The civilians in Bengal are as able as their brethren in Agra, and the country as capable of improvement, but the best man cannot exert himself for long with a good heart if no superior authority ever sees the result of his labours, if no approving voice ever sounds cheerily in his ears at the sight of successful exertions on the spot where they have been made." It was the same with

reproofs, which must produce more effect if uttered on the spot by one who knew every detail of the administration. Such a knowledge of detail, even if the Governor-General had time to acquire it, was not needed by him. It might even embarrass him in dealing with other parts of the empire where similar conditions did not prevail, or it might tend to divert his attention from broad principles. As matters stood, Bengal, "shifted from one 'prentice hand to another," must suffer, and Parliament would be "unjust" if it did not recognise the grievous disadvantage under which the province was placed.

The soundness of Lord Dalhousie's judgment in advocating the claims of Bengal to the undivided attention of a separate Governor was admitted by Parliament, and has been justified by the results. To us now the change seems so obviously necessary that one is apt to minimise the opposition it encountered and the credit due to the Governor-General who proposed it. Objections were raised from many sides, and some of them still bear their traces upon the constitution of the province. It was natural that many of the residents, Europeans in particular, should look upon a transfer from the hands of the Governor-General to an inferior officer as a loss of prestige. There was still more force in the fear expressed that the august presence of the Supreme Government at Calcutta would overshadow and weaken the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor. That is a danger, not wholly removed by time, which is particularly felt if the Viceroy's personality is strong and his mind inclined to regard the functions of the Supreme Government as administrative rather than controlling. Again, disappointment was felt by those who, recalling the Statute of 1833, would have welcomed

the separation of Agra from Fort William and the creation of both provinces as presidencies under Governors in Council. Bengal in the middle of the nineteenth century felt some jealousy of the titles of Madras and Bombay to the more sonorous designation of presidencies. The intention formed in 1833 had, it is true, been only suspended in 1836, when a Lieutenant-Governor was appointed to rule over the North-Western Provinces, and again the new Statute of 1853 still provided for the appointment of a separate Governor of the presidency of Fort William in lieu of the Governor-General of India. Meanwhile it allowed the Directors to authorise the Governor-General of India to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor "unless and until a separate Governor of the Presidency of Bengal" should be appointed. At home the objection which weighed most with the authorities was the fear of weakening the influence of the Governor-General by a reduction of his patronage, and no doubt there were those of the Directors who hoped by influence exercised upon the Governor-General to secure for their friends some of the loaves and fishes in India. The Statute of 1853 threw open to competition the admission to Haileybury College and the medical service. Hogg, writing to Lord Dalhousie on the 24th of May, 1853, bemoaned the change: "The Court is to be reduced to eighteen, of whom six are to be selected from those who have served in India. The civil patronage is to be taken away, and the vacancies to be supplied by general competition. This can never answer or work for the public good." But if inexorable Parliament transferred the home patronage to natural-born subjects of Her Majesty without nominations from the Directors, their object might still be secured through the Governor-General, and they

pressed for the retention by him of his patronage in Bengal. Their influence was so far successful that the door was left open by providing in the Statute 16 & 17, Vict. c. 95, for the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor subject to the express condition that the Governor-General should be free to limit the extent of his authority.

No time was lost by the Court of Directors in authorising Lord Dalhousie to exercise the power thus conferred upon him. But although the Court's despatch, No. 61, dated the 12th of October, 1853, empowered him to proceed at once, he determined to postpone action, partly in order to carry out some measures which he had under consideration for the better administration of his own province, and partly that he might await the nomination of the new member of his Council. Meanwhile he disposed of the first difficulty in the way by settling the distribution of patronages. In a minute, dated the 20th of April, he asserted his indifference to the exercise of patronage, adding that he regarded it "as a vexatious duty of which I would gladly disencumber myself." His main object was to surrender as much as he could while reserving to himself the opportunity of rewarding merit. All appointments hitherto reserved by the Governor-General in Council he retained with the sole exception of that of civil auditor. For the rest, he took away from the patronage of Bengal two political appointments connected with the Mysore princes and the *Nizamat* affairs, several marine appointments, the ecclesiastical posts of Archdeacon and Registrar, and the offices of Geological Surveyor and Protector of Emigrants. These excepted posts he regarded as of an imperial rather than a local character. Judges of the Sadr Court and members of

the Board of Revenue were to be nominated by the Lieutenant-Governor and approved by the Government of India. The patronage thus reserved was larger than that exercised by the Supreme Government in the presidencies of Madras or Bombay, but it was far less than some of the Directors wished. Sir Charles Wood did not interfere, although he had written on the 19th of August, 1853:—

> You will remember that you remain Governor of Bengal as you do of the North-West Provinces, and that the power of the Lieutenant-Governor in patronage and other matters is to be that, and that only, of which you divest yourself. You must consider well how you can make this quite clear on the first appointment in order to preclude all chance of subsequent dispute.

Patronage was only one of the difficulties that had to be settled; the question of control over the army was another. In the hurry of legislation it had been forgotten that the Charter Act, while providing for the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor, had not extinguished that of Governor of Bengal, created by a former statute. On the 20th of October, 1853, Sir Charles asked the pertinent question, "If the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal is appointed independent of the Governor of Bengal, in whom does the army rest?" Lord Dalhousie was a practical man, and he reflected that during his own tenure of office as Governor he had received the military despatches of the Court addressed to him in that capacity, but nevertheless he had dealt with all military matters as Governor-General in Council. Nothing was to be gained by starting difficulties or waiting for Parliament to untie the knots. He therefore wrote to Wood on the 3rd of December, 1853:—

> As Governor of Bengal I shall make no difficulties and show

no crotchets. Everything will go on quietly, and no practical inconvenience will be felt until the matter is settled!

Then having wound up his own administration of Bengal with a review of his proceedings, he appointed Halliday, on the 29th of April, 1854, as the first Lieutenant-Governor, and the change of offices took place on the 1st of May. Sir Charles Wood was still considering the legal questions when he heard the news. On the 24th of June he wrote:—

> You have puzzled us all a good deal by your announcement of Halliday's appointment. It appeared to us that you considered it could not be done without an Act of Parliament, and I have one ready drawn which I proposed to introduce for the purpose, curing the defects of the existing Acts, and covering all that has been, as we believe, irregularly done for the last twenty years in administering the army of Bengal by the Government of India.

Factum valet, and Parliament without discussion covered up any illegalities that the Governor-General or his predecessors might have committed. The Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 77, passed on the 7th of August, 1854, empowered the Governor-General to assume the government of any part of India with the sanction of the Court of Directors and the Board, and to limit and declare the extent of the authority of the Governors or Lieutenant-Governors. All powers as to the presidency of Fort William, not transferred to the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or of Agra or the North-West Provinces, were vested in the Governor-General in India in Council, and it was declared that "the Governor-General of India shall no longer be the Governor of the said presidency of Fort William in Bengal."

Lord Dalhousie had his own way in Bengal, but his views on the subject of the choice of Governors for the

minor presidencies were not accepted. He urged strongly that the Governors should be selected from the ranks of the Indian service, and be conferred upon men with local experience. He described a typical Governor of Madras in these terms :—

> Then the Governor arrives from England. He sits down upon his chair at Guindy and grows to it for the next five years. Then he returns to England. No district is ever visited, no officers are ever seen unless they come to the presidency. Everything must be taken on credit. There cannot possibly be life and vigour throughout the service.

Anticipating the usual argument of the danger of losing patronage, he added: "In truth no patronage will be lost. The Governors will be appointed as before, but the selection will be limited to men who possess the local knowledge necessary for the charge." He was prepared to give up the local councils if the argument of economy would add weight to his proposal. But when he found that this further surrender of patronage would strengthen the opposition to his plan, he abandoned that part of it. The Court, however, as well as the President, turned a deaf ear to his advice. Still, recognising the force of the contrast which Lord Dalhousie had drawn between the progress made in the Punjab and the North-Western Provinces under Lawrence and Thomason respectively, and the "stagnation" in Madras and Bombay on the other hand, they accepted his strong recommendation of Thomason, and nominated him Governor of Madras. Unfortunately, as the Governor-General wrote to Hogg on the 18th of October, 1853, "the honour of Madras came too late for Thomason, and only in time to dignify his grave." For that distinguished servant of the Company died suddenly from overwork and exhaustion on the eve

of his transfer to the government of the presidency of Madras. The Governor-General's arguments, however, bore some fruit, for attention was called to the necessity of tours of the Governors of the presidencies, and the change of practice has since been maintained with the best results.

The administration of Lord Dalhousie was signalised by other changes of far-reaching consequence in the constitution and regulations of the public service. Some of these were introduced by the new Act and under the pressure of public opinion at home. Others owed their origin to the Governor-General. Of the first class the most important was the admission of candidates into Haileybury and into the public service by public competition. Regulations for giving effect to the new system were to be made by the Board, and a Committee appointed for the purpose under the guidance of Macaulay submitted its report in November, 1854. It was at once perceived that the East India College, instituted at Hertford in 1806, and transferred in 1809 to Haileybury, had run its course, and must soon be closed. Accordingly Lord Dalhousie carried out a corresponding change in India, which he had long contemplated, by abolishing Fort William College in Calcutta. Nothing but the prestige of its distinguished founder, Lord Wellesley, had saved the institution from an earlier death. In 1800 there was some justification for its existence. Then the young civilians had arrived in India at the age of sixteen, acquainted with "the rule of three, practice, and merchants' accomplishments," but profoundly ignorant of the elements of a liberal education. The establishment of Haileybury had somewhat altered the position, but the College was kept up in order that the Hailey-

bury men might learn the languages and put a final touch to their other acquirements. The temptations of Calcutta proved too strong for them. "The splendid festivities," described by Tennant, "by which the evenings of the Europeans were exhilarated after the lassitude, fatigue, and debility of the day," counteracted any possible good that the young men might have gained in the lecture-rooms. Their extravagance became a byword, and they left the College with debts which frequently amounted to £10,000. It was once seriously proposed to apply a surplus in the accounts of India to the liquidation of these debts, which left the administrators of Bengal "at the mercy of money-lenders." Matters had improved before 1848, but Lord Dalhousie found the inmates of the College "idling and loitering." He at once put his finger on the mischief. A period of twenty-two months had hitherto been allowed for passing the examinations in two languages. This he cut down to six months, turning the unsuccessful out of Calcutta into up-country stations to learn law and the languages at a safe distance from "the festivities of the Presidency town." With the advent of the competitive system he finally closed the College as being "a mere fiction and shadow, no longer adapted to the purposes it was intended to serve." In place of it he established a system of departmental examinations for promotion under the control of a central Board, which, with the modifications required by time, is still in force in all parts of India.

This was not the only legacy bequeathed by him to the public service. It was in his time that all officers of Government were forbidden to take part in the management of banks or trading concerns; and one of his latest circulars, issued on the 12th of

January, 1856, still regulates the duty of heads of offices in dealing with subordinates who resort to the insolvent court, and warns such offenders of their liability to dismissal. No Governor-General ever enforced by higher example the standard of public duty required from the servants of the State. At the same time he did not forget the privileges due to them in leave and pension rules, and it was owing to his advocacy that the Act of 1853 extended leave and furlough to the Company's servants residing "outside the limits of the Charter."

The changes introduced by the Act into the constitution of the Court of Directors were important. Upon them, and not upon the Government of India, fell the brunt of the attack in Parliament. As Wood wrote:—

> They have ceased making their senseless attacks upon the Indian Government, and confined their censures to the Directors. It was curious to see the large majority for the "double Government," as it is called, in spite of the union of Disraeli with the Indian reformers, and the anxiety to strip the Directors of any power or patronage.

It is true that at the instance of the British exporters of salt, a clause as to the tax on that commodity was added to the Bill, but even this was thrown out in the Upper House. And the reduction in the number of the members of the Court, the regulations as to their appointment, and the qualification as to the amount of stock which made them eligible, fell upon them with crushing weight. On receiving a copy of the Bill, Lord Dalhousie wrote to Wood on the 19th of September, 1853, in these terms:—

> I regard it as the sentence of the Court of Directors. You have not ordered them for immediate execution; but the sentence

is nevertheless a capital sentence in my opinion, and death must follow sooner or later.

He was consulted by the President as to the new Directors to be nominated by the Crown, and suggested the names of Millett, Currie, and Willoughby. The first he commended as, though a poor speaker, "a man of excellent judgment and temper, and the most indefatigable worker that ever toiled." Currie was less laborious, but "of undoubted ability, reputation, experience, good temper, and independent means." "Willoughby is one of the ablest men I have met in India." Thus, although Lord Dalhousie had no voice in the alterations made in the constitution of the Court, he assisted in the exercise of the patronage conferred upon the Crown by the new Act.

This account of the provisions of the Statute of 1853 would be incomplete without reference to two clauses affecting the military concerns of the Company. By one of them the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's forces in India or in any presidency was made, by virtue of such appointment, Commander-in-Chief of the Company's forces in India or in the presidency as the case might be. But the most important change was that which increased the number of the European troops of the Company from a maximum of 12,200 men, fixed by the Act of 1781, to 20,000, including officers, and permitted the Company to train and discipline at home 4000 of that number. This was an increase of the military resources of the Company for which Lord Dalhousie had strongly pleaded; but it will be convenient to reserve for the next chapter an account of his policy and his measures affecting this department of the administration.

CHAPTER VIII

MILITARY AFFAIRS

Lord Dalhousie's interest in military reform—Obstacles at home in the way of increasing the European troops—Obstacles in India to military reform—Outline of his reforms—Incompetence of the Military Board—Full trial given to it—It is relieved of commissariat, stud, and ordnance duties, then finally abolished—The army clothing department created—The Medical department organised—Strength of official optimism at home—Lord Dalhousie's views regarding the necessity of increasing the European forces—His first minute regarding European cavalry—His second minute regarding European infantry in the Queen's service—His third minute on European infantry in the Company's service—His fourth minute on European invalid companies—His fifth minute on Bengal artillery—His sixth minute on Native infantry—His seventh minute on the Bengal cavalry—His eighth minute on the presidency armies—His ninth minute on augmentation of European officers—Suppression of the minutes by the East India House—Lord Dalhousie's proposals for forming volunteer corps—His views upon the system of seniority—Controversy regarding the Peshawar command—Rules observed by him in the exercise of patronage—The location of magazines—Reforms introduced into invalid establishments—His maintenance of discipline—His views on pensions, medals, and prize money—His advocacy of the rights of the Company's officers—His solicitude for the welfare of the soldier—His views on the education of the children of Christian soldiers attached to Native regiments.

THE military organisation of India underwent such radical changes after the mutiny that one is apt to regard the year 1858 as the commencement of an

entirely new epoch. But in reality Lord Dalhousie's reforming hand was as active in the military as in the civil departments of the administration, and if the authorities at home had listened to him, the Sepoy rebellion might have been averted. Be that as it may, it is certain that his successors, the Viceroys, have retained many of the changes introduced by him, and Secretaries of State have approved of other proposals which the Presidents of the Board ignored or rejected when they were made by the Governor-General. It is necessary, therefore, to give some account not only of the measures carried out before 1857, but also of those submitted for approval. The latter afford the best answer to critics who have tried to fasten upon Lord Dalhousie responsibility for an outbreak which he did much to anticipate and suppress. They justify the wisdom of the conviction which a sagacious young soldier, the late Field-Marshal Sir Donald Stewart, expressed to his wife in a letter dated the 22nd of May, 1858: "What we now require is a Governor-General like Lord Dalhousie, a man of character, originality, strong sense, and firmness." Fortunately the minutes and papers now available throw full light upon this page of history, and fill up the gap which Sir Charles Jackson was unable to supply,[1] "although the authorities at the India House, including Mr. Kaye[2] himself, rendered every assistance." It is reasonable to hope that if Mr. Kaye had been more successful in his quest, he would not have laid stress upon Lord

[1] See p. 163 of a Vindication of the Marquis of Dalhousie; also notice the omissions in the Return 70 East India (Additional Troops), ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 12th of February, 1858, on the motion of Mr. Vansittart.

[2] Mr. Kaye's inability to find all of the nine minutes which Jackson asked for is inexplicable. They are in the archives of the India Office, and were certainly there in 1865.

Dalhousie's "rooted conviction of the fidelity of the Sepoy," or attributed to him a habit of "boasting that the condition of the native soldier left nothing to be desired," or ventured to observe in regard to the seniority system that "he left things as he found them on his first arrival."

A brief survey of the position at home when Lord Dalhousie entered the service of the Company is essential to a proper appreciation of his difficulties in augmenting the European forces. On paper he had in 1847 an army which aggregated 273,360 men of all ranks, exclusive of Native pensioners. This force consisted of two main divisions, the royal troops, all of European origin, numbering 3474 cavalry and 22,622 infantry serving in the three presidencies, and the Company's troops, both European and native, numbering 247,264 of all arms. Besides their regular troops there were also native irregular cavalry and native infantry enlisted for service in local areas. The first point to notice is that the hands of every authority were tied, and that the increase of the Native army at the expense of the European force was the inevitable consequence of the system. This result has been frequently overlooked, and it demands careful inquiry. In the first place, to quote the statement of Lord Ellenborough made in the House of Lords on the 2nd of April, 1852, "at present the Crown cannot send out more than 20,000 troops without the consent of the Court of Directors, which is contrary to reason, as the Crown is responsible for the safety of India." There were two strong reasons which induced the Court of Directors to resist the tendency of the "Horse Guards" to send out royal troops, and especially cavalry regiments to India. The Company had to pay the bill,

and the following table shows the cost in rupees per annum of maintaining each class of regiment in each presidency, at a time, be it remembered, when the exchange rate of a rupee was more than two shillings:—

Presidency.	Royal Dragoons.	Native Cavalry.	Royal Infantry.	Company's European Infantry.	Native Infantry.	Native Irregular Infantry.	Native Irregular Cavalry.
Bengal .	712,100	372,800	551,100	549,000	282,300	161,800	180,200
Madras .	630,650	345,000	523,300	510,180	251,600		
Bombay .	660,000	407,060	522,450	528,000	279,400		

Then, when the Governments of India received a royal regiment, they had no guarantee that it would not be taken away at the very time when its services were most required. This danger was actually incurred on several occasions, and it was one which Lord Dalhousie did his best to correct. So long as it lasted, and so long as the cavalry regiments of the royal army were so costly, there was little inclination to increase the European force by recourse to that source of supply. There still remained the alternative of increasing the Company's European regiments, but here a fresh difficulty presented itself. The Statutes of 28 Geo. III. c. 8, and 39 Geo. III. c. 109, limited the force of European non-commissioned officers and privates which the Company might employ in India to 12,200 men, and the number which they might train at home to 2000 at one time. This restriction affected the companies of engineers and artillerymen, and the European infantry regiments in their service. In 1847 there were 11,664 officers and men serving with those companies and regiments. Even with the addition of officers attached to Native regiments, whether of cavalry or infantry, regulars or irregulars, together with the European veterans, the total number of Europeans in

their service only amounted to 15,059. Until the persistency of Lord Dalhousie was rewarded in 1853 by the passing of the Act 16 and 17 Vict. c. 95, which raised the limit to 20,000 men, the hands of the Governor-General were tied by law. They had in time past been tied by other fetters, such as the economies of the Court of Directors, and their fatal belief in the fidelity of the Sepoy. Thus in 1822 the the European force had sunk to 8000 men, and even after 1853 delay occurred before Lord Dalhousie could fill up the ranks of three new European infantry regiments to the total strength sanctioned. In such conditions, with the Company's European troops limited by law, and with the reasonable disinclination of the Indian authorities to accept royal regiments, the inevitable consequence was an increase of the Native army.

Such was the position of affairs at home, and in India itself there were several obstacles which hampered reform. There was a natural jealousy between the royal and the Company's forces; there were the water-tight compartments of the presidencies, and the distinction between the regular and irregular troops. The rule of seniority and the oppressive weight of the Military Board were additional difficulties in the way. As to the first of these, Lord Dalhousie was soon reminded of the full significance of the "dual control" which entered into the military as well as the civil organisation of the Company. His attention was called to a letter, written on the 25th of March, 1834, by the Horse Guards to the India Board—

The Company's army in India being in fact principals, and that of His Majesty being only auxiliaries, the officers of the Company's army must necessarily possess many important advantages over

those of the King. They naturally fill all the efficient appointments of the general staff of the army, and with few exceptions all situations of emolument; and however brilliant may be the service of His Majesty's troops, and however indispensable in every enterprise of importance, any effort to alter this relative position would only tend to establish it the more firmly, it being rooted in the nature of the political government and its separation from that of His Majesty.

The occasion for this reminder was his urgent need for the assistance of European officers in the public works and survey departments. There were 500 Queen's officers in Bengal alone, many of them intending to prolong their service in India by exchange, and some of them residing in the hills with nothing to do. Yet Lord Dalhousie found this "source of supply hermetically sealed to Government by the orders it has received." The line of division between the royal troops and the Company's European regiments met him at every turn. When he gave a medal for the Sikh War, he found that he could not grant it to the Queen's troops. When he wished to introduce a change of system in the clothing arrangements, he could only pride himself on "setting an example which the military authorities of the Crown might follow." In the next place, every reform had to be introduced first into one presidency and then into another. The creation of the public works department, with a difference to meet the susceptibilities of each presidency, thus proceeded piecemeal. In Bombay the Military Board survived for some time the extinction of that body in Bengal. Not less serious were the differences of regulations, as for instance in the case of Sind allowances, of which an account has been given in a previous chapter.[1] Again,

[1] See vol. i. chap. ix. p. 326.

within the same presidency there were troops which were enlisted for a narrow area, and others that might be sent anywhere except across the sea. Thus the Sikh corps enlisted in 1846 for service in the country between the Jumna, Beas, and Satlaj, objected to go beyond those limits when conquest added other parts of the Punjab to the Company's territories; the 5th Cavalry in Hyderabad, whose services were no longer required there, declined to proceed to Burma. Finally, the traditions and the least noble interests of the service resented the principle of selection and clung to the rights of seniority. The Military Board at his side had to be encountered by a reformer as well as his more distant foes in Whitehall and Leadenhall Street, and none but a man inspired by the highest sense of duty and by unflinching courage would have attempted the task to which Lord Dalhousie applied himself. The story of his achievements and of his unsuccessful attempts in the departments of military affairs therefore redounds to his lasting credit no less than his victories in war and in the field of civil administration.

The first part of his work led him to apply to the military department the principle which he had adopted in the civil administration, namely, a judicious division of labour combined with the assertion of personal responsibility. In this he completely succeeded, sweeping away the Military and the Medical Boards and organising in their place a series of departments which continue to the present day to justify his sagacity. The second division of his labours brought him into conflict with the home authorities upon whom rests the grave responsibility of preventing the establishment of the sound equilibrium between the European and Native forces which the Governor-General

endeavoured to secure. Yet some success was attained in augmenting the European force, although the advantage thus gained was sacrificed by his successor. A greater and more permanent gain resulted from breaking down the rule of seniority, strengthening the forts and magazines, increasing the mobility of the army, and introducing Sikhs and Ghurkhas into the Native regiments. In the third place, Lord Dalhousie improved the tone and discipline of the Company's forces; and finally did much to promote the health and comfort of the soldiers and to secure for their officers various privileges, among which were more liberal rules of leave.

In the Military Board of the Bengal army he encountered an institution which barred the way to any sort of reform, and called for the fullest exercise of the judgment which he displayed in his dealing with it. He started with no prejudices; he even commenced his administration by defending that authority against unjustified attacks. When at length he was convinced of its irremediable defects, he relieved it gradually of the functions which it mismanaged, and finally secured its abolition without any dislocation of public business. The Board in Bengal consisted of four official and one stipendiary member. One of the former was the chief magistrate of Calcutta, and the increasing pressure of his civil duties afforded ample reason for removing him from an anomalous position. There then remained the three *ex-officio* members—the chief engineer of the army, the brigadier commanding the artillery, "who attained his position by the strength of living long enough," and the commissary-general, "usually the senior officer of the department." To these veteran defenders of the rights of seniority was added a stipendiary member

chosen from the Company's cavalry or infantry. The duties entrusted to this mixed body are thus described in a minute dated the 24th of July, 1851:—

Charged with the direction of the enormous departments of public works, of the army commissariat, of the government studs, of the ordnance—and therein of the foundry, the gunpowder manufactory, the gun-carriage agency, and the arsenals, as well as of the military equipment of the army, excepting only its clothing: charged, moreover, with the account and audit of the expenditure of these several departments, as well as with the executive direction of them—it is physically impossible that the Military Board, even if it were selected and constituted with the utmost care, could satisfactorily conduct so huge and unmanageable a mass of public business, or could get through it without those delays which have made the very name of the Board a byword throughout India, and which are equally harassing and injurious to the officers of the department, to the Government, and to public interests.

Nevertheless, although the Board was a byword, Lord Dalhousie had insisted upon its being treated with respect. His own Military department of the Secretariat had, in 1848, remarked upon the back of a report that the institution was "a Board of discussion which causes very useless trouble to Government and to the military department." The Governor-General objected to such a description from the pen of a subordinate. Later on Major Goodwyn was rebuked for describing it as "a public office whose energies have lately been exhausted by internal dissensions"; and when Sir Charles Napier allowed his Adjutant-General to forward on the 19th of July, 1850, a memorandum containing this sentence: "I can easily account for the Sepoys not liking to take the provisions, because being supplied under the system pursued by the Military Board, they are probably of a worse quality than the Sepoy can buy in the market for the same money"—the Governor-

General asked for a fuller statement of the case supported by facts and figures. But although this particular allegation was not fully proved, Lord Dalhousie soon found reason to wish himself rid of the Board. Business was delayed beyond his endurance, and on the 13th of September, 1852, he relieved his feelings by writing—

> Every man capable of transacting business, especially if called upon to transact business that requires action, will be found to abhor a Committee. In proportion to the extent in which you multiply agents in any business is action impeded and business ill done.

Then the references made to Government on trivial matters were innumerable, and the Board when asked to explain matters intrenched itself behind its constitution as settled by the Court of Directors, who had authorised it to refer its difficulties to the Governor-General in Council. Lord Dalhousie could only reply that "the Court could not have been aware of the endemic differences of opinion to which the Board is subject." At times he states in his minutes the exact number of "coolie loads of correspondence and separate minutes" sent up to him. But the evil did not end there. The Board when it did agree made itself the champion of other offenders. The ship *Precursor* carrying Her Majesty's 80th Regiment to Rangoon in July, 1852, put to sea with only seven days' provisions, and as she encountered stormy weather and was consequently delayed the men were nearly starved. The Deputy Commissary General defended himself by reference to "the uniform scale established since January," and the Board considered the defence good. The Governor-General pointed out that ordinary prudence would have made special allowance for the contingency

of foul weather at such a season of the year, and he referred to " other cases in which these authorities have been indulging in a carelessness, a want of foresight, and want of common sense which might have been productive of the gravest consequences to the troops."

But mere criticism was of little avail, and Lord Dalhousie saw that active measures were unavoidable. The time was not, as he fully realised, propitious. For there are fashions in politics and administration as in the social affairs of mankind. Boards of control at home, councils in India, committees for every class of business, were the order of the day. In running atilt against such fashions, bitter opposition would have to be encountered, and it was hard for a civilian Governor-General to attack with success a system which his predecessors, including Lord Hardinge, had tolerated. The cautious tact, however, with which Lord Dalhousie proceeded was ultimately crowned with success. His first step was, as the homely phrase runs, to set a thief to catch a thief. According to the orthodox practice he appointed a commission to inquire into the administration of the commissariat department. A strong case was made out for a change of system, and on the 27th of January, 1853, the welcome news of the approval of his proposals by the Court of Directors reached the Governor-General. He at once directed the Commissary-General instead of resuming his seat at the Board to " take over executive charge of the commissariat department from that body, and suggest the best time and mode of transferring the audit." The Board, moreover, was not allowed " to cast a millstone round the neck of the auditor," but was required to audit its own accounts up to the date of the transfer. Lord Dalhousie's interest in the new commissariat department did not cease with

its creation, he advocated and carried out many reforms in its administration. One of these deserves special notice, because during the mutiny a complaint was made and repeated in Parliament that the abolition of the Government and the substitution of *rewari*, or hired camels, under orders issued by the Governor-General in 1854, had delayed the march of troops from Amballa in May, 1857, and otherwise proved unsatisfactory. This story was officially denied on the 10th of March, 1858, by the Commissary-General, who wrote—

> I beg to submit my unreserved opinion that it is a measure of the greatest public benefit as regards both efficiency and economy that has ever been introduced into this department.

Colonel Thomson, the Deputy Commissary-General, reported that—

> The Rewari camel-men have not failed us in any one respect. With the exception of 339 of some pressed by the civil authorities not a single desertion occurred. Considering the class of men usually employed as Surwans, I think it most fortunate that we are not dependent in any way on Government camels, for there is little doubt that they would, whenever they had the opportunity, have joined the mutineers. Nuthu Khan and Budderud-din, formerly Jemadars in Government employ, did so, taking with them the Government camels. This is the only instance I know of in which the camel-men have gone off of their own accord.

It has already been shown[1] that the Board was by this time divested of its control and responsibility for public works, and now that it was further relieved of the management of the commissariat, the Governor-General saw his opportunity for a larger reform. Fortunately the next encouragement to such action came from the Court of Directors, who in reviewing the operations of the stud department, observed in a despatch,

[1] See chap. vi. p. 184.

No. 92, dated the 2nd of August, 1853, that "a more efficient superintendence than that given by the Military Board is required." There was no need here to employ one committee to destroy another, and the Governor-General took action without any preliminary inquiry. On the 10th of May, 1854, he wrote that—

> The principle of individual responsibility, united with individual control, should be extended to the stud department. It has long been my conviction that the sound principle alluded to should be put in force as a general rule in all departments. The great improvement already effected in the commissariat department, since its introduction there, is practical proof of its soundness and efficiency.

Accordingly a superintendent of studs, Colonel Dickey, entrusted with full control, and aided by an adequate staff of assistants, was appointed "to give vitality and a purpose to the operations of the whole department, which it was hopeless to expect from the superintendence of a distant, stationary, divided, and ill-qualified Board."

A few weeks later, on the 12th of July, 1854, the last stroke of the axe fell upon the tottering Board. It was decided on that day that the ordnance department should be removed from it and placed under an Inspector-General of proved capacity, with a principal commissary of ordnance, six commissioners, and four deputies. Thus the occupation of the Bengal Military Board was now gone, and provision was elsewhere made for utilising the services of its members. In recommending their transfer Lord Dalhousie wrote:[1] —

> When this change shall have been completed, I sincerely believe that a great reform will have been wrought, the effect whereof will be most beneficially felt throughout the whole frame of the internal administration of this Indian empire.

[1] The Board still survived in Bombay and Madras, thus illustrating the difficulties caused by the presidential system.

The principle to which effect was thus given was applied to other departments. The army clothing arrangements had been left to "an inefficient Board composed of *ex-officio* members who can't attend when they would, and of other members who do not attend when they can, a complex machine made up of sham responsibilities and fictitious checks." One of these fictions was the "off-reckoning fund" and the interests of the Colonel. The reality, namely, the interests of government in economy, and the interests of the soldier in suitable clothing, was ignored. A Superintendent of clothing was therefore appointed in 1854 to take the place of the clothing Board.

Only a passing notice can be taken of another organic change which was introduced into the machinery of Government by the creation of a medical department. This was proposed on the very eve of the retirement of the Governor-General, whose minute was written on the 1st of February, 1856—

> The beginning, middle, and end of the imperfections of the Indian medical service is the vicious principle upon which the direction and control of the department is based. It is governed by a Board consisting of three members, those three members having been systematically the three oldest officers on the medical list. Recently the Honourable Court permitted a modification of this system of rigid seniority to be made, so far as to allow that one of the members should be appointed by selection. When I proceeded to act upon this permission I met with the utmost opposition, and although I selected a medical officer of the most eminent ability, one of the three seniors of the superintending surgeons, I was compelled to insist upon his appointment before I could overcome the resistance which was made to the measure from army headquarters.

This extract throws light upon the opposition Lord Dalhousie's numerous reforms encountered, and it ex-

plains much of the bitterness with which his memory was assailed when his detractors imputed to him responsibility for the outburst of the mutiny. Yet the wisdom of his scheme has been proved by experience, and his successors have profited by the courage with which he attacked the difficulties before him. Here again "unity of authority, coupled with direct responsibility," was the guiding principle of the reform. He recommended a clean sweep of the medical Boards throughout India, and the appointment of Director-Generals chosen from among the superintending surgeons or staff surgeons. Every grade in the department, the salaries and duties of the incumbents, and the mode of their selection, were laid down and explained. Noting that the Indian medical service, although thrown open to the public, was unpopular, Lord Dalhousie analysed the causes, suggesting remedies partly in the shape of better inducements to enter it, and partly by removing "the inequality which now prevails between the position of a medical officer and that of his brother officers in respect of pension, honours, and rent. I respectfully submit that such irregularities are founded on no sound grounds of justice, expediency, or policy. No valid excuse has ever, or can be, alleged for maintaining them. Their effect is to depress the spirits of the medical officers, to depreciate a profession and class of service which ought to be held in the utmost respect, and supported equally from motives of prudence and gratitude." The justice of these remarks could not be gainsaid, and although his championship of the service did not at the time secure all that Lord Dalhousie asked for, it furnished his successors with arguments and suggestions which have raised the Indian medical department if not to an envied, at least to the honourable, position it now holds.

From these organic changes of system the narrative must now pass on to a statement of the measures adopted or recommended for increasing and improving the military strength of the Company in India. Lord Dalhousie has never received the credit due to him for appreciating the dangers involved in the large increase of the Native army, and for endeavouring to redress the balance by augmenting the European force. On the contrary, no one can read Kaye's *Sepoy War* without carrying away the impression that the Governor-General did nothing; yet he boldly encountered and in some degree defeated the strong forces of official optimism, which united the Queen's Government with the Court of Directors in opposition to salutary reforms. Lord Ellenborough had, it is true, proclaimed his conviction that "it is absolutely necessary, especially under the present circumstances of India, in order to ensure its safety that there should be a very large increase of European troops and a very great diminution of the native forces." But his inveterate hostility to the Court of Directors and to "the present circumstances," of which the worst feature, in his eyes, was that they had placed Lord Dalhousie in the office of Governor-General, weakened his influence and hardened the opposition of those whom he attacked. The public paid more attention to what Lord Derby told them. This is the picture which that peer presented to the House of Lords in April, 1852—

And, my Lords, with this gigantic dominion it is not less extraordinary that although for the maintenance of its vast empire this Company possesses an army of 285,000 men, yet that immense army you find composed mainly of natives of those territories which they have conquered, Mahomedans and Hindus; every variety of religion and of grade alike vie in loyalty and attach-

ment to their conquerors, and in their service exhibit as much of interest and devotion as that small but noble army drawn from the mother country with which it is their pride and glory to be associated.

If therefore the greater cost of European regiments is remembered, what chance had Lord Dalhousie of securing attention in the face of the testimony borne by the Prime Minister to the loyalty of the Native army—testimony which only endorsed what had been said in so many other quarters? When in a letter of the 19th of April, 1835, Sir Charles Metcalfe said,[1] "Our danger is round about us, in the very heart of our own empire, and in every state of India," his words were at once challenged by his colleagues, and Lord William Bentinck and experienced servants of the Company like H. T. Prinsep dissented from his view, the latter writing on the 9th of June, 1835, to deprecate the proposal to raise the proportion of Europeans from one-seventh to one-fourth[2] of the Indian army, as not being "either indispensable as a security against the infidelity of our other troops, or necessary for the increase of the field and reserved armies." More recently still Sir Charles Napier had eulogised in extravagant terms both the efficiency and the loyalty of the Native regiments. It is true that the last-mentioned authority on other occasions and under different promptings had used language capable of a different interpretation; but there was no lack of authority for the pleasant and economical view that the Native troops "vie in loyalty and attachment to their conquerors." It was therefore against the full current of public opinion that Lord Dalhousie had to steer his

[1] Blue-book, East India, European and Native troops. Ordered to be printed 1st August, 1867, on the motion of Mr. Henry Seymour, p. 139.

[2] The accepted proportion is now one European to two and a half Natives.

course in advocating an increase of the European and a reduction of the native forces. Those who opposed him invariably pointed to the experience of the past. Ever since Lawrence took into his pay 2000 peons for the siege of Pondicherry in 1748, the Company had reason to be assured of the fidelity of their Native troops. They fought on the British side at Plassey, Gheria, and Buxar; and seven battalions of Sepoys formed part of the three brigades into which Lord Clive organised the Company's army in 1765. In the most stirring incidents of later Indian warfare, and notably in the capture of Gwalior by Major Popham in 1780, the loyalty of the Sepoys was demonstrated again and again. With their pay in arrears for five months, and with supplies most difficult to obtain, they had fought in Malwa and at Benares, and according to an official report, "their fidelity, attachment, and devotion were inherent, spontaneous, and undisguised." George Canning on the 4th of March, 1819, referred to the attempts of the Peshwa to seduce the Maratha troops of the Bombay army as tending "to exasperate rather than to repress their ardour in the service to which they had sworn to adhere." In short, the fidelity of the Sepoy was both an accepted article of faith and an incontrovertible fact of history.

The views which Lord Dalhousie expressed and translated into action must be given in his own words. The following passages are quoted from a letter written to Sir Charles Wood on the 15th of August, 1854:—

I should hope that the old jealousy of additional troops being raised by the Company would now find no place in any mind. . . . I cannot believe that the Queen's Government would diminish the comparatively small European force in India without any reference to the Government of the country. I wish to say to you

emphatically that two European regiments cannot be safely withdrawn, especially now. . . . Our Raj is safe from risk, but only while we are strong. We positively must not be weakened. . . . We have not, like the Colonies, anything to fall back upon. We must be strong, not against the enemy only, but against our population, and even against possible contingencies connected with our own Native army. Again I adjure you not to allow us to be weakened in European infantry.

In a minute dated the 13th of September, 1854, he gave his reasons at greater length. "The Government of India has no element of national strength on which it can fall back in a country where the entire English community is but a handful of scattered strangers." Strangers indeed, and in what surroundings! "amidst distances so vast, amidst multitudes so innumerable, amidst people and sects various in many things, but all alike in this that they are the lately conquered subjects of our race, alien to them in religion, in language, in colour, in habits, in all feelings and interests." The note thus struck was not the result of a sudden alarm caused only by "the exaggerated estimate of the power of Russia which has been formed by the people of India." It was a conviction felt and recorded as far back as the 25th of June, 1849, and based upon other considerations than those of foreign affairs—"in the first place without at all exhibiting or entertaining any distrust of the Native army, I consider that that vast body of men is already sufficiently large, and that it should not be added to unless under the pressure of inevitable necessity." When that pressure was felt, Lord Dalhousie became more and more convinced of the necessity of correcting the disproportion between the European and Native forces, and his opinion induced him to formulate a number of definite proposals for the Court's sanction. These were embodied in the nine

famous minutes mentioned by Jackson, two of which Kaye was unable to find.

The first of them dealing with the subject of "European cavalry" was dated the 18th of July, 1854, although it was not laid in its final shape upon the Council table until the 29th of February, 1856. Recognising the need of the Crown for military assistance from India, and the excessive cost to the Company of the four regiments of Royal Dragoons, the Governor-General advocated their entire withdrawal subject to a transfer of some of their men who were to be enlisted in three Company's regiments—one to be stationed in Madras and the other two in Hindustan, each consisting of 400 sabres. Each of the four regiments thus to be sent home consisted at the time of eight troops altogether numbering 606 sabres, and it was proposed that the 9th and the 12th Lancers and the 14th Dragoons should leave behind them 400 men apiece. These 1200 troopers were to be enlisted and transferred to the Company's service. At the same time certain Native cavalry regiments were to be disbanded, the officers thus thrown out of employment being appointed to the European cavalry corps. In Madras two Native cavalry regiments were to be replaced by the European Dragoon regiment, and an annual saving of fifteen lakhs was expected when once the gratuities awarded to the disbanded sowars were cleared off. In Hindustan four regiments of Bengal cavalry were to be disbanded, and their officers transferred to the two new regiments of European Dragoons. The economy thus effected was estimated at seventeen lakhs a year, subject, however, to the deduction on account of pensions and gratuities. It is true that by these arrangements India would lose four European cavalry regiments comprising more than

2400 sabres, and gain only an aggregate of 1200 privates. But she would obtain troops available for her needs which the Company could keep at all times, and the disproportion between European and native cavalry would be considerably redressed; while the reduction of the latter would in addition to other advantages place £300,000 a year at the disposal of Government for public works and other schemes of improvement. Unfortunately the military authorities at home were not prepared to forego the advantage of their connection with India. On the 25th of November, 1854, Wood wrote—

> Hardinge is very much against giving up sending Queen's cavalry to India. He says that the renovation of the force by the change which is perpetually occurring makes the force better than any Indian force, *i.e.* those regiments whose officers and men are always in India; and that, on the other hand, it is the only place where our cavalry regiments can be employed. So that in his view both English and Indian grounds of great weight exist for not changing our present system.

On the 23rd of December following the President again wrote deprecating any permanent withdrawal of the royal cavalry, and suggesting that it might be better either to reduce the regular Native cavalry, or to replace them by irregular cavalry, and not to meddle with the Queen's horse. He honestly added that the Commander-in-Chief was "for the sake of the Queen's army very unwilling indeed to give up the only field in which our cavalry are employed and can learn anything of their duty." Lord Dalhousie was deeply disappointed, and in spite of his effort to dispose of these objections this, his first scheme of reform, was dropped, as he afterwards learnt on his return to England.

The second minute dealt with the "European infantry

in Her Majesty's service," being dated the 5th of February, 1856. The recommendations embodied in it will be understood if a short account is given of previous correspondence and its results. On the 30th of April, 1848, there were nine regiments of the Queen's infantry serving in Bengal —four in Madras, and five in Bombay. There were also six regiments of the Company's European infantry— namely, in Bengal the 1st and 2nd Fusiliers, in Madras one fusilier and a light infantry regiment, and the same in Bombay. The urgent appeal of the Governor-General for three more regiments of royal infantry to take part in the Punjab war, and the panic created at home by the battle of Chilianwalla, had procured an addition of five royal regiments to the strength of the European forces in India. Another had been sent out on the outbreak of war with Burma. Thus on the 30th of April, 1853, Lord Dalhousie had the satisfaction of counting fifteen royal foot regiments in Bengal, in addition to the four and five in Madras and Bombay respectively. But the six Company's regiments represented their whole force of European infantry. The Governor-General pleaded earnestly for power to enlist three more regiments for the Company's service, and his letter reached the secret committee in March, 1853. But under the law as it then stood it was impossible to add 71 officers and 2760 non-commissioned officers and rank and file to the Company's European forces until the statutory limit of 12,200 men had been raised. The Act to provide for the Government of India was, however, passed on the 20th of August, 1853; and the limit was extended to 20,000 men. Thereon the Court of Directors on the 7th of September, 1853, sanctioned the Governor-General's proposals, and in November of that year steps were taken to raise a third regiment in each

presidency, though many months elapsed before the full complement could be made up. Lord Dalhousie was not content with this measure of success. He still wanted more troops, and when one of the Queen's infantry regiments was recalled to Europe for service in the Crimea he pressed the authorities for permission to enlist two more regiments in the Company's service. With this introduction, the purport of his second minute, dated the 5th of February, 1856, may now be given in his own summary of it.

I recommend—

1st, that the Indian establishment of European infantry shall consist, at the very least, of 35 battalions;

2nd, that the present establishment of 24 regiments of royal infantry shall be continued;

3rd, that 15 royal regiments shall be allotted to the Bengal presidency, 5 to Madras, and 4 to Bombay;

4th, that the establishment of royal regiments, whatever may be the number determined upon, shall be fixed, and shall not be altered without the consent of the Honourable Court of Directors.

5th, that a fourth regiment of European infantry be added to each of the armies of Bengal and Madras, by converting two regiments of Native infantry, in each respectively disbanding the Native officers and Sepoys, and transferring the European officers to the new European corps.

Yet again, in the following clause, he provided for the essential part of his scheme, namely, a corresponding increase of the Europeans, with a decrease of the Native element—

If for any reason it may seem good to H.M.'s Government to determine that the establishment of royal infantry shall henceforth consist of less than 24 regiments, I would then propose that the Indian establishment should be made up to its full amount by converting a further number of regiments of Native infantry of the Bengal and Madras armies into European regiments in the Company's service.

The fate of this lengthy and closely reasoned document, of which the conclusions have just been given, will be told when the purport of the rest of the nine minutes has been stated.

The third minute, dated the 5th of February, 1856, dealt with the "European infantry in the Honourable Company's service." After referring to the proposals made in regard to the royal infantry and the enlistment of two new regiments for the Company's service, Lord Dalhousie was prepared to abandon, on the ground of expense, a proposal made by Lord Hardinge for adding 130 privates to each of the existing Company's regiments, "in order to assimilate them to the royal regiments, which have each 950 bayonets." Such a compromise he was ready to accept, "as the circumstances of the time require that every increase of military charge should be avoided, and as I have already suggested an increase of European infantry by means which would not involve any corresponding increase of charge."

The fourth minute, bearing the same date as the last, dealt with the "European invalid companies of the Bengal army," and carried a step further the scheme for augmenting the available force of white troops. There were four companies of European invalids attached to the Bengal army, two consisting of artillery and two of infantry, and they were stationed at Chunar. Looking to the paucity of European soldiers in Bengal, Lord Dalhousie proposed to move the invalids to Dum Dum, where they would be at hand to garrison Fort William if the European regiment at that place should be required to move elsewhere.

The fifth minute, also dated the 5th of February, dealt with the deficiencies in the "artillery of the

Bengal army," on which subject the Governor-General had already addressed the Court in 1853, when he obtained sanction to a slight increase in the number of officers attached to that branch of the service. He now pointed out that the present establishment of European artillery in Bengal was less by 160 privates than it had been in 1842, notwithstanding the annexations of vast territories. Sir Charles Napier had urged the necessity for an augmentation, of the need of which the Government of India was even then fully sensible. Now that the financial position was improved, Lord Dalhousie pressed "very strongly" for the adoption of a plan which would add "a fifth company to each of the six battalions of European foot artillery, and a grenadier company to each of the three Native foot batteries." Other proposals for adding horse batteries, converting bullock batteries into horse batteries, and supplying field guns, brought up the cost to Rs. 380,780 a year; but the additional expenditure would enable a "large reduction in other arms," and "render more efficient one of the most important engines of war." In the suppression of the mutiny no want was more felt than that of artillery, and an injustice was done to Lord Dalhousie in suppressing mention of his earnest appeal for supplying that need.

The sixth minute, of the same date, was perhaps the most important of the whole series, dealing with "the Native army in Bengal, infantry." It showed that since 1825 no addition had been made to the number of regular regiments of the line, the additions having taken the form of irregular local regiments and police battalions. But at Lord Gough's suggestion, to which the Governor-General had yielded with misgiving, and "regret ever since," the strength of the seventy-four

regiments of the line had been raised from 800 to 1000 privates. The time had now come when this step might safely be retraced. It was therefore proposed to strike 200 men off each of these regiments. At the same time Lord Dalhousie desired to withdraw regular troops from the frontier, where their more liberal allowances gave cause for discontent to the irregular forces, and to add four regiments of cavalry and six regiments of infantry to the Punjab irregular forces. The opportunity was to be taken for making additions to the Sirmur, Kumaon, Nausari, and Arakan local battalions, so as to bring them up to a strength of 800 men apiece. The three Ghurkha regiments were to be similarly increased, and armed with the best rifles. By these means an annual saving of Rs. 16,64,000 would be effected, the Bengal army would be sensibly reduced, and its regiments removed from the Punjab beyond the Indus. It is impossible to overestimate the value of these proposals, which, if adopted, might have changed the whole aspect of affairs in 1857. It should be added that in the same minute the Governor-General advocated the future enlistment of Sepoys with the obligation to serve anywhere as public interests might require.

The seventh minute, also dated on the same day, dealt with "the Bengal army, Native cavalry," consisting of ten regiments of regular and eighteen of irregular cavalry. Lord Dalhousie proposed to reduce the strength of the Native regular cavalry regiments to 300 troopers, and that of the irregular regiments to 400 sowars apiece. He further proposed to refer to a committee the consideration of various changes in their equipment, and in the system of providing the men with horses. The appointment of an Inspector-General

of cavalry to superintend the two branches of the cavalry arms was also suggested, and as a result of the whole scheme a large reduction of expenditure was anticipated.

The eighth minute, dated the 11th of February, 1856, dealt with "the military establishments of the armies of Madras and Bombay," which maintained military forces, exclusive of local and irregular corps, aggregating 110,200 men as against 148,400 in Bengal. Lord Dalhousie assumed that if his proposals for Bengal were approved, the same principles would be applied to the other presidencies. But apart from this, the divisional and brigade establishments of the latter called for reduction; and he proceeded to show in detail where these could be effected. He also advocated the abolition of the sinecure appointment of Quartermaster-General to the Queen's troops serving in India.

The ninth and last minute, dated the 21st of February, 1856, entitled "Augmentation of European officers for the Indian army," called immediate attention to the existing supply of such officers. It was pointed out that 1258 officers were already detached from regimental duty, and that it would be impossible to supply the needs of Oudh and carry on the public administration elsewhere without large additions. Lord Dalhousie therefore asked for an addition of two Lieutenants to each regiment of cavalry and infantry in the three armies, or 388 officers. The Army Commissariat department was to be separated from the regimental strength of the army and constituted a staff department by itself. Invaluable as military officers had proved themselves to be in the capacity of civil administrators, the Governor-General regarded their detachment from military duties "with considerable

uneasiness as likely to act injuriously upon the efficiency, discipline, and military spirit of the Company's army." But even if their employment in the civil service should be curtailed, there was ample room for the increase of officers prepared by him. Above all it was urgently necessary to strengthen the Company's artillery regiments by the establishment of a grade of 2nd Captains as in the royal service.

To these nine minutes a tenth document was added, which stated that a "paper showing the result of the various augmentations and reductions" would be prepared in the military department and sent home with them. As far as can now be ascertained, an incomplete statement was transmitted, which estimated only the cost of the artillery proposals, and of increasing the British officers in the three presidencies.

The fate of these nine, or ten (if that document is counted) minutes was truly tragic. As already stated, Kaye could not find two of them when Jackson asked for them in order to vindicate the memory of the great Governor-General, who had done his utmost to make the Company strong and to defy mutiny. When on the 3rd of December, 1857, the Queen opened Parliament in person, Her Majesty dwelt upon the sufferings of her subjects in India, the heroic exertions of her forces, and the services rendered by the Native Princes, and added, "The affairs of the East Indian dominions will require your serious consideration." In the session which followed, many members, both in the House and outside of it, commented upon the want of forethought and sagacity displayed by the late Governor-General. The facts were known both in Leadenhall Street and Cannon Row, yet no one published them, although their publication would have been a bare act of justice to

a public servant under trial at the bar of public opinion and unable to open his own mouth. At last Mr. W. Vansittart moved for "copies of recommendations or despatches during the Governor-Generalship of India by the Marquis of Dalhousie for an increase of European troops." To this the East India House replied on the 11th of February, 1858, by producing[1] some correspondence and one of the minutes. A letter from the Military Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 29th of February, 1856, to the Court of Directors had transmitted the whole series "numbered from 2 to 10," but only extracts from that letter were presented to Parliament, with the minute on European infantry in Her Majesty's service. One of these extracts ran as follows: "It has been determined to consider the whole of the minutes, and to bring them eventually under the consideration of the Honourable Court, with the opinions upon them of the Government of India." To this sentence the "East India House," on the 3rd of February, 1858, added this note: "This intention has not yet been fulfilled." Why the intention was not fulfilled by Lord Canning will be explained in a later chapter. The Commander-in-Chief was asked for his opinion, and he died without giving it. The mutiny had then broken out, and it was too late to apply the remedies which Lord Dalhousie had devised. It is not strange that Lord Canning should have hesitated. His predecessor had flung himself with all his energy against the penny-wise policy of the Court, the reluctance of the Horse Guards to leave the royal troops in India, and the misplaced confidence in the Sepoy which prevailed in all quarters at home. Lord Canning

[1] See Returns, East India (Additional Troops), 70, ordered to be printed, 12th February, 1858.

therefore contented himself with sending the minutes home, and promising a review, which he never sent. But although his action was intelligible, no excuse can be made for the India House, which failed to give Parliament the papers[1] lying in its archives, at a time when their production would have silenced the angry critics of Lord Dalhousie's administration.

The minutes themselves were not the only proofs given by the Marquis of Dalhousie of his keen appreciation of the real state of affairs in India. On the 23rd of August, 1854, he anticipated a movement which took no practical shape in England until, in May, 1859, the Secretary of State for War addressed the Lord-Lieutenants of Counties on the subject of forming volunteer corps. These are the words written nearly five years before that date by Lord Dalhousie—

> It has long been my opinion that the establishment of volunteer rifle companies, more or less in number, in Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and in every station in India in which there was a sufficient European community to furnish any such body as could be called a Company, would be a most desirable measure, and would create for us in India an additional element of national strength.

After dwelling upon the value of such European auxiliaries in times of panic, the Governor-General proceeded as follows:—

> If such companies were to be raised, I should propose that everything about them—dress, drill, and equipments—should be of the simplest and least expensive character, while their arms should be of the best quality and character. . . . The subject has often been present to my mind ever since the last war in the

[1] The India House had two complete sets of the minutes. One set had been sent home by the mail packet *Gosford*, with the record of the Proceedings of the Government of India, on the 18th of August, 1857. The other set had been enclosed in the Military Secretary, Colonel Birch's letter, from which extracts were given as shown in the text.

Punjab, when I saw the inconveniences which the existence of a body of volunteers, to be employed locally and only in times of emergency, seemed likely to obviate. It was never brought forward, because there seemed little hope of its being entertained with any spirit in a time of peace. But now that we are again engaged in war, I deem it my duty to raise the question; and encouraged by the success of my first experiment, I now submit my general statement of the measure for the consideration of my honourable colleagues, and ultimately for the pleasure of the honourable Court.

The "experiment" referred to was the enrolment in Maulmain of the European residents as volunteers at the outbreak of the Burmese war, and the establishment of a volunteer rifle company at Singapore by the Governor of the Strait-Settlements on the suggestion of Lord Dalhousie.

We may now pass on to consider the steps taken by Lord Dalhousie for improving the efficiency of the Company's forces in other directions. Foremost among them was his attack upon "the bane of the Indian service"—seniority. On the 21st of June, 1851, he wrote—

The claims of old officers stand high, but the interests of the State are, above all, and ought to be, paramount in the eyes of those who are entrusted with the charge of them. No system can prevent the intrusion of occasional incapacity or inefficiency among officers who hold regimental command. A rigid system of seniority must of necessity increase the probability of such deficiencies, and must multiply instances of them. . . . I have therefore to record my strong opinion that while the claims of seniority should always have their full weight, they should be less deferred to than they have been; and that in the appointment of officers to divisional and brigade commands, the governing principle should not be as hitherto—the rejection of no man unless he is notoriously and scandalously incapable, but rather the selection of no man, whatever may be his standing, who is not confessedly capable and efficient.

These words, hard sayings to old soldiers, explain much of the unpopularity of the Governor-General, and account for the unjust attacks made upon him for interfering in military matters. The popular view of the sacred right of seniority was expressed in the most naked form by Colonel Costley, who presented a memorial to the Government, in which he advanced the following extraordinary claim:—

> Divisional command should be considered in the main degree and essentially on the principle of it being a final reward for zealous services, and as a means of enabling old officers, each in his turn, to gather from it wherewithal to pass the remainder of their old age in pecuniary ease and comfort as well as respectability.

The Governor-General replied on the 23rd of February, 1852, that "he would give no countenance to the view that the divisional commands are of the nature of pension establishment." John Lawrence expressed in the warmest terms his sense of the soundness of Lord Dalhousie's policy in this respect. "We must sacrifice the public good or incapable officers," he wrote, and no one who knew Lawrence could doubt which of the two sacrifices he was prepared to make.

The Marquis of Dalhousie not only advocated efficiency as the main ground of selection for high command, he insisted upon its maintenance as essential to continuance in command. The Court of Directors on the 10th of September, 1851, endorsed this view, but its practical application involved many a painful controversy. For instance, three Brigadiers—Home, Gwatkin, and Wilkinson—were appointed to commands in 1851. Both in 1853 and in the following year they were absent from their stations on "sick leave" throughout the hot weather. The Commander-in-Chief

helplessly brought to the notice of Government the inconvenience of appointing "worn-out" officers to such posts. The youngest of them had served for forty-four years, and the others for more than fifty. The Governor-General at once insisted upon the "resignation of their commands which ill-health had rendered them unfit to retain," and by doing so provoked a storm of indignation. In the next year his principles led him into a conflict with Sir William Gomm relative to the allowances attached to the brigade command at Peshawar, and it can hardly be denied that Lord Dalhousie had reason on his side. The Commander-in-Chief was requested to choose for that important command on the frontier an officer possessed of local experience who would work cordially with the civil authorities. After some correspondence Colonel Cotton was selected, in preference to Colonel M. C. Johnstone, his senior in the army; but Gomm insisted that Johnstone's seniority entitled him while at his post in the Jullunder division to the higher allowances which were expressly sanctioned for the Peshawar command. The Governor-General, who attached the greatest importance to the grant of first-class allowances to the Peshawar command, wrote—

> It is impossible for me to consent either to forego the advantage to the public interests of placing our most important frontier brigade in the hands of the officer whom the Commander-in-Chief has himself declared to be best fitted to hold it; or to purchase that advantage by the sacrifice of a sound and wholesome principle.

This incident, quoted afterwards as a proof of the combative character of Lord Dalhousie, affords rather an indication of his unflinching discharge of public duty.

Lord Dalhousie was himself particularly careful to act upon the principle of selection in the case of those appointments which were filled by the Governor-General and not by the Commander-in-Chief. Thus when Lieutenant Hodson, under painful circumstances, vacated the Guide corps, Lord Dalhousie, in appointing Major Lumsden to the post, did not hesitate to override a rule laid down by the Court of Directors. In his minute dated the 12th of December, 1855, he wrote—

> Major Lumsden raised the Guide corps. He served with it during the greater part of its distinguished career, and commanded it from the first. He possesses the respect and obedience of officers and men, and he has all their hearts. He is, moreover, one of the most distinguished officers in the Company's army, young as he is. Such a man, so much needed, and by such a corps, ought in my judgment to be given, notwithstanding the rules which oppose it.

With equal judgment and vigour he, on the 13th of December, 1854, nominated Major Neville Chamberlain to succeed Brigadier Hodgson in command of the Punjab Irregular force, remarking, "his high soldierly character, his judgment, good temper and tact, and the respect and regard in which he is held by all, point him out as eminently fitted for this important command." Nor did he shrink from recognising the claims of those who were closely connected with him either by being on his staff or by relationship. Yet he knew that his vindication of selection as opposed to seniority had made him many enemies, and that the choice of a relative would give a handle for misrepresentation. As he wrote on the 12th of October, 1852, when he nominated Major James Ramsay as Commissary-General instead of Colonel Thompson—

> I should commit a great injustice if I were to be deterred by

any false delicacy from recording my conviction that Major Ramsay, the joint deputy Commissary-General, possesses the capacity necessary for the office, and that his qualifications, services, and experience entitle him to the confidence of Government.

Major Ramsay had served twenty-three years in the department, he had taken part in the expedition to China and in the Gwalior campaign, and finally had been placed in charge of the commissariat of the army of the Punjab. This officer fully justified the confidence shown in him, but a weaker man than the Governor-General might have put prudence before duty, and avoided the malicious imputations which the appointment of his relative was sure to draw upon his head not only from those who considered themselves unjustly treated, but from all the friends of the seniority system.

It would involve entering into needless detail to mention the various forts, including Peshawar, Attock, Multan, which were put in order during the administration of India between 1848 and 1856. Lord Dalhousie objected to placing magazines in foreign territory, and to the plan which he found in force of selling worn-out or rejected arms in the market. He determined after inquiry that Firozpur should be the chief magazine in Northern India, and that the powder factory should not be moved from Ishapur to Allahabad. He added, moreover, a valuable element to the Native army by an increased enlistment of Ghurkhas and Sikhs. But the chief service rendered by him towards enlarging the efficiency of the army lay in the correction of abuses which had been too long tolerated by his predecessors. One scandalous abuse which the Governor-General set himself to reform was the invalid establishment. In December, 1852, he went so far as to refuse

to allow of any further invaliding until he had addressed the Court. From doctors in the smaller stations medical certificates were only too easily procured by officers, and, as the Governor-General stated—

> Among those who have been invalided there are, to my certain knowledge, men in the prime of life, who must be in rude health if there be any faith in external symptoms, the busiest men in the business of life, and the gayest dancers in the ball-room. The Honourable Company gives a most liberal pension to its faithful servants. It gives, further, an invalid allowance to those who have not established a claim to pension. But the effect of the rules often is that while a steady, hard-working, conscientious servant, who toils for thirty years on their behalf, retires at last on the pension of his rank, an idle, malingering, and (I believe I may say) sometimes a questionable soldier, who has not served half the time of the other, retires on much higher allowances and often with a bonus from his comrades.

As a remedy he proposed that no officer entitled by his service to a captain's pension should receive a higher allowance as an invalid, and, above all, that the medical examination should be conducted at the presidency by an officer specially appointed for the duty. "I have no confidence in the declarations of medical committees," added the Governor-General, faithful even in this case to his cardinal doctrine of individual responsibility.

While abuses of system were thus checked, Lord Dalhousie was invariably strict in enforcing discipline. He did not confine himself to upholding the dignity of Government. If he censured Major Ouseley for violating the rules of discipline by representing Government in a memorial transmitted direct to the Court as "insidious" and "torturing," or if he rebuked even Lord Gough for "imputing[1] to Government indifference

[1] Letter to Lord Gough, dated 12th of November, 1848.

of your recommendations, hesitation, and feebleness," or, again, reported to the home authorities the unseemly language used by John Jacob in his attack upon the Bengal cavalry and "the ignorance of the Government of India," he equally refused to tolerate "violent and insubordinate criticism of their superior officers" by discontented inferiors. He was jealous also of the good name of the military service. Lieutenant W——, adjutant of a local regiment in Burma, acted as the agent of his Burmese mistress in recovering money due from the Sepoys under his command. For "conduct so unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, so subversive of discipline, so destructive of the respect due to superiors from those under their command," he was removed from his appointment. The Governor-General bestowed infinite pains upon the study and consideration of the cases of officers whose conduct had been reported to Government. One of these cases, that of Hodson of the Guides, has given rise to much controversy, and the views of Lord Dalhousie are therefore interesting. The charges proved against that gallant officer were "the use of grossly abusive language" to Native officers, the application of "personal violence to his subordinates," and the toleration of "a system calculated to screen peculation and fraud." The Court of Inquiry found that this officer's statements "abounded in subterfuge." The Commander-in-Chief held that Hodson had failed to exonerate himself, and the Chief Commissioner, Lawrence, was unable to differ from the finding of the Court regarding the cumulative effect of so "many irregularities ruinous to his reputation." "I sincerely regret," wrote Lord Dalhousie on the 15th of September, 1855, "that a gallant and accomplished officer should have placed himself in the position in which Lieutenant

Hodson now appears. But I feel bound to decide that he has shown himself unfit to hold the command of a regiment, and to direct that he be placed at the disposal of H. E. the Commander-in-Chief."

It is pleasant to turn from the correction of faults to the successful endeavours made by Lord Dalhousie to defend the privileges and rights of the army and to improve the conditions of service. One of his earliest acts in the middle of 1848 was to secure pensions for Sepoys wounded in the discharge of their duty, though the wound was not received "on foreign service in the face of the enemy." He was the first to suggest the institution of a general medal for Indian service. As shown in a previous chapter,[1] fault was found with him for granting one to the Company's troops for the Sikh war, and thereafter the Government of India was deprived of a power which it had previously exercised. When, therefore, the Burmese war was drawing to a close, Lord Dalhousie wrote, on the 5th of September, 1853, to the President of the Board—

> It might be as well to establish one general medal for Indian service, to grant that on any occasion calling for it, and to designate the particular service for which it was given, and all future services by clasps. Thus you would multiply clasps instead of medals, which would be an improvement as far as it goes.

On the other he faced opposition and anticipated the practice of recent years by declaring his objection to prize money. He regarded the system as tending to demoralise troops and to introduce inequality in the distribution of rewards. "A national army," he wrote to Lord Broughton on the 14th of June, 1851, "should be trained to consider its pay as full recompense for all

[1] Vol. i. chap. vi. p. 228.

service done, and not to expect to be paid by the job. . . . *Batta* is bad, for it creates a mercenary feeling, as is plainly seen in this Indian army already, and if the broad principle is laid down that everything in war belongs of right to the troops that won it, I think we go far to establish a band of legalised plunderers who will be always crying out for war." This seems sound sense and policy, but it was not till the present century that such grants were finally abolished. Lord Dalhousie's opinion, however, led his successors gradually to introduce the practice of giving gratuities to the troops after a campaign instead of prize-money, but so late as the year 1898 prize-money was given to the troops which took part in the Mekran operations, and again to those which served in China in 1900.

The officers of the Indian army had to thank the Governor-General for amended rules of leave and for securing to them, by the Act of Parliament passed in 1853, authority "to repair to and reside in Europe, or elsewhere out of the limits of the said Company's Charter, without forfeiture of pay or salary." This privilege led in turn to the settlement of another vexed question. It has already been shown in this chapter that the royal forces in India were placed at a disadvantage in being debarred from many appointments, both military and civil. But the tables were turned when the Company's officers landed in England. There they found their military rank ignored so far as official authority went. This seemed to Lord Dalhousie a "galling and humiliating" anomaly. On the 9th of April, 1855, he wrote—

The authorities in England tacitly recognise their rank. They gave them place and precedence in a military character at the funeral of the Commander-in-Chief of the army, the Duke of

Wellington. The Queen grants them honours and the duty of attending her person on State occasions. Every mail now brings us news that the authorities are availing themselves of the welcome services of the officers of the Indian army in their own military operations in Europe. Yet these gallant men have yet failed to obtain in England even the bare declaration that they are soldiers. Since the earnest desire for a recognition of their military rank seems to be widely felt among the officers of the Indian army, I am bound to say that they have, in my humble judgment, the strongest possible claim to that degree of consideration on the part of the ministers of the Crown; and I beg again to recommend the memorials which have been presented on the subject to the favour and support of the Honourable Court.

There were many other directions in which the Governor-General sought to improve the position of officers. He urged upon the Court in 1856 the advantage of regimental bands "as contributing to create and sustain an *esprit de corps*, and to promote good-will among the officers," but he held that it was unfair to saddle officers with an obligation to pay heavy subscriptions, and that more liberal allowance should be granted by the Court towards their expenses. As regards messes, he wished to see them generally introduced, but he considered that an annual grant-in-aid of Rs. 1500 was as much as Government should be called upon to contribute. Even the subject of uniform came under his scrutiny, and he endeavoured to put a check upon expensive additions to it or frequent changes in it.

The comfort of the common soldier whether in the royal or the Company's army was an object of his constant solicitude. His minutes upon barrack accommodation, improved sanitation, and medical comforts, are numerous. In 1853 he objected strongly to the parsimony with which quinine was given to the Sepoys.

For Europeans he advocated healthy amusements and places of resort. In particular he encouraged a systematic attempt to provide soldiers' gardens, not merely in order that vegetables might be raised, but also to furnish a pleasant amusement to those fond of gardening, and an attractive place of resort to all of them. On the 13th of January, 1854, he wrote—

It should be such a spot as would admit of its being rendered an attractive resort, varied with shady trees, with trellised alleys, with skittle grounds, quoit grounds, gymnastic poles, and all such things as the experience of commanding officers might suggest as likely to divert the men. In short, it should be laid out on the model of the soldiers' garden near the Anarkulle cantonment at Lahore, on which Sir Henry Lawrence bestowed so much pains and with such success.

Honour to whom honour is due. If Henry Lawrence planted, Lord Dalhousie watered, and the Governor-General was as active in extending measures suggested by others as in initiating proposals of his own. Writing on the 18th of August, 1855, on the duty of extending canteen funds in all the presidencies, Lord Dalhousie thus expressed himself—

My own opinion is clear that the Government is bound by every consideration of interest and duty to provide for the European soldier in this country everything of a permanent character which is necessary for his health, comfort, and wholesome recreation. The duty of the Government to the soldier peremptorily requires that it should afford to him not only a first-rate barrack accommodation, for married men and for single men respectively, but that it should attach to such barracks establishments for punkas, schoolrooms, reading-rooms, books, racquet, and fives-courts, skittle alleys, cricket grounds, workshops, gardens, and such like, all at its own cost.

Nor did he neglect provision for religious services adapted to the wants of the several main denominations.

Above all, he had a care for education, and this brought him face to face with a difficulty in India which he did not hesitate to solve in a Christian spirit. With a quotation from a minute written on the 27th of July, 1848, regarding a grant-in-aid asked for a school conducted on Christian principles for the 2nd regiment of Bombay Light Cavalry, this chapter must be closed. Objection was raised to the grant on the ground of novelty, and because it would give alarm to the natives. Lord Dalhousie thus replied—

I altogether dissent from the view that the appointment by the English Government of a schoolmaster for the education of English or Christian children in any given regiment would be regarded by Hindu or Mussulman with either alarm or disapprobation. If it were a military question I would at once defer to the opinions of Lord Hardinge or Lord Gough. If it were a question, the solution of which depended on intimate knowledge of native character, I should refer to the Court of Directors, conscious of the inadequacy of my experience. But it is not so. It is a question, the solution of which is to be found in the general principles of human nature, and which may be answered by the pages of history. . . . The cultivation of our own religion by ourselves, the observance of its precepts and ceremonies by ourselves, the instruction of our children and our own people by ourselves, are matters which are and ought to be, so far as Government is concerned, altogether distinct from any attempt at proselytism. So long as they are kept so, I utterly deny that the strict culture of our own religion by ourselves, and the instruction of our own people in it, will ever lessen our influence with the native population. I will go further, and I will say that they will tend to lessen it least of all with Hindus and Mahomedans, themselves so rigidly attentive to the precepts of their own creed. The whole scope of modern history tends to show, that that which has really lessened the respect in which European nations have been held by barbarous people has been the gross violation of their own precepts; the scandalous inconsistency of their lives with the doctrines of the religion they profess, and the practice of every vice which their teaching forbade. Then to say nothing at all

about duty, surely it is our policy not to allow these children to grow up in a state of ignorance, until ignorance leads them to vice. The Government provides instruction for native children by their own teachers in regiments. Upon what ground can the governing authority refuse to provide aid, at least, to the instruction of children of their own blood and their own creed?

CHAPTER IX

THE ANNEXATION OF OUDH[1]

Outline of Lord Dalhousie's policy towards Oudh—History of Oudh before the battle of Buxar—Oudh brought under British protection, 1765—Its misgovernment—The treaty of 1801—Comments upon its international character—Misrule continues between 1801 and 1837—A new treaty made in 1837 but disallowed from home—A decade of misrule follows—Col. Sleeman's appointment and report—The home authorities advocate interference—The views of Lord Dalhousie—Col. Outram is appointed Resident—His report—Why Oudh is not depopulated—Lord Dalhousie is opposed to annexation—His plans explained—Opposition of his colleagues in Council—Hesitation at home—Lord Dalhousie prepares for action—Decision of the home Government arrives—Conference with and instructions to Outram—Outram's negotiations and interview with the King—The King refuses to transfer the administration, and annexation is proclaimed—The plan of administration—The failures in carrying it out—Lord Dalhousie was not responsible for some of them, and in other instances his intentions were frustrated—Remarks on the whole question.

THE most serious indictment brought against Lord Dalhousie's policy in India is that of having annexed the kingdom of Oudh to the Company's dominions, and of so carrying out the operation as to inspire a widespread feeling of discontent which conduced to, or at least helped to intensify, the outbreak of the Sepoy

[1] See papers relating to Oudh printed by order of the House of Commons, dated the 12th of July, 1861; and those presented by command, 1856, to both Houses.

rebellion. Those who repeat this charge are too ready to forget that the problem was one which had reached an acute stage before the year 1848, and demanded an early solution, that the proposals submitted to the home authorities by the Governor-General did not involve annexation, that the decision of those authorities was so delayed as to give him no time to carry out his plans for the pacification of the province after its incorporation in British India, and that many essential parts of his scheme, including even his public promises, were disregarded under the rule of a successor who, being new to India, had not fully realised the position. But for these unfortunate departures in the execution of the measure, there is no reason to suppose that Oudh would not have shown itself in 1857 as loyal and peaceful a part of the empire as the Punjab proved to be. Lord Dalhousie himself was under no delusion as to the gravity of the question. He saw the dangers that lurked behind an incomplete settlement, he knew that vested interests in disorder and corruption would suffer if peace and justice were established in the land, he had before him full accounts of the armed retinues by which society had been held together, and the strong forts that might defy authority, and he left upon record his conviction that the whole success of the policy which was forced upon him would depend upon the maintenance of an adequate force upon the spot, and the adoption of "measures to conciliate the minds of all persons" whose interests would be affected by the change. Only if a stronger man armed held possession of Oudh could its peace be assured.

1732-1764.

Few provinces in India have suffered greater vicissitudes of fortune than the rich alluvial country occupying the central portion of the Gangetic plain and

watered by the Ganges, the Gumti, the Gogra, and the Rapti. Of its history before the battle of Buxar only a bare sketch can be given. In the earliest days of which we have trustworthy record it witnessed the fierce struggle between Buddhism and Brahmanism, a struggle that ended in desolation so complete that the work of civilisation had to begin afresh. No sooner had an aboriginal tribe in the ninth century cleared the jungle than a Jain family stepped in to reap the profit of their labour. These in their turn were forced to surrender their territory to the kingdom of Kanauj. At the close of the twelfth century the Mahomedans overran Oudh, and the province, torn from Bengal, became an outlying dependency of Delhi. Passing later on under the rule of Jaunpur, it was once more the scene of revolution until it entered upon a period of peace and prosperity under a Hindu Raja. Another interval of disorder followed from which the strong hand of Akbar rescued it; and its feudal barons, who, throughout all these shifting scenes had clung to the soil, gradually grew strong under the decaying empire of Aurangzeb. About the year 1732, Saadat Khan, a merchant of Khorasan, who had risen to power in the reign of Mahomed Shah, obtained the appointment of local governor. When Nadir Shah advanced against Delhi, Saadat Khan, instead of rendering assistance to his imperial master, thought only of securing his own position. By an act of treachery he succeeded in retaining his title of Nawab Wazir and established his independence. Thenceforward the most serious danger to Oudh lay in the advance of the Marathas, and Saadat Khan prudently reserved his strength to defend his own possessions instead of engaging in the hopeless task of trying to arrest the general break-up of the empire of Delhi.

His successor, Safdar Jung, pursued the same policy, and dying in 1754, soon after the deposition of the Emperor Ahmed Shah, bequeathed the kingdom of Oudh to his son, Shuja-ud-daula, who was described by a Native historian as "the infamous son of a still more infamous Persian pedlar, who enjoys the province of Oudh as the reward for a service of uncommon villainies." The new Wazir had little to fear from the Delhi Emperor whose hands were more than tied by the invasions of Ahmed Shah Durani, or from the Marathas then engaged farther west in a struggle with the British which put an end to their power. He accordingly took just so much part in the politics and wars of the empire as would serve to keep him on his throne, while he watched with more serious interest the successes of Clive and the advance of the British after Plassey. When the Marathas were defeated at Panipat, and the empire lay a-dying, the Wazir thought that his turn had come for deriving profit from the disorders of Hindustan. The reunion of Bengal and Oudh was a scheme which appealed strongly to his avarice and ambition. An opportunity, as it seemed to him, soon occurred of realising this project. Mir Kasim, the Nawab of Bengal, his hands stained with the blood of Ellis and his fellow prisoners, fled to the court of Oudh and invoked the assistance of its ruler. The Wazir at once determined to seize Bengal for himself. Taking with him the fugitive emperor, Shah Alam, he invaded that province, and after a futile attack on Patna, retired to Buxar on the southern bank of the Ganges. There, on the 23rd of October, 1764, he suffered an ignominious defeat at the hands of Major Munro, losing 6000 killed and 130 pieces of artillery. As a consequence the emperor joined the British camp,

while Shuja-ud-daula, making his way back to Oudh, endeavoured to open negotiations with his conquerors. His efforts were fruitless. Promises of a money indemnity were treated with scorn; an infamous offer to assassinate the murderer of Ellis met with nothing but abhorrence; and finding the Council in Calcutta inexorable to all prayers, he, in May, 1765, was driven to surrender, and Oudh lay at the feet of the Company to dispose of as they might please.

1765-1801. Content with their acquisitions in Bengal, the British desired no enlargement of their territories. But they thought that a strong and friendly principality established upon their north-west frontier would serve as a buffer state between Bengal and the disordered territories on the other side of Oudh, over which Marathas, Afghans, and nobles of the Delhi court were still fighting. Accordingly Lord Clive concluded with the Wazir a treaty, dated the 16th of August, 1765, which gave effect to this policy. By the end of the century the Company discovered that a misgoverned country was useless as a buffer against hostile incursions, and in 1801 they were obliged to modify their engagement. But the main objects of their policy towards Oudh for the thirty-five years which followed the restoration of that state to the Wazir were the maintenance of its independence under British protection, and continual efforts to induce its rulers to pay their debts and administer their affairs with decent justice. The treaty of 1765 assured Shuja-ud-daula of assistance in repelling any invasion of his territories, and required him to pay a portion of the cost incurred in the military operations which he had provoked. Not only, however, was the debt left unpaid, but further expenses were incurred by Hastings in crushing the Rohillas, against whom the

Wazir had advanced claims. It is not necessary here to enter into any inquiry as to the morality of these transactions or the subsequent treatment of the Begums. The liabilities accepted by the protected state were disregarded, and though a generous attempt was made by Lord Cornwallis to secure for its ruler a fresh start, and, while relieving him from large arrears of debt, to give him a chance of improving his internal administration, no advantage was taken of the opportunity presented. Such was the condition of things in 1793 that the Governor-General addressed his ally in these terms :—

> On my return from the war in the Dekhan, I had the mortification to find that, after a period of five years, the evils which prevailed at the beginning of that time had increased, that your finances had fallen into a worse state by an enormous accumulation of debt, that the same oppressions continued to be exercised by rapacious and overgrown amils towards the ryots, and not only the subjects and merchants of your own dominions, but those residing under the Company's protection suffered exactions from the custom-house officers, zamindars, amils, and others.

The position had indeed become intolerable. Upon the British had fallen the burden of securing Oudh from invasion by the Rohillas and the Marathas, and yet the province was a thorn in the side of Bengal, and a land of oppression to its own people. "Its revenues," wrote Lord Cornwallis, "are collected by force of arms, the amils are left to plunder uncontrolled, the ryots have no security from oppression, nor of redress from injustice exercised upon them." Sir John Shore wrote in similar terms to the Wazir, and when in 1799 Lord Mornington, better known as Lord Wellesley, was Governor-General, and another Saadat Ali reigned in Oudh, "the acquisition by the Company of the exclusive authority, civil

and military, over the dominions of Oudh," seemed to the former to be the inevitable conclusion to which matters were drifting. Two years later the Resident was directed to inform the Wazir that "unless the vicious system of Native administration be immediately abandoned, he must be prepared for the active and decided interference of the British Government in the affairs of his country."

1801. On the 5th of April, 1801, the Governor-General followed up his directions by thus addressing the Wazir: "I declare to your Excellency in the most explicit terms that I consider it to be my positive duty to resort to any extremity rather than to suffer the further progress of that ruin to which the interests of your Excellency and the Honourable Company are exposed." He then went on to refer to a case in which the inhabitants of a tract of country had been driven into exile, and the amil had proposed to burn their villages to the ground. The outcome of this declaration was the conclusion on the 10th of November, 1801, of a new and important engagement between the Wazir and the Marquis of Wellesley, which placed the ruler of Oudh under a formal obligation to establish, in the part of the country left to him, "such a system of administration, to be carried into effect by his own officers, as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives and property of its inhabitants, and his Excellency will always advise with, and act in conformity to, the counsel of the officers of the said Honourable Company." Other provisions of the treaty relieved Saadat Ali from all future expenses to be incurred in defending his territories, and for that purpose Rohilkhand and certain lands in the Doab, many of which had been conquered by British arms and made over to Oudh, were

permanently ceded to the Company in lieu of the subsidy, which then stood at seventy lakhs a year, and other dues. A large reduction was made in the useless and dangerous army of the state; and, since the Wazir had resisted with all his power the execution of the new engagement, its terms were further explained to him in a separate memorandum.

A few comments may be made upon the treaty, which was fully in harmony with the policy pursued at that time towards the Native States, and was regarded as an international arrangement in no way derogatory to the independence of the sovereign of Oudh. The country had already since 1765 been brought within the ring-fence of the Company's interests, and its ruler was entitled to govern it as he pleased by his own officers without active interference. But he had broken his engagements, and failed to pay the annual subsidy and debts he had incurred. Apart from this, British policy had entirely missed its aim. The buffer state had not proved strong, nor even loyal, for it had suffered its ill-governed subjects to commit raids upon British territories, and had oppressed British merchants pursuing their lawful enterprises. The paramount power would have been justified in withdrawing its protection; it might even have declared war upon the sovereign state for breach of engagement. But it preferred to offer the Wazir a choice of taking the consequences of continued default in the payment of his subsidy, or else of giving security for its annual payment, and of accepting a formal obligation that he would govern his subjects properly, and not prove an injurious neighbour to Bengal. Misgovernment was the cause of his financial embarrassments and of his inability to meet the charges incurred under his treaty. The sovereign of Oudh chose the

latter alternative, and the events of the next fifty years proved that he and his successors were unequal to the task which they had solemnly undertaken.

1801-1837. Between 1801 and 1837 the state of affairs went from bad to worse. Though the provisions of the treaty were frequently invoked, with warning of the consequences certain to follow upon their neglect, the oppressive system of farming out the revenue to contractors continued, and no notice was taken of petitions for redress. When the Wazir thought the contractors were well gorged, they were thrown into prison, not that they might refund to the ryots the plunder extorted from them, but that the treasury of the sovereign might be refilled. In 1812 the Governor-General advised Saadat Ali to introduce a moderate assessment, and collect it through his own officers. Active steps were about to be taken to enforce this advice when the Wazir died, and so escaped the consequences of his breach of engagement. Then followed a change in British policy which, if it was justified by necessity, exposed the action of the Government of India to grave misconstruction, and laid it under inconvenient obligations to Oudh. Hostilities with Nepal were imminent at the time, and the Company's exchequer was ill-prepared to meet the necessary outlay. The new Wazir, whose own interests were involved in the success of our arms, and whose coffers were then full of hoards collected at the point of the bayonet, saw that it would be very advantageous to have the Company as his creditors. He therefore gladly agreed to furnish two loans at a fixed interest. Lord Hastings on his side, with doubtful wisdom, thought that better results would be obtained by leaving it to the sovereign of Oudh, who was about this time dignified by the title of King, to propose his own reforms. Be

that as it may, His Majesty having lent his money, and got rid of unpleasant suggestions, proceeded to replenish his treasury by his own methods, and then called upon the Company to put down the disorders which the process had excited. In 1822 British troops had been engaged in taking possession of and dismantling no less than seventy forts belonging to zamindars. Anarchy and outrage were everywhere prevalent, and gangs of robbers penetrated as far as Monghir, more than three hundred miles from the frontier, where they carried off the property of a Calcutta merchant worth 150,000 rupees. Warnings were again reverted to, and at last, in April, 1831, Lord William Bentinck significantly reminded the Wazir of the fate of Tanjore and the Carnatic, and added that if there was no change for the better, the King of Oudh would be "transmuted into a pensioner of State." The death of this ruler, Ghazi-ud-din Haidar, was followed by intrigues and disturbances, and nothing but the presence of British troops served to hold in awe the disorderly rabble of 70,000 men which the state called its army. The treaty of 1801 had been tried and found wanting.

1837. The accession of a new king gave Lord Auckland the opportunity of concluding a fresh treaty on the 18th of September, 1837. The scandal of employing British troops to coerce zamindars and repress robbery was becoming intolerable. It was therefore agreed that the King should organise and pay for "a disciplined force for the general support of his authority within his dominions," consisting of two regiments of cavalry, five of infantry, and two companies of artillery, who were to be paid regularly by His Majesty and to be placed under British officers. To this arrangement there was the obvious drawback, that it created a

fresh debt which the borrower was sure to ignore, and that while the presence of British officers might diminish, it could not remove the scandal of employing a British force to compel obedience to a rapacious and infamous government. But the treaty went beyond this; it provided a remedy against the obligation laid upon the King by the treaty of 1801 to carry out reforms "by his own officers." Experience had proved that the King never would, or could, provide men competent to introduce reforms. Even if His Majesty's good faith could be trusted, his subordinates, who lived on corruption, were certain to baffle his intentions. It was, therefore, proposed to alter and define with greater exactness the vague and impracticable duty imposed upon the protected state by Lord Wellesley's treaty. The King was required to consider at once with the Resident—

> the best means[1] of remedying the existing defects in the police and in the judicial and revenue administrations of his dominions; and if His Majesty should neglect to attend to the advice and counsel of the British Government or its local representative, and if gross and systematic oppression, anarchy, and misrule should hereafter prevail within the Oudh dominions, such as seriously to endanger the public tranquillity, the British Government reserves to itself the right of appointing its own officers to the management of whatsoever portions of the Oudh territory, either to a small or greater extent, in which such misrule may have occurred, for so long a period as it may deem necessary, the surplus receipts in each case, after defraying all charges, to be paid into the King's treasury, and a true and faithful account rendered to His Majesty of the receipts and expenditure of the territories so assumed.

Another article distinctly bound the British managers to retain the native institutions, "so as to facilitate the

[1] See Article 7 of the treaty of 11th September, 1837, of which the terms are somewhat confused.

restoration of the territories under management to the King when the proper period should arrive." This arrangement, which seems to us in the present day to be so reasonable, was not approved by the home authorities. On the 10th of April, 1838, the Court ordered the treaty to be abrogated, and two years later they desired that British relations with Oudh should be restored to the *status quo ante*. Their officers in India contented themselves with informing the King that he would not have to pay for the reformed troops, but made no intimation as to the disallowance of the other provisions of the treaty. For this omission Lord Dalhousie, when it fell to him to deal with affairs in Oudh, honestly expressed his regret. But at the same time he remarked that the absence of any communication on the subject was not in the least detrimental to His Majesty's interests then or afterwards. It is, however, possible that the rulers of Oudh deluded themselves into the belief that the treaty of 1837 represented the maximum penalty which the Court could inflict, and that at the worst the administration would be taken out of their hands for a brief season only.

1838-1848.

At any rate the heart of the King was hardened, and between 1838 and 1848, when Lord Dalhousie arrived and Colonel Sleeman was appointed Resident, there was no improvement. "The army of Oudh," according to an official report, "is an ill-paid rabble employed in coercing the refractory zamindars. The nominal pay of the sepoy is four rupees, but he receives only three, issued once in every three or four months, and kept much in arrears. He has to find his own arms and ammunition. They have no tents, and when they halt they build huts for themselves, covering

them with roofs torn from the next villages." So infamous a system naturally provoked mutiny, and in 1846 British troops were called in to overawe a regiment thus driven to despair. In fact British protection meant the coercion of the army, of zamindars and contractors, and finally of the down-trodden people, in order that the King, his courtiers, and favourites might indulge themselves in their disreputable pleasures. Lord Hardinge saw that this state of affairs could not be allowed to continue, and in an interview with the King on the 22nd of November, 1847, he forcibly pointed out that "the British had, as a paramount power, a duty to perform towards the cultivators of the soil, and unless the King adopted a proper arrangement in the revenue and judicial departments of his Government, so as to correct the abuses now existing, it would be imperative on the British Government to interfere." The Governor-General gave the King a definite term of two years in which to reform, warning him that if he procrastinated he would "incur the risk of forcing the British to assume the government of Oudh." The King thereon introduced into some districts the *amani* system instead of the *izara*, or, in other words, the trust system took the place of the contract system, and the landowners paid their rents to the public officers. But these officials, or amils, were themselves corrupt, and the old plan was soon reverted to. Thus another decade of gross misrule followed the attempt made by Lord Auckland in 1837.

1848. In 1848 Colonel Sleeman, who had won a reputation for his strong support of the country princes, was appointed Resident. The reports he received as to the condition of the province led him to write:—

It is peculiarly distressing to me to find that in continuing to uphold the sovereign power of this effete and incapable dynasty, we do so at the cost of five millions of people, in whose behalf we are bound to secure what the Oudh Government is solemnly pledged to maintain—such a system "as shall be conducive to their prosperity and calculated to secure to them their lives and property."

A few extracts from his full reports will enable the reader to picture to himself the condition of the country. One would suppose that a tyrannical ruler would at all events keep his army and police in a state of efficiency. Colonel Sleeman reported, however, that though together these forces numbered nearly 80,000 men, not half of them were ever present, and that their pay went into the pockets of the commandant. "Their horrible state of disorganisation and inefficiency," he wrote, "is only to be equalled by the derision which their raggedness excites, and the contempt with which they are regarded by the landowners and subjects of the King." The officers he thus described :—

Three-fourths of the officers commanding regiments are singers, eunuchs, or their creatures, or the creatures of the Court favourites. They are men or boys who never saw their regiments, and never intend to see them or leave the Court, in whose favour they bask. A great part of the men are in attendance upon them or their friends. Another part are paper men, whose pay is the perquisite of the commanding officer. The troops upon which the collections of the revenue depend are amongst the worst enemies the people of the country have. They dare not face a formidable landowner or gang of robbers, but are for ever engaged in pillaging the farmers and cultivators of the land, and this with the knowledge of the Government and its officers. . . . The peasantry everywhere told me that rebels and robbers did spare them sometimes, when the destruction of their houses and crops was not necessary to their purpose, but that the King's troops, who could not breathe freely in the presence of such men, never spared them. They

trod down their fields and tore down their houses, as if they were their enemies, to be destroyed by every possible means.

It can readily be conceived that the forces of the King thus organised and disciplined, the police employed by the contractors, who numbered 16,150 men, and the armed retainers of the more powerful zamindars, ate up whatever the robbers spared. The condition of society was pitiful, and whereas the adjoining districts of the North-western Provinces, occupying less than 72,000 square miles, gave a surplus to the British Government of 369 lakhs of rupees, Oudh, with an area at that time of 25,000 square miles, furnished to the King's treasury the small surplus of 35 to 40 lakhs. Yet the natural fertility and resources of the province were enormous. Mr. C. E. Boileau, describing his journey to Baraitch in Oudh, in a letter dated the 17th of February, 1856, wrote:—

> The country we came through to-day from the river to Sikrara is the most beautiful, productive, and teeming that I have ever seen in the plains of India. It would not be credited if a traveller had written of wheat up to your shoulders and *urhur* [1] up to your howdah within a few miles of Cawnpore. It is no romance. We saw many such fields, and yet the extent of waste was lamentable. We passed large towns without shops, half their houses deserted, lands fallen out of cultivation, and side by side such fields as grow in no part of the nor'-west. The grass was growing on the roads—not that yellow apology which we have been used to in the Doab, but fresh doop.[1] We were all lost in admiration of the richness of the district. Three years hence you will find the thirteen lakhs will be thirty.

The authorities at home were perfectly aware of the terrible state to which this policy of protection and

[1] *Urhur*, more properly *arhar*, is the pulse known as pigeon-pea, and *doop*, more properly *dub*, is the *Cynodon Dactylon*, a very nutritious fodder grass.

inactivity had reduced the country. Their consciences must have felt uneasy as they thought of the loans which their Governor-Generals had received from the kings, and of the use to which their troops had been put in suppressing disorders and feeble attempts at revolution which were most assuredly justified. With their half-hearted endeavours to stir the rulers of Oudh into action prior to 1848, this biography need not concern itself. When, however, they appointed Lord Dalhousie to administer their affairs in the East, they certainly showed every anxiety that he should deal with Oudh; and if they were likely to grow lukewarm, the farewell article in the *Times*, which has already been quoted,[1] left no doubt as to public opinion regarding the Company's duty to the people of that kingdom. During the earlier days of Lord Dalhousie's rule it was impossible for the matter to be taken in hand. But on the 7th of August, 1851, Lord Broughton wrote as follows :—

1848-1854.

> I shall be most happy if the putting an end to the rickety systems both at Hyderabad and Oudh should be reserved for you. It is impossible to allow either of the states to remain in their present condition much longer. They are a disgrace to our empire—a byword. I never meet a man who takes the slightest interest in Indian affairs that does not ask when these wretched misgovernments are to be put down. To which I answer, "When Lord Dalhousie has five minutes to spare."

When the Governor-General asked the President whether he would support him if he acted, Broughton replied :—

> To be sure I will. I should be most happy to hear that you had acted at Lucknow in the same spirit as at Hyderabad. Of course, do what you will, or omit to do anything, and some fault

[1] See vol. i. chap. iii. p. 97.

is sure to be found with you. That is one of the inevitable conditions of your high place, and no one ought to be better able to bear it than yourself.

On Sir Charles Wood's coming into office, Lord Dalhousie desired to know whether Lord John Russell's Government were of the same mind as their predecessors. To this inquiry Wood replied on the 21st of October, 1853:—

If you had not been under the necessity of annexing Pegu, I should have had no scruple as to Oudh—which we ought to have—and I am very sorry we have got the other. That we must take Oudh sooner or later, I have no doubt. The only question in my mind is the time, opportunity, and pretext; and as it is very undesirable to show a grasping disposition at present, I am unwilling to occupy "our principality."

Thus neither of the Presidents saw any escape from the duty of interference. The only question was that of the time and manner. A few weeks later Wood's mind was clearer as to the course he meant to pursue, and on the 24th of January, 1854, he wrote:—

Take Oudh by a voluntary surrender, and you will have done a very good deed in India and for the people of the country. I am not at all averse to the operation, and only am anxious that it should be skilfully performed—skilfully, I mean, in reference to public opinion here—for I am not at all afraid of your not doing it skilfully on Indian ground. One cannot nowadays disregard public opinion, and the Court of Directors is by no means a popular body.

Lord Dalhousie had clear views of his own as to his ultimate course of action, and as to the time for taking it. He was not wholly dependent upon the official accounts of misrule which reached him from Oudh, for during his journey through the North-west Provinces in December, 1851, he had personally tested these reports

by his own experience. In his diary for that month he wrote :—

> The border of Oudh, too, is close at hand, and till lately the roads and lands were neither of them safe from plunder and disorder. In other respects the district profits considerably by its proximity to Oudh, since the disturbances in that unfortunate land very frequently produce an emigration of good cultivators from some village that can stand squeezing no more. The other day the whole of the cultivators of one village, two hundred in number, fled into the Shahjehanpur district, and were all eagerly hired by the zamindars at once.

On the 30th of the same month his entry runs :—

> All day I heard a heavy cannonading going on, and marvelled to think that we should be able to hear the artillery practice all the way from Cawnpore. Before the evening I discovered it was our neighbours in Oudh collecting their revenue! Nothing more common, the people say, all along this border!

At Fatehgarh the Governor-General met Colonel Sleeman, the Resident, and discussed the situation with him. Referring to the severe but fruitless warning which Lord Hardinge had administered to the King at Lucknow in 1847, Sleeman gave it as his opinion that a crisis might be expected at any minute, since the treasury was empty. When that time should come, he advocated "permanent interposition on the part of the Government of India as trustees for Oudh, spending all the revenue on Oudh itself under the treaty of 1837." The Governor-General leaned rather to "occupation under a new treaty, in the same manner as Tanjore and the Carnatic, and as was proposed for Oudh itself by Lord Wellesley." But, besides the urgency of other important work, Lord Dalhousie had special reasons for not dealing at once with the Oudh problem in either way. Those reasons were thus recorded in his diary for January, 1852 :—

i. If there were imperative necessity for action, I would act, but there is no such necessity. ii. Before very long it seems certain that the King himself must solicit our interposition, in which case we shall act more authoritatively, and with less cavilling than if we should take the initiative. iii. When on my way to the presidency, and so far towards it, I am unwilling to act without the Council unnecessarily. iv. The temper and disposition of two of the members of Council, Sir F. Currie and Mr. Lowis, is such that if I were to act without them they might very probably withhold a concurrence, which, if they be consulted and the matter discussed, they would find it difficult to refuse.

On the Governor-General's arrival in Calcutta he found himself face to face with the Burmese war, and then in the following year, 1853, the crushing blow which fell upon him in the death of his wife rendered him still more disinclined to bring affairs in Oudh to a climax. Thus it was not until 1854 that he opened what he called his first parallel by appointing Outram to succeed Sleeman, and directing him to report on the condition of the principality.

1854. The circumstances in which Outram, then Brigadier at Aden, was recalled to take charge of the Lucknow Residency, have sometimes been construed into a supersession of Sir Henry Lawrence. Nothing of the kind was ever intended. The post was not offered to that distinguished officer simply because, as the Governor-General wrote on the 28th of August, 1854,

when the Residency of Hyderabad was vacated by the appointment of General Low to Council, I asked whether Sir Henry would prefer it to his present appointment in Rajputana by reason of the civil duties which had then been recently added to it. Sir Henry declined the appointment, and the office in Rajputana is such as to make a transfer to Lucknow no promotion. For these reasons, and for the reasons which on a former occasion induced Sir Henry to decline a transfer from Rajputana, I feel that it would

only be an unnecessary delay to offer the Residency at Lucknow to him.

In informing Outram that he had been selected as Resident, the Marquis wrote on the 4th of September :—

> Oudh has long been in a ticklish state. The "sick man" may any day be on our hands. With that contingency in view we wish to have the best man at our disposal to fill the vacancy. With one voice we pronounced you to be the man, and to have the best public claims to it, moreover, viewed as a public reward.

1855.

Outram was in no undue haste to submit his report on the state of Oudh, nor did the Government of India hurry him. In fact, writing in February, 1855, Lord Dalhousie expressed himself as "pleased that it should be delayed, so as to relieve it of all suspicion of hasty conclusions being formed by its author." When in the first week of May the report, dated the 15th of March, reached the Governor-General at Coonoor, he characterised it as "excellent, clear, concise, temperate in its tone, and decisive in its conclusion." Things, it appeared, could hardly be worse.

> The lamentable condition of the kingdom has been caused by the very culpable apathy and gross misrule of the sovereign and his Darbar. I have shown that the affairs of Oudh still continue in the same state—if not worse—in which Colonel Sleeman from time to time described them to be; and that the improvement which Lord Hardinge peremptorily demanded seven years ago at the hands of the King, in pursuance of the treaty of 1801, has not in any degree been effected. And I have no hesitation in declaring my opinion, therefore, that the duty imposed on the British Government by that treaty cannot any longer admit of our honestly indulging the reluctance which the Government of India has felt heretofore to have recourse to those extreme measures which alone can be of any real efficacy in remedying the evils from which the State of Oudh has suffered so long.

The facts upon which this opinion was based can

only be sketched in brief outline. The King himself was "capricious and fickle; his days and nights are passed in the female apartments, and he appears wholly to have resigned himself to debauchery, dissipation, and low pursuits." Eunuchs, fiddlers, and songsters were the advisers by whom he was guided. Outram, however, honestly laid stress upon the claims of the ruling family to the generous consideration of Government, and upon the anxiety which the King himself had shown, by establishing frontier police and by other measures, to meet the wishes of Government. But so far as his own subjects were concerned it was abundantly clear that he had failed in every part of his duty to them. Corruption reigned supreme, and proceeded "link by link from the highest authority to the lowest, the subordinate bribing his superior, and the whole weight at length falling on and crushing the ryot." There was no justice either in criminal or civil cases. Decisions were bought and sold, offenders screened, murderers reinstated in power, and the greatest scoundrels of all were the servants of the state. One of these, Raja Rughur Sing, the Nazim of Baraitch, had committed "wholesale cold-blooded massacres and plunderings, besides torturings to death of human beings to an extent which could not be believed were the facts not so fully established." The late Resident had insisted upon his trial, and the King went so far as to proclaim him and offer a reward for his arrest. But Outram reported that the atrocious villain was still negotiating for his return to office, and the only object that the Darbar had in view was to make the largest possible profit out of the transaction. It was notorious that criminal offences were concealed, but even so the average of persons killed and wounded in the year was

1752, many villages were destroyed each year, and numbers of persons sold into slavery, or else held prisoners for ransom. The public treasury was empty, and the state's credit exhausted. Even the members of the royal family had not received their allowances, the pay of the troops was in arrears, and the men naturally helped themselves. Nothing was spent on the roads and bridges, the only outlay on public works going to palaces and forts.

The wonder seemed that the country was not entirely depopulated, and the explanation given by Outram throws valuable light upon the events of 1857. The better classes of the peasantry ensured for themselves the privilege of approaching the state authorities through the Residency by furnishing recruits for the Company's army. "To acquire this privilege every agricultural family in Oudh, perhaps without exception, sends one of its members into the British army, and thus secures through him the right of claiming the Resident's interference. The number of Oudh Sepoys in our service, who enjoy this privilege, is estimated at 40,000, and the relatives they represent may probably amount to ten times that number, nearly one-tenth of the entire population of Oudh." This fact explains the deep interest which the Sepoy army took in the annexation of the province, and how ready it was to lend an ear to the complaints of broken faith which were sedulously spread, not always without some justification, in the second year of Lord Canning's administration.

Outram, as well as Sleeman, had always deprecated unnecessary interference with Native rulers, and desired to see their authority upheld as far as possible. General Low, one of the Governor-General's colleagues, was also opposed in principle to the adoption of any measures

that might weaken or subvert their administrations. Yet each of these authorities was shocked by the condition of misery in which five millions of people were plunged by the misrule of a sovereign who was supported by British troops. Lord Dalhousie felt with them that intervention could no longer be delayed, and the only question was as to the form it should take. But he was opposed to annexation. In his minute, dated the 18th of June, 1855, he wrote :—

> The reform of the administration of the province may be wrought, and the prosperity of the people may be secured, without resorting to so extreme a measure as the annexation of the territory, and the abolition of the throne. I, for my part, therefore, do not advise that the Province of Oudh should be declared to be British territory.

He then proceeded to discuss the alternative of an administration carried on by the King's officials under the control of British officers subordinate to the Resident at Lucknow. That was the system which Henry Lawrence had tried in the Punjab until the outbreak at Multan had shown its inadequacy. In the case of Oudh the futility of such an arrangement had been proved beyond doubt by the fact that the Wazir, while making a show of compliance with the Resident's advice, had given his officers secret instructions to thwart the orders which he was compelled to issue. "Such or similar failure," thought Lord Dalhousie, "must ever follow any attempt to administer, much more to purify and reconstruct, a Native government, by means of a divided authority reposed jointly in British agents and officers of the state controlled."

There was, however, a third solution of the difficulty which Lord Wellesley had suggested in a minute upon Oudh, dated the 16th of December, 1799, namely, advice

"to the Nawab Wazir to vest the exclusive administration of the civil and military government of Oudh and its dependencies in the hands of the Company, with such ample powers as shall enable the Company to act with vigour and promptitude in every branch and department of the state." This was the system which Lord Dalhousie had introduced into the Berars, and the success of it has been abundantly proved by the history of the past fifty years. Any other assumption of power would, he thought, merely relieve the unhappy people of Oudh for a time, and then render them liable to be squeezed of all the fruits of their renewed labour and restored prosperity as soon as the British management was withdrawn. Therefore the transfer must be permanent, but the King should be a party to it and should retain his royal title and rank. A regard for his own interests, and for the maintenance of his family and throne, would, the Governor-General felt confident, induce the King to give his consent to such a measure. As to the manner of carrying it out, Lord Dalhousie proposed to notify to the King that since he had violated the treaty of 1801, all agreements between him and the Company were at an end, and political relations between the Governments had ceased. The King would then, he believed, ask for a fresh treaty, or he would try to carry on his own government without British support. In the former case he would be told that if he accepted the new terms, his titles, his privileges, and a large annual payment would be guaranteed to him. In the latter, he was certain to provoke a rebellion, and as soon as it spread and affected British interests, the Government would interfere and annex Oudh. Lord Dalhousie himself felt sure that the withdrawal of the Resident and the British troops from Lucknow would

be the signal for a general rising, and that his Majesty, well aware of this result, would prefer the other alternative.

It must be admitted that the plan thus devised by the Governor-General ran counter to principles which he had avowed and acted upon. It meant, in fact, setting up a "sham prince," who would be the rallying point for disaffection, and in the indignation which such an arrangement would arouse the misdeeds of the ex-King would be speedily forgotten. But Lord Dalhousie felt that the whole position was anomalous. The treaty of 1801 was his stumbling-block. That document declared that the reforms must be carried out "by the King's own officers." In other words, it prescribed an impossible remedy for misrule. Against the doctrine that we must act by the King's consent, and that our only weapon for obtaining it was the withdrawal of protection, the colleagues of the Governor-General protested. Dorin, anticipating the modern practice,[1] held that the paramount power had an unlimited right of interference, irrespective of treaties, which enabled it to put an end to the oppression of independent Native States. Grant went further, and held that the Oudh subadars were mere subordinates of the Emperor to whose powers the Company had succeeded. They were not independent rulers at all. General Low took his stand upon the inveterate and ineradicable character of misrule in Oudh. Nothing could ever cure it, *delenda est;* and the British must exclusively and permanently manage the state. Peacock adopted the legal view, and maintained that a breach of treaty did not limit our rights of punishment to the single penalty of withdrawing our protection. We might treat the infringe-

[1] See chap. iv. p. 107.

ments as a *casus belli*, and compel the delinquent to fulfil his obligations, which could only be done by direct and permanent management. The reader will probably agree that Lord Dalhousie's plan had not merely the merit of greater "tenderness to the feelings" of the King and his family, which the Court of Directors attributed to it, but something more in its favour. Dorin's proposal certainly showed no such tenderness. Grant's theory was opposed to the treatment which the "Kingdom of Oudh" had received for many years, being uniformly dealt with as an independent state possessed of international life. Both Low and Peacock passed too lightly over the clause which we ourselves had inserted in the treaty of 1801, when we specified the one method by which good government was to be secured. Before we could take the step which they advocated, we must cut ourselves adrift of that engagement.

The decision of the Court upon the issues raised was awaited in India with impatience. Yet, although the sands of Lord Dalhousie's term of office were fast running out, it was delayed till the 21st of November, 1855, and did not reach the Governor-General till the beginning of 1856. The cause of this delay, and the steps taken by the Governor-General, after the despatch of his own proposals on the 3rd of July, 1855, to prepare the way for action, must now be explained. Before his letter reached home, Vernon Smith, writing on the 9th of August, sounded a note of alarm. "The public feeling," he wrote, "in which, I own, I agree, is much against any addition of territory to our Indian dominions." By the next mail the President was able to report that he had read the Governor-General's able minute, but he proceeded to throw cold water upon the idea of his staying in India to give effect to his views.

Having obtained so valuable an opinion in such a decisive form from you, it would not be necessary for the public service to throw upon you the burden of carrying out the details if the scheme was adopted, and a change of plans might appear derogatory to their confidence in the new Governor-General. Any plan that approaches to annexation of Oudh will, I have reason to believe, excite a violent opposition from some active parties in the country.

Even as late as the 9th of October the President wrote, "I cannot promise an immediate decision"; and on the 8th of November he foreshadowed still further delay.

Considerable embarrassment arises from conflict of opinion. The policy of inaction which your Lordship thinks it difficult to defend in Parliament has yet received the sanction of such a number of years, and so many successive Governor-Generals, that it is not easy to say why this moment is chosen for interference.

Evidently the oppressed people of Oudh might have endured their sufferings for many years to come, if stronger counsels had not prevailed. On the 22nd of November, however, Vernon Smith was able to relieve the anxieties of the Governor-General. He wrote as follows:—

You will receive by this mail the despatch regarding Oudh which has passed the Court with tolerable unanimity. It is, as you will perceive from the style, a compromise, and one that leaves tolerable liberty of action to your Lordship. My colleagues in the Cabinet agree that it is time for action, and upon the whole think it more advisable that action should take place under a Governor-General with eight years' experience, than under one who has just landed. The public should have the advantage of the great name you have acquired in India, as a security for a proceeding which will provoke opposition. My own impression is that when interference is decided upon, the more straightforward and direct it is, the better. You may call it "concession" or administration, or by whatever name you like: it is in deed annexation.

The interval between the Government of India's letter and the Court's reply had not been wasted by Lord Dalhousie. In July he wrote to Outram, telling him that, without committing himself to any action, he meant to "set agoing the whole plan of preparation." He deputed his military secretary, Major Banks, to concert with the Resident on his behalf the measures to be taken, and sketched out in full detail his own ideas regarding the form of proclamation, the number and grade of British officials, the precautions for enforcing order and submission to authority, the demolition of forts, and the march through the country of four columns of troops with a few heavy guns and mortars. Nor did he forget the organisation of a local irregular force to absorb the Darbar's troops and to maintain order, or the provision to be made for the comfort of the ruling family. Having sketched his plan, he invited Outram to criticise any part of it, and to send him information upon a variety of matters. Above all he enjoined the greatest caution so that the object of Major Banks's deputation might not be suspected, or the intentions of the Government be guessed. Fortunately for the success of the scheme, a religious feud broke out in Oudh between the Musalmans, headed by a fanatic Maulavi, one Amir Ali, and the Hindus of the Hanuman Ghurri, not far from Faizabad. "Much blood was shed, and there seemed some risk, from the general excitement which prevailed, of a religious war being raised and spreading itself to our own dominions." The attack upon Colin Mackenzie at Hyderabad, and the murder of Conolly in Malabar, which happened about the same time, created a feeling of unrest throughout India, while the delay in the capture of Sebastopol helped to strain the nerves of the people.

The religious disturbance in Oudh accordingly gave colour to the idea that Major Banks was merely watching the progress of that event, and enabled Outram to detain British troops at Cawnpore and make other military arrangements of which the true object was not even suspected.

1856. The decision of the Court of Directors reached Lord Dalhousie at midnight on the 2nd of January, 1856; and at a time when most Governor-Generals are left free to wind up their affairs, enfeebled as he was by disease, he found himself called upon to undertake a task of extraordinary labour. The mere work of writing which devolved upon him was enormous, but the forethought and experience which he threw into his minutes and his orders were still more remarkable. If any final proof of his far-seeing powers of imagination is needed, it will be evident in the plan of administration which he drew out, and in the careful respect for the feelings of the royal family and the rights of landlords which he enjoined upon those who were to carry it out. Before, however, this part of the story is reached, the decision of the Court of Directors must be stated.

In their despatch dated the 21st of November, 1855, the Court complimented the Governor-General upon his full and faithful summary of the facts, and observed that the doubt raised by them "is not whether it is now incumbent on us to free ourselves from the responsibility of upholding such a Government, but whether we have been excusable in not fulfilling that duty at an earlier period." After reviewing the arguments adduced by the members of Council against giving to the King of Oudh an option of refusing to consent to a new treaty, they proceeded as follows:—

The plan of the Governor-General includes the King himself as a consenting party to the measure; and inasmuch as it is intended to show more tenderness to the feelings of a family who, whatever may have been their offences towards their own subjects, have not been unfaithful to the British Government, His Lordship's plan has so far an advantage.

But there were, on the other hand, greater disadvantages in adopting it:—

If the King should refuse his consent to the treaty, the people of Oudh would be, at least temporarily, exposed to a state of still worse anarchy than at present, while it would be extremely difficult for us to fulfil our numerous pledges of protection to individuals and families in Oudh.

It was admitted that the Governor-General was the best judge of the position of affairs, and might have good grounds for believing that the King, when offered the choice, would prefer surrender of the administration to the certainty of revolution, but he was told that unless he was absolutely sure of this result he was not to offer that alternative to the King. In the event of his feeling any doubt on the subject, he was then directed to assume the powers necessary for the permanent establishment of good government throughout the country, all questions of detail being left to him. But if it was virtually certain that the King would accept a treaty, in that case the King and his successors were to be allowed full jurisdiction, except as regards the penalty of death, not only in the precincts of the palace at Lucknow but also within the Dilkusha and Bibiapur parks, and every endeavour was to be made to avert collisions of whatever kind, and to show proper consideration to all persons whose feelings ought to be consulted. For the rest the Court abstained from fettering his Lordship's

discretion by any detailed instructions, reposing the fullest confidence in his ability and judgment.

Lord Dalhousie responded nobly to this call upon him, and although his diary records his keen disappointment at the delay which had occurred, and at the shortness of the time left to him for carrying out so difficult a task, yet within thirteen days of his receipt of the despatch he had placed before his colleagues a draft of instructions in which they concurred. Some idea of the magnitude of his task may be formed by a bare outline of the official orders which had to be issued. In the first place it was necessary to be prepared for opposition, and instructions were sent by telegraph to assemble at Cawnpore by the 29th of January a force which should be ready for all emergencies. The new treaty was drafted, and two proclamations drawn up, one for issue if the King should sign the treaty, the other for publication if he declined to do so. A very comprehensive letter from the Governor-General to the King was prepared, in order that the policy to be followed and its justification might be conveyed to his Majesty in such unmistakable terms as only the head of the Government could use. The pith of its contents may be inferred from the following quotation :—

> For more than fifty years the British Government has faithfully performed the duties which the treaty of 1801 imposed upon it. For more than fifty years the Government of Oudh has continued to violate one of its gravest and most essential stipulations. Every effort to recall the Government of Oudh to a sense of its duty having been made in vain, the British Government has no alternative left but to declare that the violated treaty of 1801 is wholly dissolved.

The King was then solemnly warned to consider the

proposals to be made to him by Major-General Outram, and told that if he should refuse to accede to them, the inevitable consequences of his refusal would be set before him by the same agent. But the most important of all the documents prepared by the Governor-General was a letter issued on the 4th of February, 1856, to General Outram in his capacity as Chief Commissioner for the affairs of Oudh, giving him instructions, which filled 129 paragraphs, as to the principles which should regulate the new administration of the province in all its branches. This exhaustive treatise could never have been written without a long course of previous study and correspondence with Outram. The General had for months past been collecting information for the contingency which had now arrived; and when the time drew near for the receipt of the Court's despatch, he was summoned to Calcutta to confer personally with the Governor-General and his colleagues and to be made fully acquainted with their views and wishes. On the 24th of January he returned to Lucknow instructed on all points, and an account of what followed will explain the nature and the issue of the directions he had received.

Outram reached the outskirts of Lucknow on the 30th of January, 1856. There he was met as usual by the Prime Minister, Ali Nakki Khan Bahadur, to whom he communicated the grave reasons which had detained him in Calcutta, together with the general purport of the orders he had received. At the same time he intimated that a strong brigade of British troops had been directed to cross the Ganges and to march on the capital. On the following day a further conference took place between the two, and copies of the proclamation and of the treaty were given to the Minister with

the request that he would ascertain when his Majesty could arrange for an interview. On the 1st of February the King replied, evading this request, justifying his past conduct, and appealing to the Resident to intercede for him. Outram again pressed for an interview, and at the same time General Wheeler reported that the leading column of British troops had arrived within twenty-five miles of Lucknow. Notwithstanding this forcible hint, the King showed no signs of meeting Outram's wishes. Meanwhile the Queen-mother had held a conference with the Resident, and the Minister had again visited him. But it was not until the 4th of February that his Majesty at last made an appointment for the desired interview. Then nothing was omitted to move the pity of the Governor-General's agent. The palace courts wore the appearance of mourning, the guns were dismounted from their carriages, and the guard of honour, being disarmed, saluted the visitor with their bare hands. The King uncovered himself and placed his turban in the hands of Outram, declaring that now he was stripped of position and honour, he was incapable of signing a treaty or entering into negotiations with the British Government. When the treaty was produced, the King received it with deep emotion, and, handing it to a confidential servant, ordered him to read it aloud. After struggling through a few sentences, the man burst into tears and gave up the attempt. Thereupon the King himself took the document, and with every expression of poignant grief made himself acquainted with its contents. It must have been a painful interview for Outram, but he was fully armed with his instructions, and brought the scene to a close by delivering his ultimatum, to the effect that unless his Majesty accepted the terms of the

treaty the Resident must assume the government of Oudh at the expiration of three days. Those terms were in accordance with the wishes expressed by the Court of Directors, who, it will be remembered, had objected to the alternative of giving the King the option of going his own way and facing the consequences of a revolution. The first article of the treaty offered to the King vested for ever in the Company the sole and exclusive civil and military government of Oudh in terms as ample as those which in the present day provide for the government of Cyprus. The next articles guaranteed the title of King for his Majesty and the heirs male of his body born in lawful wedlock, securing for them the honours due to a sovereign, and full jurisdiction, saving capital punishment, in the palace and two parks. By a further article a pension of twelve lakhs a year was reserved for the King from the revenues of Oudh, and a provision of three lakhs for the annual maintenance of the palace guards. Finally, the Company accepted responsibility for maintaining all collateral members of the royal family.

Early in the morning of the 7th of February the King finally decided that he would not sign the treaty, but would proceed with his family to Calcutta to lay his case before the Governor-General in Council, and, if he failed there, would then sail for England. Outram had now no alternative. Oudh must not merely be administered by the British, it must pass entirely under British law. He therefore published the proclamation of annexation with which he had been furnished, reassured the troops as to the payment of their arrears, took charge of the arsenals and public offices, and handed over the keeping of the city to Major Banks.

He then sent Colonel Goldney to Faizabad, Mr. Christian to Khairabad, and Mr. Wingfield to Baraitch, to assume jurisdiction in the divisions assigned to them with the support of the troops detailed for the purpose.

The plan of administering the new province of British India was based, as might have been expected, upon that which Lord Dalhousie had introduced into the Punjab. Under the Chief Commissioner there were appointed a judicial and a financial Commissioner, four Commissioners of divisions, twelve deputies, eighteen assistants, besides two military assistants, and eighteen extra assistants. As in other provinces, there was to be a separate department of public works and for the jails. The whole scheme was framed

> so as to ensure unity of control and simplicity, by uniting fiscal and judicial authority in the person of the Chief Commissioner and the district officer; to improve and consolidate the popular institutions of the country by maintaining the village coparcenaries, and adapting our proceedings to the predilections of the people and the local laws to which they were accustomed; to promote the prosperity of the country, and the welfare of the agricultural classes, by light and equable assessments for a fixed term of years; and to expedite the distribution of justice, both civil and criminal, by removing or dispensing with the many unnecessary forms and technicalities which encumber the proceedings of the judicial and magisterial officers in the North-Western Provinces, and circumscribe their power for good.

A settlement department was to be organised, the system of village settlements introduced, and the land revenue fixed for at least the next three years. Care, above all, was to be exercised in regard to claims to hold land free of rent, it being recognised that "the only just and politic course will be for the Government to show its respect for existing rights by confirming and maintaining all grants for which sufficient authority can be pro-

duced and established." As it was desirable to set the minds of the people "at rest upon a matter which most nearly concerns their personal interests," seven rules were prescribed for the early adjudication of all such claims. State pensions were to be subjected to the same scrutiny and principles, the object in all cases being "to reduce to a minimum the harassment and vexation to which the people and the village office-bearers must be in some measure subjected." The organisation of the Oudh irregular force, consisting of eight regiments of infantry which was afterwards increased to ten regiments, three of cavalry, and three horse field-batteries, would only absorb a small part of the army, and provision was to be made for any disbanded soldiers who might be inefficient or for whom suitable civil employment could not be obtained. For this purpose a scale of pensions and gratuities was sanctioned. The governing principle which must be steadily borne in mind was "the early adoption of measures to conciliate the minds of all persons, whose interests or personal consideration may be affected by the dissolution of the existing Government," and a free discretion was left to the Chief Commissioner "to give such assurances, and hold out such advantages as (without imposing undue burden on the State) will tend to reconcile the minds of influential persons in Oudh to the intended transfer of the powers of Government."

So thoroughly had the scheme of annexation been digested, and so minutely were the details laid down, that before leaving India the Governor-General was able to regard this transfer as safely accomplished. It had been effected without bloodshed or disorder, and a confident belief prevailed in the fulness and the liberality of the assurances held out to all classes. But

although Lord Dalhousie's responsibility ceased with his departure from India, it is reasonable to look forward and see how those expectations were fulfilled. The extent to which Outram's successor, Coverley Jackson, departed from the instructions laid down has always been a matter of controversy, and it is quite possible that these instructions, as in the case of the gratuities, needed some modification. But judging from his dealings with John Lawrence in the Punjab, and with Phayre in Pegu, had time been given to him to complete his work, Lord Dalhousie would have satisfied himself week by week that his orders were being obeyed, would have amended them if need were, and visiting the province would have tested by personal intercourse and inspection the progress of the moral conquest of Oudh. His readiness to accept modifying circumstances and to acknowledge omissions is shown in a letter to Vernon Smith written on the 29th of November, 1856:—

As regards the pledge to pay extended arrears to the King's troops and civil establishments, which the Chief Commissioner took upon himself to give, I think the Supreme Government were right in confirming and fulfilling the pledge. In the haste with which the whole affair was carried through, we were ourselves to blame in omitting to give the Chief Commissioner precise orders as to arrears. It is of great importance that the plighted word of a British officer should always be fulfilled if possible. And although I do not think that the payments of extended arrears was essential for the preservation of tranquillity, still there is no doubt that it must have contributed to make matters run smoothly, and the liberality was probably on the whole a wise policy. On similar grounds I should not think it objectionable that the King's stipend should now be fixed at the fifteen lakhs originally proposed. In any case, however, I think it very undesirable that the stipend, whatever its amount, should be made hereditary, as is proposed in the despatch. It is wiser and safer to leave future governments to deal with the circumstances of their own time. I entertain a

still stronger objection to the proposal that a part of the stipend should be in Jaghir.[1] If the King is to collect the revenue, it renews, in a milder form, and as far as the inhabitants of the Jaghir are concerned, the abuses inseparable from a native administration. The officers will be corrupt, the people will be bullied, there will be trouble from recourse to the courts against the King, he will before long be in debt, the Jaghir will be attacked, and the management of it resumed by the Government.

These extracts at least show that even after his retirement the Marquis of Dalhousie had clear views as to the administration of the new province, and his whole life affords a guarantee that if he had been in Calcutta instead of Edinburgh when he wrote he would have seen that Oudh was governed properly and the pledges of Government promptly redeemed. Lord Canning was new to India, unacquainted with the character of his subordinates, and hardly able to realise the inexorable need of personal supervision. When Henry Lawrence was at last appointed to replace Jackson, his first wish was that Lord Canning would himself pay a visit to Lucknow, and his mind no doubt went back to the benefits derived by himself and his colleagues from the tours of Lord Dalhousie in the Punjab. Every allowance must be made for the difficulties of the new Governor-General, but in justice to the memory of his predecessor the facts must be told.

Two charges of remissness were admitted by Lord Canning himself, and one of them was very grave. Lord Dalhousie had laid stress, in his minute dated the 13th of February, 1856, upon making a liberal allowance for the King, and for the maintenance of the families of former rulers of Oudh. The minds of influential persons in the province were, as stated in his earlier minute, to

[1] *Jaghir* means a rent-free estate.

be reconciled to the change of administration by every measure of leniency that circumstances permitted. Yet up to the beginning of March, 1857, no allowances had been paid to the King's stipendiaries, though they included several members of the royal family. "During that protracted period," wrote Lord Stanley on the 13th of October, 1858, "many influential persons must have been reduced to great pecuniary straits, with all the humiliations attendant upon such a state." Feelings were much embittered in Lucknow by this omission. Another mistake was the unauthorised occupation by Mr. Jackson of the Chutter Munzil, one of the palaces expressly set apart for the King's family. The Chief Commissioner was censured and required to quit the building, but the offence had been given. Then, again, a large number of officials were altogether excluded from pensions. It is possible that this mistake was partly due to the rules laid down by Lord Dalhousie. But the defects in those rules should have been remedied as soon as they were observed. Even when pensions were awarded, they were not paid promptly. Sixty thousand soldiers were disbanded, of whom only a small fraction were employed in the ranks of the police or the local military forces, and the allowances granted to the rest were so inadequate as to provoke disappointment and hostility to the new Government. Lord Dalhousie had ordered a brief statement of the summary settlement to be furnished, and had particularly insisted upon the exercise of moderation in fixing the demand, but it was afterwards admitted that in many of the districts such moderation had by no means been observed. In a letter to Outram, Lord Dalhousie had expressed his firm resolution to level all forts in the province. Notwithstanding this in September, 1856, there were 623

fortified places held by the great landowners and other men of influence, and of these 351 were in good repair. The garrison which it was intended to retain in Oudh was suffered to be reduced, and Lord Canning "considered a single weak regiment with one battery of artillery a sufficient force for the maintenance of tranquillity in Oudh." As to a general disarmament, believing that the great mass of the people were grateful for their liberation of misrule, he decided on the 17th of September, 1856, to abandon this precaution. No doubt there was much excuse for the false security into which the Government was lulled, and Lord Dalhousie's correspondence with Outram shows that even his mind was not finally made up as to the necessity of a complete disarmament. But there is no injustice to Lord Canning in asserting the view that upon this and other points Lord Dalhousie would have satisfied himself by conference with the local officers and by forming his own opinion on the spot.

What, however, he would have done is of little moment. What he did do has been related in this chapter, and it must be allowed on all hands, that throughout a business of a painful and difficult nature he acted with great moderation. The wrongs of a down-trodden people cried aloud for redress, and had so cried for a long period of time. Almost every iniquity that a ruler could commit was proved up to the hilt against a King whom no considerations of justice or mercy could touch, whose good faith was shown by a steady disregard of all treaty obligations, who in the dissolute infamy of his private life outdistanced even those from whom he was descended. Advice had been proffered to him by the paramount power with a patience of neglect that was almost

fortified places held by the great landowners and other men of influence, and of these 351 were in good repair. The garrison which it was intended to retain in Oudh was suffered to be reduced, and Lord Canning "considered a single weak regiment with one battery of artillery a sufficient force for the maintenance of tranquillity in Oudh." As to a general disarmament, believing that the great mass of the people were grateful for their liberation of misrule, he decided on the 17th of September, 1856, to abandon this precaution. No doubt there was much excuse for the false security into which the Government was lulled, and Lord Dalhousie's correspondence with Outram shows that even his mind was not finally made up as to the necessity of a complete disarmament. But there is no injustice to Lord Canning in asserting the view that upon this and other points Lord Dalhousie would have satisfied himself by conference with the local officers and by forming his own opinion on the spot.

What, however, he would have done is of little moment. What he did do has been related in this chapter, and it must be allowed on all hands, that throughout a business of a painful and difficult nature he acted with great moderation. The wrongs of a down-trodden people cried aloud for redress, and had so cried for a long period of time. Almost every iniquity that a ruler could commit was proved up to the hilt against a King whom no considerations of justice or mercy could touch, whose good faith was shown by a steady disregard of all treaty obligations, who in the dissolute infamy of his private life outdistanced even those from whom he was descended. Advice had been proffered to him by the paramount power with a patience of neglect that was almost

culpable. Stern warnings were flouted with open contempt, or under the hypocritical guise of obedience were treacherously evaded. Yet Lord Dalhousie still held his hand. Hampered by the treaty of 1801, he sought to devise some means of extricating the province from the slough of despair into which it was fast sinking, and, hoping against hope, gave the King further opportunity for amending his ways. His colleagues were unanimous for drastic measures. The authorities at home had been driven to see that annexation of the province was only a question of time. They had even acknowledged their shortcomings in having so long dallied with a duty that could not be indefinitely put aside. Of the measures possible Lord Dalhousie was in favour of the least rigorous, and this he would temper with all personal consideration for the culprit to be brought to justice. In lieu of annexation he desired to treat Oudh as the Berars have now been treated for more than half a century, namely, as a province outside British India, although administered in the name of the Native ruler by British officers. Adhering to the spirit of the Company's treaties, he sought the co-operation of His Majesty in bringing tranquillity and justice to his subjects, and only when the King refused to transfer the administration, did he carry out the wishes of the Court in favour of annexation. When he annexed, he adopted every precaution to conciliate the people, and so far as it was possible sought to spare the feelings of the royal family. Such mistakes as occurred in the execution of his intentions were due to causes for which no responsibility can attach to his name, and to accidents which would never have occurred if the Government at home had had the wisdom to act more

promptly. The gain of a few months would not have given time for the new province to settle down to the same state of contentment as had followed upon the annexation of Burma and Pegu, but it would have enabled Lord Dalhousie to supplement his instructions where necessary, to visit Oudh after the transfer of its administration, and by insisting upon the observance of the principles laid down by him, to prevent those mistakes of which Lord Stanley was unable to acquit the Government of India.

CHAPTER X

THE MUTINY

Errors imputed to Lord Dalhousie as causing the mutiny—Material collected by him for his justification—Grounds for holding that Sir Charles Napier did not foresee the mutiny—Evidence that Lord Dalhousie appreciated the dangers surrounding him—Making no profession of having foreseen it, he claimed to have taken measures to meet such a danger—The causes of the mutiny—Views of Marquis de la Mazelière—Views of Sir James Outram—Opinion of Sheikh Hedayut Ali—The mutiny regarded as the inevitable conflict between two civilisations—The influence of public works in producing it—The influence of education and of legislation—These causes of aggravation were not without their advantages—Lord Dalhousie's foreign policy a source of strength—Effect of his annexations considered—Outram's opinion regarding Oudh—The true facts of the case—The occasions of the mutiny considered—The general enlistment order of the 25th of July, 1856, approved by Lord Dalhousie, and a necessary measure—The Persian war and its consequences—The greased cartridges and the mistakes made—Summary of the position and the part played by Lord Dalhousie.

When a builder has certified that his foundations are well laid, and his edifice completed according to the plans prepared, and when not long afterwards a storm beats upon his work and the building collapses, he must expect and should even court inquiry. Lord Dalhousie in laying down his office, expressed on the 28th February, 1856, the trust that he was "guilty of no presumption in saying that I shall leave the

Indian empire in peace without and within." When therefore in the course of the following year an explosion of fanatical feeling drove the native army of Bengal into mutiny, and left a large portion of British India a prey to violence and lawlessness, it was natural that the late Governor-General should be called up to the bar of public opinion to give an account of his stewardship. His enforced silence gave to his critics the opportunity of condemning his administration as the cause and not merely the occasion of that catastrophe. Many of the harsh and indiscriminate opinions expressed in 1857 have been refuted by time, and the enlightened view of a recent French author revises them by the clearer light of philosophic inquiry and modern knowledge. The Marquis de la Mazelière, in the second volume of his essay on *L'Évolution de la Civilisation Indienne*, writes as follows :—

> La politique de conquête et de développement économique inaugurée par Lord Dalhousie précipita seulement un conflit rendu nécessaire par l'opposition de deux civilisations; peut-être contribua-t-elle aussi à l'aggraver, mais ce fut à l'avantage de l'Inde et de l'Angleterre. Sans cette lutte sanglante, les deux pays eussent continué de se combattre sourdement sans jamais comprendre leurs griefs réciproques. L'insurrection de 1857 découvrit à l'Angleterre les fautes qu'elle avait commises, à l'Inde l'inutilité de sa résistance.

This view discards the graver charges which were brought against Lord Dalhousie in the last century, some of which, however, still find a place in our own British histories. It is well therefore to mention the chief counts of the indictment. It has been alleged that the Governor-General who left India in 1856 "tranquil within and without," shut his eyes for eight years, and was indeed incapable of seeing the natural

result of his own "unsympathetic administration"; that he turned a deaf ear to the warnings given by Sir Charles Napier, and obstinately reposed "implicit trust" in the native army. His annexations, we are still told, alarmed every native sovereign for his own safety, and converted the feudatory princes into "secret foes." A widespread feeling of anxiety took hold of the people, who in the feverish haste with which Western ideas were embodied in the laws of the East, and translated into facts in the departments of education, the public works, and the civil administration of India, saw their cherished faiths menaced, and their social customs destroyed. The hand of reform, it is said, moved too rapidly, and a "want of imagination" obscured the political insight of the reformer. In short, the Governor-General failed to enter into the conservative spirit of the East, and recklessly drove the ship of state upon rocks which, with a proper lookout, he might have seen. The Marquis of Dalhousie lived long enough to read these criticisms, and his own sound judgment led him to expect them. What was his defence, and how did he answer his detractors? Unfortunately his physical sufferings imposed upon him the cruel ban of silence; for, although he had imposed silence upon his friends, and trusted to time for a vindication of his policy against the hasty criticisms in the press to which the excitement of the hour gave birth and acceptance, yet statements were made in Parliament to which he would certainly have replied from his proper place in the House of Peers. But the opportunity of so doing was denied to him. Before the outbreak occurred, he had written to his cousin Lord Panmure on the 6th of March, 1857, "as for myself the shelf on which I am laid gives me no

concern. For the present and probably for a long time to come, the state of my head and my frame renders action in public life a physical impossibility to me." When the catastrophe arrived, and the tongues of detractors were let loose, he viewed his own disabilities with concern indeed, but with resignation. Writing from Malta to the same correspondent he expressed himself in these terms on the 2nd of February, 1858—

> The spring, I hope, may do something for me; but I fear I should delude myself if I were to believe that there is any chance of my being less helpless the next summer than I was last. With reference to Indian affairs, it is of course a serious misfortune to myself personally that I shall be thus dumb; but it is a misfortune which is without a remedy, and which therefore I must set myself to bear like a man. On public grounds, apart from self, I should be glad to be able to lend my little aid to the solution of the great questions that have yet to be settled. I deeply lament to read what you say, that the Indian question is rapidly becoming a party one. . . . You do me justice in believing that, if I had a voice, I should give it under no other guidance than that of my own free opinion. I have no party. I stand alone, and should give effect to my own opinions by my vote without the smallest reference to company, ministry, or party. But what is the use of my talking of what I would do? I am a mummy, and can do nothing.

But while he was dumb before his critics, he was sustained by one sure confidence. Although he could not move without crutches, and was often rendered speechless by a painful affection of the throat, still his works would follow him even when the grave had closed over his mortal remains. One day his countrymen would know by experience whether the foundations of his Indian administration were laid upon the sand, and of what kind of material its walls were built. That was his sustaining hope as one surgical operation

succeeded another, and each change of treatment or climate ended invariably in the same disappointment. In the intervals of these trials he recorded notes upon various points of the indictment made against him, and arranged the material available to him for his defence. It is possible that in corresponding with his friends he committed his conclusions to paper, but no trace of this is to be found in his papers. It is clear that after the close of 1856 he ceased to keep copies of his private letters; and in many of those, which have been placed at my disposal by his friends and relatives, Lord Dalhousie regrets his inability to write without great difficulty, a fact to which his handwriting bears ample testimony. On the other hand, the range of his study and the general outline of his defence are clearly defined by the memoranda and papers which have just been mentioned, and of which the following may serve as a specimen :—

Memorandum for Colonel Ramsay—

The records which I am anxious to have examined at the India House are those of the military department during the period of Sir Charles Napier's command—from May, 1849, to the end of 1850. The chief object of this examination is to draw forth any representations which may have been made to the Government by Sir Charles Napier regarding the fidelity of the Bengal army, its constitution and system, as well as any proposals which he may have made for its improvement, in respect of recruiting, clothing, pay, barracks, or any other circumstance. Particular attention should be given to his recommendations regarding magazines, which I think were sent in during the first half of 1850.

The course of his reading is also illustrated by notes or extracts copied from the *Life of Clive* and the biographies of other officials, as well as by public documents taken from the archives of the secretariat. Full use will be made of this material in the task which

is now to be undertaken of fixing the measure of the responsibility of Lord Dalhousie for the events of the mutiny; and it is convenient, at the outset, to test the correctness of the general belief that the Indian authorities failed to discern the signs of the times, and deliberately ignored the advice and warning of Sir Charles Napier.

The first count of the indictment brought against the late Governor-General was a lack of foresight or power of anticipating an event which assuredly took him by surprise. Lord Dalhousie's own reply to this charge is very fully indicated by the material which he had prepared in the manner already stated. It is clear that in his opinion Napier had not predicted any danger from the native army, that the whole course of history proved the impossibility of foreseeing such explosions, and that up to March, 1856, when the Sepoys had not been alarmed by the general service order or supplied with the greased cartridges, there was no thought or design of a general mutiny for any one to detect. At the same time, he proved by his own minutes and public acts that he was not insensible to the scattered warnings which he had received as to the prejudices and temper of the Sepoy, that he was keenly alive to the "dangers of peace," and was justified in thinking that prudence and resolution would meet *all* dangers, while the adoption of his military proposals for increasing the European army would have rendered a rebellion of the Native army impossible. Such was the outline of his defence against the charges of "blind confidence in the Sepoy," "want of imagination," and "absence of foresight" recklessly flung against him on the outbreak of the mutiny. The details of his argument may now be examined.

The friends of Napier claimed for that distinguished soldier credit for having mistrusted the Sepoy and foreseen the mutiny. In no vindictive mood Lord Dalhousie proved that his colleague had not only not realised such a contingency, but had even added to the insolence of the Prætorian Guards by his extravagant eulogy of them. There are to be found in his own handwriting numerous extracts from the general orders issued by Napier as Major-General-Governor of Sind, and from speeches delivered by him as Commander-in-Chief of India. The tone of the former is reflected by one dated the 26th of May, 1845, which ran as follows: "Sir Charles Napier well knows that the Sepoys are orderly, good soldiers; there are no better in the world, and when they understand what is proper they do it." It is true that now and then the Major-General-Governor published the fact that "he is sorry to see such an exhibition of indiscipline as he now witnesses," or his pleasure at finding "that the 64th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry has shown repentance for its late misconduct"; but the prevailing note of his general orders is struck in the public announcement made on the 14th of March, 1844, that ' the Sepoys are brave and obedient soldiers." Turning, then, to the speeches made by Sir Charles as Commander-in-Chief, Lord Dalhousie extracted from *The Englishman and Military Chronicle* of the 19th and 21st of May, 1849, a report of a speech delivered by the Commander-in-Chief, which contained this pronouncement—

I will endeavour to do justice to all, and will maintain that discipline of the army of India which, aided by the gallantry of the soldiers, will ever lead us from victory to victory, and prove that those glorious Sepoys, who have often fought side by side

with their European officers, striving with them even unto death, are invincible. I feel proud whenever I see the Native soldier bearing the same medals on his breast which I wear, though his are perhaps better deserved; and I feel a double pleasure in the knowledge that such decorations excite the emulation and raise the confidence of the Sepoy.

This language might be pardoned in an after-dinner speech; but even stronger praise was awarded, when in December, 1849, Napier presented new colours at Delhi to the 41st Regiment, the Doobye-kee-daheena Paltan. In that address he introduced this general compliment to the Native army: "I have long considered the British Sepoy as the best soldier in the world, except the British—brave, sober, and obedient." Finally Lord Dalhousie added to his collection of the views expressed by Sir Charles this extract from a "letter on the defence of England by corps of volunteers and militia," which is here transcribed as copied by him—

As the number of our regular troops is small, you should recollect that from India you could recall your 30,000 old soldiers at once, and let the East India Company raise European troops for itself. It has already six European battalions of its own, which are as good as ours.

In the face of these eulogies on the Sepoy, and of the suggestion for withdrawing the Queen's regiments from India, it seems unreasonable to charge Lord Dalhousie with inattention to the warnings of Sir Charles Napier. There is no doubt that in the course of his controversy with the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief scented rebellion in all the four quarters of India, but he injudiciously laid his finger upon the wrong spot as the seat of the grave peril. It was the Civil Government, and principally the Lawrences, the men who saved India in 1857, and

not the "glorious Sepoy" whom Napier indicated as the source of mischief. When the danger was passed, John Lawrence wrote: "A sense of power, defective discipline, and want of sufficient employment, ruined the Bengal army." If history is right in endorsing that view, surely the Commander-in-Chief, and not the Governor-General, must bear the blame of using language which inflated the pride and insolence of the Sepoy, and thus contributed to the rebellion.

Lord Dalhousie, however, did not shelter himself behind any of his colleagues. He had ample means of forming an opinion of his own regarding the temper of the army and the dangers of peace. His minutes and his public actions were the best refutation of the charge that he had reposed implicit confidence in the Sepoys' loyalty. When the 38th Regiment N.I., bearing the proud title of the Bengal Volunteers, refused to proceed to Burma by sea while professing their desire to march to Arakan, the Governor-General wrote in 1852[1] that "they were full of suspicions and open to the evil influences of misunderstandings and misrepresentations." The behaviour of the 8th Irregular Cavalry, who had volunteered in 1853 for two years' service in Burma, and in 1855 refused to remain there unless they were ordered to do so, called forth a minute expressing his dissatisfaction and the remark that the reports were "sufficiently significant." Lord Dalhousie hoped to provide a remedy for such symptoms of unsoldierly conduct by increasing his European forces and diminishing the Native army, but the obstinate blindness and the false economy of the home authorities frustrated his design. From the very commencement of his Indian administration he had taken to

[1] See vol. i. chap. xii. p. 426.

heart the advice proffered by Colonel Sutherland in a letter addressed by that officer, then serving as Governor-General's agent in Rajputana, to the Government of the North-Western Provinces. This letter, dated the 10th of February, 1848, had so impressed Lord Dalhousie that he had a copy of it made for his own personal use; and when the newspaper controversy arose on the subject of his responsibility for the mutiny, he took the document out from its place in his collection of official papers and put it with the material that he was arranging for his own vindication should he have the strength and opportunity of defending himself. The reader of the extract given below will at once see in its terms an explanation of the activity which the Governor-General displayed in his policy of consolidation and the development of public works. It is unreasonable to impute to him blindness and want of foresight, when the danger was thus written in large letters for his instruction, when he kept the document by his side, and faithfully carried out the very policy of precaution and remedy suggested by it. Colonel Sutherland summarised the signs of disquiet on every side, and then proceeded—

There is much, I think, in these trifling incidents which may lead us to deep reflection on our future prospects and position in India. We have now reached the time when there is likely to be an end of war and conquest, and we must all have long observed that the time of great military enterprise, when our armies are in the field, has been that of general peace. Witness the general peace which prevailed during the Maratha war of 1817-18, and that which followed the termination of the war. The period of our Afghan, Sind, and Gwalior campaigns was, too, a period of general peace in other parts of India. . . . The British Government is now, however, entering in India on a new and untried career, that of peace and internal improvement, and the transition

will require to be narrowly watched by both our civil and military authorities. Brief periods of peace have hitherto been those in which little disturbances have most prevailed, the Kol insurrection in Chota Nagpur, that of the Maulvis in Baraset in 1832-33, the disturbances in Berar and Karnul, and the late disturbance, in 1844, at Kolhapur. I do not remember any of these petty disturbances in periods of war. Few conquerors have been able to stand still in their career of conquest, or to rest in safety in time of peace. It may be hoped that a long period of peace, during which the fidelity and discipline of our army may be maintained at their war standard, will also so improve our resources, and enable the Government to devote its attention to works of utility, the construction of canals and reservoirs for irrigation, the improvement of our roads and lines of communication, and the education of the people, together with their employment more extensively in the civil administration, that thus their attention will be turned to these good works, their interests and sympathy identified with those of their rulers, and our power as rulers become gradually consolidated over them. . . . The attention and thoughts of the great body of the people will be turned to our operations. If these operations are conducted with moderation and justice, confidence and respect will be gained, and their admiration of our proceedings will be sure to attend on us.

It must not, however, be supposed that Lord Dalhousie, while he clearly realised the signs and causes of disquietude, had any conception of the imminence of the mutiny which neither John Lawrence nor any one else anticipated. He was well aware of the dangers of a foreign rule, of the excessive proportion of Native troops, and of the strain upon their fidelity which peaceful times must impose. He felt the influence of the Crimean war, and he cried in season and out of season, "India is tranquil, but only while we are strong." But for all that the day of trial came upon him unawares, and his papers show that he fully admitted this. For he made copious references to the history of Europe, as well as that of India, to prove that

revolt ever advances with muffled tread, and that the most sagacious statesman rarely catches the sound of its advance. He cited the instance of the desertion of a battalion of Sepoys from Munro's force at Patna in 1764, when the twenty-four ringleaders were executed, and four of them were so far from showing any penitence that they proudly insisted upon their right to be executed first, as they had always been foremost in the hour of danger. Lord Clive was equally taken by surprise when, two years later, two hundred European officers of the Company's army threw up their commissions. When Lord Bridport signalled to his fleet at Spithead on the 15th of April, 1797, to prepare for sea, the example of insubordination set by the men on the *Royal George* spread through the fleet to the utter amazement of the officers of every ship. Yet strong hints of disaffection had been received at the Admiralty and by Lord Howe himself. Warnings of a vague character will always precede such outbreaks, and critics wise after the event will give them more than their due value. But history is lenient to the memory of statesmen who knowing the dangers that surround them put a bold front upon a situation from which they cannot escape, and do their best to prepare for all eventualities. Lord Dalhousie, if he failed with others to realise the imminence and extent of the mutiny, was neither blind to the dangers of British rule in India, nor inactive in preparing to meet them. That he did all that was possible to avert the catastrophe, and to strengthen the hands of his successor in suppressing a rebellion, which he viewed as a possible contingency, is the main point of his defence. This line of argument cannot be pursued without a clear understanding as to the causes and the occasions of the mutiny. There must be a starting-point for every

controversy, and for that under present consideration it is essential to determine whether the mutiny was a natural consequence of British rule before one can measure the responsibility of a single Governor-General for its occurrence. The expert opinions which are now to be laid before the reader will perhaps assist him in forming a judgment upon this preliminary issue.

The first authority to be cited is the Marquis de la Mazelière, of whom mention has already been made.

> "L'influence de l'Europe," he writes, "troublait la société Indienne; le trouble fut aggravé par les réformes des libéraux, par l'accueil favorable que ces réformes trouvèrent auprès de certains hindous. Diffusion de l'instruction, grands travaux publics, extension du commerce avec l'Europe, tel était le programme du gouvernement . . . c'était la famille brisée, la caste brisée, et la religion était même directement menacée . . . avec la violence de leur imagination, les indiens se figurèrent un vaste complot: places du gouvernement, emplois chez des Européens, chemins de fer, bateaux, jusqu'à ces produits d'Europe fabriqués avec des matières impures, autant de pièges tendus à leur bonne foi, autant de moyens de leur faire perdre leur religion et leur caste." [1]

The writer traces in detail the political and economic, as well as the moral, causes of the outbreak. The ruling chiefs and the Indian nobility had their particular grievances, while the native industries which had suffered during the anarchy that followed the death of Aurangzeb disappeared on the first contact with the markets of the west. The native army had been spoilt by the privileges granted to it, and by an exaggerated sense of its own power. It outnumbered, according to the figures given by the French author, the European forces by 233,000 Sepoys, as against 45,322 [2] British troops, and it was

[1] *Essai sur l'évolution de la civilisation Indienne*, tome ii. p. 92 (Plon-Nourrit et Cie), 1903.

[2] Owing to the Persian war and other causes the disproportion of British troops in India in May, 1857, was greater than that shown above. The official

recruited from a narrow stratum of society and one most prone to feel the universal spirit of anxiety. In the opinion of the French author the conflict between the two civilisations was inevitable, and such too was the deliberate verdict of John Lawrence, whose opinion was thus bluntly expressed, in his Secretary's letter, No. 50, dated the 29th of April, 1858, "a struggle between Christianity and civilisation on the one side, and barbarism and heathenism on the other," originating, however, "in the army itself, not attributable to any external or any antecedent conspiracy whatever, although it was afterwards taken advantage of by disaffected persons to compass their own ends, and its proximate cause was the cartridge affair, and nothing else."

Sir James Outram's views, which may next be stated, are set forth in a letter, dated Lucknow, the 27th of March, 1858, preserved by Lord Dalhousie. Sir James attributed the outbreak to "something deeper than the Prætorian constitution and spirit of our native army." He regarded it as the result of a Mahomedan conspiracy engineered by appeals to the childish and credulous minds of the Hindus.

The abolition of suttee, the abolition of infanticide, the introduction of vaccination, the law to legalise the remarriage of Hindu widows, the promulgation through our colleges of the facts of astronomy, geology, etc., so opposed to the priestly cosmogonies of the country, the dissections practised in our medical schools, the attempts to establish female seminaries, and to elevate the moral and social position of the female sex, with many other of our efforts to do good were pressed upon the attention of the army and the masses as so many deliberate assaults on the outworks

returns of the strength of the army showed 27,350 Queen's troops, 14,860 Company's European troops, and 243,880 native regular troops, in addition to 31,522 irregulars and 24,435 military police.

both of Mahomedanism and of Hinduism. And the simple, superstitious, credulous Sepoys were told that the time was rapidly approaching when the grand coup was to be struck—when by some piece of Jadu (magic) the accursed Christians, whose sorceries enabled them to communicate in a few minutes between Lahore and Calcutta, through the medium of a mysterious wire, would at once uncaste the whole Hindu population and outrage all their holiest traditions and feelings.

These efforts to prepare the way for a military mutiny and a popular insurrection were much aided by the unsettled state of the public mind, which had been for some time looking forward with vague expectancy to some commotion in which a Saviour, or *Avatar*, would appear.

Such I believe to have been the elements of the storm, and I cannot but regard the greased cartridges as the means through which Providence was pleased to baffle the conspiracy. They precipitated the mutiny before it had been thoroughly organised, and before adequate arrangements had been made for making the mutiny a first step in a popular insurrection. We hear much of the annexation policy of Lord Dalhousie, and more especially of the annexation of Oudh having caused the mutiny. To my apprehension all the facts of the case are utterly opposed to such an hypothesis.

Such was the explanation of the mutiny given by a British officer with a deep insight into native character, who deservedly won for himself the title inscribed upon his grave in Westminster Abbey, the "Bayard of India."

We may now pass on to the explanation suggested in a printed paper sent to Lord Dalhousie from India by a loyal native officer named Sheikh Hedayut Ali, who gave this summary of his qualifications for expressing an opinion—

I consider that I ought to know the feelings of the late Native army. In 1763 my grandfather was in the service of the British, and in due course became and died a Subadar. My father was born in the army, and accompanied it everywhere until he became a man. He entered the service in 1801, and died a Subadar in

1853. I was accustomed to hear of former times from his own life. From the time of my birth I accompanied my father wherever his regiment went, and in his regiment I was enlisted. I rose to be Havildar Major, and then, through the interest of Captain Rattray, had the good fortune to get transferred to the Bengal police battalion, where I have risen to the rank of Subadar and Sardar Bahadur. For these reasons all the doings and customs of the army are well known to me. My home has ever been with my regiment, and I have never known any other, and I look upon the Sarkar Company as my guardian.

The story told by this native officer was as follows:—He traced the causes of the mutiny back to 1838, when the army from Hindustan crossed the Indus to engage in war with the Afghans. In the cold climate of Afghanistan the Hindus could not bathe as enjoined by their religions, and they had to take their food from the hands of Mahomedans. The posteens or sheepskin jackets given to them to wear proved to be a further source of defilement. Those of them, especially in the 27th and the 54th Native Infantry regiments, who were wounded and taken prisoners were forcibly converted by their captors. The Mahomedan troops were equally disgusted at having to fight against men of their own faith. This feeling led to several acts of mutiny, of which the Subadar gave specific instances. The next cause of irritation was produced by the withdrawal of the Sind allowances from the army serving in the Punjab after its annexation. The authorities disbanded the 66th Regiment at Amritsar, but "the 32nd and 22nd N.I. also showed symptoms of mutiny, and they were hushed up. Many commanding officers to my knowledge reported their regiments all right when they knew that there was discontent and bad feeling in their ranks."

The army was not the only body of men who had

grievances. The upper classes of native society were shocked by measures which offended their prejudices. The hospital built in 1849 at Saharanpur for the sick of all creeds gave dire offence, because the authorities used pressure to induce the people to attend it. The jail regulations, which provided for the diet of Hindus in messes, destroyed caste, and created the impression that Government meant to destroy it. Disturbances broke out in consequence in Gaya, Arrah, and Benares, and their forcible suppression did not allay the public alarm. The preachings and doctrines of Christian missionaries were believed to be inspired by Government, and their condemnation of circumcision and of early marriages was bitterly resented. The annexation of Oudh was regarded as a breach of faith with the King, and as His Majesty passed through Cawnpore in March, 1856, the minister of the Nana Sahib brought messages of his sympathy to the King and his Sardars. Then it was that larger plans of a rebellion were formed, and the arrival of the King in Calcutta brought matters to a head near Barrackpore. "I have no hesitation in asserting that the rebellion first commenced in Calcutta, when the King of Oudh was either a prisoner or under surveillance." Even the Sikhs who had been enlisted in the regiments had their grievance, for they were ordered to cut off their beards, and when the Commander-in-Chief refused to alter his order, many of them took their discharge. Although the order was rescinded, and a few of them re-enlisted, they had lost some years of service, and felt that they had been disgraced. Then followed in rapid succession two events which, in the midst of so much discontent, seemed to be intolerable aggravations of the soldier's position—

In September, 1856, a general order was issued to the effect that all recruits hereafter enlisted must swear that they would go wherever their services were required. When the old Sepoys heard of this order, they were much frightened and displeased; they said: "Up to this day those men who went to Afghanistan have not been re-admitted to caste; how are we to know where the English may not force us to go? they will order us next to London." As I have said, any new order issued by Government is looked upon with much suspicion by the Native army, and is much canvassed in every regiment.

Finally, when the new rifle was introduced,

A kalasi from Fort William went to the Sepoys on duty in the Fort, and told them that the cartridges of the new rifles were made up with the fat of cows and pigs, and that if they bit these cartridges they would lose caste.

Letters were sent out from Dum Dum to inform all the other regiments, and

the whole army were induced to believe that the time was come when the Government intended to force them all to Christianity. All this was told me by the regiments at Dinapore. From this the Government will perceive that for the last sixteen years the Sepoys have been becoming more and more mutinous. The different orders, as above described,

(i) The messing together in jails,
(ii) The remarks and proclamation of missionaries,
(iii) The annexation of Oudh,
(iv) The swearing-in of recruits to go wherever ordered,
(v) The arrival of the new rifle,

set the whole country and army mad. The Chieftains and Sardars kept constantly telling the Sepoys that it was better to die than to give up their religion. . . . I really believe that had inferior castes only been entertained, as in the Bombay army, the rebellion never would have reached the height it has done.

As to why the officers did not realise the feelings and intentions of the Sepoy, the Sheikh attributed it to the improvement in the morals of English society, since

officers no longer formed those alliances which, if the were discreditable in a moral sense, at least brough them into intimate relations with native society.

It is unnecessary to examine in detail the proclama tions issued by the rebels themselves, of which man are to be found in the records of the Indian Govern ments. When they enter into the particulars of thei vague charge that their religion and their caste are i danger, they uniformly denounce the system of publi instruction, the liberty of re-marriage accorded by law to widows, the magic practised in hospitals, and th annexation of the Native States. But through them all there runs the thread of an inveterate antagonism between eastern and western civilisation, and th conviction that their institutions of caste and religio must inevitably be destroyed by the influences o British administration. That conviction was the caus of the mutiny, and it produced the idea which took possession of the people needing only a suitable occasio to burst out into the frenzy of revolution.

The occasion was soon supplied by three events which followed each other in rapid succession after th retirement of Lord Dalhousie. The general service orde was issued on the 25th of July, 1856, war with Persia wa declared on the 1st of November of the same year, and on the 23rd of January, 1857, the "unpleasant feeling" as to the greased cartridges was reported to the Government of India. These three events gave occasion to the adversaries of western civilisation, and caused the final explosion of feeling that is known as the Indian mutiny. The responsibility of Lord Dalhousie for any of these contributing causes will be examined hereafter, and for the present the inquiry will be confined to his share in promoting the main antagonism between Indian and

European ideas of civilisation which, it has been shown, was the leading cause of the Indian mutiny. It will be urged in his defence that he was under no delusion as to the effect of his administration in the departments of public works, education, and legislation; that he fearlessly and judiciously performed his duty, and that the general result of his policy, including his annexations, was to strengthen the hands of his successor for a contest which could not be avoided. He would have done still more if his military proposals had not been shelved by his successor or rejected by the home authorities.

Moral victories inflict as sharp a sting upon public feeling as military conquests, and their wounds are more felt than those of war, because all classes of society are touched, and their sufferings are more prolonged. Sir Charles Wood and Lord Dalhousie between them, in carrying out their noble schemes in the field of public works, appeared to the orthodox Hindu as turning the world upside down. The spirit of the East has not entered into the minds of Europeans if they lightly regard the alarm and failings of heart with which the introduction of canals, bridges, railways, and telegraphs was received by native society in the middle of the last century. The Governor-General was fully aware of the price which he would have to pay for consolidating the Indian empire, and giving to the country the first-fruits of European science. When he visited the Ganges canal in December, 1851, he recorded in his diary "the great alarm felt lest the project should interfere with the interests or affect the religious prejudices of the Brahmans and their votaries at Hurdwar." Every effort was made to avoid giving any unnecessary offence, as he proceeds to show—

Accordingly the water is not drawn from the stream until it has passed for some distance beyond the Ghat at which votaries bathe, and even beyond the limits of the town. The old Brahmans, however, still affected to make a grievance, and declared that Ganga would never go into the canal, whatever the Sahibs might do to induce her. When Colonel Cautley returned from England in 1848, one of the old priests, whom he had known before, took him to the Ghat to show him that their predictions had been already fulfilled, and to point out to him in triumph that Ganga had in manifest disgust moved still farther over to the other side than she had been when he left India some years before.

Yet the goddess Ganga who descended from heaven to earth, whose waters are consecrated and used in all parts of India for religious or medicinal purposes, towards whose stream Hindus look every morning and evening to remove their sins, and by whose banks they seek to die or at least to be cremated, gave the lie to the teachings of the priests and yielded herself obedient to the science of the west. The British engineers furnished to every eye object-lessons of their invincible powers over celestial and terrestrial deities in each province of India. On the 19th of April, 1850, Lord Dalhousie recorded in his diary his conversation with a high native official, who told him that the river which he had just crossed on his way to Allahabad was under the special patronage of the evil one, and that no Hindu would allow himself to be touched by its waters for fear of frightful consequences. Yet the British built a bridge over it, and the workmen engaged in its construction constantly stood in its waters and went unharmed. These superstitions have not yet died out. In 1902 when the Mysore Government were utilising the falls of the Kaveri for electrical purposes, Captain de Lotbinière reported that for a time he could get no labourers since they were scared by fear of divine wrath,

and when an outbreak of cholera occurred the priests carried conviction to their minds and for a time stopped the progress of the works. Lord Dalhousie was the acknowledged pioneer of canals, railways, and telegraphs, and in the middle of the nineteenth century his achievements in these departments created a ferment in the public mind which of itself does much to explain the violence of the mutiny. The transmission of human messages by wire appeared to the Indian a "bit of legerdemain," as John Lawrence called it, or *Jadu* (sorcery), as the natives expressed it with bated breath. Railways were a double source of alarm. There was not only magic in their construction and working, there was the inevitable risk of defilement in the occupation of a seat probably vacated by a man of low caste.

The question whether Lord Dalhousie could have averted the mutiny thus resolves itself into the inquiry whether he could have satisfied his own conscience, and his duty to his employers and to the best interests of India, by staying his hand. The programme which he set before himself at the outset of his administration was the development of the material and moral progress of India and those who blame him for precipitating or aggravating the rebellion of 1857 are finding fault with the mission entrusted to him. As agent of a civilising government he could not, without breach of trust and disloyalty, refuse to go forward. If any fault attached to him, it must be shared by Sir Charles Wood who is rightly regarded as a statesman entitled to the lasting gratitude of India.

The department of public works was not the only sphere in which the leader of western civilisation was active. The celebrated despatch on education, issued in 1854, declared without reserve its confidence in "the

acquisition by the higher classes of a liberal European education, the effects of which may be expected slowly to pervade the rest of their fellow-countrymen, and to raise, in the end, the educational tone of the whole country." It directed attention "to a consideration, if possible, still more important, and one which has been hitherto, we are bound to admit, too much neglected, namely, how useful and practical knowledge, suited to every station in life, may be best conveyed to the great mass of the people, who are utterly incapable of obtaining any education worthy of the name by their own unaided efforts." What was this but a declaration of war against the Hindu priests who suffered none but themselves to be educated, and the Mahomedans who placed religious before secular instruction? The literature of the mutiny shows that the education of girls of all classes and of boys belonging to the lower classes of Hindu society were measures bitterly resented by native society. The policy of the Court of Directors was worthy of civilisation and of the Christian rulers of India, but it only widened the breach, and increased the bitterness of the contest between the west and the east.

The course of legislation still more agitated the depths of society and gathered up the inevitable storm. In 1829 the practice of burning and burying alive Hindu widows had been declared by the Company's laws to be "revolting to the feelings of human nature," and its suppression was held to be "no departure from one of the first and most important principles of the system of the British Government in India that all classes of the people be secure in the observance of their religious usages, so long as that system can be adhered to without violation of the paramount dictates of

justice and humanity." The Hindu priests interpreted their sacred texts as not only authorising, but highly commending, the practice. Yet in despite of this feeling Lord Dalhousie had publicly proclaimed his aversion to the cruel practice of suttee, and punished the offence when committed in a native state to which the Regulation XVII. of 1829 did not apply. In the same spirit he went a step further. The Caste Disabilities Removal Act of 1850, and the Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act introduced in his time, but passed by Lord Canning in 1856, opened the old sore of 1829, and violently inflamed the hostility of the orthodox party. In vain had Mr. Peacock defended the latter measure by saying, "There is nothing in it which will compel any man to marry a widow or any widow to re-marry." The strength of the priests in forbidding children to escape from the privations and humiliation of widowhood lay in the popular belief that re-marriage was as contrary to law as it was to religious doctrine. The British law now ranged itself on the side of those who wished to have their widowed daughters re-married, and the cry went up from the orthodox party—"How long?" These remarks and illustrations may suffice to show that the conflict between the two civilisations was inevitable, and that Lord Dalhousie could not have flinched from performing his duties, although he thoroughly realised the consequences of his public works, his scheme of education, and his legislative Acts.

A necessity was laid upon him to govern according to western ideas, but it may further be argued on his behalf that the profit of his undertakings was greater than the loss. He did his duty, and his successor was rewarded in the hour of trial. Less energy in the prosecution of public works would have meant less

strength when the conflict arose. Sir Robert Montgomery is credited with the saying that "the telegraph saved us in the mutiny," but the same conviction was expressed by the Marquis of Dalhousie in his minutes when he predicted the military and administrative results that would follow from the linking of the provinces together by the electric wire. It was the completion of a section of the railway towards Allahabad that saved the Europeans shut up in that fort on the 7th of June, 1857. The men of the 6th Regiment, N.I., had vaunted their loyalty, and begged their officers to lead them against the rebels at Delhi. Within a few hours of this offer they rose in mutiny, and if Colonel Neill had not been able to push forward by railway a part of his Madras Fusiliers, Allahabad must have slipped from the feeble grasp of its rulers. Thus again were the wisdom and foresight of the Governor-General justified by the result.

It is, indeed, no longer disputed that the policy of consolidation which was the mainspring of Lord Dalhousie's administration saved British rule, but opinions differ as to the general outcome of his foreign policy. Beyond the external frontiers of the empire his achievements were certainly crowned with success. The Afghan ruler made no more incursions into the Punjab; the Khan of Kelat remained content with his treaty. The frontier tribes did not disturb the peace; nor with the exception of an affair in the Murree Hills and a disturbance in the rough country between Lahore and Multan did anything of serious importance occur within the borders of the Punjab. The Court of Ava did not attempt to recover the province of Pegu, although it had refused to surrender it by formal treaty. The strong policy which had secured these happy results

was equally rewarded in the Native states of India within the borders of the empire. The Nizam, grateful for the indulgences shown to him, remained staunch in his allegiance. The principle of non-interference so conspicuously illustrated by the revolution in Bahawalpur had removed from the minds of the Native chiefs any serious cause for alarm. In Mysore a leading statesman wrote to the Resident on the 21st of August, 1857, to expose the hollow nature of the proclamations issued by the rebels at Delhi—

> What good will their success be? If they appoint a King, he is sure to be a Mahomedan, and we already know what to expect under a Mahomedan dynasty. Tyranny, despotism, plunder, ravage, cruelty are only to be the rule. God forbid that any such results should ensue! We earnestly pray for the preservation of the British parental power in India, which has for nearly a century secured our persons and property, and given us our liberty and rights, and never interfered with our religion and customs.

If it were true that the Native princes were racked with anxiety as to the continuance of their rule, and expected that the limited doctrine of lapse would be extended so as to be made applicable to Mahomedan, Rajput, and all Hindu dynasties without exception, surely they would not have remained quiet when events at Delhi and Lucknow gave them so favourable an opportunity for shaking off the fetters of a paramount power that was alleged to be slowly eating them up.

They were, however, under no such delusion, as asserted by so many writers on Indian affairs. The annexation policy, whether carried out under the doctrine of lapse or as a consequence of war, whatever view may be taken of its morality or its expediency, strengthened rather than weakened the hands of Lord Canning. The incorporation of the Punjab in British

India not only prevented a repetition of the events which occurred under a Sikh government in 1844 and in 1848, but it also threw into the scale on the British side the weight needed for victory over the mutineers. Sikh chiefs and Sikh soldiers vied with each other in loyal deeds. "Run over in your mind," wrote John Lawrence to Barnes on the 11th of October, 1857, "the rewards we should propose for Patiala, Nabha, and Jind. They should certainly be rewarded. Where should we have been but for their fidelity?" The Punjab regiments were not less faithful. "It is only by God's mercy that we have escaped," wrote Lawrence; "assuredly it is more than we could hope, that all the Punjab regiments should have remained staunch." Satara and Nagpur gave no trouble, and the possession of the former district proved a source of strength when mutiny showed its face at Kolhapur and in the Southern Maratha country. On the other hand, in Jhansi, which was twice wrested from our grasp during the rebellion, and in the petty states of the Central Provinces, annexation brought in its train local disturbances. But even there the gain of consolidation derived from the application of the doctrine of lapse, as wisely restricted by Lord Dalhousie, far outweighed the discontent which every transfer of authority must inevitably produce.

There remains the more difficult question of Oudh, for the annexation of which the home authorities were responsible It must be admitted that this event was turned to good account by the mutineers, and that our mistakes in the first year of British administration were dearly paid for. Nevertheless, the disarmament of the King's army and the control we gained over the population were assets of great value, while the siege

of Lucknow drew off large forces from Delhi, and the subsequent conquest of Oudh enabled the British to meet the rebels in the field and inflict upon them a signal defeat. At any rate there is no warrant for the view that the annexation of Oudh was the cause of the mutiny. On this subject a letter written from Lucknow by Outram to Lord Dalhousie on the 7th of January, 1858, may be quoted. The extract given is somewhat lengthy, but no apology is needed for citing the words of so unimpeachable an authority.

I perceive there is an impression at home that the annexation of Oudh was the primary cause of all these disturbances. Your Lordship is as aware of the absurdity of such an idea as myself. But as I hope there is no undue presumption in my saying that I have had unusual opportunities of studying the Native character, and that of the people of Oudh in particular, I cannot refrain from offering the following remarks on the subject.

Your Lordship's detractors assert, first, that the annexation was distasteful to the powerful Mahomedan community; secondly, that it was regarded with disfavour by the Sepoys, who thereby forfeited certain distinctions and immunities which they had previously enjoyed in Oudh; and thirdly, that this common grievance led to that cordial union of Mahomedans and Hindus which had hitherto been deemed impossible.

With regard to the first point, I am not prepared to deny that certain powerful Mahomedans who were compelled by the introduction of our rule to abstain from their congenial pursuits of pillage, murder, and rapine, were disaffected to our authority. But I maintain that the hostility of these rascals, rich and powerful as some of them were, had nothing whatever to do with the *origin* of this rebellion.

I am convinced that the true cause of the revolt may be traced to that prophecy which declared that India should be subjected for one hundred years to foreign dominion, after which the religion and rule of Islam should regain its supremacy.

It has been ascertained that prior to the assumption of the Oudh Government, Mahomedan devotees had been journeying through India predicting the downfall of the British Empire, calling upon

their coreligionists to be ready to raise the standard of the faithful, and pointing to the war which the Santals were prolonging in the immediate vicinity of our capital as a proof of our weakness and approaching fall. The revolt took place in the year which terminated the first century of our rule, and it was in the hopes that the words of their prophet would be fulfilled that the Mahomedans originated the conspiracy.

To say that the annexation of Oudh was distasteful to the Sepoys *en masse*, is simply ridiculous. The Sepoys do not belong to the powerful class of Talukdars and Zamindars whose career of wholesale licence was checked by British authority. They are sprung from the people, and their relations were the very men who suffered most from the oppressions of the powerful landowners. It was the fathers, the brothers, and the sons of these men who flocked in thousands to the European officers who first entered their districts; many of them weeping with joy, and all of them declaring that now, for the first time during years of anarchy, they had a prospect of reaping the produce of the fields which they had ploughed and sown. There may have been a few Sepoys whose position, or that of their relatives, were not improved by the introduction of our rule. But these were isolated cases, and to counterbalance them, I am aware of several instances in which Sepoys have come with delight to inform their officers, that under the fostering protection of the Sardars, themselves or their families had been reinstated in possessions which had been forcibly or fraudulently wrested from them by the armed and powerful myrmidons of the King of Oudh.

It is absurd to call this a military rebellion—that it could not have occurred had the Sepoys remained faithful, is of course indisputable. But the revolt itself is the fruit of Mussulman intrigue, in the hopes of gaining empire at the expiration of the century during which it had been held by the conquerors from the west. With this object they persuaded the wretched Sepoys, the most credulous and childish class of the credulous and childish race of Hindus, that we were about to ruin their caste prior to the forcible introduction of the Christian faith.

Some people argue that the hostility of the population of Oudh is a proof of the impolicy of the annexation of the province. To this I would reply that the mass of the community are *not* hostile. The agricultural classes are at heart with us to a man.

That the principal landowners are in arms, I must reluctantly admit. But even their disaffection, I confidently affirm, is not owing to their annexation *in se*, but to that unhappy system of settlement which was carried out against my wishes and warnings, and I am sure contrary to those of your Lordship, by which the entire body of these men were entirely ousted from their possessions.

I can quote one instance out, I believe, of a hundred others, in which the cultivator claiming to be restored to his rights in the land, admitted that the estate had been purchased from the ancestors of the then Talukdar upwards of forty years ago, but that the sale had been effected by force—the Talukdar, notwithstanding his admitted possession of forty years' standing, was summarily ousted, on the plea that *all* Bhynamas (deeds of sale) were false.

Is it wonderful that he and others of his stamp rose against us on the occurrence of so favourable an opportunity? But in spite of the settlements, some of the wealthy chiefs have remained true to us, and Oudh furnishes almost the sole instances in which helpless European fugitives have been protected and forwarded to a haven of safety by landowners and rajas, regardless of the imperious demands for their surrender on the part of the, for a time, victorious and all-powerful rebels.

Before too hastily condemning the conduct of the rebellious Oudh Zamindars, it should be borne in mind that not a man rose, and the collections actually went on as usual, until the majority of the north-west provinces were in a blaze.

The outbreak did not commence in Oudh, on the contrary the regiments in the province were among the last to revolt, a pretty convincing proof that the annexation was not the exciting cause of the rebellion. When, however, the Zamindars of our newly acquired territory saw the prevailing anarchy in our settled districts, what wonder if they thought that our Empire was at an end, and, instigated on the one hand by the promptings of fanaticism, and incensed on the other by the mutinous contingent and army, they should have thrown off their allegiance?

I regard the annexation to have been the salvation of India in one point of view. It is the fashion to say that if the King had remained on the throne, we should have had him and his army on our side during these disturbances. I consider this assertion to be

quite preposterous — the contingents of Sindhia and Holkar composed chiefly of Hindus, have joined the revolt, and is i likely—does it admit of argument—that the Mahomedan ruler o Oudh would have been able to restrain his army, drawn from th same sources, and incited to rebellion by his fanatic Mussulma priesthood and nobility? His army would have fought agains us, and had it done so, it is impossible to divine what the resul might have been. But its presence on the other side of th Ganges, and the rebels having at their disposal the vast amoun of ordnance and kind of military stores which we confiscated o annexation, and ultimately destroyed, would have probabl annihilated Havelock's force, and rendered our hold upon India fa more precarious than it is at present.

We may now pass on to a consideration of Lor Dalhousie's responsibility for the three measures whic gave the spirit of rebellion its opportunity. Of thes the general enlistment order was one which Lor Dalhousie had long intended to pass, and he woul not have desired to detach himself from any blam that might be attributed to its authors. It must b admitted that the famous General Order, No. 101 dated the 25th of July, 1856, agitated the Nativ soldiers, and made them realise that their professio must involve a liability to cross the seas which the religious scruples abhorred. On the other hand Lor Canning, being new to India, was misled, and mus alone bear the blame for his official statement, whic Lord Dalhousie would certainly have hesitated to pu forward, that "there is no fear of caste being excited b the new regulations." But as to the policy, Lor Canning merely carried out the designs of his pr decessor, who had recorded his views on the 2nd August, 1854, in these terms :—

These incidents press more strongly on me than ever th necessity for commencing the movement intended to uproot th

absurd and unmeaning system, under which the whole Bengal army is practically no better than a collection of local corps, and to substitute for it a system of enlistment for general service of every man who may hereafter be recruited for any arm within its ranks. Existing privileges will, of course, be scrupulously respected, but such privileges should be extinguished utterly in every new enlistment.

It is generally admitted that the order issued by Lord Canning that in future every recruit of the Bengal army should "at the time of enlistment distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the company or beyond them," gave occasion to bitter hostility, and precipitated the mutiny. Both Lord Dalhousie and Lord Canning laid too much stress upon their ability to respect existing privileges. They thought that if their orders were not retrospective, no one would impute to them breach of faith. They made too light of the fact that in India the trade of the mercenary or soldier was as hereditary as that of the shopkeeper or artisan. They overlooked the fact that the profession of arms would be saddled with a new and obnoxious obligation. The fathers must suffer in the liability imposed upon their children as much as if their own privileges had been destroyed. This must be admitted, but the admission is not tantamount to a condemnation of the order. Lord Dalhousie was right in viewing the privileges of the Bengal Sepoy as intolerable. Parts of India lay across the seas, as he had found out in the Burmese War. Unforeseen demands for the military forces of India might come from Persia, as Lord Canning soon had to acknowledge, or from China, Africa, and Arabia, as his successors discovered. The privilege of exemption from oversea service must go, even if it provoked

discontent. Lord Dalhousie therefore prepared the way for his successor, and he did the brave and right thing, even though it produced disaffection.

The second measure which has been mentioned as furnishing an occasion for the mutiny, was the declaration of war with Persia, and its consequence, the withdrawal of European regiments from India. How far Lord Dalhousie would have resisted the demand upon his military resources must be a matter of speculation. It is sufficient to recall attention to his persistent protests during the Crimean war, and it may be that so soon after the issue of the general enlistment order he would have been more unwilling to part with his European regiments. The main question, however, is one of fact, and concerns events which occurred during his administration. How far, it may be asked, did the late Governor-General bring about a state of affairs which involved India in hostilities with Persia? To answer the inquiry, it is necessary to examine the cause of the war, and the share of Lord Dalhousie in bringing matters to that pass.

The quarrel between Great Britain and Persia arose in respect of the possession of Herat, and was aggravated by certain indignities which were heaped upon the British representatives in that country. There is no doubt that the alliance negotiated by Lord Dalhousie with the Amir of Afghanistan encouraged the Dost to cherish the hope of recovering Herat for his kingdom, but the Governor-General did nothing to justify his ally in expecting British support. As regards Persia, he consistently maintained that it rested with the home authorities to lay down the line to be followed in that field of external policy, and to supply the military forces required for its success. His opinions

will be evident from the minutes presently to be quoted, and here it is only necessary to explain the events which led up to them. After the conclusion of the treaty signed by John Lawrence at Peshawar, Dost Mahomed, no longer apprehensive of Indian designs, proceeded to consolidate his power over Afghanistan. He captured Kandahar in the beginning of 1856, and having added it to his dominions, asked the Governor-General to include it by name in the treaty of the 30th of March, 1855, as an integral part of his kingdom which the Government of India had undertaken to respect. He further sought advice as to his dealings with Herat, where a Sadozai ruler in the person of Mahomed Yusaf had lately established himself. In a minute dated the 14th of January, 1856, Lord Dalhousie recorded his views to this effect:—

There are insuperable objections to the Amir's request that Kandahar should be inserted in the ratified treaty. The treaty was signed on the 30th of March last. If the name Kandahar should be inserted now, the words of the treaty and the date of it would be at variance, and the treaty would be vitiated. But in order to remove all doubts, the Government of India can offer to the Amir its formal assurance that the treaty signed at Peshawar in 1855 will be recognised as having full effect, whatever may be the territories in the Amir's possession, so long as His Highness shall observe its stipulations. . . . The request which the Amir has made respecting Herat is altogether inadmissible. The Persian Government, by its engagement dated the 25th of January, 1853, binds itself never to enter Herat or interfere with the concerns of that principality, "so long as no interference of any sort whatever shall occur on the part of the British Government, but if otherwise, these engagements shall be as if unwritten." It is manifest, therefore, that the Government of India cannot by recognition, or encouragement, or advice, or any other means, express any opinion whatever regarding the affairs of Herat in reply to the Amir of Kabul. It seems to me very desirable upon every ground that the Secret Committee should, in communication with

Her Majesty's Government, supply precise instructions for the guidance of the Government of India.

Lord Dalhousie at the same time expressed his opinion that it would be wise to strengthen our intimacy with Afghanistan, and in doing so to run even the risk of giving dissatisfaction to Persia, but while he remained Governor-General he enjoined upon John Lawrence "the utmost caution in his communications with the Amir," and insisted upon leaving the Persian question to the decision of Her Majesty's advisers. It is beyond the scope of this work to detail the insults which Persia heaped upon the British mission at Teheran, the outrage offered at Shiraz to the British agent, whose wife was imprisoned, and the aggressions upon Herat which followed the deposition of Mahomed Yusaf. Dost Mahomed was encouraged to move forward, and accordingly orders were issued by the Court of Directors on the 22nd of July, 1856, for the preparation of an expedition to occupy the island of Kharak and the Persian town of Bushire. The Persians took possession of Herat towards the end of October, 1856, and on the 1st of the following month war was declared by the Queen against the Shah. Outram was appointed to the command of the British force, and after a successful campaign, peace was concluded by the Treaty of Paris on the 4th of March, 1857. Before Outram left England, he received from Lord Dalhousie a letter wishing him all success, and adding these words, "I know nothing of what we are about, and, with all deference to our rulers, I don't think they know much more what they are about." At the same time the late Governor-General declined to be drawn into any public controversy on the subject, although Lord Derby wrote to him on the 27th of

December, 1857, asking for his views, and expressing his own opinion that "we have made, and are making, a great mistake." The conclusion which may be drawn from these facts is that, although Lord Dalhousie was not averse to the policy which led to war, he was in no sense responsible for it. Still less can he be held accountable for the want of prudence and foresight which led to the withdrawal from India of European troops, and of a large number of British officers, at a time when the white portion of the garrison of the Bengal army comprised only sixteen regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, three brigades of horse, and six battalions of foot artillery.

There remains the third incident, which has been described as one of the occasions of the mutiny—the offence given by the greased cartridges. In the opinion of John Lawrence it was more, for he wrote: 'Its proximate cause was the cartridge affair and nothing else." No one can charge Lord Dalhousie with the smallest responsibility for the unfortunate succession of mistakes which marked the substitution of the Enfield rifle for the Brown Bess. It was ten months after his departure from Calcutta that in January, 1857, a low caste kalasi revenged himself upon a Brahman Sepoy of the 2nd Grenadiers who had offended him, by the bitter retort that he would soon lose his caste when he had to bite the new cartridges smeared with the fat of oxen and the lard of pigs. His words gained confirmation from the glazed and shiny appearance of the paper used for the new ammunition. One Sepoy whispered to another, "It smells like grease when burnt, and must be made of hog's lard." The news spread from the depôt at Dum Dum to the cantonment at Barrackpore, onwards to Meerut, and so all over the country. The

Government of India were not left in the dark, for on the 23rd of January General Hearsay reported the existence of an "unpleasant feeling." Not a moment should have been lost in denying the presence of the obnoxious materials, and allowing the Sepoys to grease their cartridges with ghee or some other harmless substance. The offending paper should have been instantly withdrawn. But hesitation prevailed, and fear grew by delay. Court-martials and their sentences only invested insubordinate Sepoys with the distinction of martyrs, and their accusers and judges were held to be banded together in a conspiracy against the religions of India. The times were dangerous, for the native troops were strong, in the words of John Lawrence,

> in their great numbers, in their unexampled power of combination, and their possession of most of our magazines, many of our forts, and all of our treasuries, while our weakness consisted in the paucity of European troops. . . . Some regiments had been subtracted from our complement during the Russian War; two regiments were in Persia. Those regiments we had were numerically weak; some corps had not received any fresh drafts for two years.

But although the Government of India were acquainted with these facts, and had still before them the military minutes which Lord Dalhousie laid on the Council table on the 29th of February, 1856, they misread the signs of the times, and suffered the idle words of the kalasi to grow into panic, panic to spread into mutiny, and mutineers when they rose in rebellion to go unpunished. The blame for these mistakes does not lie with the Governor-General, who had quitted India in March 1856.

What then is the extent of the responsibility of Lord Dalhousie for the events of 1857? Looking to

the changes which had come over India since he landed on the banks of the Hooghly on the 12th of January, 1848, we may perhaps summarise as making for unrest the following facts. It must be admitted that even the most ignorant and apathetic Hindu was brought into more conscious touch with the spirit of the west during the eight years preceding 1857 than at any other period in the history of India. The military power of the Company's servants was in that term extended to Peshawar on one side and to the territories of Ava on the east, and their civil rule over the whole empire was consolidated. The dream of a revival of a Mahomedan empire was almost dissipated, although the tawdry pageantry of departed glory still hung about the palace at Delhi. The Sikh kingdom was at an end, and the death of the ex-Peshwa reminded the Marathas that their last chance of sovereignty had passed away. The spiritual power of the priests was shaken by the new scheme of public instruction, and the legal protection accorded to widows and converts. The leaven of a Christian civilisation was visibly working in the whole mass of Indian society. The annexation of Oudh, so eagerly demanded by the oppressed subjects of that kingdom, had already disappointed the hopes of many. The ex-king and his family remained alive to bemoan their fate and rally their supporters. In other parts of the country transitions from Native to British administration had not been effected without heartburnings and a sense of injury to privileged classes. All these results had been attained by military strength. The Native army, conscious of its numbers, and proud of the praises which it had won, had learnt the numerical weakness of the British garrison, and had lately seen part of it called away for service in the Crimea. Its dread of being

required to cross the "black water" had been emphasised by the extension of British dominion across the Bay of Bengal, and by rumours of war with Persia. Lord Dalhousie had played a man's part, and with prudence and courage had fought the battle of civilisation. But in such a contest he could only rely upon his European troops. His enemies henceforth were more likely to be those of his own household than a foreign foe or a Native State. The "dangers of peace" might even become more serious than those of conquest, and the weak spot in the Company's armour was the paucity of white soldiers. This defect had not been remedied. It is true that by means of railways and telegraphs the power of the small British garrison had been increased, and the abolition of the Military Board with other reforms had strengthened the hands of Government. But nothing had come of the proposals for reducing the Native army and augmenting the European forces. No guarantee had been wrung from the home authorities that the royal infantry would not be suffered to fall below the strength of twenty-four regiments. The Governor-General had indeed reached London before he heard the fate of his earnest endeavours to wake up the authorities to a sense of the danger. On the 18th of July, 1856, Colonel Birch wrote to him in these terms:—

All your minutes on army reforms are with the Commander-in-Chief. Feeling himself quite new to everything, the Governor-General after reading the minutes sent them to General Anson, desiring to avail himself of the opinions of his colleagues, before he formed or gave expression to an opinion of his own. But with all that General Anson has to do in all the departments, and in the Legislative Council—for he takes an active part in all besides the army, which is his peculiar occupation—it is not probable that any early progress will be made with the subjects of those minutes.

The result of his proposals regarding the European cavalry, by the reduction of which he hoped to provide funds for the increase of the infantry regiments, was communicated to him a few weeks later in a letter dated the 8th of September, 1856, from Mr. Vernon Smith:—

> You are probably aware that we have agreed to send back the regiments of Queen's Cavalry to India. This is contrary to your advice, but in the imperial emergency there is no help for it, and the question of economy must remain for the future, as I must say most questions of Indian economy do!

In short, the conclusion of the whole matter is this: Lord Dalhousie carried out the high mission of civilisation with which he had been entrusted by his country. His success impressed the Indian people with a sense of defeat, but it threw a strong light upon the numerical weakness of the British troops, and so encouraged the Sepoy army to revolt. That contingency had been foreseen, and a remedy had been devised to meet it, but the authorities at home would not allow it to be applied. It is true that, as John Lawrence remarked, the "Almighty disposer of events" directed the course of history; but there is no impiety in holding that in His hands Lord Dalhousie's pacification of the Punjab, his introduction of telegraphs and roads, and his administrative reforms were the human instruments of the divine purpose which sustained British rule in the day of its severest trial.

CHAPTER XI

RETIREMENT AND DEATH

Lord Dalhousie's activity to the end—His proposal to place the Punjab under John Lawrence as Lieutenant-Governor—His last Sunday in office—The last meeting of the Legislative Council—Lord Canning's arrival—Parting addresses and warnings—The farewell scene at the Ghat—Disappointments at Galle—The trials of the journey to Malta—Arrival at Spithead, and the Queen's letter—Pension voted by Court of Directors—Visits from his friends, and heavy correspondence—Advocacy of the claims of O'Shaughnessy and Stephenson for honours—Winter spent in Edinburgh—He goes to Malta for the winter 1857-58—Depression caused by mutiny—"We want a Dictator"—John Lawrence's appeal to him—Return home and stay in Malvern—Retires to Dalhousie Castle—Marriage of Lady Edith, August 9, 1859—Change for the worse—The pressure of his duties as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports—His last visit to London, 1860—Closing scenes of life—The shadow cast by the mutiny upon his work—Obituary notices—His place in Indian history—His burial in the kirkyard of Cockpen.

1856-1860. IN the second chapter of this volume the story of Lord Dalhousie's life was brought down to the close of the year 1855. He was then anxiously awaiting the decision of Her Majesty's Government regarding the fate of Oudh, and completing his arrangements for the arrival of the incoming Governor-General. In later chapters some of the most important events of 1856 were described, among them being the annexation of the kingdom of Oudh and the encroachment of Persia upon Herat, which

was shortly to drag England into war and deprive India of 4422 European officers and soldiers at a critical moment. There were many other matters that demanded the attention of a strenuous and conscientious ruler up to the evening of the 29th of February, 1856, when at length he laid down the burden of his high office. Lord Canning, anxious to lighten the load of his last days, had written from Bombay on the 29th of January entreating him "not to give way to any ultra-chivalrous desire to clear away all business before you are relieved." The Marquis of Dalhousie had no desire to fetter the discretion of those who might follow him, but his sense of duty would not allow him to bequeath to his friend any part of his own appointed task. Accordingly, he worked day and night, and his minutes recorded in 1856 exceed in bulk those of any other similar period. In them he set forth his final conclusions in regard to large schemes of railways and telegraphs, conclusions based upon his unrivalled knowledge of the empire gained during his tours; disposed of some tangled disputes concerning the boundaries of states; elaborated a scheme for reorganising and enlarging the civil service; revised various administrative reports; and settled a number of petty questions of establishment likely to be especially vexatious to a newcomer.

One at least of his latest minutes deserves particular notice, since the tendency of recent years has been to increase the responsibilities and power of Viceroys and to overload the central Government with administrative duties. Against this evil he was on his guard. For while the keynote of his policy was consolidation, his eyes had from the first been open to the need for decentralisation. On the one hand he resolutely asserted and enforced the authority of the Government of India as

the unquestioned court of control, appeal, and supervision; advocated and introduced the system of imperial departments in which the supreme government should administer as well as control; looked forward to the day when the presidential armies should be united in one imperial force; and even recognised the advantage of bringing newly annexed territories under the direct administration of the Governor-General in Council for a period until order and system had been introduced. On the other hand, in the early days of his rule he had detached Bengal from his personal charge, because he felt that the province had suffered from the neglect inseparable from its direct subordination to the overworked Governor-General; and now that he was about to transfer the Government of India to Lord Canning, he recommended that John Lawrence, "the very able and eminent man who has been associated with the government of the Punjab from the very first," should be appointed Lieutenant-Governor, and left to administer the province under the general control of the Governor-General in Council. In his minute, dated the 20th of February, 1856, he supported his suggestion by arguments of public expediency in these terms:—

The function which the Government of India has for some time past assumed, of taking into its own hands the direct administration of new provinces, has been pronounced by the public to have been a very wholesome one. But it is a function foreign to the nature of the Government of India, whose proper business is to control other Governments, not to become a local government itself. Gradually, therefore, as the new provinces become fit to walk alone, the direct power of administration in such provinces should be laid down by the Government of India. It is by giving effect to this principle, if it should receive the assent of my honourable colleagues, that I propose to find means of affording relief to the Governor-General in Council.

Preoccupied as Lord Dalhousie was with public affairs of grave moment, he omitted nothing to ensure the comfort of his successor; nor, ill as he was, did he hesitate to postpone his departure in order that Lord Canning might be able to discuss with him matters of special interest. "Your offer," wrote Lord Canning, "to remain at Calcutta for a space after our arrival is very kind and considerate. It will thoroughly accomplish my purpose, and although I never could have asked you to do so, I accept it gratefully." On Sunday the 24th of February the Governor-General, whose practice it was to set an example by regular attendance at the services in the cathedral of the established church, for once consulted his own preferences by worshipping in St. Andrew's. On the following day he sent a cheque of 500 rupees for the poor to the Reverend J. Herdman, accompanied by a characteristic letter, from which this extract is taken— 1856.

> In your service of yesterday, most impressive and touching to me, who have been so long absent from it, there seemed to me only one thing wanting. Your addition of the "kist-o'-whistles" inside does not reconcile me to the absence of the plate at the door. I therefore take the liberty of sending to you the enclosed cheque, begging you to ask your session to apply it to your poor as you think best.

The week thus commenced was spent in ceaseless labours. From all parts of India officials arrived to say good-bye to their "King"—for as such they looked upon him. Conspicuous among these was his trusted lieutenant in the Punjab, John Lawrence, together with others of less mark, but not less loyal in their devotion. Partly owing to the attitude of the Court at Ava, and partly from a misunderstanding as to the Governor-General's wishes, Phayre was not among the

number. His absence gave the cue to the ever-hostile *Englishman* for a sinister valediction in the words, "it would be singular if the first news Lord Dalhousie should receive from India on landing in England was that the third Burmese war had commenced." At such ill-will the Governor-General could afford to smile as he stood surrounded by those whose trust in him was so sure and whom he had proved to be so faithful. But their reception added not a little to his other fatigues, for his lofty idea of the duties of courtesy would not allow him to spare himself. At length the day of his relief arrived, and for the last time he presided at a meeting of his Legislative Council, at which, among other business, a Bill for the supply of pure water to Bombay was introduced, and advanced a stage. Before he left the Chamber the President, in a few eloquent terms, reminded his colleagues that "before the sun shall have set to-day the power which I have so long wielded will have passed away from my hands," and concluded with the prayer that "the spirit of wisdom may at all times direct your deliberations and guide your counsels." Then, leaving Sir James Colville in the chair that he might carry a resolution recording the Council's sense of the high services of the Governor-General who had organised and presided over it, he retired to his private office and wrote to Her Majesty the Queen, thanking her for the gracious encouragement and favour shown to him "through the eight long years during which he had borne the ponderous burden he lays down to-day," and also to the President of the Board of Control and the Chairman of the Court of Directors.[1] He had already recom-

[1] In addition to his letter announcing his retirement from the office of Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie formally resigned the post of Governor of Bengal and Commander of Fort William.

mended for various distinctions and honours the names of the most deserving of his subordinates, John Lawrence, General W. H. Sleeman, General James Outram, Mark Cubbon, Dr. W. B. O'Shaughnessy, R. M. Stephenson, and Arthur Phayre; and having thus discharged every obligation belonging to his high office, he anxiously awaited the arrival of his friend, which the booming from the ramparts of Fort William announced to be imminent. After introducing Lord Canning to the members of his Council and the high officials assembled on the steps of Government House, Lord Dalhousie conducted him to the door of the Council Chamber, and later rejoined him as still for a few hours the host, but no longer the Governor-General of India. Conscious of all that he had himself suffered and of the onerous task which had devolved upon his successor, he was for a moment tempted to wish for his sake that their places could be changed, but he at once repressed the thought, since it was no friendly wish that any one should endure the misery which he then felt and saw still lying before him.

The week which followed brought many gratifying proofs of public esteem. On the morning of the 4th of March the Planters Association presented an address marked by sincerity and cordial warmth, in which emphasis was laid upon the material progress that had signalised the rule of him to whom they were regretfully bidding farewell. This was followed on the next day by a more important deputation, charged on behalf of the Native as well as the European community with a resolution voted on the 13th of February, and bearing eloquent testimony to the wise and pure dispensation of patronage, the extension of education, the improvements of communication, the constitution of the

departments of administration, and the unbroken spirit in bodily suffering which had rendered illustrious the term of the Governor-General's office. His reply to this compliment proves that the subject of it was neither blind to danger nor over-conscious of his own achievements.

"No prudent man," it ran, "having knowledge of Eastern affairs, would venture to predict a long continuance of peace in India. We have learned by hard experience how a difference with a Native power, which seems at first to be but the little cloud no bigger than a man's hand, may rapidly darken and swell into a storm of war, involving the whole empire in its gloom. We have lately seen how, in the very midst of us, insurrection may arise like an exhalation from the earth, and how cruel violence, worse than all the excesses of war, may be suddenly committed by men who, to the very day in which they broke out in their frenzy of blood, had been regarded as a simple, harmless, timid race, not by the Government alone, but even by those who knew them best, who were dwelling among them and were their earliest victims. Remembering these things, no prudent man will venture to give you assurance of continued peace. . . . While we may rejoice that measures have been taken for opening new sources of wealth . . . I trust we still shall feel that all we have yet done must be regarded as no more than the first beginnings of greater things that are to come. In regions so vast as these and among interests so various, all progress must needs be gradual and slow. . . . I am wearied and worn, and have no other thought or wish than to seek the retirement of which I stand in need, and which is all I am now fit for."

Then, after rendering a graceful tribute to his colleagues in council for their constant aid, without one hour of discord or distrust, to the whole body of the Civil Service, the gallant army by which the honour of the country had been upheld, and to the public for the fairness and forbearance with which they had judged him, Lord Dalhousie concluded with words eminently characteristic of his unaffected piety :—

After all, now in this parting hour, when the memory of each among us is thoughtfully resting for a time on the eventful years through which we have passed together, I desire humbly and reverently to acknowledge the gratitude which is due for the ever present protection of Him from whose bounty flows every blessing of peace—in whose hand alone are the issues of war. Mr. Sheriff and Gentlemen, I have now but one word more to add—it is a word I find it hard to utter—Farewell!

On the following day, the 6th of March, Lord Dalhousie and Lady Susan left Government House in the cool of the afternoon to proceed on board the Company's s.s. *Firoze*, commissioned to carry them to Suez, whence they were to travel overland to Alexandria, and there to embark on one of Her Majesty's ships sent to meet them. The scene was one which left a deep impression alike upon the Native and the European mind. There was then none of that racial feeling which the events of the following year stirred up. The native population had been struck by the personal dignity and courtesy of one whom, in the words of Mr. W. S. Seton Karr,[1] they "worshipped as the embodiment of spiritual force and energy." The spectacle of human infirmity did not detract from the Hindu conception of divine power, while it added sympathy to the loyal devotion with which his fellow-countrymen regarded one whom they looked upon as "aye, every inch a king." *The Friend of India*, in describing the event, wrote: "It has been said that, with all his qualities, he left behind him but few personal friends. Yet in all the crowd which attended his departure there was scarcely one that could keep down the choking in his throat." Ladies did not attempt to conceal their emotions, many of them shedding tears. The object of this general sympathy

[1] Quoted from a letter written to the biographer, dated November, 1903.

barely tottered on board the ship with the aid of crutches, and his countenance bore traces of his physical pain and his mental emotions. He had described[1] his predecessor as "the departing shadow"; he might have applied to himself the words of Shakespeare,[2] "a mangled shadow." Yet it must have been felt by every one who witnessed the pathetic scene at the Ghat on the banks of the Hooghly, and had watched the "high events" of the past eight years of his administration, that—

> Their story is
> No less in pity than his glory which
> Brought them to be lamented.[3]

The only chance of his recovery lay in the enjoyment of a restful voyage, and to this his private surgeon, Mr. A. Grant, who accompanied him to England, hopefully looked forward. But a number of untoward circumstances robbed him of such relief. The famous minute[4] reviewing the stirring events of his administration, although dated the 29th of February, was in the main part written during the homeward voyage, and its compilation kept the brain of the writer in an active state of excitement when rest was imperatively needed. At Point de Galle, the *London Gazette* of the 5th of February, 1856, was awaiting his arrival, and Lord Dalhousie was much mortified at not finding the names of O'Shaughnessy, Stephenson, and Phayre included in the list of honours as he had recommended, and at the inferior class of the Order bestowed upon Mark Cubbon. Sleeman, it is true, received the coveted distinction of K.C.B., but his

[1] Vol. i. chap. iii. p. 101.
[2] *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act iv. 2, 27.
[3] The same: Act v. 2, 364.
[4] Published by order of Parliament.

death[1] on board the *Monarch* nineteen days after leaving Calcutta followed almost immediately upon the bestowal of his well-merited reward. The heart of the Governor-General whom he had served so well was wrung with sympathy for his widow; and even the promotion of John Lawrence to the same honour only served to awaken memories of his recent farewell to Calcutta. Writing to his old subordinate on the 20th of March, he thus expressed himself:—

> I was very miserable in parting from you upon the Ghat that day. Of all I leave behind me, no man's friendship is more valued by me, no man's services are so highly estimated by me as yours. God bless you, my dear John; write to me as you promised, and believe me now and always, your sincere friend.

The excitement due to the news received at Point de Galle was followed in rapid succession by other checks to his recovery. The overland journey from Suez to Alexandria intensely aggravated the pain of his diseased leg, while the lively motion of H.M.S. *Caradoc*, expressly detached for him by Admiral Sir E. Lyons, increased his sufferings to a degree that made it necessary to transfer him to another vessel. At Malta, therefore, Commander Chandos J. Stanhope had the disappointment of surrendering his distinguished passenger to the charge of H.M.S. *Tribune*, in which the voyage was completed by arrival at Spithead on the 13th of May. The broken-down man was too ill to exchange salutations with H.R.H. Prince Albert, who passed by in the royal yacht, and in fact reached his native country in worse health than when he left Calcutta. Ill as he was, his habitual courtesy was shown in the thanks which he offered to the

[1] Lady Sleeman wrote to Lord Dalhousie to announce her husband's death, which occurred on the 10th of February, 1856.

officers of the ship, and to all who had done him any service during the voyage. To his faithful surgeon he repeatedly expressed his grateful obligations, and the following extract from a letter written by Grant proves how deeply that officer had felt the responsibility which had devolved upon him.

"I am very conscious," he wrote, "of many shortcomings, but I had an earnest desire to do my duty faithfully and conscientiously. It often, however, cost me anxious thoughts and regrets that a life so valuable should not have had the benefit of higher and better advice. There was scarcely any one with whom I could share the responsibility. 'What I wanted I was obliged to borrow from myself.' I have, however, had the gratifying power to realise my hopes of seeing you safe at home, and it has been to me an inexpressible source of comfort to find an unanimity of medical opinion that everything has been done which, under the circumstances, was possible. . . . The solace of health, so long unfelt by your Lordship, is still, I fear, too remote."

After disembarkation Lord Dalhousie proceeded to London, where he occupied rooms at Claridge's Hotel. There many public honours and private welcomes awaited him, but none of them possessed such value in his eyes as the following letter from the Queen, which I am permitted to reproduce here:—

OSBORNE, *May* 13, 1856.

The Queen is anxious that Lord Dalhousie should be welcomed on his landing by the expression of his Sovereign's joy at his return, and deep sense of his invaluable services, which she fears have been rendered at too great a sacrifice of his valuable health. She earnestly hopes that the blessing of restored health and strength may be given to him, and that quiet and the enjoyment of his pure, native air, may bring about this much-desired result.

The Queen thanks Lord Dalhousie much for his two last kind letters of the 29th of February from Calcutta, and of the 14th of March from Point de Galle.

The Prince joins in all the Queen's expressions, and wishes

to be most kindly named to Lord Dalhousie, as we both do to Lady Susan.

The incidents of the next few weeks were by no means conducive to an improvement of health. From attending receptions he excused himself on the ground that he was "unwilling to display infirmity," he being in his own words little better than "a mummy." But the visits of a crowd of friends, and correspondence, both private and official, which poured in upon him, combined to forestall the rest and retirement prescribed alike by prudence and his doctor's advice. Among the public bodies who hastened to offer him addresses, or to enrol him in their societies, were the Merchant Tailors, the Writers to the Signet, the Provost and Council of Haddington, Archer's Hall, and the General Assembly on Indian Churches. Unable even to obey the commands of his Sovereign, Lord Dalhousie could only acknowledge these various compliments by letter. He was equally unable to attend a public function at which the Court of Directors desired to present to him, with some formality, the Resolution adopted by them on the 25th of April, 1856, and confirmed by the Court of Proprietors on the 14th of May. The full text of this gratifying testimonial, and an extract from the reply of the Marquis of Dalhousie, are here given. The former ran as follows:—

Resolved by ballot—That on a review of the administration of the affairs of India by the Marquis of Dalhousie, K.T., during the eight years of his Lordship's tenure of the office of Governor-General, this Court desire to record their deep sense of the great ability, of the extraordinary zeal, and untiring energy displayed by that distinguished nobleman in all departments of the Indian Government.

That the Court desire more particularly to acknowledge the

eminent merits of that statesman, as manifested in the conduct of the war which was forced upon the British authorities by the unprovoked outbreak of the Sikh Sardars, and their military followers in the Punjab.

In the system of administration framed by him for the territories acquired at the conclusion of the war, a system grounded on the most enlightened principles, incorporating the best and most recent improvements in Indian administration, and which has already produced the most striking results in the increased prosperity of those territories;

In superintending and directing the measures taken during and consequent on the war with Burma;

In the arrangements made by him for the good government of the territories of Nagpur after their lapse;

In replacing the government of Oudh upon a basis calculated to ensure peace and prosperity to the inhabitants of that important territory in which, for so long a period, anarchy and insecurity of life and property prevailed;

In his measures for the development of the resources of India by the encouragement of railways, the construction of useful public works, the introduction of the electric telegraph, the improvement of the post-office system, and for the moral and intellectual advancement of the natives of India by extended means of education:

That as a special mark of the sense entertained by the East India Company of the eminent services thus rendered by the Marquis of Dalhousie, an annuity of £5000, commencing from the day when he resigned the office of Governor-General, be granted to his Lordship, subject to the sanction of the General Court of Proprietors, and the approbation and confirmation of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India.

On the 7th of June the Chairman, Colonel W. H. Sykes, informed the late Governor-General that the various authorities just mentioned had confirmed the decision of the Court, and on the 13th he received the acknowledgments of Lord Dalhousie, who asked him

to convey to the Honourable Court the respectful expression of my gratitude for the munificent reward with which they have been

pleased to recompense my services, and still more for the approbation and confidence of which it is the token. Conscious that I laboured faithfully for the Honourable Company while I served it, but conscious also of many omissions and imperfections in what I have attempted to do, I receive with feelings of the deepest satisfaction the signal proof which the Honourable Court have given of their contentment with my public conduct. I shall never cease to retain a lively sense of the obligations which I owe to them for the constant and generous support accorded to me while administering the affairs of India, and it is my sincere and earnest prayer that those great interests in the East, which are entrusted to them, may continue to prosper in their hands.

Although the invalid could not attend meetings or entertainments held in his honour, he was accessible to his friends at Claridge's Hotel. One who had served under him as Under-Secretary in India gives the following account of his visit:—

As I was leaving the room, Mr. Gladstone was announced, and Lord Dalhousie told me to stop and said he would introduce me to him. I expected that the conversation would turn on politics, but they at once began to talk of former days at the Board of Trade, recalling a porter who had since died, and a messenger who brought the wrong bag and paper on an occasion when the President had been summoned to discuss an important matter with the Prime Minister. I was amused and delighted to hear these two men discussing with such animation such petty details.

Many of his college friends came up to see him, and those who were unable to do so were not forgotten. To his old tutor he wrote describing himself as "a workman who had served his apprenticeship" under Temple, and to Dr. Vaughan, of Harrow, he sent a donation for the memorial aisle of the school chapel. Begging letters and appeals for the exercise of his influence proved an intolerable worry to him. He replied that he had sought and required retirement; but too often the appeal was renewed. On the other hand, his sympathetic

nature induced him to reply at length to a reference, dated the 23rd of June, 1856, from the Guardians of the Poor at Exeter, which was to the following effect:—

> The number of lunatics is fearfully on the increase in this city, and as so few are cured by the present system of treatment, it has been proposed to have recourse to mesmerism as a means of cure. As your Lordship's name is alluded to, we venture to ask whether Dr. Esdaile has been authorised to quote your Lordship as sanctioning the application of mesmerism in India, and whether you would advise its application to the case of lunatics in this country.

Lord Dalhousie replied that he had not authorised the use of his name, adding, however—

> Of the efficacy of Dr. Esdaile's practice of mesmerism in cases of lunacy I am not able to say anything. Of the efficacy of it in surgical cases I can speak with confidence. Dr. Esdaile undoubtedly did possess the faculty of so influencing the sensations of natives of India by mesmerism, as to reduce them to a state of insensibility not less complete than that which is now produced by chloroform. While they were in that state he performed surgical operations of every kind—many of them tremendous in their magnitude, duration, and severity. These operations were performed without any apparent consciousness of the patient, without pain and usually with success. I never witnessed any of these operations myself, but the testimony of many witnesses of the highest official position and character, both written and oral, was so strong, that even the evidence of my own senses could not have added to it. . . . I must not, however, be considered to be a disciple of the doctrines of mesmerism generally.

In one respect Lord Dalhousie obeyed the orders of his medical attendants. As a rule he refused to enter into correspondence upon official matters, and pleaded the state of his health as an excuse for not offering an opinion upon questions which were referred to him by the Court or by the Board. Yet even here he made an exception, feeling that his duty to his loyal subordinates

was a stronger obligation than regard for his own health. Mark Cubbon had lately, owing to his advocacy, been raised to the dignity of a Knight Commander of the Bath, but Dr. W. B. O'Shaughnessy, Mr. R. M. Stephenson, and Arthur Phayre, still remained without any recognition of their services. The first of these had successfully introduced the telegraph system into India, while Stephenson, who was the Managing Director of the East Indian Railway, had devoted his health and energies since 1840 to the cause of railway construction. The work done by Phayre in Pegu has already been fully described. The claims of these three officers had been rejected by the authorities at home, mainly because the first two were members neither of the military nor of the civil service, while Phayre's failure to negotiate a treaty with the King of Ava, a failure due to no want of skill or enterprise on his part, was alleged as the ground of his exclusion. Lord Dalhousie determined to renew his efforts, and obtained from the Court of Directors a copy of the correspondence which had passed in order that he might see the official reasons assigned for refusal and fight for what he believed to be justice. He then addressed the President of the Board in these terms:—

> Of those who had been officially recommended for some honour from the Crown, the names of Major Phayre, Dr. O'Shaughnessy, and Mr. Stephenson were altogether omitted. I had no means of knowing the reasons until I obtained a copy of the letter addressed to the Court of Directors.
>
> As H.M.'s Government were of opinion that the grant of C.B. to Major Phayre should depend upon the success of his negotiations with the King of Ava, and as a treaty was not obtained, it would be vain to urge his claims any further. But I presume to bring the names of Dr. O'Shaughnessy and Mr. Stephenson once more before you, because the consideration of the letter to the

Court of Directors has convinced me that their claims have been rejected by reason of misapprehension.

Lord Dalhousie then went on to controvert the argument officially put forward that "similar energy and similar skill have been displayed in England, and it has not been thought necessary to reward them with public honours." He showed by analogy that Mr. Rowland Stephenson had fully deserved the title of a knight bachelor which had been granted to Sir W. Telford, Sir Isambard Brunel, Sir W. Cubitt, Sir M. Wyatt, Sir John Rennie, and Sir John McNeill. The construction of the first railway in India was, he maintained, a political service of the highest value. The same considerations had made him recommend knighthood and also the decoration of C.B. for O'Shaughnessy, whose services were not inferior to those of Colonel Cautley. His letter ended with the sentence, "I entreat you, for the encouragement of public servants in India, to see justice done to the merits of these men to whom the Crown, not less than the Company, owes so much." To this representation a somewhat chilling answer was received, but in September Lord Dalhousie wrote from Arrochar to press his point, and eventually his recommendations prevailed.

Enough has been said to show that London was no place for an invalid who needed absolute rest and quiet. In August, therefore, Lord Dalhousie proceeded to Arrochar and took up his residence at the hotel. Mr. R. Napier of West Shandon, Gareloch, proposed to place his house at the disposal of his eminent fellow-countryman, but "this gratifying instance of real Scottish hospitality" was courteously declined. In November the Marquis of Lothian would have persuaded his neighbour to make his home at Newbattle so long as

Dalhousie Castle remained in the hands of the builders, begging him to "treat this as your own house, coming to breakfast and dinner or not just as may be most convenient." The time, however, had arrived when the doctors insisted upon having their patient immediately under their care, and Edinburgh was chosen as most suitable for the purpose. Residence there would also, Lord Dalhousie hoped, enable him as his health improved to give sittings to Mr. Steell for a statue which the people of Calcutta wished to erect as a memorial to the late Governor-General's administration. For this testimonial a large fund had been raised; and it may here be mentioned that the allotment of the surplus after the cost of the statue had been defrayed led to prolonged discussion after the mutiny. There was no difference of opinion as to placing the statue of Lord Dalhousie near that of the Marquis of Wellesley, nor in assigning a provision for scholarship in the Engineering College there. But there still remained the large sum of nearly 70,000 rupees. This balance Mr. Duff proposed should be spent upon a hall for the accommodation of committees, to be called the Dalhousie Institute, while Mr. Wylie advocated a public museum, Mr. Ritchie was in favour of a scheme for improving the buildings of the Engineering College, and the Agricultural Society pressed for the formation of a public garden. Eventually the erection of an Institute was preferred, and there the life-size statue of the Governor-General now stands raised on a marble pedestal.[1]

1857. The new year opened, as it was fated to end, with every circumstance of misery and distress. While Dr. Grant was writing to him, at Christmas, from Calcutta—

[1] The building was not completed until the year 1865.

"The condition of the leg seems very satisfactory; nature is slowly and surely working out the disintegration and renewal of the bone," Mr. Syme in actual attendance was obliged to have recourse to free incisions into that limb; and in addition to this the sufferer's throat and nose were "tormented." His letters to intimate friends [1] confess that "for all purposes of life I am quite useless," "incapable of resolution," "without any appetite and done." The advent of spring forced upon him the conclusion that he must "play the sunflower and follow warmth through the seasons." Anxiety about Lady Susan's health further urged a move south. He therefore proceeded first to London and thence to Malvern, being, as he remarked with some of his former humour, "shut out from visitors and rusticated to different quarters." A consultation with Sir Benjamin Brodie in August led to the belief that his health had somewhat improved, though it was at the same time decided that he must spend the winter at Malta. A voyage would at least save painful experiences of journeys by land, "as stairs and platforms are so many chains of mountains to me, and I shall have no more trouble than being put in at Southampton, and taken out at Malta, like any other heavy package." Accordingly, after returning for a few weeks to Edinburgh, where he gave sittings to Sir J. Watson Gordon for the portrait which now hangs in Government House, Calcutta, he sailed in September with his two daughters to Malta on board the S.S. *Indus*. There in a house facing the harbour of Valetta, and in full view of "the beautiful terraced gardens," he resigned himself to the

[1] Even to others he made the same confession; thus writing on the 1st of December, 1856, to Seton Karr, Lord Dalhousie said: "My progress is so slow and my condition such, that there is no probability of my return to public life, under any circumstances, for a long time to come, if ever."

absence of friends and visitors, waiting for the warmth to restore health to his body.

Until December, when a severe cold brought back many of his bad symptoms, his bodily ailments seemed to improve. But he was "sick and sore" at heart,[1] and with the exception of the terrible months of 1853 passed in Calcutta after receipt of the crushing news of his wife's death, there was perhaps no sadder period in his life than that spent at Malta during 1857 and 1858. For mail after mail brought him fresh tales of mismanagement and disaster in India, sometimes accompanied by reflections upon his administration, and at other times by appeals for his influence. It was all very well for the doctors to bid him keep his mind easy and not to worry himself about such matters. But this advice could not give calm to a brain already overwrought, and now freshly stimulated by the well-meant but unfortunate confidences poured into his ear by many of the chief actors on the stage of Indian history.

1858.

Of the character of such communications it is worth while to give a few specimens. Thus on the 7th of August, 1857, Cecil Beadon wrote a long account of General Lloyd's mismanagement at Dinapore, of the obstinacy and imprudence shown by the officer sent to relieve the garrison at Arrah, and of the panic at Patna which, despite the strenuous efforts of Money and Hollings, had led to the loss of eight lakhs of treasure at Gya. The burden of his letter was "Oh, for a dictator!"

[1] On the 24th of September, 1857, he wrote to Seton Karr: "I cannot write or speak, I can hardly bear to think of the horrible scenes that have been acted, and of the misery that has been and still is suffered by many for whom I entertained the warmest regard, and by the services which I so lately saw in the full sunshine of success and hopeful prospect."

"I don't think," he said, "we can restore our authority properly with less than 30,000 additional European infantry, 5000 cavalry, and as many artillery. As for our allowing Natives to touch one of our guns again, it is quite out of the question. England will retain India, but she must send us men and money, for our revenue for this year and the next is gone, and our credit is terribly shaken. If you had not annexed the Punjab, we should now be in a very much worse position than we are. Lord Canning has done everything in his power to send us reinforcements and keep things straight. But we want a dictator just now."

So gloomy a picture could not but awake bitter memories of the earnest and fruitless endeavour which Lord Dalhousie had made to secure an addition to the European force in India. The following letter from Halliday, dated the 24th of November, 1857, stirred up yet stormier feelings in his heart. For after dwelling upon the situation in Sambalpur, Chittagong, and other parts of Bengal, and condemning Lord Canning's policy, the writer allowed himself to touch upon a more exciting topic:—

"The strangest effect," he said, "of these occurrences in the English mind, is the sudden popularity they have given to the ill-weighed and exaggerated opinions of Sir Charles Napier, who, from being half-hero, has become whole prophet. Every military officer poured upon us by every ship has Napier's Life in his portmanteau, and is ready to show at a moment's notice how Lord Dalhousie caused the present insurrection by not taking Sir Charles Napier's advice, how the latter was brought to his grave by ill-treatment, and how, if he had lived, this mutiny would either never have happened, or would have been suppressed with a wave of the old General's beard. There are not a few who have anxiously wished you back in this perilous time."

In a similar strain wrote Captain Rennie: "There is universal regret that your hand is not at the helm, and your presence on the quarter-deck." To one of such

correspondents Lord Dalhousie replied briefly: "I am reluctant to criticise what has been doing on your side of the sea, and I have not been in a position to tell you anything from this side worth your hearing." To another who wrote to tell him of a rumoured change in the Executive Council he observed—

> I doubted and doubt the expediency of detaching Grant at this time from the Council Chamber—that is to say, if there must be a Council at such a time. For my own part I must say, and I hope no harm in saying it, that in such circumstances as those of the last four months I would rather (being Governor-General) have had all the burden on my own shoulders than divide with five other pairs.

With this single exception, if indeed it be one, I can find nothing in his letters which could be interpreted as suggesting any reflection upon his successor, or as giving countenance to the wish so often expressed by others that his hand had not been withdrawn from India during the mutiny.

Robert Montgomery only put on paper what others thought when he wrote to his late chief on the 9th of March, 1858, in these terms—

> I trust that the change of air and scene at Malta may be blessed to your recovery, and that your valuable life may be spared to do further good service to your country. Most truly did your annexation of the Punjab save India. How often myself and others have longed for your presence either in India, or at the head of affairs in England. Your experience, energy, and decision would in India have been above all price. The Almighty has indeed laid His hand heavily on this land; but all is now clearing up, and I trust that all will soon be well! You see how nobly Sir John Lawrence has behaved, and I must say that all the Punjab officers did well. I am compiling a report of what each officer did. You will see in it the names of nearly all the men you appointed, and most admirably have they acted.

Such a letter was no doubt gratifying to Lord

Dalhousie, but it was at least exciting; and when, on the 16th of June, 1858, John Lawrence appealed to him for help, the thought of his own impotency well nigh broke him down.

"I have not," ran this communication, "written to you much since the mutiny broke out, for I have had much to do; and I knew also that you were suffering. I think, however, that we are now at a stage in the crisis when I must not only write, but ask for the aid of your still potent voice. We are, I conceive, in great difficulties in India, and I do not think that our position is by any means known, nor appreciated at home. England has done much for us; but she should do more, if we are to recover our lost prestige and diminished power. The delay in sending out reinforcements in the first instance was very nigh fatal. As it was, it did us immense harm. It caused thousands to become compromised, who would otherwise have remained true. We have never recovered this mistake; and the policy which has hitherto been pursued has enhanced our difficulties. All the hell-passions[1] of our nature have been excited; it has been a war of extermination against mutineers, and in many instances even against insurgents. It has become to some extent a war of races. The consequence has been that we have an uphill part to play—a part which I may add is beyond our resources and our power. While denouncing vengeance on our enemies, we have let them slip through our hands on every occasion. At Delhi we had not the means of punishing them. At other places we have allowed them to escape. . . . Old and new Punjab troops together we have already 57,000 on my rolls, and more than 60,000 if we count all classes. More are required, but to raise more is very dangerous. We want more European troops from England. A good body of real light cavalry. We require a thorough change of policy. We want a discriminative amnesty, that is an amnesty which, excepting cold-blooded murderers, would allow all others to go and live at their homes in peace, provided they obeyed the law. We require also a man at the head of affairs with real

[1] The careful reader of the *Life of Lord Lawrence* will notice some slight variations from other versions in the letter as here printed. Since Lawrence's letter is here copied verbatim, I assume that the copy kept by himself contained the few verbal changes which have appeared elsewhere.

vigour and promptitude. A man who can see what is to be done with the twinkle of an eye; and seeing it, will have his own way. If a goodly body of troops can be sent out by October next, and a proper system of tactics be introduced, coupled with a policy of vigour combined with consideration, we shall yet do well. Otherwise it is difficult to see what may not occur; and I am quite certain that we shall not see the end of this rebellion for several years. People have no idea of our real position. Even as a question of finance, it is far better to spend money now, and by a vigorous effort beat down opposition, than allow it to extend over a series of years. . . . It is little use my writing to people in power in England. There I possess no influence. You, my lord, are differently situated. You have done great things for India. By coming forward now, and inducing the Ministry to act decidedly, you may be instrumental in saving this great empire to England. In one word, we want more European soldiers in India, and a Dictator."


This stirring appeal reached Lord Dalhousie at the crisis in his life. He had left Malta in May, and to the casual observer seemed to be thinner but more healthy in appearance. Soon after his return to London he proceeded to Malvern, where he was subjected to a course of active treatment which did him no good. His symptoms were described as "bad appetite, worse digestion, augmented general misery and depression, and abolition of locomotive power." Dr. Gully candidly warned him that "no treatment but that which gives tone to the nerves generally, and through them renews healthy blood-making, will avail. All the medicinal remedies in the world will not renew the tone or the nutritive fluid of the body." On the 17th of September, 1858, writing to Panmure from Edinburgh, Lord Dalhousie said—

Many thanks to you for the box of grouse which was reported to me as having arrived from you. Miserable man that I am, none of it profited me, for I have been for five days in bed, and

too ill to face grouse or any other living thing. I am sure you will be glad to learn that Sue, who suffered much all the summer, is greatly better, and continues to mend under Dr. Simpson's care.

Briefly referring to the ever-present anxiety of his mind regarding India, he added, "The situation is a very awkward one for both public and private interests." There, in reality, lay the root of his incurable disease. "Forget India," was the advice of his doctors, and the thought of India, past, present, and future, haunted his mind by day and night. He tried a change at Bournemouth, but derived little advantage from it, and at length decided to retire to his own castle and see what the "home cure" could do for him.

The alterations and additions to the castle, which had been planned by Mr. David Bryce of Edinburgh, were now completed, and it was no longer necessary to carry the sufferer up and down stairs. The room in which he henceforth passed his weary days was at the back of the castle, and looked out towards the church of Cockpen, in which he had attended service as a child, and in his journal recorded so regularly his impressions of the sermons there delivered. The stream in which he had first learnt to fish wound its tortuous course within sight of his windows, and the tops of the stately trees, as they bent beneath the fury of the winter storms that swept down the valley, awoke the memories of happy days spent with his parents on their return from Canada. There were sadder thoughts as he recalled the tragic scenes of his brother's death and the final breakdown of his father's health. But interests and occupations which he could find nowhere else filled up his time, and his mind was drawn off from his own ailments and public cares. During the year 1859 he



DALHOUSIE CASTLE, BONNYRIGG, MIDLOTHIAN.

[*Face p.* 406.

abandoned himself to these influences, and it pleased him to discover that Oliver Cromwell had spent Sunday, the 8th of October, 1648, and the following day within the walls of the old castle on his way from Edinburgh to Carlisle. His factor has kindly given me an outline of his recollections of these days in the following words:— 1859.

He took considerable interest in what was going on connected with the estate, and passed his time, when free from pain, in looking over and checking accounts. At that time I used to see him pretty often. He often remarked to me about the Indian mutiny that it was his firm belief that had he been well, and in India, this unfortunate calamity would never have taken place. He then thought he was in the way of getting better, but afterwards his spirits sank, and he declared that he was no better, and never would be. Lady Susan, too, required a great deal of nursing. In 1859 Lady Edith married Sir James Fergusson, and on that day Lord Dalhousie looked well, although he still had to wear crutches, and his noble appearance was striking.

The ceremony here referred to took place at noon on Tuesday, the 9th of August, in the library of the castle, the service being performed by the Very Reverend Dean Ramsay. The party present was restricted to the small circle of the nearest relatives of the two families and a few others, and it included the Marquis of Tweeddale, Mr. and Lady Louisa Wardlaw Ramsay, Lord John and Lady Julia Hay, Colonel William Maule Ramsay, Lady Dalrymple Fergusson, and the family doctor, Dr. Smith of Lasswade. There were six bridesmaids, of whom Lady Susan was one, and Lord Dalhousie was able to give away his daughter. The proceedings were arranged so as to spare him fatigue, and the bride and bridegroom left almost immediately afterwards by special train for Kilkerran. The tenantry and local magnates were entertained in the evening at the George Inn, Haddington.

1860. Before the year closed news was received of the murderous outrage committed by Waziri tribesmen upon Captain Mecham[1] of the Bengal Artillery, who had served upon the staff of Lord Dalhousie, and the intelligence brought fresh sorrow to the heart of his former chief. This event, and the inclement season of the year, robbed the patient of the advantages which he had seemed to derive from his quiet residence at the castle. He was also distressed at the account he received of the health of Lord Panmure. What he thought as to the benefits of the "home cure" may be judged by a letter written to his cousin in the summer of 1860 when he heard that he was returning from abroad.

> The waters have not given you, I fear, the relief they certainly have given to very many others; but it is quite possible their good effects may show themselves yet. Anyhow, you have done all that in you lay, and you are nearing home again—a blissful sight for a sick man, as I have cause to know. I grew better in town, but for the last three weeks I have had an odious attack, and I can hardly move or see.

As the year 1860 wore on, Lord Dalhousie became more and more unequal to any effort, and began to complain that the duties of Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports were too heavy for him. It will be remembered that his first public appointment was that of Captain of Deal Castle. This he resigned in 1847, and Earl Clanwilliam succeeded him. On the death of the Duke of Wellington he was appointed Lord Warden, and received intimation of the fact from Lord Derby in 1852. When his term of office in India was prolonged he tendered his resignation of the Wardenship, but the Earl of Aberdeen signified to him Her Majesty's pleasure that he should retain possession of it. Soon after his return to England

[1] See above, chap. i. p. 18.

it was decided to relieve the Lord Warden of most of his duties, as he had already been relieved of the salary of £375 a year which had formerly appertained to the post. The position of affairs at that time was thus described in a letter dated the 9th of April, 1857, which Lord Dalhousie wrote to the Secretary to the Treasury—

> The Wardenship, as their Lordships are no doubt aware, is an office of great antiquity, having existed certainly from the reign of the Conqueror, or, as many prefer to believe, since the more distant times of the Confessor. The great political importance and the extensive authority which once belonged to it have long since disappeared. Its emoluments have from time to time been withdrawn. Recent legislation has deprived it of its jurisdiction over the Cinque Ports pilots, and a Bill has lately been laid before Parliament which, by transferring the control of Dover harbour to the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty, will strip the Wardenship of some more of the few rags of authority which it still retains. If this Bill should pass, the Lord Warden will preserve only his admiralty jurisdiction, with certain functions connected with salvage commissioners. This jurisdiction, and the traditional dignity of the office, together with the right to the honour of a salute, will constitute the whole duties, authority, and privileges that will be left to the Warden of the Cinque Ports.

But the shreds of authority are often more troublesome than the full measure of it. In 1857 the War Office asked that the "Castle Hill Farm," an estate of some 250 acres at Dover, and certain quarters in the castle left vacant by the death of Mr. Jenkinson, late Lieutenant-Governor of Dover Castle, should be placed at their disposal for military purposes. This led in turn to the abolition of various subordinate offices and the posts of Captains of Archcliffe Fort and Moat's Bulwark, and a general reorganisation of the whole establishment. As usually happens, small details were overlooked by great departments of the State. The

chaplain of the debtors' prison at Dover, which used to be under the jurisdiction of the Lord Warden, received no notice of the termination of his salary; the clerical establishment had been removed, but certain payments had still to be made to the garrisons of the Cinque Ports; and finally, on the 27th of January, 1860, the War Office claimed the right to resume possession of Deal Castle on the ground that the building was needed for the accommodation of troops, "an important object of national defence." These and other matters of smaller moment connected with the Cinque Ports, gave rise to much troublesome correspondence; and in the autumn of 1860, Lord Dalhousie's life-long friend,[1] Sir George Couper, wrote to advise him to tender his resignation of the post. That he should have demurred to this advice was but one more proof of his devotion to duty. For his health had never permitted him to occupy Walmer Castle, nor had he ever enjoyed anything but the barren honour of being Lord Warden. The appointment had, however, been a mark of Her Majesty's favour; and since, when he once before offered to resign, he had been dissuaded by the Prime Minister from doing so, he now resolved to hold office so long as his health should enable him to discharge its duties.

In the spring of 1860 his spirits and general health improved so much under the influence of home life, that when the summer came he was able to pay his

[1] Sir George Couper was Comptroller of the Household to H.R.H. the Duchess of Kent, and a devoted friend of the Marquis of Dalhousie, whose father he had served as A.D.C. during the Peninsular war. Indeed, Lieutenant-General the Earl of Dalhousie presented his own sword to Captain George Couper, "his A.D.C. and friend, on the field of battle of Vittoria, June 21st, 1813," and at a later date a watch with the inscription "To his friend in arms. *Olim meminisse juvabit*," which are still preserved as heirlooms by Sir George Couper, Bart., K.C.S.I.

last visit to London. This unfortunately proved the signal for letters asking him to use his influence on behalf of the writers or their friends. To a near relative he was obliged therefore to reply on the 24th of July in these terms—

> I have no interest of any sort. The Court of Directors is gone. I am not a member of Lord Derby's or of Lord Palmerston's party. All the world knows that, as a public man, I am disabled for ever. I am no longer either formidable or valuable.

Shortly after writing this letter it became necessary for him to take further advice. His doctors did not at once agree as to his symptoms. His legs became swollen, his deafness increased, and his powers of utterance were impaired. Dr. Bruce Jones hesitated to adopt the more serious view taken by Dr. Stone and Dr. Jackson who suspected Bright's disease. On the 17th of September Dr. Stone replied in ominous language to a letter which Lord Dalhousie had written him on returning to Scotland—

> "I am gratified," he said, "to hear that the attack of giddiness and vomiting could be fairly ascribed by those who saw you to bile, for these are symptoms which often accompany complaint of the kidney, and the fear of their occurrence, with possibly attacks of faintness, made me anxious that you should not be alone with Lady Susan on the Continent."

It was not long before the possibility proved to be a reality. The patient began to have attacks of faintness, and lay unconscious sometimes for a few minutes and at other times for hours. But his powers of mind were spared long enough to enable him to rejoice in the birth on the 28th of September of a granddaughter, who was christened Susan Georgina.

From this time forward each fresh attack found the patient less able to bear it. But his gentleness and

piety triumphed over all his bodily infirmities. Colonel William Ramsay, known in the family as the Brigadier, he having held that rank at Gwalior when the contingent mutinied on the 14th of June, 1857, was his constant companion during these trying seizures, and to him, as he recovered consciousness, Lord Dalhousie always commended the care of his daughter. "I have never heard him complain once," was the remark of Colonel Ramsay, while Sir James Fergusson writes: "His sufferings and increasing weakness were borne with unfailing patience and resignation. His manly piety and trust in religion never varied." He treasured to the last a letter written on the 19th of October by the Duchess of Gordon—

> I am most deeply concerned to hear you are suffering so much, and wish I had been capable and permitted to minister to your comfort at this time. I know how much a word from Him, whose name is Love, can soothe a sufferer; and I venture to send you a little book which contains some passages well applied from the Word of Life, which may be lighter to hold in a weak and weary hand than anything near you. I trust that dear Susan and Edith will not suffer from their anxiety about you, and I earnestly pray that the Good Physician may be your healer for time and eternity.

The end came at last to the patient sufferer at 6.30 P.M. on the evening of Thursday, the 19th of December, 1860, when he passed away peacefully and unconsciously, in the forty-ninth year of his age. The impression which he left upon those who knew him is thus recorded in a letter, written on the 26th of August, 1903, by Admiral of the Fleet, Lord John Hay, G.C.B.—

> I have seen many men of high and low degree in all parts of the world in the course of a long life; but I have never known any one who so fulfilled my idea of a great man—so truthful, so straightforward, so utterly incapable of meanness, so religious

without fanaticism, so generous and kind-hearted, so determined without obstinacy. He was a great autocrat, yet the most thoughtful of all that tended towards the well-being of the masses.

It cannot be said that he was *felix opportunitate mortis.* For, though British supremacy had reasserted itself in India, the hour had not come when a dispassionate judgment could be pronounced as to the causes of the mutiny, and praise or blame be apportioned to those who in recent years had administered affairs in our Eastern empire. Confidence in our rule was rudely shaken, if only for a time; a heavy strain had been put upon our resources and courage; financial difficulties of vast magnitude still remained to be met; the fabric of organisation throughout the length and breadth of the peninsula had to be built up again almost from its foundations; ideas and beliefs were in the process of remoulding; the experience of the past dictated imperial precautions hitherto ignored or neglected. Such considerations, among others, were disturbing forces in the formation of public opinion at the time of Lord Dalhousie's death. Private feelings no less were fruitful of bias and prejudice. Scarcely a family in Great Britain but from it the mutiny had claimed a victim, and fortunate were they whose hearts did not rankle with some painful memory of ruthlessness enacted in the betrayal of those most fondly loved. Death of the bread-winner had brought poverty to many a home; careers had been marred by broken health; fortunes had been lost in the cataclysm which involved industry and enterprise. Well might the sufferers curse the cruel days of 1857! Nor was it matter of wonder that, so suffering, they should seek an outlet for their bitterness in the condemnation of those who, as they thought, were

answerable for the horrors of that outbreak. How small the discrimination shown in tracing effect to cause was seen in the conflict of opinion which for years raged round the question of the origin of the rebellion—a conflict which even to this day has not wholly died out. But whatever the difference of view on that point, there was unanimity in the demand for a scapegoat. And against whom should that cry go up more instinctively than against the great Proconsul who for nearly eight years had swayed the destinies of a country from which such evils had flowed? He had annexed vast territories, and those ignorant of the compelling causes at once assumed that such annexations had engendered all the mischief. He had introduced drastic reforms, and they who once acclaimed them now saw in their working the birth of hatred and distrust. He had fostered education of the masses, and here was the outcome. Granted the beneficence of his projects, why waste it upon a people which had now shown what place gratitude held in their natures? It mattered nothing that he had acted according to the dictates of duty, in conformity with the advice of those best fitted to advise, upon principles and analogy which elsewhere have proved sure and trustworthy guides of conduct. The mutiny was a sequel of his rule, and to judgments that did not pause for reflection, to outlooks narrowed by passion, to predilections and prepossessions, it was also a consesequence of that rule. There were of course many whose minds were not so warped, many whose knowledge of facts amply assured them that sooner or later the truth would emerge. But to stem the tide of condemnation which had set in no *apologia* would have been of any avail. No reasoned appeal for stay of judgment might then hope for patient hearing. The

few years of broken health and failing powers that remained to Lord Dalhousie were thus embittered by the consciousness that to the world at large the edifice which his care had raised was but a crumbling ruin, and that the revenge of time was one that he could never live to see. Yet the charges so recklessly thrown out, and so eagerly believed, were not for long to go unchallenged. With the subsidence of bitter passions, the Duke of Argyll's famous article in the *Edinburgh Review* for January, 1863, effectually swept away the misrepresentations of which Lord Dalhousie's memory had been the mark, and one cannot fail to regret that the following passages from it did not appear in time to cheer the spirits of him whose services to his country were so highly praised :—

> To Lord Dalhousie's policy in the Punjab, to the men he chose, to the forces he organised, to the people he conciliated, we owe in a very large degree the salvation of India. If it had been possible to carry into effect at once the policy he recommended in respect to the number and distribution of European troops in the Lower Provinces, it is not too much to say that there would have been no massacre of Cawnpore, and no abandonment of Lucknow. . . . When the records of our empire in the East are closed, Lord Dalhousie's administration will be counted with the greatest that have gone before it; and among the benefactors of the Indian people no name will have a better place than his.

This was followed two years later by Sir Louis Jackson's vindication of the Governor-General's policy; and now that the great healer has closed so many painful wounds, I may perhaps hope that the fresh sources of information from which this work has derived its chief value will enable his countrymen to form a juster appreciation of this distinguished statesman's claim to their reverence and regard.

Of obituary notices that of *The Times* in its issue for the 21st of December, 1860, characterised his plans as "admirable," and his administration as "splendid," but added that the history of it "must be read by the light of that bloody commentary of the rebellion which succeeded it." The writer of the article admitted that in "the wail of massacre" it was not easy to fix his place in history, and strangely selected as the most prominent feature of his character "his desire to carry public opinion with him." Yet this was the man who remained dumb before his critics, gave directions that his private papers should be kept sealed beyond the close of the century in which he laboured, and in the time of his strength and his controversies with Napier forbade his friends to undertake his defence in the columns of the public press. The same feeling which imposed reserve upon journalists manifested itself in the Houses of Parliament. The public services of the Governor-General were forgotten in the perilous crisis through which India had passed, and from which she had not wholly emerged. In opening the session on the 5th of February, 1861, the Queen had spoken of "the state of her Indian territories as progressively improving," and had expressed the hope "that their financial condition will gradually partake of the general amendment." But no one who took part in the debate upon the address dared to eulogise the administration of him who had so lately passed away. Indeed, when on the 8th of February the Government were questioned about the extravagance of the grant made by them to the Mysore family, the Secretary of State did not hesitate to characterise the views of Lord Dalhousie on that subject as "impolitic, harsh, and unjust"; and many months elapsed before a reaction set in against

the asperity of such expressions, and the voice of truth and reason triumphed over calumny and exaggeration.

Three commanding figures stand out in the annals of Indian history. The first of these, Warren Hastings, created the British administration of Bengal, and, having secured the safety of that foothold for the territorial expansion of the Company, taught his successors to build up empire in India. His penetrating judgment assured him that "nothing but attention, protection, and forbearance" would be needed to maintain "the solid fabric of the British power in the East." The second, the Marquis of Wellesley, conceived and created the political system by which the Native sovereignties lying outside British India were included in one empire of India under the control of the paramount power. Lord Dalhousie brought into harmony the work of his two great predecessors. He consolidated the scattered territories under the Company's direct rule, carrying the British frontier across the Indus and the Irrawaddy, and enlarged the sphere of foreign interests by throwing the ægis of British protection over Baluchistan, and entering into an alliance with Afghanistan. He removed formidable obstacles to the moral and material development of a continent, linking together British provinces by annexation of states, sweeping away phantom royalties, and connecting all portions of the empire by railways and telegraphs. He gave to the administrative system the shape which it still preserves, centralising imperial control over postal and other communications, but permitting freedom to the local administrations in other directions. By him were laid the foundations of the legislative assemblies and the departments of education. His reforming hand was checked in military affairs, but

after the mutiny statesmen adopted the staff corps, and other measures which his foresight had emphatically declared to be necessary. Whether he would have suppressed the rebellion at the outset, or even have averted it, must remain a matter of opinion. But history records the fact that while the cause of civilisation triumphed, the victory was won by the weapons placed in Lord Canning's hands by his predecessor. The influence of Lord Dalhousie's administration is felt to the present day in his works, while his simple piety, fearless devotion to duty, and silent endurance of obloquy and misrepresentation still inspire the public services[1] over which he presided, and for whose honour and reputation he was as jealous as he was for the traditions and lustre of the family of Ramsay.

His mortal remains lie under no stately dome of a national cathedral, nor in the precincts of any cemetery dedicated by a grateful country as the last resting-place of those who have consecrated their lives to its service. No pomp attended his funeral. On the 26th of December a few friends and relatives assembled in the dining-room of Dalhousie Castle to hear the solemn words of the Burial Service read by Dr. Cook of Haddington and Mr. Muir of Cockpen. Then, through storms of snow so violent that railway communication with Edinburgh was interrupted by them, the small party drove to the old churchyard of Cockpen, amongst them being the Lord Justice-General, Lord Mark Kerr, Viscount Melville, the Earl of Dalkeith, Lord Edward Hay, and Dean Ramsay. The pall-bearers were General James Ramsay, Colonel

[1] On the 30th of December, 1854, Lord Dalhousie wrote to a member of the Bengal Civil Service as follows: "Whatever I may have really accomplished in India has been effected by the never-failing and most able assistance of the services with which I have had the good fortune to be connected for now many years."

William Maule Ramsay, Colonel J. Ramsay, the Marquis of Tweeddale, Sir James Fergusson, Major Hay, Captain Young, and Mr. Caddell. The tenants on the estate carried the coffin to its resting-place in the family vault, and reverently laid it by the side of that of the Marchioness of Dalhousie. The vault is now sealed up, the churchyard is no longer used, ivy covers and supports the crumbling walls of the old church, and rank vegetation has grown up within the enclosure. But amid these scenes of ruin and decay two monuments tell in simple language the story of two noble lives. A cross erected by Lady Susan Ramsay briefly records the fact that her mother died at sea on the 3rd of May, 1853, aged thirty-six years, adding the beatitude—

> Blessed are the pure in heart,
> For they shall see God,

while to her father's memory the same loving and discriminating daughter erected a granite obelisk, recording simply the date of his birth, April the 22nd, 1812, and that of his death, December the 19th, 1860, with the inscription full of sure confidence and faith—

> They rest from their labours,
> And their works do follow them.

APPENDIX

PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS RELATING TO MATTERS REFERRED TO IN THIS BIOGRAPHY

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